Commonwealth v. Rutledge ( 2014 )


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    13-P-965                                              Appeals Court
    COMMONWEALTH   vs.   ROBERT RUTLEDGE (and sixteen companion
    cases 1).
    No. 13-P-965.         July 25, 2014.
    Firearms. Constitutional Law, Stop and frisk, Search and
    seizure, Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Protective
    frisk, Container, Exigent circumstances, Probable cause.
    Probable Cause. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.
    The defendants were charged with, inter alia, numerous
    firearms offenses. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the
    defendants' motions to suppress a firearm seized after a
    warrantless search of a backpack following an investigatory stop
    of a motor vehicle. The Commonwealth appeals, contending that a
    preliminary patfrisk of the backpack was not necessary as a
    prerequisite to the search. We affirm.
    1. Background. After an evidentiary hearing on the
    motions, the judge found the following facts. On July 13, 2011,
    a 911 operator in Brockton received a call from Roseangela
    Andrade. She explained to the operator that, while on the
    telephone with her boyfriend, she overheard an argument erupt
    between her current boyfriend and her former boyfriend, Jaemill
    Horton. Andrade further reported that, during the argument,
    Horton allegedly pulled a gun on her boyfriend, threatening to
    kill him if Andrade refused to drop her pending charges against
    Horton. Andrade advised the operator that Horton drove a black
    Acura automobile, with registration number "749-GH7." Initial
    1
    Seven against Robert Rutledge and nine against Jaemill
    Horton.
    2
    dispatch to the scene of the alleged altercation returned
    nothing.
    After following up with Andrade, officers determined that
    the vehicle was an Infiniti, with registration number "759-GH7,"
    and that Horton had an active matter pending in the Taunton
    Division of the District Court Department. At that time, the
    police initiated a general broadcast advising the officers to
    look for a black Infiniti, explaining that a gun had been pulled
    and threats made in connection with a pending court case.
    Officer Michael Minnock heard the general dispatch, but did
    not respond to the area. A little over an hour later, Minnock
    spotted the suspect vehicle and observed its occupants making
    furtive movements. Minnock activated his emergency lights and
    siren and stopped the vehicle. At that time, Horton, who was
    driving, exited the vehicle. In response, Officer Minnock
    exited his cruiser, drew his firearm, and ordered Horton to get
    back into the vehicle. Horton, however, did not comply. The
    front seat passenger, Rutledge, also exited the vehicle and was
    ordered to reenter. Instead, both Horton and Rutledge fled the
    scene. A third passenger, Christopher Dozier, remained in the
    vehicle. Minnock broadcast the description of the fleeing men;
    he ordered Dozier out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed
    him in the back of the police cruiser. Although officers later
    apprehended Horton, Rutledge remained at large.
    Officers Minnock and Rodenbush performed a search of the
    vehicle, looking for a firearm in and around the seats and
    consoles; none was located. They discovered a backpack on the
    right rear seat. They opened the backpack and found a firearm
    and other items identifying Rutledge as its owner.
    Both Rutledge and Horton moved to suppress the firearm
    seized from the warrantless search of the backpack. The judge
    allowed the motion, ruling that the officers first needed to
    perform a preliminary patfrisk of the backpack before executing
    a search. The Commonwealth appeals the judge's order.
    2. Discussion. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to
    suppress we accept, absent clear error, the motion judge's
    subsidiary findings of fact. We independently review the
    judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law. See
    Commonwealth v. Scott, 
    440 Mass. 642
    , 646 (2004). There was no
    error.
    3
    This case is controlled in material respects by reasoning
    set forth in Commonwealth v. Pagan, 
    440 Mass. 62
    , 68-70 (2003).
    "The purpose behind the protective measures allowed by Terry is
    to enable an officer to confirm or dispel reasonable suspicions
    that the stopped suspect may be armed with a weapon." Id. at
    68. These measures are limited to what is "minimally necessary
    to learn whether the suspect is armed and to disarm him once the
    weapon is discovered." Id. at 69. While ordinarily a patfrisk
    of a container will be sufficient to make this determination,
    there are times when a patfrisk is inadequate. In all cases,
    though, "[w]here a patfrisk can establish whether a possible
    weapon is present or not, courts have required a preliminary
    patfrisk of the container in question." Ibid.
    The Commonwealth raises numerous reasons why the officers
    did not need to perform a preliminary patfrisk of the backpack,
    none of which is availing. The contention that a patfrisk would
    only reveal to the officers that the backpack contained a hard
    object goes to the essence of the pat-frisk principle. If the
    preliminary patfrisk revealed such information, the officers
    would have done the minimum necessary to establish whether a
    weapon was inside the backpack. Had a patfrisk not revealed the
    presence of a hard object, no additional search of the backpack
    would be warranted.
    Next, the Commonwealth argues that a patfrisk of the
    backpack was pointless because it would only reveal that the bag
    contained indiscernible heavy objects. We recognize that
    "particular features of the container, readily observable by the
    police, may make it apparent that nothing short of opening the
    container will suffice to address the officer's reasonable
    suspicions." Pagan, supra at 72. In such cases, the minimum
    search necessary would invariably involve opening the container.
    See id. at 69. In this case, however, there was no such
    descriptive testimony. The officers did not testify to the
    weight of the backpack, or that the backpack contained hard
    objects, or anything else that would have proved a preliminary
    patfrisk useless. Contrast id. at 63 (officers testified that
    backpack contained "heavy objects" and weighed approximately six
    pounds); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
    461 Mass. 616
    , 618 (2012)
    (officer testified that he picked up a heavy backpack and felt
    what he believed to be a gun barrel).
    The Commonwealth's argument that an exigent circumstance
    existed is too speculative. Contrast Commonwealth v. Robinson,
    
    83 Mass. App. Ct. 419
    , 430 (2013) (in the "rapidly deteriorating
    situation" the officer faced, bypassing a preliminary patfrisk
    4
    of the defendant's fanny pack was warranted). Here, the
    attendant circumstances did not deprive the officers of the
    opportunity to perform the preliminary patfrisk of the backpack.
    Compare Commonwealth v. Flemming, 
    76 Mass. App. Ct. 632
    , 638
    (2010) (where the defendant was cooperative and did not make any
    threatening moves, there was no reason not to perform a
    patfrisk); Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 
    85 Mass. App. Ct. 134
    ,
    135-136 (2014) (officer pat frisked a backpack before searching
    it after observing ammunition and a hunting knife in the
    defendant's vehicle, and after the defendant said, "Wait, there
    is a loaded gun in the bag").
    Lastly, the Commonwealth argues, for the first time on
    appeal, that the search of the backpack was justified because
    the officers had probable cause to arrest Horton. We do not
    reach the merits of this argument, as it was not raised below.
    See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    79 Mass. App. Ct. 124
    , 131 (2011)
    (Wolohojian, J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v.
    Bettencourt, 
    447 Mass. 631
    , 633-634 (2006) (arguments not raised
    below by the Commonwealth in connection with a motion to
    suppress are not considered on appeal as a basis for reversal).
    Order allowing motions to
    suppress affirmed.
    Michael Sheehan, Assistant District Attorney, for the
    Commonwealth.
    Sarah E. Dolven for Robert Rutledge.
    Kirsten A. Zwicker Young for Jaemill Horton.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC 13-P-965

Filed Date: 7/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024