State Police Association of Massachusetts v. Alben ( 2020 )

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19-P-210 Appeals Court
STATE POLICE ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS & others1 vs. TIMOTHY
ALBEN2 & another.3
No. 19-P-210.
Suffolk. November 1, 2019. - May 1, 2020.
Present: Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ.
State Police. Practice, Civil, Declaratory proceeding,
Standing. Declaratory Relief. Arbitration, Collective
bargaining, Police. Police, Collective bargaining. Public
Employment, Collective bargaining, Police. Labor, Public
employment, Collective bargaining, Failure to pay wages,
Overtime compensation.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 19, 2015.
A motion to reinstate the complaint, filed on June 28,
2018, and motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were heard
by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and entry of final judgment was
ordered by him.
1 Timothy Gillespie, Justin Joyce, and Daniel Sullivan.
2 Individually and in his official capacity as
Superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police.
3 Thomas P. Glynn, individually and in his official capacity
as chief executive officer of the Massachusetts Port Authority.
2
Stephen G. DeNigris for the plaintiffs.
Howard R. Meshnick, Assistant Attorney General, for Timothy
Alben.
Joseph M. Kaigler, Sr., for Thomas P. Glynn.
SULLIVAN, J. The plaintiffs, the State Police Association
of Massachusetts (union) and several individual State troopers,
appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court dismissing
their claims for overtime pay against two Massachusetts State
Police (State Police) and Massachusetts Port Authority
(MassPort) officials.4 The plaintiffs' claims for damages and
declaratory relief were dismissed after an arbitrator ruled that
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State
Police and the union provided for payment for detail work at a
lower rate than the CBA required for overtime work. At issue is
whether the State troopers were entitled to overtime pursuant to
G. L. c. 149, § 30C, which mandates time and one-half pay for
overtime work by State troopers, or whether they were
permissibly paid the detail rate set forth in the CBA. We
conclude that G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d) (i), requires that the
contractual pay rate for detail work takes precedence, and we
affirm.
4 The complaint named the defendants in both their official
and individual capacities. Because all of the allegations in
the complaint concern only actions taken by the defendants in
their official capacities, we refer throughout to Alben as
"State Police," and to Glynn as "MassPort."
3
Background. At all relevant times, MassPort contracted
with the State Police for police services at Logan International
Airport (airport). See G. L. c. 22C, § 30 ("The colonel shall
enter into an agreement with [MassPort] for police service to be
provided by the department at . . . [the] airport"). State
Police Troop F provided State troopers who worked at the
airport.
The State troopers in Troop F were represented by the union
for purposes of collective bargaining with the State Police.
The union and the State Police are parties to the CBA that
included, in relevant part, an article on overtime,5 an article
on detail work,6 and a grievance process culminating in
arbitration. Pursuant to an agreement between the State Police
and MassPort, Troop F State troopers were paid directly by
MassPort for overtime work at the time the complaint was filed.
MassPort and the State Police subsequently amended their
5 Article 8, § 2(D), of the CBA stated that, "[i]f duty
requires an employee to work beyond the normal quitting time of
his/her scheduled tour of duty, he/she shall be deemed to have
performed overtime service for each hour or fraction thereof."
The CBA obliged the employer to pay such overtime "at the rate
of time and one-half [a trooper's] regular hourly pay."
6 Article 30 of the CBA addressed "paid details" and
referenced a "circular letter" that the parties to the CBA were
authorized to amend by agreement. At the time the complaint was
filed, the parties' most recent memorandum of agreement on paid
details required the State Police to "increase the detail rate
from $40.00 per hour to $44.00 per hour effective February 1,
2014."
4
agreement in June, 2018, to return Troop F to the State Police
payroll, and to have MassPort reimburse the State Police for the
costs of State Police services at the airport.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Attorney
General's office alleging that the State Police and MassPort
were in violation of various Massachusetts wage and hour laws
because the State Police had paid the individual plaintiffs at
the lower "detail pay" rate provided in the CBA, rather than the
time and one-half overtime rate provided in G. L. c. 149, § 30C.
On May 6, 2015, the Attorney General's fair labor division
issued letters to the individual plaintiffs "authorizing [them]
to pursue this matter through a civil lawsuit immediately."
Thereafter the plaintiffs filed the present complaint. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated G. L.
c. 149, § 30C, by failing to pay State troopers time and one-
half their normal hourly rate for "overtime detail work."7 The
7 General Laws c. 149, § 30C, provides, in relevant part:
"The service of all . . . uniformed members of the state
police . . . shall consist of an average of forty hours per
week over a period of one or more work weeks not in excess
of eight, as determined by the commissioner of the
department in which they are . . . serving, and shall be
restricted to not more than five normal work days, as so
determined, in any consecutive seven-day period; provided,
however, that all services in excess of the normal work
day, as so determined, or in excess of forty hours per
week, as so averaged, rendered by any such officer at the
request of the commissioner of the department in which he
is serving, shall be compensated for at the rate of one and
5
complaint sought declaratory relief and damages. Both
defendants promptly moved to dismiss. The Superior Court judge
granted the motions to dismiss without prejudice as to the
counts against the State Police and the count for damages
against MassPort, ruling that the parties should submit the
grievance to arbitration under the CBA, and that the arbitrator
should rule in the first instance.8 The judge stayed the portion
of the complaint that sought declaratory relief against
MassPort.
The plaintiffs filed for arbitration. The arbitrator ruled
that the grievance was not substantively arbitrable. He
concluded that the State Police Colonel had the nondelegable
authority to assign State troopers to detail work as opposed to
overtime work.9 He also concluded that the negotiated rate for
detail work was binding, and that he lacked the authority to
change it, "because [t]he parties' [CBA] and past practice
clearly provides for different rates of pay for private details
and overtime work." The arbitrator declined to reach the issue
whether the CBA violated State wage and hour laws, concluding
one half times the regular hourly rate of such officer for
every hour or fraction thereof of such services rendered."
8 The parties have not challenged this aspect of the judge's
ruling, and we express no opinion on it.
9 The plaintiffs do not challenge this aspect of the
arbitration award.
6
that whether the parties' "contract terms and past practice
violate Massachusetts [l]aw is a matter that is not within the
scope of the parties' [CBA], and must be adjudicated in the
judicial forum."
The plaintiffs then moved to reinstate the complaint. The
Superior Court judge allowed that motion and also allowed the
State Police's motion to dismiss and MassPort's motion for
summary judgment. The judge concluded that under G. L. c. 150E,
§ 7 (d) (i), the CBA superseded any contrary provision in G. L.
c. 149, § 30C.
Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to
dismiss de novo." Massachusetts State Police Commissioned
Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 219, 221 (2012),
quoting Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676
(2011). "We accept as true the allegations in the complaint and
draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff."
Id., quoting Curtis, supra. Similarly, "our review of a motion
for summary judgment is de novo." Murray v. Hudson, 472 Mass.
376, 384 (2015), citing Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College, 461
Mass. 707, 711 (2012). For purposes of summary judgment, we
accept as undisputed the arbitrator's factual findings, and
treat his interpretation of the contract as final and binding.
See Pittsfield v. Local 447 Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 480
7
Mass. 634, 637-638 (2018).10 Any remaining material facts
presented are undisputed, and the appeal presents a question of
law.
1. Private right of action. The State Police and MassPort
contend that there is no private right of action to challenge
violations of G. L. c. 149, § 30C, because the Attorney General
alone is authorized to enforce that section. The plaintiffs
maintain that a private right of action may be inferred and
that, in any case, the Attorney General conferred a right of
action on the plaintiffs by issuing "right to sue" letters.
General Laws c. 149, § 2, provides that "[t]he attorney
general shall, except as otherwise specifically provided,
enforce the provisions of this chapter, and shall have all
necessary powers therefor." In analogous circumstances we have
held that no private right of action exists under G. L. c. 149,
§ 30B, which addresses overtime pay for Commonwealth employees
who are not State troopers. Tortolano v. Lemuel Shattuck Hosp.,
93 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 779 (2018). In Tortolano, supra, we
noted that § 30B made no reference to a private right of action,
"Because of a strong public policy favoring arbitration,
10
judicial review of an arbitrator's award is limited in scope.
We may not pass on an arbitrator's alleged errors of law or
fact." Board of Higher Educ. v. Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n,
NEA, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 47 (2004), citing Higher Educ.
Coordinating Council/Roxbury Community College v. Massachusetts
Teachers' Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council, 423 Mass. 23,
27 (1996).
8
unlike, for example, G. L. c. 149, § 150. We reasoned "the many
express private rights of action in c. 149 demonstrate that the
Legislature knows how to confer a private right of action when
it so intends, and the c. 149 provisions are a strong indication
that no further private rights of action should be inferred."
Tortolano, supra. For the same reasons, we conclude that there
is no express or implied private right of action in G. L.
c. 149, § 30C. See Tortolano, supra at 778-781. The Attorney
General may not confer by letter a private right of action that
the Legislature has not authorized. See id. at 780.
The plaintiffs contend that they nevertheless have standing
to bring a declaratory action pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, because
"[a] plaintiff may seek the equitable remedy of declaratory
relief . . . even if the relevant statute does not provide a
private right of action." Service Employees Int'l Union, Local
509 v. Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 335 (2014).
The issue of standing to bring a declaratory judgment action is
a complex question. A party may not perform an "end run" around
a legislative determination to foreclose certain remedies by
seeking declaratory relief. Id. at 336. Further complexities
may arise where a party asserts associational standing. See
generally id. at 333-337. However, even were we to assume,
without deciding, that one or more plaintiffs had standing to
9
bring a declaratory judgment action under G. L. c. 149, § 30C,
their claims would not succeed.
2. Rate of pay. The plaintiffs contend that G. L. c. 149,
§ 30C, requires payment at the overtime rate of time and one-
half, notwithstanding the arbitrator's ruling that the CBA
provided for voluntary details to be paid at the lower detail
rate.
The Commonwealth has a "strong public policy favoring
collective bargaining between public employers and employees
over the conditions and terms of employment." Board of Higher
Educ. v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 483 Mass. 310,
319 (2019), quoting Somerville v. Somerville Mun. Employees
Ass'n, 451 Mass. 493, 496 (2008). The Commonwealth also has a
strong interest in enforcing its own statutes. These public
policies are embedded in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), which
explicitly delineates the dividing line between the
Commonwealth's interest in collective bargaining and its
interest in setting certain conditions of employment by statute.
See Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Office
& Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 6, 441 Mass. 620,
625 n.13 (2004). "General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (d), provides that,
with respect to matters within the scope of negotiations under
G. L. c. 150E, § 6, the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement prevail over contrary terms in certain enumerated
10
statutes." Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd.,
470 Mass. 563, 572 (2015).
Among those enumerated statutes is G. L. c. 149, § 30C.
See G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d) (i) ("the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement shall prevail" over "sections thirty to
forty–two, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty–nine").
The language of G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d) (i), is clear and
unambiguous. See Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465
Mass. 134, 138-139 (2013). Consequently, under G. L. c. 150E,
§ 7 (d) (i), the CBA governs, not G. L. c. 149, § 30C. As a
matter of interpretation of the CBA, the arbitrator's
determination that the detail rate of pay applied is conclusive;
the CBA as interpreted prevails over any arguably conflicting
provision of G. L. c. 149, § 30C, regarding the rate of overtime
pay.11 The State Police did not violate G. L. c. 149, § 30C, by
paying the detail rate in accordance with the CBA, rather than
at the time and one-half rate provided in the statute.12
11Because we conclude that G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), provides
that the terms of the CBA prevail over G. L. c. 149, § 30C, we
find it unnecessary to decide whether the paid details at issue
would be paid as overtime at a time and one-half rate under that
statute in the absence of the CBA.
12By extension, MassPort did not violate G. L. c. 149,
§ 30C, regardless of whether it is considered a joint employer
of the State troopers who worked at the airport. Consequently,
we decline to reach the issue whether MassPort was a joint
employer prior to June 1, 2018, when the State Police and
11
The plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the real issue is
whether G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), applies in perpetuity, or
whether the durational limit for CBAs in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a),
also limits the time that a CBA will prevail over a conflicting
statute under § 7 (d). The plaintiffs "did not raise this
argument [below] and have therefore waived it on appeal."
Charles v. Leo, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 336 (2019). However,
"[i]f we were to reach the merits, we would disagree." Id. See
Quazi v. Barnstable County, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 780, 783 n.2
(2007).
The plaintiffs rely on Boston Hous. Auth. v. National
Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162
(2010), for the proposition that "[t]he unambiguous language of
G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a), reveals a clear legislative intent to
limit the term of a CBA to not more than three years." The
plaintiffs contend that the three year limit of § 7 (a) governs
not only the duration of a CBA, but also the length of time that
the CBA may prevail over an inconsistent statute enumerated in
§ 7 (d).
MassPort amended their agreement to require that the State
Police pay State troopers assigned to Troop F directly.
12
This argument misses the mark.13 General Laws c. 150E,
§ 7 (a), has been amended in such a manner as to negate the
conclusion reached in the Boston Hous. Auth. case. There the
Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether an "evergreen clause" -
- that is, language in a CBA that continued the terms and
conditions of a CBA after its expiration -- was valid under a
prior version of G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a). Boston Hous. Auth.,
458 Mass. at 162. At that time the statute read, in pertinent
part, "[a]ny collective bargaining agreement reached between the
employer and the exclusive representative shall not exceed a
term of three years." Id., quoting G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a), as
then in effect. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that
evergreen clauses were invalid under the statutory language then
in effect, because public employers and unions were limited by
the plain meaning of the three-year durational limit of § 7 (a).
However, the Legislature abrogated the central holding of Boston
Hous. Auth. the following year, when it amended G. L. c. 150E,
§ 7 (a), to expressly permit public employers and unions to
negotiate enforceable evergreen clauses. See G. L. c. 150E,
13 Carried to its logical conclusion, the plaintiffs'
argument would prohibit parties to a CBA from negotiating
successive CBAs carrying forward terms and conditions of
employment that implicate any statue enumerated in G. L.
c. 150E, § 7 (d). This result would be at odds with the plain
language of § 7 (d).
13
§ 7 (a), as amended by St. 2011, c. 198, § 1.14 The CBA at issue
here contains such an evergreen clause, but more importantly,
detail and overtime pay provisions in the CBA have remained in
effect in successive CBAs at all points material to this
litigation. Consequently, we reject the plaintiffs' contention
that G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a), limits to three years the duration
that the CBA will prevail over G. L. c. 149, § 30C.
Conclusion. We conclude that the detail rate of pay in the
CBA prevails over any contrary provisions in G. L. c. 149,
§ 30C. See G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d) (i). Payment at the detail
rate negotiated by the parties in the CBA therefore does not
violate the overtime provisions of G. L. c. 149, § 30C.
Accordingly, the judge did not err in allowing the State
Police's motion to dismiss and MassPort's motion for summary
judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
14General Laws c. 150E, § 7 (a), as amended by St. 2011,
c. 198, § 1, now reads, in pertinent part:
"Any collective bargaining agreement reached between the
employer and the exclusive representative shall not exceed
a term of three years; provided, however, that the employer
and the exclusive representative through negotiation may
agree to include a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement stating that the agreement's terms shall remain
in full force and effect beyond the [three] years until a
successor agreement is voluntarily negotiated by the
parties."