Dracut v. Dracut Firefighters Union, IAFF Local 2586 ( 2020 )

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19-P-14 Appeals Court
TOWN OF DRACUT vs. DRACUT FIREFIGHTERS UNION, IAFF LOCAL 2586.
No. 19-P-14.
Middlesex. November 7, 2019. - May 1, 2020.
Present: Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ.
Arbitration, Collective bargaining, Authority of arbitrator,
Fire fighters, Judicial review. Contract, Collective
bargaining contract, Arbitration. Labor, Arbitration,
Collective bargaining, Fire fighters. Municipal
Corporations, Collective bargaining, Fire department.
Public Employment, Collective bargaining. Fire Fighter.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
February 6, 2017.
The was heard by Joshua I. Wall, J., on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Joseph G. Donnellan for the defendant.
Stanley L. Weinberg for the plaintiff.
SULLIVAN, J. The Dracut Firefighter's Union, IAFF Local
2586 (union), appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior
Court vacating an arbitration award in favor of the town of
Dracut (town). The award arose from a grievance filed after the
2
chief of the Dracut Fire Department (fire department)
implemented a new policy preventing on-duty firefighters
assigned to the east and west fire stations from attending union
meetings at the central fire station. The arbitrator found that
the chief's decision to impose a ban on travel by on-duty
firefighters to union meetings at the central fire station from
the east and west stations violated the parties' collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). The Superior Court judge vacated
the arbitration award on the ground that it exceeded the
arbitrator's authority by infringing on the nondelegable
authority of the chief. See G. L. c. 48, § 42; G. L. c. 150C,
§ 11 (a) (3). We reverse.
Background. We summarize the facts found by the
arbitrator, which are binding on a reviewing court. See
Pittsfield v. Local 447 Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass.
634, 637-638 (2018); School Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 469
Mass. 104, 105 n.3 (2014).1
The fire department is staffed twenty-four hours per day,
seven days a week. The union holds meetings on a monthly basis.
By necessity, these meetings are scheduled during a shift.
Prior to 1986, union meetings were held off-site, at bars or
1 The arbitrator summarized the witnesses' testimony in
these matters, and credited all of it. Where, as here, there
are no facts in dispute, we understand these to be the
arbitrator's findings.
3
restaurants. In 1986, the parties agreed that, in order to
ensure attendance at union meetings by members and union
officers assigned to work the shift when the meeting took place,
the union would be permitted to hold its meetings at the central
station, where the fire department's headquarters is located.
This agreement was memorialized in the parties' CBA, Article 20,
§ 2, which stated that "any meeting either special or regular
monthly meeting of [the union] will be allowed to be held at the
central station (Sta. 1). Scheduled (unless waived) at least
three days in advance with the Chief."
When the parties agreed to this language in 1986, the fire
department had two stations: the central station and the west
station. In 2000, the fire department opened a third station,
the east station. Article 20, § 2, remained in the parties'
successor CBAs, apparently unchanged, from 1986 through the
2015-2018 CBA.
From the time the parties agreed to Article 20, § 2, in
1986, until April 6, 2016, the practice of permitting
firefighters at the outlying stations (i.e., the west station
and the east station) to attend union meetings at central
station was consistent. Depending on the shift, each outlying
station had a single crew of two or three firefighters on duty.
Before leaving for the central station, these crews would call
the central station and report to the officer in charge that
4
they were ready to leave for the union meeting. The officer in
charge would then inform them if they needed to stay at their
assigned station due to "inclement weather or other public
safety considerations." If no such circumstances existed, each
crew drove the full complement of equipment to which it was
assigned to the central station for the duration of the meeting.
If any calls for service came in during the union meeting, crews
deployed from the central station. The same procedure was used
by crews at the outlying stations when they left their stations
to go to the central station for other activities, such as
inspections, memorial services, public relations activities,
training, drills, and for refueling. The chief's ban applied
only to union meetings, not the other activities.
On April 6, 2016, the chief informed the union that he
would no longer permit on-duty firefighters from the outlying
stations to attend union meetings at the central station. He
told the union's executive board that he was concerned about
potential delays in response times if crews departed from the
central station rather than from the outlying stations.
Specifically, he stated he was concerned about meeting the fire
department's goal of reducing response times to six minutes or
less, a goal which the fire department was meeting only 45.8% of
5
the time.2 The chief further suggested that the fire department
could work with the union to use videoconferencing technology to
permit firefighters from the outlying stations to participate in
meetings remotely.3 The chief did not apply this new rule to
inspections, memorial services, public relations activities,
training, drills, refueling, or like activities at the central
station.
The union filed a grievance alleging that the chief's new
policy violated Article 20, § 2, and the parties' past practice.
The union prevailed at arbitration and the town filed a
complaint in Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award. A
judge of the Superior Court concluded that the award intruded
upon the nondelegable authority of the chief to manage the fire
2 The chief cited a report prepared by an outside consultant
on fire department response times between January, 2015 and
October, 2015. During that period, the average response time
was 6.15 minutes, and 54.2% of responses came in over six
minutes. The report did not disaggregate response times from
individual stations or note whether any delay had been caused by
the circumstances at issue here, that is, where crews from
outlying stations responded from the central station.
3 The record does not contain the Local 2586's constitution
or by-laws, which would govern whether personal attendance at
union meetings was required at the time this case arose. We
recognize that since this case was argued, a global pandemic has
altered the manner in which many segments of society do
business. Whether union meetings may be conducted by video
conference is a matter of internal union governance, however, a
matter over which the town has no direct authority. See G. L. c.
150E, § 10 (a) (2) (prohibiting employer domination,
interference, or assistance "in the formation, existence or
administration of any employee organization").
6
department, particularly with respect to matters of public
safety. This appeal followed.
Discussion. This case calls upon us to balance numerous
competing policies. The fire department performs an important
public safety function, and response time is a matter of public
safety. By the same token, the Legislature has declared a
public policy in favor of self-organization and collective
bargaining. We conclude, under the unique facts of this case,
that the public safety interest expressed by this particular
policy is not so heavy as to warrant vacating the award on
either nondelegability or public safety grounds.
Because the public policy of the Commonwealth strongly
encourages both collective bargaining and arbitration, see G. L.
c. 150E, § 6; School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of
Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 758 (2003), a court may "vacate
arbitration awards only in rare, statutorily enumerated
circumstances." Pittsfield, 480 Mass. at 637. See G. L.
c. 150C, § 11. Among those circumstances are those in which
"[a]n arbitrator . . . intrudes upon decisions . . . left by
statute to the exclusive managerial control of designated public
officials." Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 477
Mass. 434, 440 (2017), quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Higher
Educ./Holyoke Community College v. Massachusetts Teachers
7
Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council/Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 79
Mass. App. Ct. 27, 32 (2011).4
The judge concluded that the arbitration award was not
entitled to deference because it ran afoul of G. L. c. 48, § 42,
which sets forth a fire chief's authority over the fire
department. The judge determined that the arbitrator exceeded
his authority by usurping the chief's nondelegable authority to
manage the workforce, and make decisions pertinent to matters of
public safety.5 He concluded that this dispute was one which the
4 We review the decision of the Superior Court judge de
novo. Pittsfield, 480 Mass. at 637.
5 In the course of his decision, the judge stated that the
arbitrator had "order[ed] the [t]own periodically to close two
of its fire substations so that firefighters stationed there
[could] attend union meetings." The arbitrator took care to
find that the CBA did not contain a per se rule, and that under
the parties' binding past practice, the chief retained the
authority to order firefighters to remain at the east or west
station in the event that public safety so required. Where, as
here, the parties have elected to resolve disputes through a
binding grievance and arbitration procedure, a reviewing court
may not engage in fact finding, and must be "considerably more
deferential [to an arbitrator's award] than even the abuse of
discretion or clear error standards applied to lower court
decisions." Pittsfield, 480 Mass. at 638. A reviewing court
does not review for actual or perceived errors of fact or law;
the arbitrator's findings and rulings are binding in the absence
of narrowly enumerated instances of fraud, corruption, certain
procedural irregularities, an award that exceeds the
arbitrator's powers, or a violation of a well-defined and
articulated public policy. See id. at 638-639; Boston v. Boston
Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 818 (2005); School
Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 293 (2000).
8
parties could not lawfully agree to collectively bargain or
arbitrate.
1. Nondelegability. The nondelegability doctrine has
evolved over time, and it is helpful to revisit its derivation
and its current application in order to determine its proper
contours in the case before us. Statutes such as G. L. c. 41,
§ 97A, and G. L. c. 48, § 42, defining the authority of police
and fire chiefs, respectively, were adopted long before
collective bargaining became a reality for all cities and towns
in 1974.6 With the enactment of G. L. c. 150E, collective
bargaining imposed new obligations on public sector employers,
and public policy questions born of the tensions between G. L.
c. 150E and other statutes defining the authority of public
officials ensued.7 This tension was particularly acute in the
context of public safety, most notably policing. See
Massachusetts Coalition of Police, Local 165, AFL-CIO v.
Northborough, 416 Mass. 252, 255 (1993).
6 See St. 1920, c. 591, § 27 (town fire chiefs); St. 1948,
cc. 540, 595 (town police chiefs); St. 1973, c. 1078, § 7,
effective July 1, 1974 (public sector collective bargaining).
7 We have focused on police and fire department statutes in
this opinion, but the doctrine has been considered in a number
of contexts. See generally Board of Higher Education v.
Commonwealth Labor Relations Bd., 483 Mass. 310 (2019) (citing
cases).
9
The Supreme Judicial Court addressed one aspect of these
tensions by adopting the nondelegability doctrine.
"Pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 6, public employers must
'negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
standards or productivity and performance, and any other
terms and conditions of employment.' However, from that
expansively defined category of mandatory bargaining
subjects, we have exempted certain types of managerial
decisions that must, as a matter of policy, be reserved to
the public employer's discretion. '[I]n instances where a
negotiation requirement would unduly impinge on a public
employer's freedom to perform its public functions, G. L.
c. 150E, § 6, does not mandate bargaining over a decision
directly affecting the employment relationship.' Local
346, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations
Comm'n, 391 Mass. 429, 437 (1984). See Boston v. Boston
Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 403 Mass. 680, 684 (1989);
Burlington v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 390 Mass. 157, 164
(1983); Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct.
172, 178–179 (1997). '[T]he inquiry has been directed
towards defining the boundary between subjects that by
statute, by tradition, or by common sense must be reserved
to the sole discretion of the public employer so as to
preserve the intended role of the governmental agency and
its accountability in the political process. Id. at 178.
'[T]he crucial factor in determining whether a given issue
is a mandatory subject of bargaining is whether resolution
of the issue at the bargaining table is deemed to conflict
with perceived requirements of public policy.' Greenbaum,
The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining Under Massachusetts
Public Sector Labor Relations Law, 72 Mass. L. Rev. 102,
103 (1987)."
Worcester v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180–181
(2002). In sum, the nondelegability doctrine is a judicially
created doctrine limiting the reach of G. L. c. 150E, §§ 6-7, in
those circumstances where public policy requires that a public
employer reserve certain personnel matters to its sole
10
discretion in order to preserve accountability to the public in
the performance of the essential functions of government.
The application of the nondelegability doctrine has most
recently been addressed in Board of Higher Educ. v. Commonwealth
Employment Relations Bd., 483 Mass. 310 (2019), in which the
Supreme Judicial Court explained and synthesized the development
of the nondelegability doctrine over the last several decades.8
That case teaches that we must balance two competing interests.
These interests are the "principle of nondelegability[, which
extends] only so far as is necessary to preserve the [pubic
employer's] discretion to carry out its statutory mandates"
(citation omitted), id. at 319, and the public policy favoring
collective bargaining. See G. L. c. 150E, § 6.
"The scope of a governmental employer's nondelegable
authority depends on 'the explicitness of the statutory
authorization under which [that] employer acts.'" Board of
Higher Educ., quoting Lynn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 182. "Where
. . . the employer acts 'under the authority of a statute or law
authorizing the employer to perform a specific, narrow function
or, alternatively, acts with reference to a statute specific in
8 The motion judge did not have the benefit of Board of
Higher Educ., 483 Mass. 310, at the time he rendered his
decision.
11
purpose that would be undermined if the employer's freedom of
action were compromised by the collective bargaining process,'
we will not enforce a conflicting provision in a collective
bargaining agreement." Id. at 320, quoting Lynn, supra at 180.9
In contrast, broad "'general grants of authority . . .' must
yield to the obligation to engage in collective bargaining"
where the ingredient of public policy is not so weighty. Id. at
319, quoting School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n,
388 Mass. 557, 565-566 (1983).
Like the statute in Board of Higher Educ., 483 Mass. at
320-321, G. L. c. 48, § 42, gives the fire chief authority over
his or her fire department in "broad [and] general" terms. The
fire chief "shall have charge of extinguishing fires in the town
and the protection of life and property in case of fire," has
the power to purchase and repair property and apparatus used by
the fire department subject to the approval of the select board,
shall have the powers and duties of an engineer, the authority
to appoint deputy chiefs, officers, and firefighters, and "may
remove the same at any time for cause and after a hearing."
G. L. c. 48, § 42. In addition the chief has "full and
9 One such statute is G. L. c. 32, § 16 (1) (a), which
grants fire chiefs the narrow and specific nondelegable
statutory authority to seek involuntary retirement of members of
the fire department for superannuation, disability, or
accidental disability. See Lynn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 184.
12
absolute authority in the administration of the department,
shall make all rules and regulations for its operation, [and]
. . . shall fix the compensation of the permanent and call
members of the fire department subject to the approval of the
selectmen." Id.
Where, as here, there is a broad grant of authority, "the
scope of exclusive management powers has been worked out 'on a
case by case basis.'" Board of Higher Educ., 483 Mass. at 319,
quoting Lynn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 177. "The list of factors so
fundamental to the effective operation of an enterprise as to be
exempt from mandatory bargaining requirements will of necessity
vary with the nature of the employer." Worcester, 438 Mass. at
181, quoting Local 346, Int'l Bd. of Police Officers, 391 Mass.
at 438. "[W]e ask 'whether the ingredient of public policy in
the issue subject to dispute is so comparatively heavy that
collective bargaining, and even voluntary arbitration, on the
subject is, as a matter of law, to be denied effect.'" Board of
Higher Educ., supra, quoting Lynn, supra at 178. See Burlington
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 390 Mass. 157, 164 (1983).
In conducting a case by case analysis, we have been
particularly sensitive to issues of public safety. See notes
10-14, infra. A policy that impacted response times in a fire
department could raise an important public safety issue. But as
presented in this case, the town has not demonstrated the
13
existence of a public policy of sufficient weight, or a core
managerial function of sufficient gravity, to warrant denying
effect to collective bargaining. The town permits on-duty
firefighters to leave the east and west fire stations to attend
events at the central fire stations for a variety of events
sanctioned by the chief. The chief's policy is directed solely
to attendance at union meetings.10 A policy this selective is
not "fundamental to the effective operation of an enterprise."
Worcester, 438 Mass. at 181, quoting Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of
Police Officers, 391 Mass. at 438. Nor does a policy this
idiosyncratic contain the ingredient of public policy so heavy
as to warrant overriding the right to self-organization
guaranteed under G. L. c. 150E, as discussed infra.
The town maintains, however, that the public safety
function of the fire department is simply too critical to allow
anything other than unfettered decision-making by the fire chief
regarding the deployment of personnel. The town relies on a
number of cases involving the nondelegable authority of police
chiefs. Leaving to one side whether the contours of the
10The union asked the arbitrator to decide not only whether
the chief's decision violated Article 20, § 2, of the CBA, but
to also find that the new policy discriminated on the basis of
union activity in violation of a separate provision of the CBA.
Having found that the policy violated Article 20 of the CBA, the
arbitrator did not reach the second issue.
14
nondelegability doctrine apply in the same manner to fire
departments as police departments,11 this is not a case about the
fire chief's authority to assign12 or transfer13 personnel, to
require mandatory overtime,14 or to make other decisions deemed
11See Worcester, 438 Mass. at 180-181; Chief of Police of
Dracut v. Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 502 (1970) ("What we have said
above may not necessarily apply to agreements covering employees
of other municipal departments").
12See Worcester, 438 Mass. at 183 (city not obligated to
bargain over assignment of police officers to enforce truancy
laws); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 403 Mass. at
684 (noting police commissioner's nondelegable authority to
assign one officer rather than two to marked patrol vehicle);
Burlington, 390 Mass. at 164 (exclusive managerial prerogative
to assign prosecutorial duties); Chief of Police of Dracut, 357
Mass. at 500-502 (police chief's statutory authority to assign
officers); Framingham v. Framingham Police Officers Union, 93
Mass. App. Ct. 537, 542-544 (2018) (transfer and reassignment of
police officers within exclusive managerial authority of police
chief); Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 52
Mass. App. Ct. 296, 300-301 (2001) (police commissioner not
required to bargain over temporary assignments to Boston police
department communications center); Taunton v. Taunton Branch of
the Mass. Police Ass'n, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 243 (1980)
(police chief's statutory authority to assign officers to
particular duties as matter of public safety); Boston v. Boston
Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 898, 899 (1980)
(police commissioner's nondelegable authority to make temporary
assignment).
13See Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 466
Mass. 210, 214-215 (2013) (police commissioner's nondelegable
authority to transfer officers between precincts); Framingham,
93 Mass. App. Ct. at 542-544.
14See Saugus v. Saugus Pub. Safety Dispatchers Union, 65
Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901-902 (2005) (police chief's exclusive
managerial prerogative to assign overtime shifts); Andover v.
Andover Police Patrolmen's Union, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 169-170
(1998) (police chief's authority to assign mandatory overtime);
15
essential to the effective operation of a public safety
department.15 This is a case about whether union officers and
members may attend union meetings, and is therefore more akin to
Local 2071, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Bellingham, 67 Mass
App. Ct. 502 (2006), S.C., 450 Mass. 1011 (2007) ("judgment must
be affirmed, for the same reasons articulated by the Appeals
Court"). There the town moved to vacate an interest arbitration
award ordering the adoption of twenty-four hour shifts. The
town had argued that public safety would be threatened by
twenty-four hour shifts, because responding firefighters could
be sleep deprived. After reviewing the public safety arguments,
Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 41 Mass. App. Ct.
269, 272 (1996) (police commissioner's exclusive "zone of
managerial authority" to assign mandatory overtime).
15See Massachusetts Coalition of Police, Local 165, AFL-
CIO, 416 Mass. at 257 (reappointment of police officer is
nondelegable managerial prerogative); Broderick v. Police Comm'r
of Boston, 368 Mass. 33, 41 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048
(1976) (police commissioner has authority to question officers
regarding some aspects of private conduct); Boston Police
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 367 Mass. 368, 371-372 (1975)
(police commissioner has nondelegable authority to require
officers seeking elective office to take leave of absence
without pay during campaign); Selectmen of Ayer v. Sullivan, 29
Mass. App. Ct. 931, 932 (1990) (reappointment of police officer
nondelegable); Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n,
29 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1990) (staffing levels, assignments,
uniforms, weapons, and definition of duties are nondelegable);
Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 220,
226-227 (1979) (police commissioner could not bargain away
authority to control weapons).
16
this court confirmed the interest arbitration award, holding
that shift hours were a "core" subject of collective
bargaining,16 and that "[t]o reserve to the sole discretion of
management a core subject of collective bargaining . . . on
public safety policy grounds requires a clearer showing that
public safety is being affected by the . . . proposal." Id. at
512.17 Similarly, the ability of union officers and members to
attend union meetings is at the core of the right to self-
representation. See G. L. c. 150E, §§ 2, 10 (a) (1)-(2).18 And
like Local 2071, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, a clearer showing
of a threat to public safety than the one made here is required
to impinge upon such a statutorily protected right. Were we to
16See Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 477 Mass.
at 440-442 (police commissioner's agreement to arbitrate
discipline by negotiating "just cause" provision does not
intrude on commissioner's nondelegable authority).
17Although not at issue here, we note that the "means of
implementing managerial decisions . . . may be the subject of an
enforceable provision in a collective bargaining agreement" even
if the underlying decision is reserved to management. Boston v.
Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 908,
citing School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388
Mass. 557, 563-564 & n.5 (1983). See generally Board of Higher
Educ., 483 Mass. at 321-322.
18 The Department of Labor Relations has concluded that "the
subject of on-duty officers' attendance at union meetings is
clearly [a] mandatory" subject of bargaining, where stations are
staffed on a twenty-four hour, seven days a week basis. Taunton
v. Taunton Branch, Mass. Police Ass'n, 7 M.L.C. 2133, 2136
(1981).
17
accept, on the record presented, that G. L. c. 48, § 42, imbues
the chief with nondelegable authority to preclude on-duty
firefighters working in fire stations staffed around the clock,
seven days a week, from attending union meetings, "we would be
hard-pressed to discern any limiting principle" to the chief's
nondelegable authority. Board of Higher Educ., 483 Mass. at
321.
2. Public safety. The town also contends that even if
collective bargaining over attendance at union meetings might be
permitted, the award violates an important public policy because
public safety would be endangered by a delay in response times.
This argument is overbroad. As the court noted in Local 2071,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 513-514, there
must be a clear showing that public safety will be affected.
That showing was not made in this arbitration. The new policy
does not prohibit on duty firefighters at the east and west
stations from attending inspections, memorial services, public
relations activities, training, drills, refueling, or like
activities at the central fire station. The recitation of facts
in the arbitrator's decision contained no basis for concluding
that there was a correlation between response times and
18
attending events at the central fire station.19 See id.
Additionally, under the arbitrator's award, the chief retains
his or her historical "discretion to decide based on
circumstances, on a given day, that firefighters should not
leave an outlying station to attend a [u]nion meeting." This
discretion, which the arbitrator found had previously been
exercised to keep all three stations fully staffed in instances
of "inclement weather or other public safety considerations,"
remains available to the chief or the officer in charge.
Conclusion. The fire department policy barring on-duty
union members and officers from attending union meetings at the
central fire station is not shielded from arbitrable review by
the nondelegability doctrine. The arbitrator found that the new
policy conflicted with the terms of the CBA. Resolution of
conflicts between a CBA and "the regulations of a fire chief or
other head of a fire department pursuant to chapter forty–eight"
is governed by G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d). Where, as here, a
dispute involves mandatory subjects of bargaining under G. L.
c. 150E, § 6, "the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
shall prevail." G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d). For the reasons
19The arbitrator's decision stated: "[The fire chief]
stated that when he compiled his reports on response times he
did not break it down by response times for each station, nor
did he know the times when a crew from [the east or west
station] was at Central Station when a call for service came
from one of the outlying stations."
19
provided, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court. A new
judgment shall enter confirming the arbitrator's award.
So ordered.