Commonwealth v. Eric Joseph Dickerson. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-156
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ERIC JOSEPH DICKERSON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a bench trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the
defendant, Eric Dickerson, was found guilty of assault and
battery on a police officer in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13D.
Dickerson appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
Background. We summarize the relevant facts in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). On September 22, 2018, Boston
firefighters approached Dickerson after receiving reports of a
male suffering a seizure at the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) Chinatown station. Dickerson and the
firefighters were having a verbal argument and Dickerson refused
to speak to anyone until the police arrived. After MBTA police
officers arrived and identified themselves, they and the
firefighters asked Dickerson whether he wanted medical
treatment. Dickerson repeatedly explained to the officers that
he was not suffering a seizure and was only sleeping. At this
point, the officers chose to eject Dickerson from the station
because he was yelling obscenities and acting disorderly.
Dickerson refused to leave the station, assumed a fighting
stance, threw a series of punches at one of the officers, spit
on the same officer, and began striking him on the head. The
officers subdued and handcuffed Dickerson, and, with the
assistance of onsite firefighters, led him out of the station.
During the removal, Dickerson was alleged to have struck one of
the firefighters with his boot.
Dickerson was arrested and placed in the rear of the MBTA
officers' vehicle. He was charged with assault and battery on a
police officer, injuring a firefighter, and assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot). The second count,
injuring a firefighter, was amended to assault and battery on a
public employee. At trial, Dickerson testified that he did not
recall anything after he entered the MBTA Chinatown station, as
he "blacked out." Dickerson did not cite a specific medical
condition to explain the blackout but did claim that he
previously had suffered a concussion and had experienced two
blackouts of shorter durations. Additionally, Dickerson
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testified that this incident occurred after he had worked an
eighteen-hour shift. Dickerson was convicted of assault and
battery on a police officer and acquitted of the other charges.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Dickerson
argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
sustain the conviction of assault and battery on a police
officer. He argues the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we determine
whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
(citation omitted). Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. After a review
of the record, we affirm the conviction because Dickerson never
provided notice of his intention to raise an issue of his mental
condition at the time of the incident, as required by Mass. R.
Crim. P. 14 (b) (2), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1626 (2019), and
failed to raise the affirmative defense of lack of criminal
responsibility through evidence presented at trial.1
1 Defendants in criminal case are required to provide the
Commonwealth with notice if they intend to assert the
affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Mass.
R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2). Here, Dickerson failed to provide the
requisite written notice. Of the five pretrial motions
Dickerson filed, none directly stated or indirectly alluded to
the defendant's intent to assert a lack of criminal
responsibility. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 124, 138
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The Commonwealth is required to "prove criminal
responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt only after there is
evidence presented of lack of criminal responsibility that is
sufficient to warrant a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.
Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 816-817 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.
Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 612 & n.5 (2010). A lack of criminal
responsibility defense "may be raised properly by the admission
of any evidence which, if believed, might create a reasonable
doubt concerning the defendant's criminal responsibility at the
time of the [crime]" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Mills,
400 Mass. 626, 627 (1987). "Although expert testimony is not
required to raise the issue of insanity, something more than the
defendant's own characterizations that he freaked out and lost
control is required" (citation and quotations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 425 Mass. 507, 516 (1997).
Here, Dickerson did not provide the necessary threshold
evidence at trial to indicate a lack of criminal responsibility.
Indeed, Dickerson did not articulate or suggest a lack of
criminal responsibility defense during the trial. Dickerson did
not produce medical records or opinions by lay or expert
(2018) (defendant showed intent to raise lack of criminal
responsibility by informing court before empanelment that he was
"seeking a murder two conviction . . . based on diminished
capacity" and "psychiatric testimony" would be introduced).
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witnesses to verify either his claimed concussion or history of
blackouts. Contrast Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794,
797 (2011) (defendant introduced evidence of long history of
mental illness through psychiatric testimony and corresponding
records); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 812-815 (1975)
(defendant presented lay witness' observations of defendant's
changed behavior and testimony by two psychiatrists). The only
evidence that tended to show Dickerson's lack of criminal
responsibility was his own testimony that he had suffered a
concussion at some unspecified time. Dickerson did not,
however, explain a connection between the concussion and claimed
blackout. See Commonwealth v. Santiago (No. 2), 485 Mass. 416,
427 (2020) (defendant failed to introduce any evidence
connecting claimed head injury to behavior on day of incident).
Simply put, this testimony was not enough. Although the
defendant is not required to present expert testimony, the facts
of this case do not provide sufficient evidence to indicate
Dickerson lacked criminal responsibility. Contrast Mills, 400
Mass. at 627 (defendant did not present expert witness but
instead established lack of criminal responsibility by facts of
case, including suicidal attitude and memory loss).
Finally, even assuming Dickerson presented sufficient
evidence to raise such a defense, the Commonwealth's evidence,
when viewed in its totality and in a light most favorable to it,
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sufficiently established criminal responsibility. Both officers
testified that Dickerson spoke to them, and that Dickerson made
several statements that indicated his awareness of the
circumstances and that he was speaking to public officials.
When asked if he required medical assistance by onsite police
officers and firefighters, Dickerson repeatedly responded that
he was not suffering a seizure and was only sleeping.
Dickerson's responses indicate he was oriented to time, place,
and persons. See Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 47-48
(1983).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Blake,
Englander & Walsh, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: March 31, 2023.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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