GEORGE BUTLER & Another v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF MATTAPOISETT & Others. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-463
GEORGE BUTLER & another1
vs.
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF MATTAPOISETT & others.2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs, Maureen and George Butler, are neighbors in
Mattapoisett (town) of the Inn on Shipyard Park, which is owned
by defendant Vintage 13, LLC, and operated by defendant Nils
Johnson (collectively, defendants). After complaining for years
about noise made by live music performances at the Inn, the
plaintiffs petitioned the town zoning board of appeals (board)
to enforce its zoning bylaws, arguing that the defendants had
changed the Inn to a nightclub, which no longer complied as a
preexisting nonconforming use. The board denied the petition.
The plaintiffs sought review of the denial in the Superior
Court, and also alleged that the noise constituted a nuisance.
1 Maureen Butler.
2 Nils Johnson and Vintage 13, LLC. The zoning board appeared at
trial but has not filed a brief on appeal.
After a jury-waived trial, a judge concluded that the
defendants' operation of the Inn did not constitute either a
change to the preexisting nonconforming use or a nuisance. The
plaintiffs now appeal, and we affirm.
Background. We draw the facts from those found by the
judge after the jury-waived trial, supplemented by the
documentary evidence.
The Inn is located at 13 Water Street and faces
Mattapoisett Harbor. Built as a tavern in 1799, it is one of
the oldest operating inns on the eastern seaboard. Throughout
most of its history, the Inn has offered lodging, food, drink,
and musical entertainment to the public.3
In 1967, the town enacted zoning bylaws for the first time.
Section 5.5 of the zoning bylaws designated as residential the
district where the Inn is located. Sections 3.1.1 & 3.1.2.1
provided that preexisting nonconforming uses may be continued,
except that a special permit would be required for "any change
of a nonconforming use or substantial extension of a
nonconforming use." When the zoning bylaws were enacted, the
Inn was owned by Irving Bookstein and offered public lodging,
food, drink, and musical entertainment with instruments that
were not electronically amplified.
3 At various points in its history, the Inn was called by other
names. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to it as the Inn.
2
Between 1978 and 2004, the Inn was owned by Mark Goddu.
During those years, musical entertainment increased. It was
offered three to five nights per week, until 1 A.M. On
weekends, the Inn was "raucous and loud," lines of patrons
waited outside to enter, and the music, which was electronically
amplified, could be heard outside.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs had patronized the Inn since the
1960s. In 1995, the plaintiffs purchased 11 Water Street, which
is adjacent to the Inn's property. In 2000, plaintiff Maureen
Butler purchased 9 Water Street, which is to the rear of 11
Water Street. Both 9 and 11 Water Street are separated from the
Inn building by a driveway that is about ten feet wide and leads
to a parking lot behind the Inn. In 2005, the plaintiffs moved
to 9 Water Street and began renting 11 Water Street to tenants.
While Goddu owned the Inn, the plaintiffs did not complain about
the music and noise.
In 2004, the Inn was sold to Anthony Clark and Michael
Galway, who operated an Irish pub on the premises until 2012.
It continued to feature electronically amplified music. At
first, the genre was Irish music, but eventually it transitioned
to feature more rock and roll. In response to noise complaints
from the plaintiffs, Clark and Galway installed sound-proofing
insulation on the wall closest to the plaintiffs' properties and
replaced windows on that side with small, porthole-style
3
windows. Clark also obtained a decibel meter and kept a log of
the readings; he tried to keep the volume of music at about
sixty-five decibels.
Beginning in 2012, defendant Johnson leased the Inn, and
then purchased defendant Vintage 13, LLC, which owned the Inn.
The Inn continued to offer lodging, food, drink, and live,
electronically amplified music, but the music was quieter than
it had been during Goddu's ownership. The genres of music now
included rock and roll, blues, rhythm and blues, and jazz at
Sunday brunch. The Inn's patrons, many of whom were in their
fifties or older, had decreased in number since during Goddu's
ownership, so that lines of patrons no longer waited outside the
Inn to enter. Even so, the plaintiffs complained frequently
about noise and music coming from the Inn: they made over three
hundred complaints to police and sent more than twenty letters
of complaint to town officials. Few people other than the
plaintiffs have complained about the Inn.
The plaintiffs requested that the town's zoning enforcement
officer enforce the zoning bylaws, arguing that the defendants'
use of the Inn had changed to a nightclub. The plaintiffs
requested that the defendants be ordered, among other things, to
"eliminate noise from the [Inn] which is audible to [the
plaintiffs] at their residence." After the zoning enforcement
officer failed to act on that request, the plaintiffs appealed
4
to the board. See G. L. c. 40A, §§ 8 & 15. The board held a
public hearing at which it considered information including
statements of residents in attendance, and then issued a
decision concluding that the defendants had not changed or
substantially extended the Inn's use, as compared to its use in
1967 when the town first adopted zoning bylaws.4
In 2016, the plaintiffs filed the Superior Court complaint
alleging, as relevant here, two counts.5 One count sought review
pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, of the board's decision,
alleging that the defendants had changed the use of the Inn and
substantially intensified its nonconformity, as defined in
§ 3.1.2.1 of the zoning bylaws. The other count alleged that
the defendants created a common-law nuisance by permitting noise
4 The plaintiffs also requested the zoning enforcement officer to
order the defendants to stop the use of the Inn for entertaining
customers who were not also lodgers or restaurant patrons. The
board found that there was "no evidence whatsoever" to support
the plaintiffs' claim that in 1967 the Inn provided
entertainment only to lodgers. The plaintiffs did not raise
that issue in their Superior Court complaint or on appeal, and
so we do not consider it.
5 In a third count, the complaint alleged that the noise coming
from the Inn was "obnoxious" in violation of § 2.8 of the zoning
bylaws. The plaintiffs had unsuccessfully made that claim to
the town's zoning enforcement officer and the board. On review
pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, the judge denied the plaintiffs
relief, interpreting the zoning bylaws to mean that § 2.8 did
not apply in the residential district where the Inn and the
plaintiffs' properties are located. The plaintiffs do not raise
the claim on appeal, and so we do not reach it.
5
pollution prohibited by 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10(1) (2001),
promulgated by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
In 2017, the plaintiffs' acoustical engineer conducted a
noise survey, which determined that
"the primary area of noise transmission from inside [t]he
Inn to the outside was the exit door to the handicap ramp
from the bar area, which exited into the alley directly
adjacent to the [plaintiffs'] property. Not only was noise
emanating through the door, but, whenever the door was
opened, which occurred frequently while music was being
played, noise levels at the property line increased
significantly."
In May 2018, the defendants added an enclosed, sound-
proofed vestibule to the Inn's rear door, at a cost of $16,000.
The vestibule substantially mitigated the volume of noise heard
outside the Inn, but did not eliminate it, particularly when the
door was opened.6
In May 2021, the judge conducted a ten-day, jury-waived
trial during which he heard testimony of more than twenty
witnesses, reviewed dozens of exhibits, and took a view of the
Inn.7 The exhibits included audio-visual recordings taken from
6 In March 2020, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Inn
substantially curbed its operations. Between then and the time
of trial, the Inn did not offer musical entertainment.
7 This complaint was tried with another complaint in which the
plaintiffs sought G. L. c. 40A, § 17, relief from the board's
issuance of a special permit for the defendants to renovate the
Inn's front porch. The judge affirmed the issuance of the
special permit. The plaintiffs do not appeal from that
judgment, and so we do not consider any issues pertaining to the
issuance of the special permit.
6
the plaintiffs' property that depicted the Inn's rear door, both
before and after construction of the vestibule, and reproduced
the sound coming from the Inn. They also included graphs
depicting decibel readings taken at the plaintiffs' properties,
both before and after construction of the vestibule. The judge
concluded that the defendants had not changed or substantially
extended the nonconforming use, and that the sound coming from
the Inn did not constitute a nuisance.
Discussion. 1. Change or substantial extension to
preexisting nonconforming use. Both the board and the judge
concluded that the defendants' use of the Inn did not constitute
a change or a substantial extension to the nonconforming use of
the property that existed in 1967, and therefore the defendants
were exempted by G. L. c. 40A, § 6, and § 3.1 of the zoning
bylaws from compliance with the zoning bylaws. The plaintiffs
argue that the judge's conclusion was clearly erroneous.
Like the judge, we give "substantial deference" to the
board's interpretation of the zoning bylaws. See Wendy's Old
Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of
Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 381 (2009). As to the facts found by
the judge after trial, we accept them unless clearly erroneous,
but review de novo his legal conclusions, including
interpretations of the zoning bylaws. See Shirley Wayside Ltd.
Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 475
7
(2012). Where, as here, "the board's decision is supported by
the facts found by the judge, it 'may be disturbed only if it is
based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable,
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.'" Perry v. Board of Appeal
of Boston, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 143 (2021), quoting Fish v.
Accidental Auto Body, Inc., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 355, 362 (2019).
Like the board, the judge applied the three-part test
enunciated in Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 351 Mass. 20, 23 (1966),
in analyzing whether the defendants' use of the Inn had changed
from how it was used in 1967. Under that test, we consider:
"(1) Whether the use reflects the 'nature and purpose' of the
use prevailing when the zoning by-law took effect" in 1967;
"(2) Whether there is a difference in the quality or character,
as well as the degree, of use"; and "(3) Whether the current use
is 'different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood'"
(citation omitted). Id. See also Cape Resort Hotels, Inc. v.
Alcoholic Licensing Bd. of Falmouth, 385 Mass. 205, 212 (1982).
The burden is on the defendants, as property owners, to prove
"the requisite similarity" between the present use and the
original nonconforming use. Almeida v. Arruda, 89 Mass. App.
Ct. 241, 244 (2016).
As to the first prong of the Bridgewater test, the judge
concluded that the defendants' use of the Inn reflected the same
nature and purpose as the use in 1967. In 1967, the Inn offered
8
lodging, food, drink, and musical entertainment to the public.
Except for the pause in its operations due to the COVID-19
pandemic, at the time of trial the defendants used the Inn for
the same purposes. We agree that the judge properly found that
the defendants met the first prong. See Almeida, 89 Mass. App.
Ct. at 245 (first prong met where addition of beer and wine
sales did not change nature or purpose of convenience store).
Contrast Cape Resort Hotels, Inc., 385 Mass. at 212-213 (use as
full-service resort hotel changed to "largest entertainment
complex on Cape Cod").
As to the second prong of the Bridgewater test, like the
board, the judge concluded that there was "no difference in the
quality or character or in the degree of use" of the Inn at the
time of trial as compared to in 1967. The judge found that, as
in 1967, at the time of trial the Inn was "still primarily a
restaurant and bar with musical entertainment." Therefore, the
second prong of the test was satisfied. See Almeida, 89 Mass.
App. Ct. at 246 (second prong satisfied where judge found that
beer and wine sales "would not predominate," but "operate as an
adjunct" to grocery sales). Contrast Cape Resort Hotels, Inc.,
385 Mass. at 213 ("lodging and meals have been supplanted as the
dominant business of the hotel by fully developed entertainment
facilities designed especially to attract crowds of young
people").
9
Under the third prong of the Bridgewater test, the judge
concluded that the defendants' use of the Inn was not different
in kind in its effect on the neighborhood than the Inn's use in
1967, because "[t]he evidence presented does not support the
conclusion that the music today is significantly louder, or more
of a disturbance to neighbors, than in the Bookstein era." In
doing so, the judge rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the use
differed in kind in its effect on the neighborhood because the
defendants presented music with electronically amplified
equipment, but in 1967 Bookstein presented singing accompanied
by piano.8 The judge concluded that the change in electronic
amplification did not result in a substantially different effect
on the neighborhood, because of other factors that reduced any
disturbance. Those included the vestibule that the defendants
built around the Inn's rear door in May 2018, the soundproofing
and smaller porthole windows installed on the side of the Inn
closest to the plaintiffs, and the music's ending by 12:15 A.M.
instead of 1 A.M. as it had during Bookstein's ownership. See
8 The judge's factual findings differed from those of the board
in one respect. The board found that "[l]oud, amplified musical
entertainment existed at the [Inn] in 1967." In contrast, the
judge found that in 1967, the Inn "offered singing, and sing-
alongs, with piano and acoustical instruments," but not electric
guitars or drums. We accept the judge's finding of fact, see
Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership, 461 Mass. at 475, and assume
for the purposes of our analysis that only acoustic, and not
electronically amplified, musical instruments were played at the
Inn in 1967.
10
Almeida, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 246-247 (third prong satisfied
where judge found that beer and wine sales would not affect
neighborhood traffic, litter, or safety in way different in kind
from current store). Contrast Cape Resort Hotels, Inc., 385
Mass. at 216 (entertainment complex generated "traffic and noise
problems wholly different" from prior use).
The plaintiffs fault the judge's application of the
Bridgewater test, 351 Mass. at 23, contending that he did not
conduct sufficient analysis under the test's second prong and
conflated it with the first prong. We are not persuaded. In
discussing whether under the third prong the defendants' use of
the Inn was "different in kind" in its effect on the
neighborhood, Bridgewater, supra, quoting Medford v. Marinucci
Bros. & Co., 344 Mass. 50, 60 (1962), the judge analyzed facts
that also pertained to whether under the second prong the
defendants' use was "differen[t] in the quality or character, as
well as the degree, of use," Bridgewater, supra, quoting Brady
v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 523 (1965).
Where the second and third prongs of the test are so similarly
worded as "different in kind" and "differen[t] in . . . quality
or character," we will not fault the judge for including fewer
facts in his analysis under the second prong. He did not have
to reiterate the same facts at every step of his analysis.
11
2. Nuisance. The plaintiffs argue that, in concluding
that they had not proven that the sound coming from the Inn
constituted a nuisance, the judge erred in several respects.
They contend that the judge made factual errors as to the
decibel levels of sound emitted from the Inn, and legal errors
in declining to apply the DEP noise pollution regulation and in
misapplying the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance," and that
those errors infected his conclusion as to nuisance. Because
the judge was the trier of fact, we accept his findings unless
shown to be clearly erroneous, and we give due regard to his
opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses, including the
plaintiffs' expert. Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423
Mass. 1402 (1996). We consider de novo the judge's rulings of
law.
The plaintiffs bore a "heavy burden" to prove their
nuisance claim. Rattigan v. Wile, 445 Mass. 850, 855 (2006). A
nuisance is "a substantial and unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of the property" of the plaintiffs. Id.
at 856, quoting Doe v. New Bedford Hous. Auth., 417 Mass. 273,
288 (1994). "Whether a nuisance exists is usually a question of
fact." Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 490
(1914). "The law of nuisance 'does not concern itself with
trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances of everyday
life in a civilized community.'" Rattigan, supra at 855-856,
12
quoting W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 88, at 626 (5th ed.
1984). Thus, a trier of fact may conclude that an annoyance
which is sporadic does not constitute a nuisance. See Saldi v.
Brighton Stock Yard Co., 344 Mass. 89, 95 (1962) ("sporadic"
escapes of cows from stockyard did not constitute nuisance).
Contrast Rattigan, supra at 863 (rejecting defendant's argument
that his various offensive activities intended to harass
neighbors were "sporadic"). Or a trier of fact may conclude
that a landowner's actions in substantially reducing an
annoyance rendered it no longer a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the neighbors' enjoyment of their property.
Cf. Rattigan, supra at 857-858 & n.15 (defendant could have
accomplished goals by storing portable toilets and landing
helicopter in area not immediately adjacent to plaintiffs'
property). See also Trenz v. Norwell, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 271,
276 (2007). See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 830
(c) (1979).
a. Computation of decibel levels. The plaintiffs argue
that the sound coming from the Inn constituted a nuisance
because it met the definition of noise pollution in DEP noise
policy 90-001. The plaintiffs' expert acoustical engineer
testified that the ambient noise level at the plaintiffs'
property was forty-nine decibels measured on an A-weighted scale
13
(dBA).9 He explained that an increase of more than ten dBA above
that ambient noise level, i.e., above fifty-nine dBA, would
constitute a violation of DEP noise policy 90-001.
The plaintiffs illustrated their expert's testimony with
thirty-four graphs depicting decibel measurements taken at their
property on various dates. Of those, five graphs depicted dBA
measurements taken after construction of the vestibule. The
expert testified that a line on each of those thirty-four graphs
labeled "Leq" depicted "roughly the average value" of sound.
The judge asked the expert:
THE COURT: "So let me just clarify. On each of these pages,
does it indicate somewhere what the ambient is?"
. . .
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT: "[N]o. . . . [T]his graph does not
specifically have a line where the ambient is. But, I
mean, if you look at the X axis, obviously, if the ambient
was 49 and the ten dB above is 59, you could probably just
eyeball, you know, and look at the –- "
THE COURT: "To see what the average is?"
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT: "Yes. Or you could see how many instances
above -- like 59 on this plot would be right about there."
THE COURT: "Okay."
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT: "So if you just draw a line across here,
you can see how many instances would be above . . . 59."
9 The plaintiffs' expert explained that he took decibel
measurements using equipment with an A-weighted scale, signified
as dBA, which is the unit of measurement referenced in DEP noise
policy 90-001. The plaintiffs' own equipment used a C-weighted
scale and could not be used to determine compliance with that
policy.
14
THE COURT: "I just didn't know if there was some -- if it
was spelled out on there, or if you're just looking at what
appears to be the average."
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT: "No. The MaDEP -- my determination of the
background at 10 dB is not on any of these graphs"
(emphases added).
The judge found that the combined decibel readings were, on
average, less than fifty-nine dBA, which is about the same as
the sound of normal conversation or an air conditioner.10 The
judge also found that the loudest sounds, generally audible once
or twice each night for very brief periods, averaged about
eighty-three dBA, which is about the same as the sound of a gas
lawn mower or leaf blower. From the video recordings depicting
the rear of the Inn during music performances both before and
after construction of the vestibule, the judge found that the
vestibule "significant[ly] lessen[ed] . . . the volume of music
outside the Inn." We have reviewed the exhibits, including the
five graphs depicting dBA measurements after the construction of
the vestibule, and, on each of those graphs, the line labeled
"Leq." We do not discern any clear error in the judge's
findings of fact. See Rattigan, 445 Mass. at 855.
The plaintiffs argue that the judge's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous because their expert did not testify to those
10At oral argument, the plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that
those readings spanned the period both before and after
construction of the vestibule.
15
averages, and thus the judge must have arrived at them by
looking at the graphs and "eyeballing only a selected number of
peaks." They contend that because decibels are measured on a
logarithmic scale, it would be impossible for the judge to
compute averages because he did not have the raw data, only
graphs depicting the data. On the contrary, the plaintiffs'
expert testified that the line labeled "Leq" on each graph
signified "roughly the average value," and suggested that the
judge "eyeball" the graphs to determine whether they depicted
readings above fifty-nine dBA. The plaintiffs did not meet
their "heavy burden" to prove nuisance, Rattigan, 445 Mass. at
855, by providing the judge with incomplete data and then
faulting him for interpreting the data as their expert
suggested.
The plaintiffs also contend that the judge's findings were
clearly erroneous because even a single reading above fifty-nine
dBA would violate DEP noise policy 90-001 and thus support a
finding of nuisance. We are not persuaded. As discussed above,
a fact finder has considerable discretion in determining whether
an annoyance constitutes a nuisance, see Rattigan, 445 Mass. at
859. The judge was not required to find that brief and
intermittent increases in sound when the Inn's vestibule door
was opened constituted a nuisance.
16
b. DEP noise pollution regulation. The plaintiffs argue
that the judge erred in declining to apply the DEP noise
pollution regulation, 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10 (2001), in
determining whether the defendants' use of the Inn constituted a
nuisance.11 That regulation provides that it "shall not apply to
sounds emitted during and associated with . . . parades, public
gatherings, or sporting events, for which permits have been
issued" (emphases added). 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10(3)
(2001).
Interpreting that language, the judge concluded that the
Inn was not subject to 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10(1) because
its music performances were "public gatherings" and its common
victualler's license authorizing it to present music constituted
a "permit" within the meaning of § 7.10(3). The plaintiffs
argue that the judge erred as a matter of law because the
categories of events listed in the regulation -- parades, public
gatherings, or sporting events -- implied that the exemption
applied to irregularly occurring, permitted events, not to an
ongoing business such as a bar or restaurant. We tend to agree.
11That regulation provides: "(1) No person . . . controlling a
source of sound shall willfully, negligently, or through failure
to . . . take necessary precautions cause, suffer, allow, or
permit unnecessary emissions from said source of sound that may
cause noise." 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10(1). Noise is defined
as "sound of sufficient intensity and/or duration as to cause or
contribute to a condition of air pollution." 310 Code Mass.
Regs. § 7.00 (2015).
17
"[W]ords are, at least in part, defined by the company they
keep" (citation omitted), Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miville,
491 Mass. 489, 495 (2023), and it is unlikely that "public
gatherings" in the regulation was meant to include patrons at
bars and restaurants.12
We need not definitively determine that issue, however. We
note that a determination that the defendants' use of the Inn
violated that regulation would not necessarily require a finding
that the use amounted to a nuisance. And, in any event, we
interpret the judge's findings to mean that he did apply DEP
noise policy 90-001 when he found that the music emanating from
the Inn did not, on average, exceed the fifty-nine dBA limit
dictated by that policy, and the loudest sounds, generally
audible once or twice each night for very brief periods,
averaged about eighty-three dBA. With those findings, the judge
implicitly found that the music was not "of sufficient intensity
and/or duration," 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.00 (2015), to violate
the DEP noise pollution regulation.
12Less convincing is the plaintiffs' argument that the music
performances could not be public gatherings within the meaning
of 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10(3) because the Inn is privately
owned, rather than being owned by a governmental entity. We
doubt that whether property is publicly or privately owned
controls the question whether an event held on the property
constitutes a public gathering within the meaning of the DEP
noise pollution regulation. The Inn is certainly a place of
public accommodation, see G. L. c. 272, § 92A.
18
c. "Coming to the nuisance." The plaintiffs contend that
the judge misapplied the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance,"
because he did not find sufficient facts as to the level of
noise in 1995, when the plaintiffs bought 11 Water Street. The
contention is unavailing. The judge found that the plaintiffs
had patronized the Inn since the 1960s, and that they did not
complain about noise from the Inn at any point during Goddu's
ownership, which lasted until 2004, even though the noise then
was louder and more raucous than under any other owner. The
judge properly considered that the plaintiffs' nuisance claim
was undermined by evidence that when they bought their
properties in 1995 and 2000, they were aware of the effect of
living near the Inn. See Escobar v. Continental Baking Co., 33
Mass. App. Ct. 104, 110 (1992). See also Stevens, 216 Mass. at
19
488 ("No one can move into a quarter given over to foundries and
boiler shops and demand the quiet of a farm").13
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Englander,
Grant & Brennan, JJ.14),
Clerk
Entered: April 19, 2023.
13The defendants' request for appellate attorney's fees and
costs is denied. "Although the . . . appeal is unsuccessful, it
is not frivolous." Perry v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Hull, 100
Mass. App. Ct. 19, 25 n.10 (2021), quoting Filbey v. Carr, 98
Mass. App. Ct. 455, 462 n.10 (2020).
14 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
20