Bristol Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc. ( 2023 )


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    21-P-1135                                             Appeals Court
    BRISTOL ASPHALT CO., INC., & another1 vs. ROCHESTER BITUMINOUS
    PRODUCTS, INC., & others.2
    No. 21-P-1135.
    Plymouth.       November 2, 2022. - April 28, 2023.
    Present:   Rubin, Englander, & Hand, JJ.
    "Anti-SLAPP" Statute. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss.
    Constitutional Law, Right to petition government. Zoning,
    Site plan approval, Wetlands. Municipal Corporations,
    Conservation commission. Massachusetts Environmental
    Policy Act.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    August 17, 2020.
    A special motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas F. McGuire,
    Jr., J.
    Michael S. Rabieh for the defendants.
    Brian M. Hurley for the plaintiffs.
    1   Edgewood Development Company, LLC.
    2 Albert Todesca and Paul Todesca, individually and as
    trustees of the Todesca Realty Trust.
    2
    HAND, J.   This case stems from a decade-long battle between
    the plaintiffs and the defendants over the plaintiffs' efforts
    to build a bituminous concrete plant on property in the town of
    Rochester's (town or Rochester) industrial zoning district.      The
    proposed plant was to be developed adjacent to an existing
    concrete plant operated by the defendants in the same district.
    Beginning in 2010 and continuing through 2020, the
    defendants opposed the plaintiffs' plans before local and State
    boards and administrative agencies and sought judicial review of
    the adverse decisions of those bodies in the trial court and in
    the Appeals Court.   The plaintiffs prevailed before every
    tribunal at every level.   The plaintiffs contend that the
    defendants' petitioning was merely an improper attempt to
    prevent business competition.   Accordingly, in August 2020,
    after the dust from the defendants' petitioning efforts had
    settled, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants in the
    Superior Court.   In their amended complaint they alleged
    violations of G. L. c. 93A, § 11 (count I), G. L. c. 93, § 4
    (count II), and abuse of process (count III).   The defendants
    responded that the plaintiffs' action was an improper attempt to
    chill their rights to engage in legitimate petitioning activity,
    and filed a special motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims
    3
    under the "anti-SLAPP"3 statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H.   Applying
    the augmented burden-shifting framework set forth in Blanchard
    v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 
    477 Mass. 141
    , 159-160 (2017)
    (Blanchard I), S.C., 
    483 Mass. 200
     (2019) (Blanchard II),
    modifying Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 
    427 Mass. 156
    (1998) (Duracraft), the judge concluded that the defendants, as
    the moving parties, made the required threshold showing that the
    complaint was based solely on their petitioning activity.    He
    also concluded, however, that the plaintiffs ultimately met the
    "high bar" required to defeat the motion by demonstrating that
    the defendants' petitioning activity lacked any reasonable basis
    in fact or law.   See Blanchard II, supra at 204.   Accordingly,
    the judge denied the defendants' special motion to dismiss.4      The
    defendants appealed that ruling under the doctrine of present
    execution.   See id. at 213 (doctrine of present execution
    applies to interlocutory order denying anti-SLAPP motion);
    3 "SLAPP" is an acronym for "Strategic Lawsuit Against
    Public Participation." Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp.,
    
    427 Mass. 156
    , 160 n.7 (1998).
    4 The defendants' special motion to dismiss included a
    motion, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. The
    judge allowed that motion as to so much of count III as alleged
    abuse of process based on administrative proceedings, and
    otherwise denied it. As far as we are aware, no separate
    judgment has entered as to that aspect of the plaintiffs' claim.
    In any event, the ruling is not part of the instant appeal, and
    we do not address it further.
    4
    Gillette Co. v. Provost, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 133
    , 136 (2017)
    (same).
    As we discuss below, the plaintiffs' amended complaint is
    based on three petitioning efforts by the defendants to block
    the plaintiffs' plans, including the defendants' appeals from
    the unfavorable results of each.    After careful review, we
    discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the judge's
    conclusion that the defendants' petitioning activity, in its
    entirety, "lacked any reasonable factual support or any arguable
    basis in law," Baker v. Parsons, 
    434 Mass. 543
    , 553-554 (2001),
    and that the defendants' special motion to dismiss was properly
    denied, see Blanchard II, 
    483 Mass. at 203
     (appellate court
    reviews "ruling for an abuse of discretion or error of law").
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    Background.   We summarize the facts drawn from the
    pleadings and the affidavits in the record before the judge.
    Benoit v. Frederickson, 
    454 Mass. 148
    , 149 (2009).
    1.    The parties.    The plaintiffs are Bristol Asphalt Co.,
    Inc. (Bristol Asphalt), and Edgewood Development Company, LLC
    (Edgewood) (collectively, Bristol parties).     In 2019 Bristol
    Asphalt was established to assist Edgewood and other related
    entities in obtaining the necessary permits for the bituminous
    concrete plant (proposed plant) on behalf of the proposed
    plant's developer, Lorusso Corporation.     Bristol Asphalt was
    5
    also incorporated to construct the permitted plant at a site
    located at 99 Kings Highway in Rochester (proposed site).
    The defendants are Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc.
    (Rochester Bituminous), and Albert Todesca and Paul Todesca,
    individually and as trustees of the Todesca Realty Trust
    (Todesca Trust) (hereinafter, we refer to the defendants
    collectively as the RBP parties).5   Rochester Bituminous owns and
    operates an existing bituminous concrete production facility at
    83 Kings Highway, the abutting parcel immediately south of the
    proposed site.   Previously, title to that property was held by
    the Todesca Trust, of which brothers Albert Todesca and Paul
    Todesca are the trustees.    Additionally, at different times Paul
    Todesca has served as a manager, officer, and director of
    Rochester Bituminous, while Albert Todesca has served as a
    "consultant."    Albert Todesca and Paul Todesca, as trustees,
    also owned two neighboring residential properties located on
    5 On appeal, the RBP parties argue that in considering their
    special motion to dismiss, we should separately consider each
    defendant's role and level of involvement in opposing the plans
    for the proposed plant. Because none of the defendants raised
    this need for separate consideration below, that argument is
    waived. See Trapp v. Roden, 
    473 Mass. 210
    , 220 n.12 (2015). We
    note that nothing prevents the discrete defendants from availing
    themselves of further motions to dismiss or for summary judgment
    on grounds other than the anti-SLAPP statute as this case
    progresses, although we express no opinion on the likelihood of
    success of any such motion.
    6
    Kings Highway; neither property abutted the site of the proposed
    plant or was within 300 feet of it.
    2.     The petitioning activity.   a.   Site plan approval.   The
    first category of petitioning activity addressed in the amended
    complaint concerns the RBP parties' challenges to the town
    planning board's approval of the site plan.6
    The proposed site was located in the industrial district of
    the town.    Under § IV(D)(1) of the town's zoning bylaws, as
    amended May 18, 2009, activities including "[m]anufacturing,
    industrial or commercial uses including processing, fabrication,
    assembly and storage of materials" were permitted by right in
    that district, provided that "no such use [was] permitted which
    would be detrimental or offensive or tend to reduce property
    values in the same or adjoining district."      The bylaws required
    that all new development of the size and cost contemplated by
    the proposed plant be subject to site plan review and approval
    by the planning board.     See Rochester Bylaws § XVI(1.1), as
    6 In his "corrected" affidavit submitted in support of the
    defendants' special motion to dismiss, Albert Todesca admitted
    that "we participated in the permit review process . . . [and]
    filed multiple . . . lawsuits and appeals" challenging the
    permitting for the proposed plant. In addition, the Todescas
    had an agreement with the abutters to the proposed site and
    other area residents whereby the Todesca Trust would fund all
    costs of the litigation opposing the site plan approval. The
    Todescas also admit that the Todesca Trust sponsored the citizen
    petitions discussed in part 2.c, infra.
    7
    amended June 9, 2003, and October 24, 2005.   In performing the
    required review for a use available as of right, the planning
    board's discretion was explicitly limited:    the bylaws provided
    that "[t]he Planning Board shall approve an application" if it
    found that the proposed development conformed with the bylaw, or
    if conformity could be achieved by compliance with "conditions,
    limitations and safeguards" imposed by the planning board.     See
    Rochester Bylaws § XVI(1.9)(3)(a), adopted February 27, 2002.
    The planning board's discretion to deny approval of an as of
    right use was limited to, as relevant here, circumstances in
    which the plan "[was] so intrusive on the needs of the public in
    one regulated aspect or another that rejection by the [b]oard
    would be tenable because no form of reasonable conditions can be
    devised to satisfy the problem with the plan."   Rochester Bylaws
    § XVI(1.3)(3), as amended October 24, 2005.
    Edgewood applied to the planning board for site plan
    approval for the facility in November 2010.   In May 2011, after
    nine public hearings on the application, the planning board
    approved the site plan.   In doing so, it concluded that the
    bituminous concrete plant was a use permitted as of right in the
    industrial district and that any defects in the plan as proposed
    could be remedied through the series of conditions the board
    imposed on, among other aspects of the project, the proposed
    8
    plant's compliance with State noise regulations and a traffic
    management plan.7
    The Todesca Trust, through trustee Paul Todesca, and
    several abutters and other neighbors of the proposed site,
    including tenants of the Todesca Trust (abutters), appealed the
    planning board's approval of the site plan to the town's zoning
    board of appeal (ZBA).   After a public hearing, the ZBA affirmed
    the planning board's decision.   Pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17,
    a subset of the abutters,8 including both Todesca brothers, as
    trustees, appealed the ZBA's decision to the Land Court.    A
    judge of that court granted partial summary judgment for
    Edgewood, rejecting the abutters' argument that the plant would
    generate noise levels so inherently "detrimental and offensive"
    as to take the plant out of the category of permitted uses under
    the zoning bylaws.
    7 The traffic-related conditions imposed by the planning
    board included a prohibition on truck parking on Kings Highway;
    installation of traffic signs; orientation of a driveway to
    accommodate increased traffic to the site; and distribution of
    rules for truck operation to all drivers, contractors, clients,
    and the planning board.
    8 Carol D'Acci, Michael D'Acci, Brandon Empey, Krystle
    Empey, Emma Galvin, Jeffrey Mason, Sean Somers, and Paul Murphy
    as trustee of the Willard Realty Trust. The named parties
    changed over the course of the litigation as tenants moved in
    and out of the residential properties near the proposed site.
    9
    Trial proceeded on the abutters' remaining claims,
    including that the proposed plant was a prohibited use under the
    zoning bylaws because the truck traffic and other harms
    associated with its operations would be "detrimental or
    offensive" and would tend to reduce the property values in the
    same or adjoining district; and alternatively, even if the
    proposed plant were a permitted use, that the request for
    approval of the site plan should be denied because "the
    [claimed] problem[s] [with the site plan] [were] so intractable
    that [they] could admit of no reasonable solution."   Prudential
    Ins. Co. of Am. v. Board of Appeals of Westwood, 
    23 Mass. App. Ct. 278
    , 283 (1986).
    The Land Court judge first rejected the abutters' challenge
    to the proposed plant's qualification as a permitted use on the
    grounds that "there is no evidence that [the] harms [on which
    the abutters' claims were based] are inherent in an asphalt
    plant use as opposed to any other industrial use."    In doing so,
    the judge found no evidence that the proposed plant "would be
    appreciably different, or more intense in character, than any of
    the existing industrial uses," including the larger and more
    intense bituminous processing use by neighboring Rochester
    Bituminous.   Next, the judge found no evidence from which she
    could find that the proposed plant would tend to reduce property
    values in the industrial district as a whole.   She then
    10
    considered and rejected the abutters' claims that even
    considering the proposed plant as a permitted use, the ZBA erred
    in approving the site plan because the predicted problems were
    "intractable" and "admit[ted] of no reasonable solution."
    Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 283.
    Both sides introduced evidence about whether the proposed
    plant's operation created new safety risks or was likely to
    result in traffic congestion on the adjacent roadway.    The judge
    noted, however, that the abutters' evidence -- their expert's
    testimony about the ability of trucks of a certain size to pass
    or travel abreast on the driveway of the proposed facility and
    the possibility that the "queuing" of waiting trucks could
    extend onto Kings Highway -- was based on "assumed facts
    provided by the Todescas and not on . . . proposed site
    conditions."9   Concluding that (1) the risks predicted by that
    expert were hypothetical and unlikely to be realized, and (2)
    any actual traffic concerns could be adequately resolved through
    the imposition of the planning board's reasonable conditions,
    9 Although, as we will discuss, certain abutters appealed
    from the Land Court judgment upholding the planning board's
    decision, no appeal was pursued from this aspect of the judge's
    decision. See D'Acci v. Board of Appeals of Rochester, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
     (2017).
    11
    see note 7, supra, the Land Court judge rejected the abutters'
    arguments10 and, after trial, dismissed their appeal.
    Three abutters funded by the Todesca Trust appealed the
    Land Court judgment to this court.    On April 24, 2017, we
    rejected their claims, agreed with the Land Court judge's
    reasoning, and affirmed the judgment in an unpublished
    memorandum and order pursuant to our rule 23.0.     See D'Acci v.
    Board of Appeals of Rochester, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
     (2017).
    In doing so, we concluded that the Land Court judge had
    correctly granted summary judgment on the issue of noise where
    the planning board's site approval was ultimately conditioned on
    Edgewood's conformance with State noise regulations, as
    evidenced by an air permit issued by the Department of
    Environmental Protection (DEP).11    See 
    id.
       We also agreed with
    10The Land Court judge's assessment of the likelihood that
    the risks predicted by the abutters' traffic expert would be
    realized relied on her weighing of conflicting evidence. It
    does not appear, however, that the abutters introduced any
    evidence to show that if the traffic problems they predicted did
    come to pass, the conditions imposed by the planning board could
    not address them. Although the abutters' expert opined that one
    of Edgewood's efforts to comply with those conditions -- its
    implementation of a "Temporary Truck Parking Plan" -- was
    "unworkable," there is no indication in the record that no
    "reasonable solution" was achievable.
    11The planning board's conditions also    required that to
    ensure compliance with the DEP regulations,    Edgewood (1) provide
    the zoning enforcement officer and planning    board weekly reports
    documenting ambient sound levels during the    first sixty days of
    the proposed facility's operations; and (2)    pay for the planning
    12
    the Land Court judge "that there [was] no evidence [that
    anticipated increased noise and truck traffic near the abutters'
    homes] [were] inherent to the [proposed] facility in particular,
    'as opposed to any other industrial use,' and that the by-laws
    do not contemplate prohibiting an industrial use in an
    industrial district solely because a nearby residential property
    owner would find it offensive or detrimental."   
    Id.
          Finally,
    we agreed with the Land Court judge that the abutters had
    produced no evidence to show that the proposed facility would
    cause property values across the industrial district to
    decrease, and that the abutters' argument relied on an incorrect
    interpretation of the bylaws.   See 
    id.
    b.   Conservation commission.   The second category of
    petitioning activity engaged in by the RPB parties arose from
    Edgewood's request for an extension of an order of conditions
    issued by the town conservation commission (commission).
    In December 2010, a month after it submitted its
    application for site plan approval, Edgewood filed, pursuant to
    the Wetlands Protection Act, G. L. c. 131, § 40, and the
    Rochester wetlands protection bylaw, a notice of intent with the
    commission.   The commission issued an order of conditions in
    March 2011, but due to delays in the site plan approval process
    board's retention of a noise monitoring consultant to submit
    ongoing reports three times annually.
    13
    (resulting, at least in part, from the unsuccessful appeals of
    the planning board's decision), Edgewood was required to file
    for an extension of the order in January 2018.   It did so, and
    the commission granted Edgewood a three-year extension.
    On June 26, 2018, Rochester Bituminous and three abutters
    (wetlands abutters) filed a certiorari action in the Superior
    Court challenging the extension.12   See G. L. c. 249, § 4.   The
    judge assigned to that case ruled against the wetlands abutters
    in July 2019, concluding that they had presented no evidence of
    any changes to the area that would require the rejection of or
    revisions to the original order of conditions, and nothing in
    the applicable statutes or regulations supported their arguments
    that either a new wetlands delineation or confirmation of the
    prior one was required.13   The wetlands abutters appealed from
    that judgment to this court; in 2020, we affirmed the judgment
    12The Bristol parties do not challenge the propriety of the
    wetlands abutters' attempt to seek review of the extension order
    in this manner, rather than through an appeal to the DEP. See
    generally Healer v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 714
    , 717-718 (2009) (discussing procedures for
    obtaining review of conservation commission orders).
    Accordingly, we do not address the propriety of their chosen
    path.
    13The judge noted that the wetlands abutters could have
    appealed from the commission's order at the time it was issued
    but did not do so. The judge also rejected several other
    arguments made by the wetlands abutters, none of which impacts
    our analysis and which we therefore do not explain in detail.
    14
    upholding the decision of the conservation commission to approve
    the extension order.14   See Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc. v.
    Conservation Comm'n of Rochester, 
    98 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
     (2020).
    c.   MEPA petitions.   The final category of petitioning
    activity to which the amended complaint refers was connected to
    the RBP parties' efforts to obtain review of the proposed
    facility under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, G. L.
    c. 30, §§ 61-62H (MEPA).    Although the proposed plant was not
    subject to such a review, the Todesca Trust nonetheless
    collected the signatures of twenty-one town residents and,
    through the trust's attorney, filed a citizen "fail-safe
    petition" in January 2018.15   The Executive Office of Energy and
    Environmental Affairs (EOEEA) issued an order in February 2018
    14Contemporaneously with these proceedings, a group of
    twenty town residents appealed the extension order to DEP and
    from there to the Office of Appeals and Dispute Resolution
    (OADR). The OADR concluded that nothing in the applicable law
    provided for an appeal to DEP and recommended that the DEP
    commissioner issue a final decision dismissing the appeal for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    After the commissioner adopted the recommendation, Albert
    Todesca appealed the final decision to the Superior Court, but
    ultimately voluntarily dismissed that complaint.
    15Under MEPA regulations, certain petitioners may seek a
    "fail-safe review" of a project that "does not meet or exceed
    any review thresholds" -- if specific requirements are met. See
    301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1) (2008). The petition submitted
    by the Todesca Trust's attorney was based on the contention that
    "[e]xtensive construction in the area" in which the proposed
    plant was sited would "amplif[y] impacts to the surrounding
    wetlands and the watershed."
    15
    concluding that the petition did not meet the regulatory
    requirements for MEPA review.    Undeterred, in January 2020, the
    Todesca Trust again recruited signatures and submitted, through
    its attorney, a second citizen petition in which it reiterated
    the same concerns on the same basis.     The EOEEA denied the
    Todesca Trust's second fail-safe petition on the grounds that it
    alleged "virtually identical facts" to the 2018 petition.
    3.    The present action.   On September 2, 2020, the Bristol
    parties filed a three-count amended complaint in the Superior
    Court alleging (1) unfair and deceptive acts and practices in
    the conduct of trade or commerce in violation of G. L. c. 93A,
    § 11; (2) conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in
    violation of G. L. c. 93, § 4; and (3) abuse of process.16       In
    that complaint, the Bristol parties contended that the RBP
    parties' efforts to block the development of a new concrete
    plant were nothing more than attempts to eliminate competition
    for their own existing concrete production business, and that
    the RBP parties had repeatedly misused the petitioning process
    to accomplish that goal.    The Bristol parties alleged that the
    RBP parties' challenges to its permitting efforts were
    "frivolous."    They further alleged that as a result of the
    unnecessary litigation and resulting delays, they had suffered
    16   The original complaint was filed on August 17, 2020.
    16
    nearly $12 million in lost profits and had incurred hundreds of
    thousands of dollars in legal fees.
    4.   The special motion to dismiss.   In response to the
    amended complaint, the RBP parties filed an answer and a special
    motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H.    The RBP
    parties argued that all the conduct about which the Bristol
    parties complained was protected petitioning activity, and that
    each of the requests the RBP parties made for review of
    Edgewood's permit applications was reasonable and reflected
    their legitimate concerns about the proposed plant.
    Additionally, the RBP parties contended that the Bristol parties
    could not show that they had been injured by the RBP parties'
    petitioning activity.
    After a hearing, the motion judge denied the RBP parties'
    special motion to dismiss.   In a concise written decision, the
    motion judge correctly applied the analytical framework we
    discuss in detail below, concluding that, while the Bristol
    parties' claims were based solely on the RBP parties'
    petitioning activity, the Bristol parties had met their burden
    of demonstrating that the petitioning activity was a "sham" that
    caused injury to the Bristol parties, and that the RBP parties
    were therefore not entitled to the protections of G. L. c. 231,
    § 59H.   This appeal followed.
    17
    Discussion.   1.   Overview.   "General Laws c. 231, § 59H,
    provides a procedural remedy -- the special motion to dismiss --
    for early dismissal of SLAPP suits, i.e., 'lawsuits brought
    primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
    rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
    grievances.'"   Nyberg v. Wheltle, 
    101 Mass. App. Ct. 639
    , 645
    (2022), quoting Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 147
    .    "SLAPP suits
    have been characterized as 'generally meritless suits brought by
    large private interests to deter common citizens from exercising
    their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing
    so.'"   Nyberg, supra, quoting Duracraft, 
    427 Mass. at 161
    .      In
    response to constitutional concerns and the difficulty of
    achieving the statute's legislative intent, see Blanchard I,
    supra at 143, the Supreme Judicial Court has built upon the
    analysis first laid out in Duracraft, 
    supra at 167-168
    , for
    analyzing an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss.    We pause
    briefly to review the requirements of this augmented Duracraft
    framework as it applies here.
    To prevail on a special motion to dismiss under § 59H, the
    special movants (here, the RBP parties) "must make a threshold
    showing through pleadings and affidavits that the claims against
    it 'are "based on" the petitioning activities alone and have no
    substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning
    18
    activities.'"   Fustolo v. Hollander, 
    455 Mass. 861
    , 865 (2010),
    quoting Duracraft, 
    427 Mass. at 167-168
    .
    If the special movants (here, the RBP parties) make that
    "first stage" showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmovants
    (here, the Bristol parties) at the second stage of the analysis
    to defeat the special motion by meeting the requirements of one
    of two analytical paths that the judge must consider
    sequentially.   See Nyberg, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 646.   The first
    path tracks the statutory language and requires a showing by the
    nonmovants (the Bristol parties) establishing "by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the [special movants (here,
    the RBP parties)] lacked any reasonable factual support or any
    arguable basis in law for [their] petitioning activity . . . and
    that the petitioning activity caused the nonmoving part[ies]
    'actual injury' -- i.e., that [their] petitioning activity is
    illegitimate" (quotation and citation omitted).   477 Harrison
    Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC, 
    477 Mass. 162
    , 168 (2017)
    (Harrison I), S.C., 
    483 Mass. 514
     (2019) (Harrison II).    The
    judge does not consider the defendant's motivation for engaging
    in the petitioning activities; "[r]ather, the relevant inquiry
    is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant's
    petitioning activity lack[ed] any objectively reasonable basis."
    Harrison I, supra at 173.   "Proving that the moving party's
    petitioning activity was . . . a sham presents a 'high bar.'"
    19
    Blanchard II, 
    483 Mass. at 204
    , quoting Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at
    156 n.20.
    If, and only if, the nonmoving party fails to make the
    showing required under the first path of this second stage, the
    judge must then consider the nonmovant's showing under the
    second stage's second path announced in Blanchard I.   If the
    judge reaches this level of the analysis, the nonmovants (here,
    the Bristol parties) are required "to establish, such that the
    motion judge can conclude with fair assurance, that [their]
    claim is not a 'meritless' SLAPP suit 'brought primarily to
    chill the special movant's . . . legitimate petitioning
    activities.'"   Harrison II, 
    483 Mass. at 518-519
    , quoting
    Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 160
    .
    Here, the motion judge determined that the RBP parties met
    their burden at the first stage, successfully shifting the
    burden to the Bristol parties.   He also concluded that the
    Bristol parties, as the nonmovants, prevailed at the second
    stage by proving by a preponderance of the evidence both that
    the RBP parties' petitioning lacked "any reasonable factual
    support or any arguable basis in law," Baker, 
    434 Mass. at
    553-
    554, and that the Bristol parties had suffered resulting
    20
    injury.17    We consider de novo the RBP parties' showing at the
    first stage, see Reichenbach v. Haydock, 
    92 Mass. App. Ct. 567
    ,
    572 (2017), but review for abuse of discretion or error of law
    the motion judge's ruling concerning the Bristol parties'
    showing at the second stage.      See Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 160
    ;
    Nyberg, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 646, citing Blanchard II, 
    483 Mass. at 203
    ; Reichenbach, supra at 572 n.14; Gillette Co., 91
    Mass. App. Ct. at 137.
    2.     Judge's analysis.   a.   First stage.   The Bristol
    parties do not dispute that their amended complaint was "'based
    on' [the RBP parties'] petitioning activities alone and [had] no
    substantial basis other than or in addition to [their]
    petitioning activities."18      Reichenbach, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at
    17Having decided the motion based on the second stage,
    first path, the motion judge properly did not reach the second
    path of the second stage.
    18We are unpersuaded by the Bristol parties' argument that
    because Rochester Bituminous was a business competitor, and thus
    engaging in petitioning activity of a kind different than that
    which the anti-SLAPP statute was intended to protect, G. L.
    c. 231, § 59H, should not apply. Though "[t]he typical mischief
    that the legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at
    individual citizens of modest means for speaking publicly
    against development projects," Duracraft Corp., 
    427 Mass. at 161
    , the statute as enacted "[does] not address concerns over
    its breadth and reach, and ignore[s] its potential uses in
    litigation far different from the typical SLAPP suit." 
    Id. at 163
    . Further, for purposes of the threshold determination, "[a]
    special movant's motivation for engaging in petitioning activity
    does not factor into whether it has met its threshold burden."
    Harrison I, 
    477 Mass. at 168
    .
    21
    572, quoting Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 
    437 Mass. 113
    , 122
    (2002).     We agree and conclude that the RBP parties met their
    threshold burden under the first stage of the augmented
    Duracraft framework.
    b.   Second stage.   The burden shifted to the Bristol
    parties at the second stage.      The motion judge correctly began
    with an assessment of the Bristol parties' showing under the
    first of the two second-stage paths and, concluding that they
    had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the RBP
    parties' conduct amounted to sham petitioning,19 allowed the
    motion.20    G. L. c. 231, § 59H.      See Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 159
    .    Considering each of the three aspects of the RBP parties'
    petitioning activity, we discern no abuse of discretion or error
    in the motion judge's conclusion.
    i.   Site plan approval.   A.    Claims based on noise levels
    and decrease in property values.        The RBP parties' noise-based
    challenge to Edgewood's site plan approval was based on evidence
    predicting that the proposed plant would raise noise levels at
    The motion judge concluded that the RBP parties'
    19
    petitioning was "based on arguments that either conflicted with
    governing regulations or had no evidentiary support," and thus
    was not legitimate petitioning activity.
    On appeal, the defendants do not challenge the motion
    20
    judge's determination that the plaintiffs suffered actual injury
    as a result of their petitioning. Accordingly, we need not
    discuss the Bristol parties' evidence of damages.
    22
    adjacent properties to thirty A-weighted decibels above the
    ambient noise levels despite DEP regulations "limit[ing]
    allowable increases to 10 [A-weighted decibels] above ambient."
    See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.10 (2002); Policy 90-001 (Jan. 16,
    1990).    In making that argument, however, the RBP parties
    ignored the fact that the planning board's approval of the site
    plan was conditioned on the applicant's compliance with DEP-
    promulgated noise regulations -- the very regulations on which
    the RBP parties' argument relied.     See D'Acci, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    .     Where the Bristol parties could not permissibly operate
    the plant unless they complied with those regulations, the RBP
    parties' continuing noise-based objections to the site plan
    approval lacked any reasonable legal basis or factual support.21
    We likewise see no error in the motion judge's rejection of
    the RBP parties' argument that approval of the site plan
    violated § IV(D)(1) of the bylaws, which excluded from as of
    21The RBP parties contend that this argument nonetheless
    had a legal basis because the Bristol parties had failed to show
    actual compliance through the site plan submission. This
    argument verged on the frivolous; as the Land Court judge
    reasoned, and we restated, a determination of actual compliance
    could not be made until operations began. See D'Acci, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    . Additionally, as the Land Court judge explained,
    interpreting § IV(D)(1) of the bylaws to say that any industrial
    use otherwise allowed in the industrial district is prohibited
    if it has the potential for being "offensive" or "detrimental"
    would confer broad (and arguably unfettered) veto powers on
    adjacent property owners in a way that is not contemplated by
    the bylaws.
    23
    right uses in the industrial district a use that "would . . .
    tend to reduce property values in the same or adjoining
    district."   The RBP parties' evidence demonstrated, at best, a
    potential decrease in the value of certain individual
    properties, not, as the relevant bylaw required, a "tend[ency]
    to reduce property values in the [industrial] or adjoining
    districts" more generally.   To the extent that the RBP parties
    argued for a narrower interpretation of the bylaw, the motion
    judge did not err in implicitly deferring to the planning
    board's reasonable interpretation of its own bylaws, see Shirley
    Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley, 
    461 Mass. 469
    , 475 (2012).22
    B.   Claims based on traffic.   We also discern no abuse of
    discretion or other error in the motion judge's conclusion that
    the RBP parties "lack[ed] a reasonable basis in fact or law" for
    their claim that potential traffic issues required the denial of
    the application for site plan approval.    Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 159
    .   As we concluded in D'Acci, and as the motion judge
    noted in his decision on the special motion to dismiss, the RBP
    22Indeed, as the motion judge noted, both we and the Land
    Court judge had already done so. Additionally, both we and the
    Land Court judge determined that the RBP parties had failed to
    introduce evidence to show that the proposed plant would cause
    property values across the industrial zone to decrease. See
    D'Acci, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    .
    24
    parties did not present evidence at any stage to show that the
    Bristol parties' proposed bituminous concrete plant was any more
    detrimental or offensive than any other similar use, or that it
    was not a permitted use in the industrial district.   See D'Acci,
    
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    .
    Considering the proposed plant as a permitted use, the
    planning board was limited by § XVI of the bylaws, adopted
    February 27, 2002, to imposing conditions in support of the
    objectives outlined there,23 which it did.   There was, in our
    view, no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's implicit
    conclusion that the conditions were reasonable and that
    additional site-specific conditions beyond those imposed by the
    board were not required.   Since the proposed plant was a
    23Section XVI(1.4) of the bylaws, as amended and recodified
    October 25, 2005, sets forth a series of conditions including,
    as relevant here, design requirements intended to maximize
    "vehicular safety both on the site and egressing from it,"
    "minimiz[ing] visual intrusion" from vehicles and glare, and
    "[c]onform[ance] with State and local sound regulations."
    Rochester Bylaws § XVI(1.4)(7), (9)-(10), (14). Section
    XVI(1.4) also provides that "Site Plan approval shall be granted
    upon determination by the Planning Board that the [enumerated]
    considerations have been reasonably addressed by the applicant.
    The Planning Board may impose reasonable conditions, at the
    expense of the applicant, to secure this result." Rochester
    Bylaws § XVI(1.4)(5). Section XVI (1.9)(3)(a) states, "The
    Planning Board shall approve an application if said Board finds
    that the proposed development is in conformance with this bylaw.
    In granting approval of an application, the Planning Board may
    impose conditions, limitations and safeguards which shall be in
    writing and which shall be a part of such approval."
    25
    permitted use in the industrial zone, under the relevant bylaws
    the question before the planning board (and on each successive
    review) was not whether there were potential problems with the
    site plan, but whether, as provided in § XVI(1.3)(3) of the
    bylaws, as amended October 24, 2005, "rejection . . . would be
    tenable because no form of reasonable conditions [could] be
    devised to satisfy the problem with the plan."
    The RBP parties' particular traffic arguments required no
    site-specific conditions.24    The motion judge relied on our
    decision in D'Acci to conclude that "there was 'no evidence' the
    proposed plant would increase noise or truck traffic any more
    than any other use permitted in the industrial zoning district."
    See D'Acci, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    .    While true as far as it
    goes, this conclusion was part of our determination that the
    proposed facility was a permitted use; in D'Acci, we did not
    consider the traffic challenges the RBP parties raised, or
    whether additional conditions were needed to address them.       
    Id.
    We nonetheless conclude that because the record permitted the
    judge to reach the conclusion that he did, he was within his
    discretion in denying the special motion to dismiss.    See
    Gabbidon v. King, 
    414 Mass. 685
    , 686 (1993) (appellate court may
    affirm on "any ground apparent on the record that supports the
    24   See note 7, 
    supra.
    26
    result reached in the lower court").   This is because it is
    apparent from the Land Court judge's decision that to the extent
    that the abutters introduced evidence supporting their traffic
    challenges, the evidence was grounded in assumed facts, rather
    than on what the dissent aptly terms "the idiosyncrasies" of the
    site plan, see post at .25
    It is true that in the Land Court trial, the abutters'
    traffic expert testified, based on the proposed site plan, that
    the proposed plant's operation would result in traffic backups
    on the adjacent roadway, and that if more than six trucks were
    lined up on the driveway to pick up deliveries, any additional
    truck traffic would spill over onto the adjacent roadway.     As
    the Land Court judge noted, however, the expert's testimony
    depended on essential facts about which he had no personal
    knowledge, and which were provided to him by the "Todesca
    Plaintiffs."   Notably, the expert relied on the "Todesca
    Plaintiffs" for such critical facts as the dimensions of the
    trucks to be used at the site, the number of trucks that
    "actually process" through a facility and the time required to
    load each truck and to move it out of the queue of waiting
    vehicles, and the ability of the plant operators to regulate the
    25We have reviewed the transcript of the Land Court trial,
    which was included in the record in D'Acci. See D'Acci, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
    .
    27
    timing of incoming truck traffic.    The fact that the Land Court
    judge engaged in a weighing of the evidence presented does not
    mean that the motion judge abused his discretion in concluding
    that, ultimately, the site plan challenge was a sham.    As the
    motion judge correctly recognized, to carry its burden at the
    second stage, first path, the Bristol parties' burden was to
    demonstrate that the RBP parties' claims lacked reasonable
    factual or legal support; the Bristol parties were not required
    to show that the RBP parties' claims lacked any support.       See
    Baker, 
    434 Mass. at 553-554
    .   Given the Land Court judge's
    assessment, the motion judge, in ruling on the RBP parties'
    special motion to dismiss, acted within his discretion to
    conclude, as he did, that although the "Todesca Plaintiffs"
    introduced evidence in support of their position, the evidence
    in question did not provide them with "a reasonable basis in
    fact or law" for their traffic claims.    Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 159
    .   The bar at this stage of the analysis is "high," but
    the record here supports the judge's conclusion that the Bristol
    parties met it in this case.   Blanchard II, 
    483 Mass. at 204
    .
    ii.   Conservation commission.    We discern no abuse of
    discretion or error in the motion judge's conclusion that the
    RBP parties' opposition to the commission's extension of the
    Bristol parties' order of conditions was "sham" petitioning.
    The RBP parties' argument that they had a good faith basis to
    28
    bring the opposition -- and to seek certiorari review in the
    Superior Court, and then to appeal to this court -- based on the
    mere passage of time between the commission's original order of
    conditions and Edgewood's January 2018 request for an extension
    lacked any basis in law or fact.   See 310 Code Mass. Regs.
    § 10.05(8)(b) (2014) (identifying bases for denial of extension
    requests, including "where new information, not available at the
    time the Order [of Conditions] was issued, has become available
    and indicates that the Order is not adequate to protect the
    interests identified in G. L. c. 131, § 40").   On this record,
    not only did the RBP parties fail to introduce evidence at any
    stage of their petitioning of any "new information" or that "the
    [o]rder [was] not adequate to protect" the relevant statutory
    interests, id., but the only evidence that was presented on the
    subject indicated just the opposite -- that the wetlands at
    issue were unchanged from the time of the original order.     As
    the motion judge noted, under these circumstances nothing in the
    applicable law or regulations required the commission to conduct
    a new wetlands delineation or to reevaluate the prior one.26
    26The appeals to DEP and to the OADR were also without
    basis, as the governing statute and regulations do not provide
    for such an appeal. Cf. G. L. c. 131, § 40, nineteenth par.;
    301 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(7)(b) (2014). The same is true for
    Albert Todesca's subsequent appeal to the Superior Court.
    29
    iii.   MEPA petition.   We similarly determine that there was
    no abuse of discretion or other error in the motion judge's
    conclusion that the MEPA petitioning was sham litigation.      Under
    301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.04(1) (2008), to invoke fail-safe
    review, the petitioner must demonstrate three criteria:     (1)
    "the Project is subject to MEPA jurisdiction"; (2) "the Project
    has the potential to cause Damage to the Environment" either
    unforeseeable when 301 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 11.00 was promulgated
    or that "would be caused by a circumstance or combination of
    circumstances that individually would not ordinarily cause
    Damage to the Environment"; and (3) "requiring the filing of an
    [environmental notification form27] and other compliance with
    MEPA and 301 [Code of Mass. Regs. §§] 11.00 . . . is essential
    to avoid or minimize Damage to the Environment; and . . . will
    not result in an undue hardship for the Proponent."    Here,
    neither petition satisfied more than the first condition.
    Although the project was "subject to MEPA jurisdiction" as a
    result of its need for an air quality plan approval by the DEP,
    see 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 11.01(2)(a) (2013), there was no
    evidence that it would cause the damage to the environment at
    issue in the regulation, or that MEPA review was essential to
    27An environmental notification form is an initial step in
    obtaining MEPA review of a given project, and serves to "inform
    the [EOEEA] Secretary of the nature of the project." See Allen
    v. Boston Redev. Auth., 
    450 Mass. 242
    , 246 (2007).
    30
    avoid or minimize potential environmental impacts of the
    proposed plant.   Accordingly, as EOEEA indicated in response to
    the first petition, and reiterated following the second one,
    there was no basis for MEPA intervention.
    Conclusion.   The motion judge properly concluded the RBP
    parties' petitioning activity was "devoid of any reasonable
    factual support or any arguable basis in law."    G. L. c. 231,
    § 59H.   Because such "sham" petitioning is not entitled to the
    protections of § 59H, the judge did not err or abuse his
    discretion in denying the RBP parties' special motion to dismiss
    at the first path of the second stage of the augmented Duracraft
    analysis.   We affirm the motion judge's interlocutory order
    denying the RBP parties' special motion to dismiss the complaint
    against them and remand the case to the Superior Court for
    further proceedings.
    So ordered.
    RUBIN, J. (concurring).   I agree with and join the
    majority's opinion in its entirety.   Although I therefore do not
    believe we need reach the question to resolve this case, I write
    separately to express my disagreement with my learned dissenting
    colleague's assertion that, even in the absence of a statute
    like the anti-SLAPP statute, the Federal Constitution requires
    immunity from suit (what he calls "not be[ing] subject to
    suit"), post at , for redress against all abusive litigation
    that is not within the definition of "sham" as it has been
    articulated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
    and Tenth Circuit cases he cites construing the Noerr-Pennington
    doctrine of antitrust immunity for nonsham litigation1 (which, I
    note, is in any event an immunity from liability, not suit).
    See United States v. Koziol, 
    993 F.3d 1160
    , 1171 (9th Cir.
    2021), cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 1372 (2022)
    ; CSMN Invs., LLC v.
    Cordillera Metro. Dist., 
    956 F.3d 1276
    , 1286 (10th Cir. 2020);
    Scott v. Hern, 
    216 F.3d 897
    , 915 (10th Cir. 2000).   For example,
    suits alleging the tort of abuse of process, themselves facially
    protected by the petition clause of the First Amendment to the
    United States Constitution, have long been held to have merit
    even in some cases where the defendant's abusive suit led to
    1 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 
    381 U.S. 657
    (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
    Freight, Inc., 
    365 U.S. 127
     (1961).
    2
    some recovery.   See, e.g., Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. San Juan
    Cable LLC, 
    874 F.3d 767
    , 774 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 1597 (2019)
     (Barron, J., concurring, with whom Torruella,
    J., joined) ("[T]he tort of abuse of process is itself sensitive
    to circumstance, but, presumably, the First Amendment is not
    infringed just because the tort imposes liability on some suits
    that have some merit").   See also Poduska v. Ward, 
    895 F.2d 854
    ,
    857 (1st Cir. 1990) (Aldrich, J.) (even fact that jury made
    small award to defendant as plaintiff in lawsuit does not
    preclude finding that suit was abuse of process); Restatement
    (Second) of Torts § 682 comment a (1977).2   This aspect of the
    tort obviously was not outlawed at the Federal level by the
    adoption in 1791 of the First Amendment, nor in Massachusetts by
    the adoption in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution.   Likewise, the relatively recent enactment
    of the anti-SLAPP statute in 1994, was not, as the dissent's
    analysis implies, unnecessary because, since 1868, one could get
    every suit to which it applies, and more, dismissed directly
    under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
    2 Although the dissent implies otherwise, see post at , I
    know of no authority holding that the clauses of the First
    Amendment prohibiting laws "abridging the freedom of speech,"
    which says nothing about the motive of the speaker, and laws
    "abridging . . . the right . . . to petition the Government for
    a redress of grievances" (emphasis added) are coextensive, or
    that the analysis under them is identical.
    3
    I also therefore disagree with my dissenting colleague's
    conclusion that the Supreme Judicial Court's second path of the
    second stage holding in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc.,
    
    477 Mass. 141
    , 160 (2017), S.C., 
    483 Mass. 200
     (2019), by which
    we are bound, that a plaintiff can defeat a special motion to
    dismiss and proceed with suit if that plaintiff can
    "demonstrat[e] that [the challenged] claim was not primarily
    brought to chill the special movant's legitimate petitioning
    activities," violates the petition clause of the First
    Amendment.
    ENGLANDER, J. (dissenting in part).     Application of the
    anti-SLAPP act, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, in this context requires
    judges to navigate between two basic principles:    on the one
    hand, the people have the fundamental right to petition the
    government for redress of grievances -- and this petition right
    sometimes includes, as in this case, the right to sue the
    government to compel it to comply with its own rules for
    conducting its business.    On the other hand, parties should be
    held responsible if they make a claim before an adjudicative
    body that has no reasonable basis in fact or law, including
    answering for any damages they may cause.    Here the majority
    sweepingly concludes (as did the motion judge) that all of the
    defendant RBP parties' prior contentions made to the government
    boards and agencies were without reasonable basis in fact or
    law, and thus actionable.    The Federal Constitution (and the
    anti-SLAPP case law) requires a more discerning look, however,
    and in my view, one of the claims that the RBP parties
    previously asserted cannot properly be considered a "sham," and
    accordingly, cannot be subject to suit.     See Kobrin v.
    Gastfriend, 
    443 Mass. 327
    , 333 (2005) ("the right of petition
    protected in the anti-SLAPP statute is that right enumerated in
    the First Amendment to the United States Constitution").
    To be clear, I agree with the majority that many of the
    claims that the RBP parties previously asserted to government
    2
    bodies -- including all claims that the RBP parties asserted
    based upon actions of the town of Rochester (town) conservation
    commission and the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental
    Affairs -- were entirely without basis and thus a "sham."    But
    not all of the RBP parties' prior claims met that test.     In
    particular, the RBP parties' Land Court challenge to the
    planning board's site plan approval raised material concerns
    about how truck traffic would infringe on the public way
    abutting the site, which concerns were backed by reasonable,
    fact-based expert testimony.   In bringing suit to present such
    legitimate concerns, the RBP parties were exercising their
    constitutional right to petition the government for redress.1
    See Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. v. National Real
    Estate Info. Servs., 
    608 F.3d 110
    , 124 (1st Cir. 2010).    The RBP
    parties cannot be subject to government sanction for that
    exercise, and the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be construed to
    allow same.   See CSMN Invs., LLC v. Cordillera Metro. Dist., 
    956 F.3d 1276
    , 1282 (10th Cir. 2020) ("Immunity flows from this
    right, protecting those who seek redress through the courts from
    1 I do not mean to suggest that the petition clause of the
    First Amendment (petition clause) provides the RBP parties a
    constitutional right to sue the government over their neighbor's
    land use. It does not. But whereas here the Commonwealth has
    provided that right by statute (and, to that extent, waived any
    governmental immunity), the RBP parties' exercise of the right
    was protected petitioning activity.
    3
    liability for petitioning activities").     Insofar as the
    plaintiff Bristol parties' suit claims that the RBP parties
    violated the law (e.g., G. L. c. 93A) by pursuing these traffic
    issues, that portion of the Bristol parties' claims was required
    to be dismissed.2
    My quarrel with the majority is narrow, but important.
    While I agree that most of the claims and arguments that the
    RBP parties advanced in opposing the proposed development were
    without basis in fact or law, the majority also would allow the
    Bristol parties to pursue damages from the RBP parties for their
    assertion of a claim that was not "without basis."     There are
    several points to be made about why such a result cannot be
    allowed.
    First, we should pause for a moment to recognize that it
    should be the unusual case where a court concludes, as the judge
    did here, that a party's prior efforts to petition the
    government were without reasonable basis.     Labeling petitioning
    2 As others have already observed, the case law construing
    the anti-SLAPP statute is remarkably complex, and in need of
    simplification. See Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
    489 Mass. 724
    , 728 n.5 (2022) (recognizing anti-SLAPP "case law may
    require further reconsideration and simplification"); Nyberg v.
    Wheltle, 
    101 Mass. App. Ct. 639
    , 656-658 (2022) (discussing
    "concerns" regarding anti-SLAPP case law). As I discuss infra,
    one such simplification would be to do away entirely with the
    "second path of the second stage" analysis, since that analysis
    cannot be squared with the protections afforded by the petition
    clause of the United States Constitution.
    4
    activity a "sham" cannot be undertaken lightly.   As the majority
    notes, proving that particular petitioning activity is "a sham
    presents a 'high bar'" (citation omitted).   Blanchard v. Steward
    Carney Hospital, Inc., 
    483 Mass. 200
    , 204 (2019) (Blanchard II).
    And for good reason, because if petitioning activity can be too
    easily subjected to suit, we will end up chilling the very
    activity that the anti-SLAPP statute (and the petition clause)
    were designed to protect.
    Second, the standard for establishing "sham" petitioning
    was not met here with respect to the RBP parties' previous claim
    that the Bristol parties' proposed use might result in
    "detrimental or offensive" traffic impacts on an abutting
    highway.   As indicated, the sham petitioning standard requires
    the Bristol parties to show that the petitioning activity they
    seek to sanction was "devoid of any reasonable factual support
    or any arguable basis in law."3   G. L. c. 231, § 59H.   The test
    is objective; it does not turn or depend upon the motivations of
    the petitioner.   See 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC,
    
    477 Mass. 162
    , 173 (2017), S.C., 
    483 Mass. 514
     (2019)
    ("motivation for engaging in petitioning activity" irrelevant to
    3 The standard is found in the language of the anti-SLAPP
    statute itself, but it also derives directly from the petition
    clause. See CSMN Invs., LLC, 956 F.3d at 1283, 1286 (first step
    of "sham-petitioning test" asking "whether the petitioning has
    an objectively reasonable basis . . . determin[es] whether
    conduct . . . loses [p]etition [c]lause immunity").
    5
    whether such activity "lacks an objectively reasonable basis").
    See also CSMN Invs., LLC, 956 F.3d at 1286 (holding that
    petitioning activity may not be subject to suit unless, as a
    first step, petitioning is objectively unreasonable).
    The petitioning activity I wish to focus on here was the
    RBP parties' challenge to the planning board's site plan
    approval.   The RBP parties filed suit in the Land Court, as
    provided by statute.   See G. L. c. 40A, § 17.    One of the
    grounds they argued was that as designed and operated, the
    proposed site would result in traffic backing up onto Kings
    Highway, the public way from which the site would be accessed.
    The RBP parties presented an expert traffic engineer; he pointed
    out that the access road into and out of the plant was designed
    narrowly -- eighteen feet wide, barely enough for two trucks to
    pass in opposite directions.   The expert also calculated that if
    more than six trucks were waiting to pick up finished product on
    site, the waiting trucks would necessarily spill out onto Kings
    Highway, choking traffic on that road.    The RBP parties
    accordingly contended that the site plan should not have been
    approved, because it violated the town bylaw requiring that a
    proposed use not be "detrimental or offensive."
    For their part, the Bristol parties did not take issue with
    their obligation to meet the not "detrimental or offensive"
    legal standard under the town bylaws.    Nor did the Bristol
    6
    parties challenge the RBP parties' expert's calculations or
    observations as to how many trucks could be queued on site at
    one time.   Rather, the Bristol parties argued that the scenario
    painted by the RBP parties' expert was unlikely to occur.     For
    one thing, the Bristol parties pointed out that one of the
    conditions of site plan approval required "no parking" signs to
    be placed on Kings Highway.    But the Bristol parties' principal
    contention was a practical one:    they contended that most of the
    trucks bringing raw material would be from their own or related
    companies, and those trucks could be instructed not to come to
    the site if backups were occurring.    After hearing this
    evidence, the Land Court judge sided with the Bristol parties,
    but in measured words:
    "On balance, I am not persuaded that [the] site plan . . .
    will result in the vehicular safety issues hypothesized by
    [the RBP parties' expert], except in unusual circumstances.
    Even if such unusual circumstances were to arise, I credit
    [the Bristol parties' expert's] testimony that [the Bristol
    parties] ha[ve] the capacity to control the majority of the
    trucks visiting the [proposed site] and therefore could
    direct trucks away from the site if the hypothetical events
    posited by [the RBP parties' expert] were to occur."
    It was incorrect to conclude, on the above record, that
    this aspect of the RBP parties' claims was a "sham."    The RBP
    parties' claim was based in fact (the idiosyncrasies of the
    proposed site plan, including the proximity to Kings Highway and
    the narrowness of the interior roads), and supported by
    reasonable expert testimony.    The RBP parties brought an
    7
    appropriate legal claim, based upon the standard of a town
    bylaw.     Notably, the trial judge did not suggest the claim was
    without basis, ruling against it only after considering the
    arguments "on balance."     A losing claim is not automatically a
    "sham."    See Wenger v. Aceto, 
    451 Mass. 1
    , 7 (2008) ("The
    critical determination is not whether the petitioning activity
    in question will be successful, but whether it contains any
    reasonable factual or legal merit at all"); Donovan v. Gardner,
    
    50 Mass. App. Ct. 595
    , 601 (2000) ("That [defendants] were
    unsuccessful does not, in and of itself, mean that their
    [petitioning activity] did not have some basis in law or
    foundation in fact").
    In short, this particular aspect of the RBP parties'
    arguments raised reasonable concerns to a government body, which
    the RBP parties were entitled to raise.     The majority attempts
    to paint these concerns as "hypothetical," ante at       , but that
    is a mere label, which does not meet the substance of the RBP
    parties' contentions.     True, the RBP parties' expert testimony
    necessarily was hypothetical, in that the expert was addressing
    what would happen in the future, when the plant was completed
    and operating.    His analysis was not rooted in fantasy, however,
    but in a facially reasonable assumption that from time to time,
    more than six trucks would be queued to pick up finished
    product.    Notably, there was no planning board condition that
    8
    would prevent this; there was no condition, for example,
    requiring the Bristol parties only to work with trucks from
    their own companies.     And as the RBP parties' expert pointed out
    in his testimony, "no parking" signs might well be ineffective
    in preventing trucks from spilling out onto the highway, engines
    running (and thus arguably not "parked"), when there was
    insufficient room for them on site.     Much more was required to
    demonstrate sham petitioning.4
    Third, I disagree with the majority that we review the
    motion judge's denial of the special motion to dismiss only for
    "abuse of discretion."     The question whether particular
    petitioning activity was without reasonable basis must be
    4 These traffic issues were not previously addressed by this
    court. They were not raised in the appeal from the Land Court
    judgment.
    The RBP parties' traffic arguments can be contrasted with
    their contentions, also made to the planning board on site plan
    review, that the proposed plant would violate the Department of
    Environmental Protection (DEP) noise regulations. The RBP
    parties pursued this noise argument, even though the planning
    board expressly conditioned its site plan approval on the
    plant's compliance with DEP noise regulations. And the RBP
    parties thereafter pursued this noise argument to the town
    zoning board of appeals, to the Land Court, and to this court,
    at which point we noted that the planning board's conditions
    were reasonable, because "[i]n order to begin operations, [the
    plant operator] would have to apply for an air permit from DEP,
    which would only approve the permit if it found the [proposed]
    facility to be in conformance with State noise regulations."
    The RBP parties' pursuit of the noise argument in connection
    with the planning board's site plan approval thus had no
    reasonable basis in law.
    9
    treated as a question of law, subject to de novo review.    The
    reason for this, most importantly, is that fundamental First
    Amendment rights are at stake; the RBP parties had a right to
    bring their Land Court suit, and they cannot be subject to State
    sanction (e.g., in damages) for bringing it, unless it was
    without basis in fact or law.   See Scott v. Hern, 
    216 F.3d 897
    ,
    914-915 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases; "petitioning
    activities" are protected "from liability under the First
    Amendment" unless, among other things, plaintiff shows "the
    defendant's [prior] claims were devoid of reasonable factual
    support" or "lacked any cognizable basis in law" [citation
    omitted]).5   Under First Amendment case law, judges commonly are
    5 Citing authority addressing the tort of abuse of process,
    Justice Rubin's concurrence suggests that a party may be held
    liable for prosecuting an action that had an objectively
    reasonable basis, if the party had a subjectively improper
    motive for doing so. Stated broadly, the position the
    concurrence advances cannot be squared with the petition clause
    or the precedent I cite above (which, I note, is explicitly not
    limited to the antitrust context, but has been applied to a
    panoply of torts). See CSMN Invs., LLC, 956 F.3d at 1283. I
    note that the United States Court of Appeals for the First
    Circuit also has recognized the "long standing" First Amendment
    "right to file lawsuits that are not baseless." Real Estate Bar
    Ass'n for Mass., Inc., 
    608 F.3d at 124
    .
    Indeed, I am aware of no context in which conduct
    objectively protected by the First Amendment nevertheless can be
    sanctioned, because the government (i.e., the courts) concludes
    that it does not like the subjective motivation behind the
    petitioning/speech. Accordingly, while I acknowledge a tension
    between some abuse of process authority and the above petition
    clause case law, that tension is resolved by requiring abuse of
    process plaintiffs to show that the action they are challenging
    10
    called upon to exercise de novo review when State judicial
    process is invoked to sanction conduct that may be protected.
    See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
    466 U.S. 485
    , 511 (1984) ("whether the evidence in the record in a
    defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip
    the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a
    question for the trier of fact," but is instead subject to de
    novo review).   See also United Food & Commercial Workers Unions
    & Employers Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Novartis Pharms.
    Corp., 
    902 F.3d 1
    , 14 (1st Cir. 2018) ("review of whether the
    plaintiffs have plausibly alleged 'sham' litigation is de
    novo").   Moreover, whether the plaintiffs have shown that the
    defendants' petitioning activity was "without reasonable basis
    in fact or law" is a question of law that this court is equally
    able to evaluate, based upon the trial court record.6   Where the
    prior petitioning activity was reasonably based, our standard of
    was objectively without basis. See Protect Our Mountain Env't,
    Inc. v. District Court, 
    677 P.2d 1361
    , 1369 (Colo. 1984).
    6 This is certainly the case where, as here, the factual and
    legal basis for the prior petitioning activity is evident from
    the petitioning activity itself. As the statute contemplates,
    there may be circumstances where the court takes additional
    evidence on such subjects, but in the vast majority of cases the
    judge's ruling will be on a paper record. See Kitras v.
    Aquinnah, 
    474 Mass. 132
    , 138, cert. denied, 
    580 U.S. 1000
     (2016)
    ("no special deference is shown" where findings are premised "on
    documentary materials").
    11
    review should not afford the motion judge "discretion" to deny
    the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, thereby allowing a
    case to go forward that is prohibited under the First Amendment.
    The cases the majority cites for applying an abuse of
    discretion standard -- in particular, Blanchard v. Steward
    Carney Hosp., Inc., 
    477 Mass. 141
     (2017) (Blanchard I), S.C.,
    
    483 Mass. 200
     (2019) (Blanchard II) -- do not require a contrary
    result.   In Blanchard I, the Supreme Judicial Court announced an
    alternative means by which plaintiffs can defeat special motions
    to dismiss -- the complexly labelled "second path" of the
    "second stage" of the anti-SLAPP analysis.    Blanchard II, 
    483 Mass. at 204-205
    .   In Blanchard I, the Supreme Judicial Court
    explained that this new, second path analysis should be applied
    by "the motion judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, . . .
    assess[ing] the totality of the circumstances pertinent to the
    nonmoving party's asserted primary purpose in bringing its
    claim."   Id. at 160.   That language, however, related to the
    alternative path that the Supreme Judicial Court had just
    announced; it does not set the standard to apply when reviewing
    whether a special motion to dismiss can be avoided by showing
    that the challenged petitioning activity lacked a reasonable
    basis.7
    7 While there are several other anti-SLAPP cases that
    describe the standard of review as "abuse of discretion or other
    12
    Fourth, the decision below, which denied the motion to
    dismiss in its entirety, cannot be justified on a theory that
    most of the defendants' petitioning activity was, in fact, a
    sham.   The anti-SLAPP case law requires a more careful and
    discerning analysis.   The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
    Blanchard I made this clear, where the court separately
    addressed two components of the plaintiffs' libel claim, holding
    that one survived the anti-SLAPP statute, while one might not.
    See Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 150-153
    .   As we noted in Haverhill
    Stem LLC v. Jennings, 
    99 Mass. App. Ct. 626
    , 634 (2021), when
    applying the anti-SLAPP statute, "the allegations need to be
    carefully parsed even within a single count."    Accordingly,
    while the anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied as to many of
    the bases of the Bristol parties' claims, the motion had to be
    granted as to claimed damages arising out of the traffic
    error of law," (emphasis added), Kobrin, 
    443 Mass. at 330-331
    , I
    do not view those cases as inconsistent with the de novo
    standard I espouse here. See Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp.,
    
    463 Mass. 394
    , 397 (2012); Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 
    448 Mass. 242
    , 250 (2007). In Wenger, for example, the Supreme Judicial
    Court clearly applied a de novo standard of review in holding,
    as a matter of law, that two counts of a plaintiff's complaint
    must be dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute, because the
    defendant's prior petitioning activity had a reasonable basis in
    fact and law. See Wenger, 
    451 Mass. at 7
    . But see Gillette Co.
    v. Provost, 
    91 Mass. App. Ct. 133
    , 137-140 (2017) (arguably
    applying abuse of discretion standard only).
    13
    contentions highlighted above.8      The First Amendment precludes
    the Bristol parties from recovering for that conduct.       See CSMN
    Invs., LLC, 956 F.3d at 1286 (petition clause immunizes
    objectively reasonable claims).       See also United States v.
    Koziol, 
    993 F.3d 1160
    , 1171 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 1372 (2022)
     ("constitutional right to petition"
    "immunize[s] from statutory liability" "most litigation
    activities" not constituting a "sham").
    Fifth and finally, I need to go on to address the "second
    path of the second stage" of the anti-SLAPP analysis.       Why this
    is necessary is not simple to describe, but I will give it a
    try:       (1) if (as here) the plaintiffs' (Bristol parties') claim
    is based solely on the defendants' (RBP parties') prior
    I acknowledge that it will not always be easy to separate
    8
    protected petitioning activity from unprotected conduct, where
    both are the subject of the allegations of a single count. This
    issue has previously arisen when applying the first path of
    anti-SLAPP analysis -- that is, whether the plaintiff's claim is
    based "solely" on petitioning activity. Sometimes, as with the
    G. L. c. 93A claim in Haverhill Stem LLC, the allegations of
    petitioning and nonpetitioning activity in a single count are so
    interrelated that the entire count must be allowed to go
    forward, while recognizing that those allegations that challenge
    protected petitioning activity cannot be the basis for an
    ultimate recovery. See Haverhill Stem LLC, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at
    633-634. On the other hand, in Blanchard I, the two types of
    allegedly libelous statements could be separately addressed,
    with one type being deemed petitioning activity and thus
    (potentially) dismissible. See Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 161
    .
    Here, as in Blanchard I, the defendants' traffic contentions in
    the Land Court are sufficiently separable and distinct that suit
    based upon that objectively reasonable petitioning activity
    should have been dismissed at this stage.
    14
    petitioning activity, then the first stage is satisfied, and the
    anti-SLAPP statute applies to bar the claim, unless (2) the
    petitioning activity sued upon is a sham (under the second
    stage, first path), in which case the anti-SLAPP statute does
    not apply to bar the claim and the case can go forward.
    So far, so good.   But as noted, in Blanchard I the Supreme
    Judicial Court set forth the alternative "second path."    See
    Blanchard I, 
    477 Mass. at 160
    .   Under that alternative, even if
    a lawsuit seeks to sanction petitioning activity and the
    petitioning activity had a reasonable basis (i.e., was not a
    sham), dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute can still be
    avoided on the plaintiffs' showing that its lawsuit was not
    "primarily brought to chill" the defendants' prior assertions of
    their petitioning rights.   See 
    id.
       In Blanchard I, the Supreme
    Judicial Court reasoned that this second path was required to
    further mitigate "the possibility" that defendants "may . . .
    use the [anti-SLAPP] special motion [to dismiss] to eradicate
    [plaintiffs'] . . . claim[s]," even where the plaintiffs' claims
    are not "primarily geared toward chilling [legitimate]
    petitioning" -- thus (arguably) chilling the plaintiffs' own
    petitioning rights in the process.    
    Id. at 157
    .
    Because I have concluded that a portion of the RBP parties'
    prior petitioning activities was not a sham, under Blanchard I
    and its progeny I would need to analyze this second path.     But
    15
    in my view, such an analysis is unnecessary, and indeed,
    constitutionally inappropriate.   As discussed above, the
    defendants' traffic contentions were (1) petitioning activity,
    and (2) not a sham.   Under the United States Constitution, this
    has to be the end of the analysis.   The arguments were protected
    under the First Amendment's petition clause, and as a result,
    could not be the basis for a State law damages claim.    See CSMN
    Invs., LLC, 956 F.3d at 1286-1288 (District Court properly
    dismissed suit seeking to sanction State-based claims that were
    objectively reasonable).   See also Scott, 
    216 F.3d at 914-915
    .
    The plaintiffs' claims based upon those arguments must be
    dismissed, as must any such claims based on protected
    petitioning activity.9
    To the extent described above, I dissent from the
    majority's opinion affirming the denial of the motion to
    dismiss.
    9 It should not be a controversial proposition that the
    protections provided under the anti-SLAPP statute equal (at
    least) those under the First Amendment. The statute's text
    expressly protects a "party's exercise of its right of petition
    under the constitution of the United States," which it defines
    in part as "any . . . statement falling within constitutional
    protection of the right to petition government." See G. L.
    c. 231, § 59H. Accordingly, at least in the context of the
    claim at issue here, the "second path of the second stage"
    cannot be applied because it could allow a claim to go forward
    where the claim violates the petition clause. It may well be
    that anti-SLAPP analysis can be simplified by eliminating this
    second path.