John Tyler v. Melissa Tyler. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-536
JOHN TYLER
vs.
MELISSA TYLER.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
John Tyler (John) appeals the Probate and Family Court's
order of partial judgment and judgment of divorce nisi
incorporating that partial judgment. He makes three arguments:
(1) he was denied a trial; (2) the judge erred in his
determination that Florida Law applied to the prenuptial
agreement; and (3) res judicata prohibited the equal division of
one of the marital assets, 154 Maverick LLC (the LLC). For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Background. In 2004, Melissa Tyler1 (Melissa) and John
signed a prenuptial agreement in the State of Florida and were
married in the Bahamas. The prenuptial agreement stated that
1 The appellee changed her name on June 8, 2021. As is our
practice, we use the parties' names as they appeared in the
complaint.
the contract was to be governed by Florida law. After the two
moved to Boston, the marriage deteriorated, and John filed a
complaint for divorce in November of 2016.
The probate judge, at the request of the parties,
bifurcated the case into two parts: first, the issue of the
validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement; and
second, the division of marital assets. After receiving
submissions from the parties and holding a hearing on December
3, 2018, the court ruled that it would apply Florida law when
determining the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial
agreement. The court then, at the request of both parties,
appointed a special master to "make findings regarding the
validity and enforceability of the parties' prenuptial agreement
under Florida law," preliminary to the special master's
recommendations "on the divorce and counterclaim." After
receiving evidence from the parties,2 the special master made
recommendations to the probate judge including that the
prenuptial agreement was valid and that certain assets,
including the LLC, be equally distributed between the parties in
accordance with the parties' prenuptial agreement. On April 15,
2021, nunc pro tunc to March 6, 2020, the probate judge wholly
2 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties, as the only
witnesses in this case, presented their direct examination to
the master by affidavits and exhibits and conducted cross-
examination over Zoom.
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adopted the findings of the special master. On May 4, 2021, the
Probate and Family Court issued a judgment of divorce nisi.
At the same time the parties were involved in the divorce
proceedings in the Probate and Family Court, the parties were
also undergoing litigation in Superior Court to determine
ownership and management of the LLC and the property located at
154 Maverick Street in East Boston.3 On May 3, 2019, the
Superior Court ruled that "John Tyler has the majority voting
rights in and is the manager of 154 Maverick LLC." The Superior
Court also stated that "nothing in this Court's decision is
meant to limit the Probate Court's authority to reach a
different conclusion in equity when it divides the Tylers'
marital assets upon finalization of their divorce."
Discussion. 1. Due process. John's first argument is
that he was denied his due process rights and his right to a
fair trial because he did not receive a trial. He also argues
that the court's adoption of the special master's
recommendations was in direct contradiction of the bifurcation
the court previously ordered. His final contention is that, on
this record, he believes it is clear the parties and the court
intended to go to trial and adopting the special master's
3 The Probate and Family Court issued an order on December 11,
2018, stating it would defer to the Superior Court on the issues
of ownership and management of the LLC.
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recommendations without a trial was fundamentally unfair. To
show that it was the court's intention that a trial occur after
the special master's recommendations, John cites an email dated
March 8, 2021, from a case manager of the Probate and Family
Court, asking the parties for trial date availability.
We note at the outset that the court's order appointing the
special master was clear that the special master would both have
the power to make recommendations regarding the "validity and
enforceability of the parties' prenuptial agreement under
Florida law," and regarding the "divorce and counterclaim."
John does not challenge the appropriateness of that order on
appeal.
Here, where the order appointing the special master was
clear, we see nothing on this record that shows John was
deprived of his fundamental rights or that he was treated
unfairly. John having requested "an equitable division of the
parties' marital estate" as part of a divorce, and Melissa
having counterclaimed for divorce and enforcement of the
prenuptial agreement, John was on notice from the court's order
that the special master would be making recommendations on the
issues of the agreement's validity and enforceability and the
division of property. John did not make any objection to the
order granting the special master the authority to address the
divorce and counterclaim until after the special master made his
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recommendations to the probate court. John had the opportunity
to present the special master with evidence regarding the
divorce and counterclaim. He was able to present relevant
evidence to the special master as shown by his affidavit and the
fact that he submitted eighty-nine exhibits at the hearing
before the special master. Only then did the special master
make his recommendations to the court. Additionally, John made
the court aware of the various areas in which he disagreed with
the special master in his proposed amendments to the special
master's draft report. Only after hearing from both parties did
the trial judge adopt the special master's recommendations.
The case manager's email does not upset our conclusion that
John was not deprived of his fundamental rights or treated
unfairly. The email asking for trial date availability makes
clear the court's understanding, and by extension the parties'
understanding, that a trial may occur, not that it was
inevitable or required.
We are also not persuaded that the special master's report
of recommendations and the court's order adopting those
recommendations inherently contradicted the order of
bifurcation. It is clear from the special master's report that
he first considered the validity of the prenuptial agreement and
the relevant law before making recommendations regarding the
division of assets. Bifurcation did not require separate
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reports from the special master addressing the validity and
enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the divorce and
counterclaim, as John's arguments seem to imply.
2. Florida law. John next argues that the court erred in
applying Florida law to interpret the prenuptial agreement.
"Where the parties have expressed a specific intent as to
the governing law, Massachusetts courts will uphold the parties'
choice as long as the result is not contrary to public
policy. . . and as long as the designated State has some
substantial relation to the contract" (citation omitted).
Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 260 (1977).
Although the prenuptial agreement clearly contains a paragraph
that Florida law governs the agreement, John contends that
Massachusetts law should apply to the interpretation of the
agreement for public policy reasons. His primary justification
for this argument is that the parties resided in Massachusetts
for most of their marriage. John also argues that Massachusetts
law should apply to the interpretation of the agreement because
Florida does not have a substantial relation to the contract.
Our review of whether the governing law provision of the
agreement violates public policy is de novo.
First, the result of enforcing this agreement is not
contrary to public policy. John argues that Florida law does
not provide the protection provided by Massachusetts law to
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prevent the enforcement of an "agreement that essentially strips
the contesting spouse of substantially all of [his or her]
marital interests." Dematteo v. Dematteo, 436 Mass. 18, 37
(2002). This protection, however, only protects against the
enforcement of an unconscionable contract. John points to no
evidence or findings that under Massachusetts law this contract
would be unconscionable where under Florida law it is not.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that enforcement of this
contract is against public policy. Additionally, we discern no
other public policy concerns that would prohibit the application
of Florida law in either the enforcement or the interpretation
of this contract.
Second, the special master was presented with evidence
connecting the parties to Florida at the time when they signed
the agreement, including Melissa's affidavit, which detailed
numerous occasions when the parties resided in Florida. The
parties' history of residing in Florida at the time when they
signed the agreement and their intent for the agreement to be
governed by Florida laws is sufficient to show that Florida had
a substantial relationship to the contract.
For those reasons, the court was correct in ordering the
special master to apply Florida law when interpreting the
prenuptial agreement.
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3. Res judicata. John's final argument is that the
Probate and Family Court was barred from ordering the equal
division of the LLC under the principle of res judicata. Res
judicata encompasses both the ideas of issue preclusion and
claim preclusion. See Santos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass.
App. Ct. 687, 692 (2016). After reviewing John's arguments, the
only argument he has made in this appeal under the principle of
res judicata that qualifies as an appellate argument is that of
issue preclusion.4 See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Essentially, John argues that the
Probate and Family Court could not divide the LLC as a marital
asset because the Superior Court had already ruled that "John
Tyler has the majority voting rights in and is the manager of
154 Maverick LLC." We review this claim de novo.
Issue preclusion applies where (1) the earlier judgment is
final and on the merits; (2) the current party was a party, or
in privity with a party, in the previous case; (3) the past and
present issues are identical; and (4) the issue was essential to
the prior judgment. See Kelso v. Kelso, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 226,
231 (2014). John's argument fails because the issue before the
Superior Court was determining who had ownership of the LLC
4 We note that had John raised a valid argument of claim
preclusion he likely would not have been successful because the
Superior Court action was not based on the same underlying claim
as this action for divorce.
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prior to the divorce, which is not identical to the issue before
the Probate and Family Court, which was who will have ownership
after the divorce. In cases like this, the Probate and Family
Court has the power to "assign to either husband or wife all or
any part of the estate of the other." G. L. c. 208, § 34. In
order to make such allocations, the Probate and Family Court
need not only decide ownership rights prior to the action, but
also ownership rights after the action. The Superior Court in
this case assumed the role of deciding whether John was the
owner of the LLC prior to a final judgement in the divorce
action, not how the marital assets, including the LLC, should be
divided. For that reason, issue preclusion does not apply.
Conclusion. For all of the above reasons, we affirm the
Probate and Family Court's order of partial judgment in this
action, and the judgment of divorce nisi incorporating that
partial judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade,
Englander & Walsh, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: May 23, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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