Lanctot v. Town of Brewster ( 2023 )

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22-P-259 Appeals Court
DANIEL LANCTOT & others1 vs. TOWN OF BREWSTER.
No. 22-P-259.
Barnstable. January 10, 2023. – June 22, 2023.
Present: Sullivan, Shin, & Hodgens, JJ.
Civil Service, Police. Police, Compensation, Hiring. Police
Officer. Public Employment, Police, Salary. Massachusetts
Wage Act. Labor, Wages. Statute, Construction.
Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute,
Agency's interpretation of regulation. Practice, Civil,
Summary judgment. Declaratory Relief.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
April 3, 2017.
The case was heard by Mark C. Gildea, J., on motions for
summary judgment.
Alan H. Shapiro for the plaintiffs.
Paul J. Hodnett for the defendant.
Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
1 Brandon Rice and Morgan Vermette. As is our practice, we
use the caption as it appears in the underlying complaint.
2
HODGENS, J. When sending an employee to a police academy,
a municipality must pay that person "regular wages provided for
the position to which he was appointed." G. L. c. 41, § 96B.
This case clarifies the meaning of that phrase. We hold that a
municipality must pay its employee attending a police academy
the "same basic pay as regular sworn officers." Cambridge v.
Cambridge Police Patrol Officers Ass'n, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 522,
526 (2003). Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary
judgment in favor of the town of Brewster, and remand this
matter to the Superior Court for entry of declaratory relief in
favor of the plaintiffs.2
Background. As set forth in an agreed statement of facts
submitted on summary judgment, Brewster hired the plaintiffs,
Daniel Lanctot, Brandon Rice, and Morgan Vermette, sent them to
a police academy, and ultimately appointed them as police
officers. More specifically, Brewster solicited applications
for a "Police Officer Entrance Examination." The plaintiffs
passed the entrance examination and applied for the position of
"Police Officer." Brewster hired the plaintiffs to a position
designated in the municipal bylaws as "Cadet." According to
individual employment contracts with Brewster, each plaintiff
would be compensated as a "dispatcher/cadet" while attending the
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc.
3
police academy and would "be sworn in as a Police Officer" upon
completion of the required education and training. In
accordance with the individual contracts, Brewster paid the
plaintiffs at the hourly wage rate for "Cadet" as set by the
bylaws, ranging from $19.08 to $20.19 per hour. Each plaintiff
successfully completed the academy, and Brewster hired them as
probationary police officers at the regular wage rate for police
officers set by the collective bargaining agreement -- $23.06 or
$23.41 per hour, depending on when each plaintiff was hired -- a
higher rate of pay than they received as cadets.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brewster in the
Superior Court seeking declaratory relief and alleging a
violation of G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). The parties
filed cross motions for summary judgment on an agreed statement
of facts. The plaintiffs claimed that under G. L. c. 41, § 96B,
they were entitled to be paid as police officers while attending
the academy, and Brewster countered that the statute allowed the
plaintiffs to be paid a lesser wage because they were hired as
cadets. The judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and entered judgment in favor of Brewster.
Discussion. We review motions for summary judgment "de
novo." Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy, Inc. v. Patel, 489 Mass.
549, 553 (2022). When cross motions for summary judgment are
filed on an agreed statement of facts, we review the documentary
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record to determine whether judgment may issue as a matter of
law. See Kewley v. Department of Elementary & Secondary Educ.,
86 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 158 (2014); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as
amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). The proper construction of a
statute is a question of law. See Meyer v. Veolia Energy N.
Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019). As summary judgment turned
entirely on an agreed statement of facts and the interpretation
of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, the present case is "especially suited
for summary disposition and de novo review." Kewley, supra.
The dispute in this case arises from two lengthy sentences
in the text of G. L. c. 41, § 96B:
"Every person who receives an appointment to a position on
a full-time basis in which he will exercise police powers
in the police department of any city or town, shall, prior
to exercising police powers, be assigned to and
satisfactorily complete a prescribed course of study
approved by the municipal police training committee. The
provisions of chapter thirty-one [civil service] and any
collective bargaining agreement notwithstanding, any person
so attending such a school shall be deemed to be a student
officer and shall be exempted from the provisions of
chapter thirty-one and any collective bargaining agreement
for that period during which he is assigned to a municipal
police training school [police academy], provided that such
person shall be paid the regular wages provided for the
position to which he was appointed and such reasonable
expenses as may be determined by the appointing authority
and subject to the provisions of chapter one hundred and
fifty-two [worker's compensation]" (emphases added).
The parties agree that Brewster had an obligation to pay the
plaintiffs while they were attending the police academy. They
disagree over what "regular wages" were due "for the position to
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which [the plaintiffs were] appointed." Id. The plaintiffs
contend that they were entitled to be paid as police officers
because they "were hired to become full-time police officers."
Brewster contends that the statute allowed the plaintiffs to be
paid as cadets because that is the "position to which [the
plaintiffs were] appointed" while attending the academy.
To resolve this dispute, we look to the language of the
statute as "the primary source of insight into the intent of the
Legislature." International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass.
841, 853 (1983). "Clear and unambiguous language in a statute
is conclusive as to legislative intent." Monell v. Boston Pads,
LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 575 (2015). In our view, the unambiguous
language of the statute requires that the plaintiffs should have
been paid as sworn police officers while attending the academy.
The statute requires training for anyone who "will exercise
police powers." G. L. c. 41, § 96B. The statute further
requires that "any person so attending such [police academy]
shall be deemed to be a student officer." Id. Student officers
are exempt from civil service as well as collective bargaining,
"provided" that they are "paid the regular wages provided for
the position to which [they were] appointed." Id. Because
student officers, hired by a municipality, are appointed for the
ultimate purpose of exercising police powers, student officers
must logically be paid the "regular wages" for the "position" of
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a sworn police officer who exercises such powers. Id. The
statute assures "that police recruits who are in training will
receive the same basic pay as regular sworn officers."
Cambridge, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 526.
An alternative construction of the statute risks exalting
form over substance. Brewster contends that the plaintiffs were
hired as cadets who lacked any prospect of exercising "police
powers" in that limited capacity. The record also shows,
however, that Brewster hired the plaintiffs so that they would
become police officers who would exercise police powers.
Brewster solicited applications for a "Police Officer Entrance
Examination." The plaintiffs passed the entrance examination
and applied for the position of "Police Officer." Brewster
entered into employment contracts with all three plaintiffs and
agreed that upon completion of the required education and
training each would "be sworn in as a Police Officer." The
plaintiffs completed the training at the police academy and were
sworn in as probationary police officers. Thus, the plaintiffs
received "appointment[s] to a position on a full-time basis in
which [they] will exercise police powers." G. L. c. 41, § 96B.
They were entitled to "regular wages" for the "position[s] to
which [they were] appointed." Id. They were not hired to
attend the academy for the purpose of becoming cadets; they were
hired to attend the academy for the very purpose of becoming
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police officers and should have been paid the "regular wages" of
police officers. Id.
Brewster also contends that Municipal Police Training
Committee regulations governing the academy lend support to its
position. To be enrolled at the academy, student officers do
not have to be appointed as sworn police officers. See 550 Code
Mass. Regs. § 3.06 (2013) (student officers must be twenty-one
years of age, pass physical ability test, and satisfy medical
examination). The regulations permit a student to be
"sponsored" by a police or law enforcement department, id.,
instead of being "employed by a law enforcement agency." 550
Code Mass. Regs. § 3.02 (2013) (definition of "Sponsored
Candidate"). The regulations also recognize that a student
officer might not be employed as a police officer at the time of
graduation: "any student officer who does not become employed
as a police officer within two years must re-attend the
applicable police academy or reserve/intermittent training
program prior to exercising police powers." 550 Code Mass.
Regs. § 3.03(3) (2013). Contrary to Brewster's argument, none
of these regulations conflicts with our view of the plain
language of § 96B. A sponsored candidate or one otherwise not
employed by a municipality is not a "person who receives an
appointment" while attending the academy. G. L. c. 41, § 96B.
When a municipality chooses to hire a full-time employee who
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becomes a "student officer" at the academy, the municipality is
required to pay "regular wages" of a sworn police officer. Id.
Brewster contends that the language of the statute "did not
prohibit" the hiring process it used to appoint and pay the
plaintiffs as cadets. For the reasons already stated, we take a
different view. Our conclusion is reinforced by the requirement
in the statute, added by amendment in 1994, that "any person so
attending such a school shall be deemed to be a student
officer." G. L. c. 41, § 96B, as amended through St. 1994,
c. 333. Brewster's bylaw creating a "cadet" position (with a
discretionary rate of pay) conflicts with the plain language of
the statute creating a "student officer" position (with a police
officer rate of pay). G. L. c. 41, § 96B. "[A] municipality
may not enact a bylaw, policy, or regulation that is
inconsistent with State law." Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449
Mass. 690, 699 (2007). See G. L. c. 147, § 21A (establishing
process for appointing "police cadets"). Thus, the plain
language of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, prohibits precisely the sort of
special classification that Brewster has tried to create.
Even if § 96B were susceptible to some ambiguity, however,
we discern no legislative intent to pay municipal employees who
become student officers at a rate different than sworn officers.
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the
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ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be
effectuated." Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v.
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). A review of the long
history of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, shows that the Legislature has
consistently required municipal employees attending a police
academy to be paid as police officers.
In order to provide a uniform, Statewide training program
for municipal police officers, the Legislature enacted "An Act
establishing a municipal police training council and requiring
police officers in cities and in certain towns to attend a
police training school." St. 1964, c. 564, §§ 1-5. This
legislation added G. L. c. 41, § 96B, and instituted a training
requirement for "[e]very person who receives an appointment as a
regular police officer on a permanent full-time basis" in cities
and towns with 5,000 or more inhabitants. St. 1964, c. 564, § 3
(adding G. L. c. 41, § 96B). The appointee would enjoy a grace
period of one year to complete the training and would be "paid
his wages as police officer." St. 1964, c. 564, § 3.
Starting in 1967 and continuing for a decade thereafter,
the Legislature systematically expanded the reach of the
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training mandate under § 96B. Amendments between 1967 and 1972
reduced the grace period to complete training,3 added in-service
training requirements,4 expanded training requirements for
additional police agencies,5 and maintained the requirement of
police wages for those attending training.6 Through an amendment
in 1977, the Legislature eliminated the grace period, extended
training requirements to "[e]very person who receives an
appointment to a position on a permanent full-time basis in
which he will exercise police powers," and added a training
requirement for anyone "appointed as a reserve, or intermittent
police officer, in a city or town." St. 1977, c. 932. The 1977
amendment further added to the patchwork of police agencies
3 See St. 1967, c. 504 (reduced grace period to six months).
4 St. 1968, c. 742 (added "in-service" training
requirement).
5 St. 1968, c. 742 (extended in-service training requirement
to include "metropolitan district commission police [and] the
capitol police"); St. 1971, c. 172 (extended in-service training
requirement to include "Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority police"); St. 1972, c. 697 (extended initial training
and in-service training to include all full-time municipal
police, "the metropolitan district commission police, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority police, the capitol
police, [and] . . . an employee of the registry of motor
vehicles having police powers").
6 St. 1967, c. 504 (trainee "shall be paid his wages as
police officer"); St. 1968, c. 742 (in-service trainee shall be
paid "his regular wages as a police officer"); St. 1972, c. 697
(initial and in-service trainee shall be paid wages as "police
officer").
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within the sweep of the training requirement by including the
"division of law enforcement within the office of the secretary
of the executive office of environmental affairs." Id. The
1977 amendment also added the language that is central to the
instant dispute: "Any person so attending such a school shall
be paid the wages provided for the position to which he was
appointed and such reasonable expenses as may be determined by
the appointing authority" (emphasis added). Id.
When read in the context of the prior amendments and
existing statutes regarding police powers, the language in the
1977 amendment is a clear effort to mandate training for those
who would be exercising police powers (regardless of the formal
occupational title). See, e.g., St. 1970, c. 534, § 2 (granting
police powers to Registry of Motor Vehicles "supervising
inspectors . . . , supervisors of special services and assistant
supervisors of special services, investigators, examiners and
safety instructors") (amending G. L. c. 90, § 29; partially
repealed by St. 1991, c. 412, § 58); St. 1938, c. 249, § 5
(granting police powers to "superintendent [of buildings] and
his capitol police") (amending G. L. c. 8, § 12; repealed by St.
1984, c. 413, § 12); St. 1939, c. 441, § 1 (granting police
powers to "call officer" of Metropolitan District Commission)
(amending G. L. c. 92, § 62A; repealed by St. 1991, c. 412,
§ 65). Because of the various formal titles assigned to those
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entrusted with police powers in the diverse law enforcement
landscape of 1977, the amendment necessarily included the broad
phrase, "position to which he was appointed," as a mechanism to
include all the wide-ranging personnel included under the new
training mandate. St. 1977, c. 932. We do not read this phrase
as an effort by the Legislature to deprive student officers from
receiving wages of a police officer or as an invitation to
municipalities to craft an alternative wage structure. See
Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962), quoting Walsh v.
Commissioners of Civ. Serv., 300 Mass. 244, 246 (1938) (proper
statutory construction requires interpretation "with reference
to the pre-existing law" that results in "harmonious and
consistent body of law").
Conclusion. The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated,
and judgment shall enter for the plaintiffs on Count I of their
complaint seeking declaratory relief. The case is remanded to
the Superior Court for entry of a declaration that the town of
Brewster violated G. L. c. 41, § 96B, by failing to pay the
plaintiffs regular wages as police officers while they attended
the police academy, and for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.7
7 The parties have not briefed, and we do not reach, any
issue as to Count II of the plaintiffs' complaint concerning the
town's liability under G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150, or as to the
issue of damages.
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So ordered.