Caitlin Schiffer v. Brendan Reid. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    22-P-289
    CAITLIN SCHIFFER
    vs.
    BRENDAN REID.1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The underlying action arises from a dispute among three
    siblings over the proceeds of their mother's estate.2              The
    plaintiff filed the action in Norfolk County Superior Court,
    alleging that the defendant wrongfully took funds from the
    estate, contrary to the instructions in their mother's will.
    After the defendant failed to comply with multiple discovery
    orders, a judge imposed on him a sanction of default on all of
    the plaintiff's claims (for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
    conversion, and tortious interference with inheritance).                 The
    judge then held an evidentiary hearing on assessment of damages,
    following which judgment entered for the plaintiff in the amount
    1 Individually and as personal representative of the estate of
    Claire F. Reid.
    2 One sibling, who was originally a plaintiff, was dismissed from
    the case upon the filing of a suggestion of death.
    of $42,319.03 in damages and $30,900 in attorney's fees, plus
    interest and costs.   The defendant now appeals from the judgment
    and from the denial of his later motion to vacate.3
    We begin by noting that the record appendix submitted by
    the defendant is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate
    review.   Among other deficiencies it does not contain the docket
    entries, the hearing transcript, the pertinent decisions of the
    judge, the judgment, or the notices of appeal.   See Mass.
    R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 
    481 Mass. 1637
     (2019).      As the
    appealing party, the defendant had the obligation to produce an
    appendix containing all relevant portions of the record; that he
    is pro se did not excuse him from this obligation.    See Davis v.
    Tabachnick, 
    425 Mass. 1010
    , 1010 (1997).   For this reason alone,
    we decline to overturn the judgment.
    For completeness, however, we will address the defendant's
    arguments, as we understand them.   The defendant first asserts
    that the plaintiff served him with a complaint that was "never
    3 The defendant filed multiple motions to vacate. His first
    motion was allowed in part as to the computation of damages, and
    a revised judgment entered. After appealing from the revised
    judgment, the defendant filed a second motion to vacate, which
    was denied by a second judge, the original judge having retired.
    Although the defendant filed an appeal from the second judge's
    decision, he does not raise any separate argument with respect
    to it and has thus waived his right to appellate review of that
    ruling. See Abate v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 
    470 Mass. 821
    , 833
    (2015). He did not appeal from the denials of any of his later
    motions.
    2
    part of the official record" and that his "entire defense" was
    based on this complaint.    Evidently, the defendant is referring
    to a duplicative action that the plaintiff filed in Plymouth
    County Superior Court, which was eventually dismissed with
    prejudice by stipulation.   From what we can tell, the complaint
    filed in Plymouth County is identical to the one that initiated
    the underlying case in Norfolk County, except that the former is
    missing paragraphs seven and twelve.4   Although this appears to
    have caused momentary confusion at the evidentiary hearing, the
    defendant has not demonstrated how he was thereby prejudiced.
    Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, the defendant is not
    entitled to relief.   See G. L. c. 231, § 119; Care & Protection
    of Frank, 
    409 Mass. 492
    , 499 (1991).
    Next, the defendant contends that damages should not have
    been awarded on the claims of fraud and tortious interference
    with inheritance because the factual predicates of those claims,
    as pleaded in the complaint, were either contradicted by
    evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing or were insufficient
    to state a claim on which relief could be granted.    See Nancy P.
    v. D'Amato, 
    401 Mass. 516
    , 519 (1988) ("When . . . a defendant
    4 Paragraph seven of the underlying complaint states,
    "Immediately following Ms. Reid's death, Brendan, the oldest
    sibling, represented to Bryan and Caitlin that their Mother had
    passed away intestate." Paragraph twelve states, "The June 7,
    1999 will also provided that Ms. Reid's estate was to pay all
    costs associated with her funeral."
    3
    is defaulted, well-pleaded facts are deemed to be admitted, but
    a plaintiff may recover only to the extent the complaint states
    a claim for relief").    To the extent this argument relies on the
    evidence adduced at the hearing, we cannot consider it because
    the defendant failed to provide us with a copy of the
    transcript.   See Cameron v. Carelli, 
    39 Mass. App. Ct. 81
    , 84
    (1995).   That aside, the argument does not support any reduction
    of damages, given the judge's finding that "the plaintiff would
    have been entitled to recover damages under any or all of her
    four claims."   As the defendant does not separately challenge
    the judgment with respect to the claims of breach of fiduciary
    duty and conversion, we have no basis to vacate the damages
    award.
    Nor do we have a basis to vacate the default judgment.       The
    defendant asserts that a default judgment was a disproportionate
    sanction for his discovery violation because the discovery
    requests were "never served upon" him yet he "complied with what
    he could anyway."    But the record flatly contradicts this
    assertion.    The attorney representing the defendant at the time
    attested in an affidavit that he received the discovery requests
    by e-mail.    In addition, as the judge stated in her decision
    imposing the sanction, "[t]he defendant was provided with a copy
    of the [discovery requests] on the record and in the presence of
    the Court."   The judge's decision also describes how the
    4
    defendant willfully and repeatedly violated her discovery
    orders, despite multiple warnings and extensions of the
    deadline.    In these circumstances the judge was within her
    discretion to impose the sanction of default.     See Short v.
    Marinas USA Ltd. Partnership, 
    78 Mass. App. Ct. 848
    , 852-853
    (2011).
    The judge was also within her discretion to award the
    plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees.     The defendant
    challenges the award on the ground that it was in essence a
    second sanction for his failure to comply with discovery.      As
    the defendant acknowledges, however, the award was based only
    "in part" on the discovery violation.     The primary basis was
    that the defendant engaged in "bad faith conduct that
    constituted contempt"; specifically, as the judge found, the
    defendant concealed information from the Probate and Family
    Court during the probate of the estate -- forcing the plaintiff
    "to file this lawsuit to recover the assets to which she was
    clearly entitled" -- and he then "continued to maintain that the
    [e]state was insolvent and refused to produce discovery that
    demonstrated the falsity of that assertion up until the eve of
    trial."     Given the defendant's bad faith, the judge determined
    that this was one of those "rare and egregious cases" in which
    an award of attorney's fees was warranted.     Police Comm'r of
    Boston v. Gows, 
    429 Mass. 14
    , 19 (1999).     The defendant has not
    5
    demonstrated, or even argued, that this was an abuse of
    discretion.   See 
    id. at 18
     (judge has discretion to award
    attorney's fees based on conduct amounting to contempt of court,
    including where litigant acted in bad faith, where "litigant's
    conduct [was] unreasonably obdurate or obstinate," and "where it
    should have been unnecessary for a successful litigant to have
    brought the action").5
    Judgment affirmed.
    Order dated September 21,
    2020, denying motion to
    vacate judgment, affirmed.
    By the Court (Sacks, Shin &
    D'Angelo, JJ.6),
    Clerk
    Entered: June 26, 2023.
    5 We deny the plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees,
    as she has offered no basis for such an award.
    6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    6