Commonwealth v. Robert S. Logan, Jr. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-624
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ROBERT S. LOGAN, JR.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a bench trial in the District Court, the
defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of liquor.1 On appeal, the defendant
contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient
identification evidence. We affirm.
Background. We set forth the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Colas, 486
Mass. 831, 833 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677 (1979). On February 19, 2020, at approximately
5:15 P.M., off-duty Shirley police detective William McGuinness
1 At the close of trial, the defendant admitted to sufficient
facts on a charge of negligent operation, which the judge
continued without a finding for a one-year period. The judge
also found the defendant not responsible for four civil
infractions relating to the same incident.
was in his car with his wife at the intersection of Columbia
Street and Main Street in Ayer when he noticed a small black
sedan speeding over a hill on Main Street. The sedan lost
control as it crested the hill and crossed the double yellow
line multiple times before rolling onto its side and crashing
into a light pole. McGuinness asked his wife to call 911 and
went to assist the driver. The driver was able to kick the door
open to exit the sedan, and McGuinness instructed him to sit in
the grass at the intersection. McGuinness observed an empty
bottle of rum and a bottle of Coca-Cola with liquid in it in the
sedan.
Ayer police officer Casey Scott responded to the scene and
spoke with the operator of the vehicle, who was identified as
the defendant, Robert S. Logan, Jr. The defendant told Scott
that he had been speeding on his way to get alcohol. Scott
observed that the defendant's speech was slurred, his behavior
was erratic, and Scott smelled an odor of alcohol on the
defendant's breath. The defendant complained of shoulder pain,
and Scott requested an ambulance to transport the defendant to
the hospital. Scott testified that he spent between twenty and
thirty minutes with the defendant at the scene. Over the
defendant's objection, the judge admitted the defendant's
medical records from the date of the accident. At the close of
the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required
2
finding of not guilty, arguing that no one "identified this
person sitting here as Robert Logan." The judge denied the
motion and ruled that "as the fact finder . . . [there was]
sufficient evidence to believe that [the defendant] was the
person who . . . the police engaged with."
Discussion. "In determining whether the Commonwealth met
its burden to establish each element of the offense charged, we
apply the familiar Latimore standard. '[The] question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the [Commonwealth], any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Colas, 486 Mass. at 836, quoting Latimore, 378 Mass.
at 677. On appeal, the defendant solely challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence of his identity.2
It is a basic principle of law that the Commonwealth must
establish as an essential element of any crime that the
defendant is the same person referred to in the evidence. See
Commonwealth v. Davila, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 512 (1984).
"[B]ald identity of name without confirmatory facts or
circumstances is insufficient to prove identity of person"
2 The Commonwealth was required to "prove that the defendant (1)
physically operated a vehicle; (2) 'on a public way or place to
which the public has a right of access; and (3) . . . was
impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor.'"
Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133-134 (2018),
quoting Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016).
3
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct.
728, 731 (2016). The Commonwealth may prove identity in several
ways, see Davila, supra, and "[t]he Commonwealth is entitled to
the reasonable inferences that a [fact finder] may draw from its
evidence on identification and the inferences drawn by the [fact
finder] need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary or
inescapable" (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth
v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483 (2010).
There is no dispute that the driver of the sedan that
crashed was Robert Logan, as evidenced by Scott's testimony and
the defendant's medical records, which identified the person
brought to the hospital from the crash as "Logan, Robert S."
Rather, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not
present sufficient evidence that he is the same Robert Logan who
was identified by police at the scene. But the trial transcript
belies this argument. After Scott testified that he spoke with
Robert Logan, the operator of the sedan that crashed, the
prosecutor said, "Your honor, at this time I'd ask that the
record reflect that the witness has identified the defendant --"
The judge interrupted the prosecutor and said, "It will." The
prosecutor responded, but the transcript reflects that the
response was "inaudible."3 To the extent the transcript was
3 We note that the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 243 (2014), to allow
4
insufficient, it was the defendant's burden to resolve that
issue. See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 604-605
(1983), citing Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 940(1979). See also Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481
Mass. 1637 (2019). While a more fulsome transcript may have
resolved the question, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, along with the
longstanding principle that a judge as fact finder is presumed
to instruct herself properly on the law, see Commonwealth v.
Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 152 (2001), we conclude that the
evidence sufficed.
Our conclusion also finds support in the reasonable
inferences drawn from Scott's testimony. This includes that the
driver identified himself as Robert Logan at the scene of the
accident, and Scott's responses to questioning at trial about
"the defendant" with answers detailing his response to the
accident involving Robert Logan.4 See, e.g., Coates, 89 Mass.
the in-court identification of the defendant by Scott. While it
is not clear that the judge ruled on the motion, defense counsel
did not object when the judge asked if there was an objection to
"the Clayton [sic] motion, which is the identification issue."
4 Scott referred to Robert Logan as the "operator" of the sedan
at the scene of the crash. Thereafter, Scott answered questions
about Robert Logan as "the defendant." From this, the fact
finder reasonably could have inferred that the person in court
was the same person at the scene of the accident. Robert Logan
could only properly be referred to as "the defendant" once he
had been charged and arraigned in court.
5
App. Ct. at 731-732. Moreover, "[i]t is not necessary that any
one witness should distinctly swear that the defendant was the
man, if the result of all the testimony . . . should identify
him as the offender" (citation omitted). Davila, 17 Mass. App.
Ct. at 512.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Blake, Walsh &
Hershfang, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: July 5, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
6