Commonwealth v. Chad Roach. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-364
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CHAD ROACH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the
defendant was convicted of operating under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (OUI), third offense, and sentenced to six
months in the house of correction.1 The defendant, who moved
unsuccessfully for a required finding of not guilty at the close
of the Commonwealth's case, appeals from his conviction for OUI.2
Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove
the elements of OUI beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
Facts. "When reviewing the denial of a motion for a
required finding of not guilty, 'we consider the evidence
introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
1 He was acquitted of a separate charge of negligent operation of
a motor vehicle.
2 He does not independently challenge his conviction of the
subsequent offense.
Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct.
377, 378 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539,
547 (2017). Because the defendant challenges only the
sufficiency of the evidence of operation and intoxication, we
focus on those elements. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).
At approximately 4 P.M. on March 8, 2020, the defendant's
neighbor was on the balcony of her apartment when she saw the
defendant's car make a wide turn from Route 28 in Middleborough
into the parking lot of their housing complex and drive "at an
alarmingly high rate of speed" into the parking area. The
neighbor watched as the car continued through the lot, nearly
sideswiping a number of the cars parked there, and then felt the
building shake as the car crashed through a bush and into the
building. The neighbor called the police. Officer Andrew
Lefebvre arrived approximately twenty minutes later and found
the defendant in the driver's seat of his car alone and
unconscious. The car was covered in debris from the bush and
was not parked properly.
Officer Lefebvre tapped on the window and roused the
defendant. The officer observed that the defendant smelled of
an alcoholic beverage, was slurring his words, and was
"definitely unsteady on his feet." The defendant admitted to
2
having consumed "four or five beers" earlier in the day. He
also admitted that he "had been drinking, had been driving" at
approximately 11 A.M., and had been "sleep[ing] it off." The
key was not in the ignition, but the hood and the grille of the
defendant's car were still warm.3 The defendant agreed to
perform field sobriety assessments; he was able to count
backward and recite the alphabet as requested, but was too
unsteady to safely complete the physical tests offered to him.
Officer Lefebvre, who had formed the opinion that the defendant
was intoxicated, placed him under arrest for OUI.
Discussion. The defendant first argues that the
Commonwealth's evidence on the element of operation was
insufficient because there was no direct evidence that he drove
his car. "The absence of . . . direct evidence [of operation]
. . . is not dispositive, as 'a conviction may rest entirely on
circumstantial evidence.'" Commonwealth v. Cromwell, 56 Mass.
App. Ct. 436, 438–439 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 414
Mass. 343, 354, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993). There is
ample circumstantial evidence of operation in the evidence here.
Specifically, the neighbor's observation of the defendant's
car driving off Route 28 and into the housing complex's parking
3 As we note above, these events occurred in March 2020. The
judge could have inferred from the trial testimony that the
weather was cold at the time.
3
lot, coupled with the defendant's admission to having driven
home to "sleep . . . off" the effects of the beer he had
consumed, and the police officers' discovery of the defendant
unconscious in his recently-driven car was enough to prove the
defendant's operation of the vehicle.4 See Commonwealth v.
Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52-53 (2006) (evidence of warm
engine, defendant's ownership of vehicle and possession of keys
to car, defendant's apparent intoxication and agreement to
perform sobriety tests, and lack of evidence indicating that
someone else operated car, together sufficient to prove
defendant's operation). See also Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 378
("The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be
reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or
inescapable'" [citation omitted]). Cf. Commonwealth v. Adams,
421 Mass. 289, 291 (1995) (defendant's admission of operation
not enough to warrant jury's finding on that element unless
corroborated by other evidence).
Regarding the element of intoxication, the evidence
likewise was sufficient. As the judge noted at the conclusion
of the trial, that evidence included the neighbor's account of
the defendant's erratic driving; the officers' observations of
4 It was also sufficient to prove the element of public way
although, as we have noted, the defendant does not explicitly
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that point. See
G. L. c. 90, § 1.
4
how the defendant looked, smelled, and acted; the defendant's
admission that he had consumed alcohol, albeit earlier in the
day; and the officers' opinion that the defendant was
intoxicated some twenty minutes after he arrived in the parking
lot. That evidence, in combination, was plainly sufficient to
prove that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol when
he drove into the parking area of the apartment complex. See
Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 19, 21-22 (1996)
(manner in which vehicle was parked, combined with odor of
alcohol, defendant's admission to being drunk, and defendant's
failure on multiple field sobriety tests sufficient to prove
OUI).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Hand &
Hodgens, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: July 5, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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