Commonwealth v. Luis Merced Navaez. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-37
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
LUIS MERCED NAVAEZ.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant
was found guilty of rape, assault and battery on a family or
household member, and assault and battery on a pregnant person.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in
admitting prior and subsequent bad act evidence. We affirm.
Background. The defendant and the victim met in 2012 and
were initially friends before beginning a romantic relationship,
and the two started living together in 2014. After the
defendant was released from prison in 2019, he often visited the
victim at her apartment, where she was living with their son
(born in 2016) and her son from a previous relationship. In
July 2019, the defendant became aggressive when he found out
1 As is our usual practice, we take the defendant's name as it
appears on the indictments.
that the victim was pregnant again. Around the same time, the
victim also became suspicious that the defendant was in a
relationship with another woman. When she questioned the
defendant about her concerns, he refused to answer.
On August 3, 2019, the defendant arrived at the victim's
apartment, and the two went into her bedroom. The victim
questioned the defendant about whether he had been seeing
another woman. The defendant became aggressive and told the
victim that "he had just come over that day so [she] would cook
for him" and "meet his needs as a woman." The victim's younger
son tried to come into her bedroom, and she had a "tug of war"
with the defendant so that she could get their son out of the
room. The defendant pulled the victim from the doorway to the
bed by her hair, covered her mouth so that she could not yell,
and put his hands on her neck. The defendant then threw the
victim on the bed, tore her pants off, held her arms with his
hands, and put his penis in her vagina. The victim screamed and
told the defendant to stop because she was afraid that she would
lose the baby. The victim's fourteen year old son heard the
screaming and heard the victim yell, "Get off of me" in Spanish.
He testified that when the victim came out of her bedroom, she
was hurt and bruised. She did not report the rape at that time.
On August 5, 2019, the victim went to see the defendant
with plans to end their relationship. When she confronted him,
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he picked up a phone charger and hit her with the cord multiple
times. After that, the victim was terrified and in pain. Two
days later, on August 7, 2019, the victim reported both the rape
and the assault with the phone charger to the police.
Discussion. Before trial, both parties filed motions in
limine regarding the admission of prior and subsequent bad act
evidence. The Commonwealth sought to admit evidence that the
defendant had previously committed an assault and battery on the
victim in 2015 while she was pregnant, and that on August 5,
2019, the defendant struck the victim with the cord of a phone
charger. The judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion and denied
the defendant's motion.
It is well established that "[e]vidence of a defendant's
prior or subsequent bad acts is inadmissible for the purpose of
demonstrating the defendant's bad character or propensity to
commit the crimes charged." Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass.
228, 249 (2014). However, the Commonwealth may introduce such
evidence for another purpose, including to establish "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident" (quotation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 385 (2020). A judge must
engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether to admit bad
act evidence at trial. See id. at 386. "First, the evidence
must be relevant to something other than the defendant's
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propensity to commit the charged offense . . . Second, if the
evidence is relevant, its prejudicial effect must not outweigh
its probative value." Id. We review to determine whether there
was error, and if so, whether it was prejudicial. See Crayton,
470 Mass. at 252.
Prior bad act evidence. The judge found that the prior bad
act evidence (the 2015 assault) was relevant to the nature of
the parties' relationship, the defendant's state of mind, his
intent, and the absence of mistake. The defendant argues that
this was error. We disagree. The evidence was relevant to
demonstrate that the defendant and the victim had a hostile
relationship. See Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 550
(2017) ("It is well established that in appropriate cases, a
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence may be admitted for
the purpose of showing a defendant's motive and intent and to
depict the existence of a hostile relationship between the
defendant and the victim" [quotation omitted]). See also
Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 780 (2016)
(prior bad act admissible to show "the history of the
relationship [between the defendant and the victim] to give
context to the jury" [quotation omitted]). Additionally, the
victim was pregnant both during the 2015 assault and when the
rape and assault in this case occurred. Accordingly, the
earlier assault was probative of the defendant's mental state
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and intent. See Oberle, 476 Mass. at 550-551. The judge
reduced the prejudicial effect of the evidence by precluding the
victim from testifying to the underlying facts of the 2015
assault. He also explained to the jury that they could only
consider the uncharged prior act as probative of the nature of
the parties' relationship or either party's state of mind. See
Commonwealth v. Lowery, 487 Mass. 851, 868-869 (2021) (no abuse
of discretion when risk of prejudice was mitigated by multiple
limiting instructions).
The defendant also argues this evidence should not have
been admitted in evidence because it was not charged conduct.
However, evidence of uncharged conduct may be admissible in
sexual assault cases to show the jury a full view of the
relationship between the defendant and the victim. See
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128-129 (2006). This is
particularly true when, as here, the judge instructed the jury
that the conduct was uncharged, and it would therefore be unfair
to consider it for propensity purposes. Additionally, the judge
did not err in his determination that the 2015 assault was not
too remote in time because the defendant had been incarcerated
for almost three and a half of the four intervening years. See
Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 416 (2000) (length between
two crimes not so temporally remote as to preclude admission of
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the earlier offense because defendant spent most of that ten-
year period in prison). There was no error.
Subsequent bad act evidence. The judge found that the
subsequent bad act evidence helped to explain why the victim
delayed in reporting the rape and assault. The defendant claims
this was error, and that it had minimal probative value. We are
not persuaded as the judge both limited the scope of the
victim's testimony about the assaults and gave the jury limiting
instructions. Moreover, when a judge determines that defense
counsel plans to impeach a witness about a delay in reporting,
as he did here based on the defendant's opening statement, it is
proper for the Commonwealth to elicit testimony regarding the
circumstances of the delayed disclosure on direct examination.
See Commonwealth v. Hall, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 396 (2006).
The judge also gave a limiting instruction that the testimony
was admitted only to explain the witness's state of mind in
delaying her report of the crime. See id. Finally, subsequent
bad acts may be admitted when the parties are in an ongoing,
abusive relationship, as they were here, to explain a victim's
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seemingly illogical actions and reactions. See Commonwealth v.
Childs, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 72 (2018). There was no error.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Blake &
Brennan, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: June 1, 2023.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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