Commonwealth v. Sylvester Agyeah. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-965
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
SYLVESTER AGYEAH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the District Court, the
defendant, Sylvester Agyeah, was convicted of resisting arrest
in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B. The defendant appeals from
the denial of his motion for a new trial after a nonevidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
Background. The defendant is a citizen of Ghana and has
been a permanent resident of the United States since 2013. The
present matter stems from an incident that occurred on April 26,
2018, in Worcester. On that date, members of the Worcester
Police Department were conducting a "john sting," targeting
individuals soliciting prostitutes near Loudon Street. At
approximately 9:30 P.M., officers identified and engaged in a
struggle with a "john" in the middle of Loudon Street. As the
officers struggled with the john, the defendant approached the
scene in his motor vehicle, caused a "commotion" by "yelling
from his vehicle," argued with officers regarding the john's
arrest, created "a safety issue" for the officers struggling to
arrest the john, and refused several requests to leave the area
despite being warned that he would be arrested "for interfering
with police and disorderly conduct." Despite several warnings,
the defendant continued to argue with the officers. Thus, the
officers ordered him to exit his vehicle. The defendant
complied, but then "used force to pull away from [the officers]
so that he couldn't be placed into handcuffs," "pushed his body
back from the car . . . and pulled his arms away from [the
officers'] grasps." After a struggle, two officers "forcibly
put [the defendant's] arms behind him," "gain[ed] control of
him," and placed him in handcuffs.1
The defendant testified at trial and claimed, inter alia,
that an officer knocked the cell phone that he was using to
record the incident out of his hand and later took it from him;
that the officers never asked him to move his vehicle; that he
could not leave because his vehicle was blocked in by other
1 The officers were unable to double lock the defendant's
handcuffs because he was not compliant. Also, when walking the
defendant to the transport wagon, an officer applied a
"wristlock" technique because the defendant "was resisting the
efforts to go to the wagon" while he "continued yelling and
screaming." Officers testified that the defendant did not
complain of any injuries.
2
vehicles; that he complied when asked to put his hands behind
his back; that an officer twisted his handcuffs, causing him
pain and injury to his wrists; and that one of the officers made
a disparaging racial remark to him.2
The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct,
disturbing the peace, resisting arrest, and the common law crime
of interfering with a police officer. Aware of the defendant's
status as a permanent resident, trial counsel advised his client
early in his representation "that a conviction could have
immigration consequences," but told the defendant that he "was
not an immigration attorney" and referred him to two local
immigration lawyers. Following this advice, the defendant spoke
with an immigration lawyer after his arraignment who advised him
that "if [he] was convicted, [he] could be prevented from
applying for United States citizenship for five years."
On May 30, 2019, the day scheduled for trial, the
Commonwealth offered to dismiss the resisting arrest charge and
decriminalize the disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace
charges if the defendant agreed to be found responsible for the
2 During an August 1, 2022 hearing on the defendant's posttrial
motion to present expert testimony, appellate defense counsel
represented that the defendant had filed a civil suit in Federal
court against the Worcester Police Department. However, that
matter is not before us.
3
two civil infractions. The defendant rejected the offer,3 and
following trial that same day, a jury convicted him of resisting
arrest and acquitted him of disorderly conduct and disturbing
the peace.4 The judge sentenced the defendant to one year of
administrative probation that terminated on May 26, 2020.
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial in June of
2022, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
in two areas. First, he argued that trial counsel failed to
advise him of the immigration consequences of the Commonwealth's
plea offer compared to that of proceeding to trial. In his
accompanying affidavit, the defendant averred that trial counsel
did not explain that if he accepted the Commonwealth's offer,
there would be "no statutory bar to [his] applying for United
States citizenship, but that if [he] was convicted of resisting
arrest, [he] could be barred from applying for five years."
Second, the defendant argued that trial counsel failed to
present "important evidence implicating the credibility of
government witnesses" where the case was a "credibility contest
3 The defendant does not allege that trial counsel advised him to
reject the Commonwealth's offer. To the contrary, the trial
transcript reveals that the judge explained on the record that
the Commonwealth was "going to dismiss the resisting
arrest . . . [and] decriminalize the disorderly, disturbing."
Trial counsel acknowledged the offer, stating, "I explained that
to my client."
4 The interfering with a police officer charge was dismissed at
the Commonwealth's request with the defendant's consent.
4
between the police and [the defendant]." The motion judge, who
was also the trial judge, denied the defendant's motion after a
nonevidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
Discussion. "To prevail on a motion for a new trial
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that . . . 'behavior of counsel [fell] measurably below
that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,'
and that counsel's poor performance 'likely deprived the
defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of
defence.'" Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 429-430
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96
(1974). "We review a judge's denial of a motion for a new trial
for 'a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion,'
granting 'special deference to the rulings of a motion judge who
was also the trial judge.'" Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass.
150, 158 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469,
488 (2014).
1. Immigration consequences. The defendant asserts that
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
inform him that accepting the Commonwealth's offer to dismiss
the resisting arrest charge and decriminalize the remaining
charges presented no adverse immigration consequences, while a
conviction for resisting arrest was "likely to set his
5
application for citizenship back at least five years." On the
record before us, the argument is unpersuasive.
"[D]efense counsel [has] a duty to inform a noncitizen
client that conviction, whether by plea or by trial, may carry
adverse immigration consequences." Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466
Mass. 422, 436 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464
Mass. 115, 125 (2013). "In determining whether the defendant
met his burden under the performance prong of the Saferian
standard, we must first address what level of advice [trial]
counsel [was] constitutionally required to provide the defendant
given the charges against him."5 Commonwealth v. Henry, 88 Mass.
App. Ct. 446, 452 (2015). The level of advice required depends
upon the certainty of risk that the defendant faces. When the
immigration consequences are "truly clear," then "the duty to
give correct advice is equally clear." Commonwealth v. Chleikh,
5 We reject the defendant's contention that the Commonwealth is
estopped from arguing that he did not meet his burden on the
"performance prong" of the ineffective assistance test because
the Commonwealth conceded the issue below. Judicial estoppel
"precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal
proceeding that is contrary to a position it had previously
asserted in another proceeding" (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. McGilvery, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 509-510
(2009). However, the doctrine only applies where the party
"succeeded in convincing the court to accept its prior position"
(citation omitted). Id. at 510. Here, the motion judge did not
accept the Commonwealth's position on the first prong, but
rather concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate that
counsel's performance "fell measurably below that which might be
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."
6
82 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 723 (2012), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). However, "when the law is not
succinct and straightforward, . . . a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences." Id., quoting Padilla, supra.Here, it is far from clear that resisting arrest
constitutes a "crime involving moral turpitude" such that a
conviction would bar the defendant from applying for citizenship
for five years for lack of "good moral character." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a).6 The defendant has not identified any legal
authority, nor are we aware of any, indicating that resisting
arrest is a crime involving moral turpitude. Contrast
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 180-181 (2014) (relevant
immigration statute "succinct, clear, and explicit" about
removal consequences for noncitizens convicted of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine). Rather, the defendant
relies on conclusory statements in affidavits unsupported by
6 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) requires applicants for naturalization to be
of "good moral character" for five years preceding the date of
their application. A person who is convicted of or admits to
having committed a "crime involving moral turpitude" is
precluded from being regarded as a person with good moral
character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
7
legal authority.7 Contrast Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 86 Mass.
App. Ct. 438, 442-443 (2014) (defendant cited legal authorities
indicating larceny and malicious destruction of property are
crimes involving moral turpitude that would subject defendant to
"presumptively mandatory deportation"). Where counsel's advice
to the defendant -- that a conviction could have immigration
consequences and referring him to two immigration lawyers -- was
consistent with the requirements of Padilla and its progeny,
see, e.g., Chleikh, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 723, the judge did not
err or abuse his discretion when he found that the defendant
failed to show the "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or
inattention of counsel" required to satisfy the first prong of
the ineffective assistance test.8 Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.
7 The defendant's immigration expert, Attorney Valentin, averred
in an affidavit that "immigration officials would likely
consider the defendant's conviction for resisting arrest to be a
'crime involving moral turpitude,'" but acknowledged that
"[t]here is no case law" analyzing the immigration consequences
of resisting arrest in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B. The
defendant's other immigration expert, Attorney Harrington,
averred in an affidavit that "in [his] experience," permanent
residents convicted of resisting arrest are "at risk of being
denied reentry" to the United States and will not be granted
citizenship for "at least five years." Consistent with this
view, in his own affidavit, the defendant averred that an
immigration lawyer advised him that if convicted he "could be
prevented from applying for Unites States citizenship for five
years." The defendant further averred in his affidavit that he
was "told" by some unnamed source that, because of his
conviction for resisting arrest, he must wait five years from
the end of his probation term to apply for citizenship.
8 The defendant's trial counsel averred in an affidavit that he
advised the defendant that a conviction could have immigration
8
Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant satisfied the
first prong of the Saferian test, we agree with the judge that
he failed to satisfy the second, "prejudice" prong. In the
present case, "[h]aving to stand trial, not choosing to waive
it, is the prejudice alleged." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156,
163-164 (2012). To establish prejudice in the plea context,
"the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the prosecution would have made an offer, that the defendant
would have accepted it, and that the court would have approved
it." Marinho, 464 Mass. at 129. As evidence that he would have
accepted the Commonwealth's offer, the defendant relies on his
statement in his affidavit that he "would never have taken [his]
chances at trial" if counsel had explained that accepting the
offer would ensure that he was not barred from applying for
citizenship for five years. However, the motion judge was
entitled "to reject as not credible the defendant's self-
serving, conclusory affidavit," see Commonwealth v. Grant, 426
consequences but that he was not an immigration attorney. He
further averred that he "referred [the defendant] to two local
attorneys who practice immigration law." The defendant, in his
affidavit, averred that trial counsel told him that he could not
advise him of immigration consequences, but "should
independently seek the advice of an immigration lawyer." The
defendant further acknowledged in is affidavit that he "did talk
to an immigration lawyer shortly after [his] arraignment . . .
[and] was advised that if [he] was convicted, [he] could be
prevented from applying for United States citizenship for five
years."
9
Mass. 667, 673 (1998), and here implicitly did so. The
defendant, having followed counsel's advice and spoken to an
immigration attorney, knew at the time of the plea offer that if
he was convicted, his citizenship application could be barred
for five years. The defendant did not assert that counsel
advised him not to accept the deal, or that he did not
understand that a dismissal and decriminalization to civil
infractions for the remaining charges did not constitute a
conviction. Accordingly, the defendant has met neither prong of
the Saferian test, and we cannot conclude that the motion
judge's determination "falls outside the range of reasonable
alternatives." L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27
(2014).
2. Failure to present evidence implicating the credibility
of government witnesses. The defendant next contends that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present
certain evidence implicating the credibility of the officers'
testimony. We disagree.
"Generally, failure to impeach a witness does not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel." Commonwealth v. Norris, 483
Mass. 681, 687 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass.
340, 357 (2001). "[A]bsent counsel's failure to pursue some
obviously powerful form of impeachment available at trial, it is
speculative to conclude that a different approach to impeachment
10
would likely have affected the jury's conclusion." Fisher,
supra. See also Millien, 474 Mass. at 432 (defense
"substantial" under prejudice prong of Saferian "where we have a
serious doubt whether the jury verdict would have been the same
had the defense been presented").
The defendant maintains that counsel could have consulted
with and presented testimony by an expert on police use of force
and police procedures to demonstrate that the officers'
testimony was not credible. The defendant argues that his
proposed expert, a retired Connecticut police officer who
reviewed the surveillance video footage of the incident, would
have been able to discredit the officers' testimony by
demonstrating that the defendant's vehicle was blocked in and he
was unable to turn around to leave the area of the john's
arrest. Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant's proposed
expert testimony would have been admissible, counsel's failure
to introduce it was not prejudicial, because the alleged
blocking of the defendant's vehicle prior to his arrest would
not have undermined or contradicted the evidence that he
resisted arrest. The evidence at trial allowed a jury to
conclude that, as officers attempted to handcuff the defendant,
he "used force to pull away from [the officers] so that he
couldn't be placed into handcuffs," "pushed his body back from
the car . . . and pulled his arms away from [the officers']
11
grasps." See Commonwealth v. Don, 483 Mass. 697, 707 (2019)
(defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure "to present
expert testimony 'disproving' a particular factual scenario that
was not essential to the Commonwealth's theory of the case").
The defendant further contends that counsel was ineffective
for failing to cross-examine the officers regarding the
surveillance video footage of the incident or their compliance
with Worcester police policies. Trial counsel authenticated and
introduced the surveillance video footage of the incident
("Exhibit 2") during the defendant's direct examination.
Putting aside whether trial counsel could have introduced the
surveillance video footage earlier, such as during cross-
examination of the officers,9 the defendant has failed to
demonstrate with any reasoned argument, as opposed to conclusory
assertions, how doing so would have influenced the jury's
conclusion that he resisted arrest. Likewise, the defendant has
not demonstrated how any alleged violation of Worcester police
policies -- e.g., by failing to document the seizure of his cell
phone or file a use of force report for the wristlock technique
-- would have influenced the jury's conclusion that he resisted
arrest.
9 The judge told trial counsel that he would not allow counsel to
introduce and authenticate the video footage during cross-
examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses.
12
Nor did counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to
impeach Officer McGrath with a prior inconsistent statement he
made during a July 25, 2018 hearing on the defendant's traffic
citation. Officer McGrath testified at the citation hearing
that he activated his cruiser's siren and lights when he arrived
behind the defendant's vehicle. At trial, he testified that he
activated the cruiser's siren, but not the lights. Whether
Officer McGrath turned on his cruiser's lights when he
approached the scene was inconsequential and unlikely to have
influenced the jury's conclusion that the defendant resisted
arrest. See Fisher 433 Mass. at 357.
The defendant also argues that trial counsel should have
introduced a video recording taken by a rear exterior camera of
the police transport wagon because it demonstrated that he
appeared to be in pain; that he was cooperative; that officers
had an opportunity to double lock his handcuffs before loading
him into the wagon; and that two officers were not displaying
their police identification. Where the video footage has no
audio and shows a limited view of officers loading the defendant
into the wagon after they had already handcuffed him, we are not
persuaded that playing the video at trial was likely to provide
a substantial ground of defense to resisting arrest. Saferian,
366 Mass. at 96. On this record, we cannot say that it was an
abuse of discretion to deny the motion for a new trial.
13
Likewise, the defendant's argument that counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce documentary evidence of his
injuries is unpersuasive. The medical records are from a
hospital visit on May 17, 2018, approximately three weeks after
the defendant's arrest, and the photographs the defendant took
of his wrists lack date or time stamps.10 Moreover, both
officers testified that it is common for individuals to
experience pain while handcuffed and explained that an arrestee
being noncompliant makes it "impossible" to double lock
handcuffs to prevent further tightening. In short, we cannot
conclude that the defendant was deprived of a substantial ground
of defense, and we have no "serious doubt whether the jury
10The only indication of the date each photo was taken is the
defendant's averment that he took them on May 3, 2018, and May
14, 2018, several days after his arrest on April 26, 2018.
14
verdict would have been the same" in the absence of counsel's
claimed failures. Millien, 474 Mass. at 432.11
Order denying motion for a
new trial affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman,
Desmond & Smyth, JJ.12),
Clerk
Entered: August 7, 2023.
11 We are likewise unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that
the judge abused his discretion by denying the motion without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. The judge is not required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing unless the defendant raises a
"substantial issue." Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). "If, on the papers presented, the
basis of the motion is not 'credible' or 'persuasive,' an
evidentiary hearing accomplishes nothing." Commonwealth v.
Candelario, 446 Mass. 847, 859 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v.
Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348-349 (2004). For the reasons
discussed supra, "the judge's finding that the defendant[] . . .
did not raise a substantial issue is entitled to substantial
deference, . . . and the judge could properly use his knowledge
and evaluation of the evidence at trial in determining whether
to decide the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary
hearing" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 Mass.
496, 509 (2019). To the extent that we have not specifically
addressed subsidiary arguments in the parties' briefs, they have
been considered, and do not warrant further discussion. See
Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
15