Guardianship of Kayla. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    22-P-588
    GUARDIANSHIP OF KAYLA. 1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The guardian, the child's maternal grandmother, appeals
    from a decree allowing the father's petition to terminate the
    guardianship of the child and resume parental duties.               See G. L.
    c. 190B, § 5-212 (a).       Following a three-day trial in the
    Probate and Family Court, the judge found the father fit to
    parent the child, terminated the guardianship, and awarded
    custody to the father. 2      On appeal, the guardian contends that
    the judge erred in finding the father fit to parent, as well as
    in denying the guardian's requests to appoint a guardian ad
    litem and to order visitation for the guardian.             We see no abuse
    of discretion or error of law, and affirm.
    1.   Fitness.    "[P]arents have a fundamental liberty
    interest in the care, custody, and management of their
    1 A pseudonym.
    2 The mother participated at trial but is not a part of this
    appeal.
    children."   Matter of Hilary, 
    450 Mass. 491
    , 496 (2008).
    Although a guardianship displaces a parent's rights, a parent
    retains the right to "petition for removal of a guardian on the
    ground that removal would be in the best interest of the ward."
    G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212 (a).    See Guardianship of Kelvin, 
    94 Mass. App. Ct. 448
    , 453 (2018).    "The burden of proof rests with
    the guardian to establish the [parent's] unfitness by clear and
    convincing evidence."    Guardianship of Cheyenne, 
    77 Mass. App. Ct. 826
    , 829 (2010). 3   Unfitness is evidenced by "grievous
    shortcomings or handicaps that would put the child's welfare
    . . . much at hazard."    Petition of the New England Home for
    Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
    367 Mass. 631
    , 646 (1975).    In addition to proving unfitness, the guardian
    must also show that continuation of the guardianship is in the
    best interest of the child.    Guardianship of Kelvin, supra at
    456.   We review the trial judge's decision for abuse of
    discretion or clear error of law.     See Guardianship of Cheyenne,
    supra at 829-830.
    3 The father originally consented to the guardianship and thus
    had never been found unfit. This relieved the father of the
    burden to present evidence of changed circumstances since the
    appointment of the guardian. See Guardianship of Kelvin, 94
    Mass. App. Ct. at 456. Nevertheless, the judge credited the
    father's subsequent efforts to attain sobriety as a change in
    circumstances in favor of the father.
    2
    Here, there was no error in the judge's ruling that the
    guardian failed to meet her burden of proving the father unfit.
    The guardian argues that the father struggles with ongoing
    substance abuse issues, fails to meet the child's medical needs,
    and frightens the child, but the judge addressed each of these
    issues with detailed findings that were supported by the record.
    See Custody of Eleanor, 
    414 Mass. 795
    , 799 (1993).   The judge
    found that after the father consented to the guardianship so
    that he could work on his sobriety, he promptly obtained mental
    health and addiction treatment, regularly provided negative drug
    tests, and had been sober for over one year at the time of the
    trial.   The judge also considered that the father regularly
    visited the child in both supervised and unsupervised settings,
    and cared appropriately for the child by cooking, doing laundry,
    and helping with the child's schoolwork.   The judge found that
    although the father had refused to attend a Zoom meeting with
    the child's doctor and had been asked to leave the child's
    pediatrician's office, these incidents were more indicative of
    the father's relationship with the guardian than the father's
    ability to care for the child.   See Adoption of Querida, 
    94 Mass. App. Ct. 771
    , 778 (2019) (judge must confront "troublesome
    facts").
    In considering the child's best interests, the judge also
    compared the child's behaviors while with each party.   The judge
    3
    found that while the child was with the guardian, the child
    presented behavioral issues like biting and scratching and was
    afraid to go to her bedroom at night.       The father testified that
    the child did not exhibit any of these behaviors while visiting
    him.    In light of the detailed findings provided by the judge,
    we see no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that
    the father was fit and that the best interests of the child
    would be served by terminating the guardianship.
    2.    Guardian ad litem.   Prior to trial, the guardian
    unsuccessfully moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem to
    conduct an investigation of facts bearing on the father's
    petition and to make a report, with recommendations, to the
    court.       The judge did not err in denying the motion, or in
    instead appointing a probation officer to conduct an
    investigation.
    A judge has discretion in deciding whether to appoint a
    guardian ad litem or other appropriate person to investigate
    facts.       See G. L. c. 215, § 56A; Ruml v. Ruml, 
    50 Mass. App. Ct. 500
    , 513 (2000).       Here, the judge ordered the probation
    department to investigate and report on the issues surrounding
    the custody of the child.       The nature of the scope of the
    investigation, as well as the person chosen to conduct it, fell
    squarely within the permissible discretion of the trial judge.
    See Hayden v. Hayden, 
    15 Mass. App. Ct. 915
    , 916 (1993).         In
    4
    addition, a wide variety of pertinent witnesses, including the
    father, the guardian, the probation officer, and multiple other
    witnesses familiar with the child's circumstances, were
    available to testify at the trial, and statements by the child
    were available in the record. 4   Presented with all this
    information on which to base her decision, the judge did not err
    in appointing a probation officer, or in declining the
    guardian's request to appoint a guardian ad litem, to conduct
    the investigation.
    3.   Visitation.   Nor did the judge abuse her discretion in
    declining to order visitation time for the guardian with the
    child.    Although the judge recognized that the child and the
    guardian shared a close relationship, the judge credited the
    testimony of the mother that she would allow the guardian access
    to the child during the mother's parenting time. 5   Contrary to
    the guardian's assertion, the mother plainly testified that she
    would allow the guardian access to the child on alternate
    4 To the extent that the guardian mentions her unsuccessful
    attempts at trial to introduce statements by the child's
    therapist and a video recording containing statements by the
    child, her brief does not explain how this was reversible error.
    See Donovan v. Gardner, 
    50 Mass. App. Ct. 595
    , 602 (2000)
    (conclusory statements in brief "do not rise to the level of
    appellate argument").
    5 The judge similarly declined to order visitation for the
    paternal grandparents, where the father testified that they
    would have access to the child during his parenting time since
    he would be living with them.
    5
    weekends if the guardian did not have her own visitation time.
    See Adoption of Quentin, 
    424 Mass. 882
    , 886 (1997) ("the judge's
    assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
    the witnesses is entitled to deference" [citation omitted]).
    See also Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 66 (2000) (parents
    have a fundamental right to "make decisions concerning the care,
    custody, and control of their children").      Although the guardian
    had been the child's primary caregiver for several years, the
    child also had an ongoing relationship with the father, with the
    father regularly visiting and appropriately caring for the
    child.     Compare Youmans v. Ramos, 
    429 Mass. 774
    , 784 (1999)
    (guardian was entitled to visitation where guardian was "only
    family [the child] knows").     The judge therefore did not err in
    ordering visitation only to the father and the mother.      See 
    id. at 781
     (controlling consideration in custody proceedings is the
    welfare of the child).
    Decree affirmed.
    By the Court (Green, C.J.,
    Ditkoff & Hodgens, JJ. 6),
    Clerk
    Entered:    August 29, 2023.
    6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    6