Commonwealth v. Paul Collins. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-438
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
PAUL COLLINS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Over three years after he pleaded guilty to various sex
offenses, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R.
Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), seeking
to withdraw his pleas on the ground that his plea counsel was
ineffective. On July 23, 2021, the same judge who presided over
the defendant's change of plea hearing denied the motion after
an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
Background. 1. The defendant's pleas. We summarize the
facts found by the judge, supplemented with undisputed facts
from the record. See Commonwealth v. Dew, 492 Mass. 254, 255
n.2 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 481
(2000) ("In examining the defendant's claim that his counsel was
ineffective, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of
fact absent clear error"). The defendant was the aquatic
director and swim team coach at the Arlington Boys Club from
September 1977 until July 1980, when he was asked to resign
after allegations surfaced that he had sexually assaulted one of
the boys on the swim team. The defendant moved out of State
shortly thereafter.
Police learned of the sexual assault allegations against
the defendant in 2013, by which time "multiple people" had come
forward. The defendant was arrested at his home in New York and
interviewed by Arlington police on May 17, 2013. During the
interview, the defendant denied the sexual abuse allegations,
while also making statements acknowledging that it was possible
sexual abuse had occurred of which he had no recollection. 1
Later in the interview, the defendant said "All right. I might
have been over friendly with the two kid --, a couple of kids,
but I did not rape anybody. . . . I did not force myself on
anybody. " When asked to describe what he meant by "over
friendly," the defendant stammered, "I, I . . . I, ah, yeah, I
know. I know." He then asked the officers to "just give [him]
a second," at which point the interview appears to have ended.
The following month, a grand jury returned an indictment
1 For example, when police asked the defendant if it was
"possible that something . . . could have happened with one of
the kids" while the defendant was under the influence of
prescription opioid medication, the defendant responded, "I
suppose everything is -- yes. I guess this would be possible,
but I don't remember anything like that happening."
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charging the defendant with one count of rape of a child with
force, three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child
under the age of fourteen, and one count of open and gross
lewdness.
Counsel for the defendant was appointed and met with him at
least ten times between May 24, 2013, and his change of plea
hearing on February 6, 2015. Due to the age of the victims'
allegations, trial counsel researched the applicable statute of
limitations, which is set forth in G. L. c. 277, § 63 (§ 63).
Section 63 states, in relevant part, that where a complaint or
indictment for rape or sexual assault of a child is filed more
than twenty-seven years after the commission of the alleged
crime, "such offense shall be supported by independent evidence
that corroborates the victim's allegation." Trial counsel "did
no significant research into the meaning" of "corroborates"
within the context of § 63 but believed that the multiple
victims' accusations corroborated one another and were further
corroborated by evidence the defendant worked at the Boys Club
and had left the Commonwealth in 1980 after he was informed of
the allegations.
Trial counsel advised the defendant that he had little
chance of prevailing at trial because the victims had no motive
to lie, and warned him that because there were multiple victims,
he could face consecutive sentences if convicted. After
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entering his guilty pleas in February 2015, the defendant was
sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight to ten years in State
prison followed by ten years of probation.
2. Subsequent developments. Over one year after the
defendant entered his guilty pleas, in Commonwealth v. White,
475 Mass. 724, 725 (2016), the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)
considered, for the first time, the meaning of § 63's
corroboration requirement. Applying the standard articulated in
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 219 (1986), the SJC held
that § 63 requires corroborating evidence that relates "to the
specific criminal act at issue and, in particular, . . .
consist[s] of 'some specific testimonial fact, which, in the
context of the case, is probative on an element of the crime.'"
White, supra at 739, quoting Helfant, supra at 219. The SJC
opined that, although the Helfant standard had originated from
the interpretation of a different statute's corroboration
requirement, G. L. c. 272, § 11, the standard was "especially
appropriate for defining the corroboration requirement" of § 63
because "[i]t distills our construction of comparable
corroboration requirements, derives from the interpretation of a
statute relating to sexual crimes, and furthers the statutory
aim of ensuring that the occurrence of the criminal act alleged
by a victim is proved, at least in part, by some source other
than the victim's testimony." White, supra at 739-740.
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After reading White and Helfant, trial counsel concluded
that she had "made a mistake" in advising the defendant, as
there had not been any corroborating evidence in his case within
the meaning of § 63. She testified at the evidentiary hearing
on the motion for new trial that if she had been aware of
Helfant and been able to predict the SJC's future ruling in
White before the defendant entered his pleas, she would have
filed a motion to dismiss and advised him he had a good chance
of prevailing at trial. Counsel sought to rectify "[her]
mistake" by notifying the defendant and requesting the
appointment of postconviction counsel.
On April 26, 2018, the defendant filed a motion seeking to
withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that his decision to accept
the plea agreement was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently because his plea counsel failed to adequately
research and inform him of the corroboration requirement of
§ 63. The defendant's motion was denied after an evidentiary
hearing, and this appeal followed.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "A motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial under Mass.
R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)."
Commonwealth v. Jean-Louis, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 351 (2023).
"A judge may grant the defendant's motion only if it appears
that justice may not have been done" (quotations and citations
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omitted). Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).
"Where an evidentiary hearing is conducted on a motion for a new
trial, we 'accept the [judge's] findings where they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record,' and we 'defer
to the judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.'"
Dew, 492 Mass. at 260-261, quoting Commonwealth v. Tate, 490
Mass. 501, 505 (2022). "[W]e review the judge's decision for
abuse of discretion or clear error of law, and we reverse only
if it appears 'manifestly unjust, or . . . the [proceeding] was
infected with prejudicial constitutional error.'" Commonwealth
v. Loring, 463 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v.
Russin, 420 Mass. 309, 318 (1995).
2. Effective assistance of counsel. "Before deciding
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to 'the
effective assistance of competent counsel.'" Commonwealth v.
Minon, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 247 (2023), quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). In order to make out a
claim that plea counsel was ineffective, "a defendant must . . .
show serious incompetency of counsel (behavior falling
measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinarily
fallible lawyer) and prejudice." Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442
Mass. 11, 15 (2004). See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass.
89, 96 (1974).
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a. Competency of counsel. Here, the defendant contends
his plea counsel was incompetent because she failed to properly
research the corroboration requirement of § 63. In analyzing
this claim, we consider whether defense counsel acted "within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases"
at the time of the defendant's February 2015 change of plea
hearing, and do not view her conduct "retrospectively through
the lens of subsequent events" (citation omitted). Mahar, 442
Mass. at 17.
Although Helfant was issued approximately thirty years
before the defendant's change of plea hearing, the SJC in
Helfant did not interpret "corroboration" within the context of
§ 63, but rather in the context of G. L. c. 272, § 11, which
appears in a different chapter of the General Laws and contains
language -- absent from § 63 -- that requires allegations of
certain crimes against the public be corroborated "in a material
particular." Here, the defendant was charged with crimes
against the person. Before White, it would have been reasonable
to conclude that the absence from § 63 of language requiring
corroboration "in a material particular" meant that § 63's
corroboration requirement could be satisfied by a broader range
of evidence than that required by G. L. c. 272, § 11.
Therefore, counsel acted within the range of competence demanded
of criminal attorneys when she did not assume, at the time of
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the defendant's change of plea hearing, that Helfant controlled
this case.
The defendant's suggestion that his counsel should have
nevertheless anticipated that the SJC would eventually rely on
Helfant to define the corroboration requirement of § 63 would
have required a level of prescience that is not required by our
case law. See Mahar, 442 Mass. at 19 (attorneys not required
"to foretell the future"). Counsel's failure to predict, before
White was decided, that the definition of "corroborate" used in
Helfant was applicable to § 63, did not constitute ineffective
assistance. 2 See Mahar, supra at 19 ("the attorney's advice was
reasonable, and it did not become incompetent because a
subsequent judicial opinion made clear an aspect of the offense
that previously was less certain").
2 In ordinary usage, the term "corroborate" means "[t]o
strengthen or confirm; to make more certain." Black's Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This definition of "corroborate,"
which appears to be the definition that trial counsel presumed
was applicable to § 63 during the plea proceedings, is used
throughout our criminal case law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Ahart, 464 Mass. 437, 440 (2013) (cell phone records
"corroborated much of [witness's] testimony" concerning his
whereabouts at time of crime); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista,
442 Mass. 423, 431 (2004) (defendant's guilt "corroborated" by
his anger toward victim and evidence he was one of only three
people with keys to door used by perpetrator); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 660 n.7 (2002) ("'corroborate'
means to confirm or support the credibility of the victim's
testimony").
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b. Prejudice. Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel's
failure to anticipate the holding in White was behavior falling
measurably below that expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer
(a conclusion we do not reach here), the defendant cannot show
that he was prejudiced. "In the context of a guilty plea, in
order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant has
the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"
(quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Lastowski,
478 Mass. 572, 577 (2018). "Additionally, the defendant must
'convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.'" Id.,quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 (2011). This
requires a showing that the defendant had an available,
substantial ground of defense that he would have pursued but for
counsel's alleged error, or that there is a reasonable
probability that a different plea bargain could have been
negotiated. See Clarke, supra.Here, even if counsel had anticipated that § 63's
corroboration requirement would be interpreted by analogy to
Helfant, the defendant's ability to defend the charges would
have remained the same, because the corroboration requirement
was satisfied by his statements to police. In particular, the
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judge could have reasonably inferred that, viewed collectively
and in context, the defendant tacitly admitted to committing the
alleged rape and sexual assaults when he conceded that it was
"possible" the sexual assaults had occurred, and later, that he
"might have been overly friendly with . . . a couple of kids."
See Commonwealth v. Buono, 484 Mass. 351, 364 (2020) (viewed
within context of victim's allegations, grand jury could have
reasonably inferred word "it" in defendant's statement, "it
wasn't gonna happen again," was reference to "the alleged oral
rapes for which the defendant was charged, therefore providing
the . . . corroborating evidence" required by § 63). Contrast
White, 475 Mass. at 735, 740 (testimony that witness saw sexual
abuse on later date and in different location than charged
offenses did not satisfy § 63 corroboration requirement). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Grenier, 415 Mass. 680, 689 (1993) ("the
defendant's response, dropping his head, saying no, pausing, and
then denying involvement, . . . could be seen collectively as an
admission by word and deed"); Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413
Mass. 498, 506 (1992) (equivocal response to accusatory
statement "which, under the circumstances, a reasonable person
would challenge," admissible to support theory that "the party's
response amounts to an admission of the truth of the
accusation"); Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. 567, 571 (1985),
quoting Commonwealth v. Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 715-716 (1959)
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(responses to incriminating accusations made in "an equivocal,
evasive or irresponsive way inconsistent with . . . innocence"
admissible as evidence of guilt). Rather than negate this
inference, the defendant's assertion that he never "forced"
himself on anyone could reasonably be construed as an effort to
mitigate his culpability for the assaults by emphasizing the
absence of physical coercion.
Because the defendant's statements to police provided
sufficient corroboration of the victims' allegations within the
meaning of § 63, the defendant was not deprived of an available,
substantial ground of defense, nor did a reasonable probability
exist that a different plea bargain could have been negotiated.
Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's
conclusion that the defendant did not establish that, but for
his counsel's alleged incompetency, it would have been rational
for the defendant to reject the plea agreement.
Order denying motion to
withdraw guilty pleas
affirmed.
By the Court (Blake, Walsh &
Hershfang, JJ. 3),
Clerk
Entered: August 21, 2023.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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