Commonwealth v. Carlos Rios. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1094
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CARLOS RIOS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Carlos Rios, was indicted on one count of
unlawful possession of a firearm as a career criminal, see G. L.
c. 269, §§ 10 (a) & 10G (b); one count of unlawful possession of
ammunition as a career criminal, see G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (h) &
10G (b); two counts of assault and battery on a family or
household member, see G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a); one count of
unlawful possession of a class B substance (cocaine), see G. L.
c. 94C, § 34; one count of trafficking in cocaine in an amount
between eighteen and thirty-six grams, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32E
(b) (1); and one count of possession of a firearm in the
commission of a felony, see G. L. c. 265, § 18B.1 The defendant
1 The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi of the count of the
2019 indictment alleging possession of cocaine, and all of the
remaining counts of the indictments were tried before a jury.
now appeals from the denial of his motion for a required finding
on the charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of
firearms and ammunition. We affirm.
Background. For purposes of the sufficiency challenge, we
summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 93 Mass. App. Ct.
469, 471 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.
671, 677 (1979). The defendant was at home with his girlfriend
when a dispute occurred between the defendant and another
person. When the girlfriend stepped in between the two, the
defendant hit her several times in the face. The girlfriend
called the police and the responding officers arrested the
defendant. At the time of the arrest, the defendant was wearing
a backpack. The officers asked him to remove it so they could
handcuff him, and the backpack was subsequently searched
incident to the arrest and the defendant was pat frisked. While
conducting the patfrisk one of the officers discovered a "golf
ball-size glassine baggie containing a white powdery substance."
The officer searching the backpack found "a red glassine baggie
that contained ammunition" and a box with a firearm and
magazines inside. The arresting officers ran the defendant's
name through a database and found that he did not have a license
to carry a firearm or a firearm identification (FID) card. The
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substance in the baggie, which the officers suspected was
cocaine, was sent to a lab for testing.
At trial, a laboratory technician testified that the
substance in the baggie was cocaine weighing 20.2235 grams. The
Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Officer Ryder, whose
expert testimony, if credited by the jury, established the
following facts. Possession of twenty grams of cocaine was more
consistent with the intent to distribute than the intent to use,
as users typically have only enough money to purchase about one-
half of one gram at a time. The cocaine was likely purchased
for $1,200 to $1,300 and could be resold on the street for
$2,000. Because the drug community is secretive and insular,
only a trusted person would likely be able to obtain that volume
of cocaine. Users (as opposed to dealers) typically carry items
such as a rolled-up bill, straw, razor blade, or credit card
with which to arrange and snort cocaine. No such implements
were found on the defendant or in the backpack. Finally,
dealers often also possess firearms to protect themselves from
theft.
Discussion. 1. Trafficking. As relevant here, "[t]here
are five elements to the charge of trafficking in [cocaine] that
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, namely
that (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally (2) possessed
(actually or constructively) (3) [eighteen] grams or more [but
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less than thirty-six grams] (4) of [cocaine] (5) with the
specific intent to distribute it." Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441
Mass. 170, 174 n.7 (2004). See G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b) (1).
The defendant asserts that the judge's denial of his motion for
a required finding of not guilty was erroneous because the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof regarding intent
to distribute.
"When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required
finding of not guilty, 'we consider the evidence introduced at
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Commonwealth v. Polanco, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 764, 771 (2018),
quoting Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547 (2017).
Factors relevant to proving intent to distribute include the
amount of money found on the defendant's person, evidence of
involvement in a drug transaction, whether the transaction
occurred in an area known for drug sales and use, the absence of
drug paraphernalia, the amount of drugs recovered, the manner in
which the drugs are packaged, and the testimony of an expert
witness. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 360-362
(2018); Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 164-169 (2014).
Additionally, "[a] person's . . . intent . . . is a matter of
fact, which may not be susceptible of proof by direct evidence."
4
Richardson, supra at 360, quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 356
Mass. 574, 578-579 (1970).
Here, the Commonwealth offered testimony that officers
found twenty grams of cocaine in the defendant's possession. In
addition, there was evidence regarding the street retail value
of the amount found, that this amount was more consistent with
distribution than personal use, that there were no implements of
personal use in the defendant's possession, and that dealers
often carried firearms to guard against theft. This evidence
was sufficient to prove intent to distribute. See Sepheus, 468
Mass. at 164-169.
The defendant asserts that evidence indicative of
distribution (such as money or scales) was lacking, and that
there was no evidence that the defendant himself used drugs or
that the drugs discovered were part of a bigger stash. The
claim is unavailing as it was for the jury to decide what weight
to accord the evidence. See Richardson, 479 Mass. at 362.
Considering all of the evidence -- and the expert testimony in
particular -- in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
there was sufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute.
See Sepheus, 468 Mass. at 164-169.
2. Possession of firearm and ammunition. For the first
time on appeal, the defendant asserts that it was the
Commonwealth's burden to prove that he did not have a license to
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carry the firearm or ammunition. The defendant further asserts
that the judge's instruction that the jury need not consider
licensure was in error because the Commonwealth must prove,
among other things, that the defendant did not have a valid
license to carry the firearm or possess the ammunition at the
time the gun and ammunition were found, and the instruction
failed to inform the jury of this essential element of the
offenses.2
While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court decided Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023).
Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n. v. Bruen, 142 S.
Ct. 2111 (2022), the Supreme Judicial Court held in Guardado,
supra at 686-694, that (1) the defendant's failure to raise the
issue of the burden of proof of licensure was excused under the
"clairvoyance" exception to our usual preservation requirements,
(2) absence of licensure was an element of the offense of
unlawful possession of a firearm, (3) the Commonwealth carried
the burden of proving absence of licensure beyond a reasonable
2 Without objection, the judge instructed the jury that "The law
provides for exemptions for criminal responsibility for
possession of a firearm if the defendant demonstrates that he
possessed the weapon in his personal residence or place of
business, and/or if the defendant demonstrates that he had a
lawfully issued license to carry such a firearm. In the present
case, however, there is no evidence that the defendant possessed
a valid firearm's license. So, for this reason, the issue of
license is not relevant to your deliberations."
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doubt, (4) the jury should be so instructed, (5) the failure to
provide evidence of an absence of licensure and to instruct that
the Commonwealth bore the burden of proof on this element rose
to the level of a violation of the defendant's right to due
process, and (6) its decision was applicable to all cases
pending in the trial court or the appellate courts since Bruen,
supra. Applying these holdings to this case, we conclude that
evidence of non-licensure was an element of the Commonwealth's
case for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. We
review the erroneous instruction, which relieved the
Commonwealth of its burden of proof, to determine whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth
v. Bookman, 492 Mass. 396, 401 (2023); Commonwealth v. Hinckley,
422 Mass. 261, 266-267 (1996).
As with other constitutional errors, "the results of our
review are determined by the circumstances of each case."
Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 155 (2011), quoting
Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 697 (1983). "The
'essential question' in analyzing harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt is 'whether the error had, or might have had,
an effect on the [fact finder] and whether the error contributed
to or might have contributed to the [findings of guilty].'"
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 360 (2010), quoting
Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 549 (1990). "The inquiry
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'is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error.'" Vasquez, supra at 361, quoting
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). The
Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating that the error
was harmless. Vasquez, supra at 362.
Looking "to the basis on which 'the [fact finder] actually
rested its verdict,'" the Commonwealth has met its burden here.
Vasquez, 456 Mass. at 360-361, quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at
279, and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). The evidence
at trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant did not
have a license to carry a firearm or possess ammunition.3 The
evidence was unchallenged; no question of admissibility,
credibility, weight, or reliability was presented. See Bookman,
492 Mass. at 401. In closing argument, the defendant
acknowledged that "[i]f he had a weapon he's guilty of the
licensing provision." Under these circumstances, we are sure
3 After Bookman was decided, we requested supplemental briefing.
In response to our order, the defendant has argued that the
evidence of nonlicensure was insufficient because it was
improperly admitted. We do not consider the argument. The
sufficiency of the evidence "is to be measured upon that which
was admitted in evidence without regard to the propriety of the
admission." Sepheus, 468 Mass. at 164, quoting Commonwealth v.
Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 98 (2010).
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that the erroneous instruction did not influence the verdicts in
any respect.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Sullivan,
Desmond & Singh, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: August 15, 2023.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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