John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 360651 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-482
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 360651
vs.
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff (Doe) appeals from a Superior Court judgment
upholding his classification as a level two sex offender. Doe
argues (1) that the classification decision was arbitrary and
capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence, (2) that
the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) hearing examiner used
regulatory factor 37 (other information related to the nature of
sexual behavior) to, in effect, apply factor 2 (repetitive and
compulsive behavior) in an impermissible manner, see 803 Code
Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2), (37) (2016), and (3) that his privacy and
liberty interests outweigh the public's interest in Internet
publication of his information. We affirm.
Background. Doe was classified as a level three sex
offender in 2012 and, after a rehearing, again in 2017. In
March of 2021, Doe sought reclassification under 803 Code Mass.
Regs. § 1.31 (2016). A SORB hearing examiner held a hearing in
September of 2021 and, the following month, issued a decision
reducing Doe's classification to a level two. We summarize the
facts as found, and relied on, by the hearing examiner.
Doe was convicted of sexual assault (second degree) in
Connecticut in 1992, 1 for assaulting his stepdaughter when she
was (approximately) between the ages of five and seven. The
assaults occurred on multiple occasions; among other things, Doe
digitally penetrated his stepdaughter's vagina and twice
threatened her with violence -- once with a knife and once with
a handgun. In 1993, Doe was convicted of a sex offense against
a different victim in Connecticut -- assault (fourth degree). 2
The conviction stemmed from Doe flicking a five year old boy's
penis. Doe was accused of other sexual offenses between 1991
and 2016, but the hearing examiner did not consider those as
additional instances of "sexual misconduct," mainly due to a
lack of evidence concerning those events.
Doe's criminal history extends beyond sexual offenses and
includes a history of violent behavior spanning from 1979 to
2017. For example, in 2005, Doe was convicted of assault for
repeatedly punching his wife in the face. More recently, two
1 The hearing examiner found this was the "like offense" in
Massachusetts of rape and abuse of a child.
2 According to the hearing examiner, the "like" Massachusetts sex
offense of indecent assault and battery on a child.
2
women obtained abuse prevention orders against Doe (in 2013 and
2016); each averred that Doe physically assaulted them in
conjunction with their refusing to engage in sexual activity. 3
And in 2017, Doe was charged with attacking his roommate with a
knife and then an axe. Doe also has a history of substance
abuse, including several substance-related charges and incidents
between 1980 and 2020. Doe's substance abuse persisted despite
past participation in addiction treatment.
Applying the factors in 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33, the
hearing examiner found that Doe posed a moderate risk of
reoffense and a moderate degree of dangerousness. As to Doe's
risk of reoffense, the hearing examiner cited that Doe offended
against children (factor 3), one of whom was intrafamilial
(factor 7) and another male (factor 17). She also considered
Doe's substance abuse (factor 9), violent criminal history and
abuse prevention orders (factors 10, 11, and 15), and that Doe
violated community supervision while on probation for his sex
offenses (factor 13). In mitigation, the hearing examiner
considered, among other things, that as of the 2021 hearing Doe
was sixty years old (factor 30) and had not committed a
3 We note the hearing examiner also declined to treat these
allegations as instances of "sexual misconduct," although she
likely could have. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.
356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 79
(2015) ("examiner may consider . . . uncharged conduct").
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qualifying sex offense in the nine years since his release from
prison (factor 29).
Regarding Doe's dangerousness, the hearing examiner cited
that Doe's victims were extravulnerable children (factors 3, 18,
and 22) of different genders and relationship categories (factor
21); the high-contact and violent nature of some of Doe's
offenses (factors 8 and 19); and Doe's criminal history. The
hearing examiner also found it "concerning" that Doe
"repetitive[ly] . . . assault[ed]" his stepdaughter "and then
sexually assault[ed]" a five year old boy, and considered that
as "other information related to the nature of sexual behavior"
(factor 37) in assessing Doe's dangerousness. Finally, the
hearing examiner concluded that Internet publication of Doe's
information was warranted to "prevent young boys and girls and
adult women known to [Doe] . . . from becoming [v]ictims of sex
offenses."
Doe sought review of his classification under G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14, and G. L. c. 6, § 178M. Doe's motion for judgment on the
pleadings was denied, and the level two classification was
affirmed. Doe now appeals.
Discussion. Doe raises three arguments seeking to overturn
his level two classification. The law and procedure applicable
to SORB proceedings is discussed in depth in Doe, Sex Offender
Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass.
4
643, 645-646 (2019) (Doe No. 496501). Our review is limited to
determining whether the hearing examiner's decision is
"unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with
law." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 633 (2011).
1. Arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence. Doe
first contends that the hearing examiner's decision was
arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial
evidence, because the hearing examiner applied an impermissible
"checklist" approach and "failed to explain who Doe may offend
against and why, at present, Doe is a 'moderate' [risk] of
[re]offending." We discern no error.
The examiner's thoughtful and detailed decision discusses
and applies several regulatory risk factors indicative of an
increased risk of reoffense. Doe offended against two child
victims (factors 3 and 22), one of whom was an intrafamilial
female and the other an extrafamilial male (factors 7, 17, and
21); he violated community supervision while on probation for
those offenses (factor 13); and he has a lengthy (and recent)
history of violent criminal behavior (factors 10 and 11),
substance abuse (factor 9), and hostility toward women (factor
15).
5
Doe does not argue that the hearing examiner erred in
applying those factors, but instead seems to challenge how the
hearing examiner weighed them given that Doe's index sex
offenses where somewhat dated -- from 1992 and 1993. It is
clear, however, that the hearing examiner's analysis of the
pertinent risk-mitigating factors, including that Doe had not
committed a qualifying sex offense in nine years, 4 is what drove
her conclusion that Doe posed only a moderate, rather than a
high, risk of reoffense. Despite the dated nature of Doe's sex
offenses, substantial evidence showed that Doe's criminal
behaviors and substance abuse persisted in the years immediately
prior to his 2021 hearing, and thus supported the hearing
examiner's determination that, as of that date, Doe posed a
moderate risk of reoffense. See, e.g., 803 Code Mass. Regs.
§ 1.33(10)(a) ("Ongoing criminal behavior weighs heavily in the
application of factor 10"). We are therefore satisfied that the
hearing examiner engaged in "a sound exercise of informed
4 To the extent Doe argues that the hearing examiner erred in the
weight she afforded to factor 29 (offense-free time in the
community), we disagree. The hearing examiner did not afford
Doe the full mitigating weight of that factor because he had not
remained sex offense free in the community for ten years, having
been released from prison only nine years prior to his hearing.
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(29) ("risk of reoffense lowers
substantially after ten years"). That decision was within the
hearing examiner's discretion. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry
Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 138-
139 (2019).
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discretion rather than the mechanical application of a
checklist." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 651 (2012).
Nor do we agree that the hearing examiner's analysis was
wanting as to Doe's degree of dangerousness. Doe contends that
the hearing examiner failed to provide a "detailed analysis of
the predicted future acts that Doe is likely to engage in." But
the hearing examiner considered that Doe had committed contact
offenses against "two five-year-old prepubescent extravulnerable
children," and that those contact offenses had been repeated,
and accompanied by threats of violence. She also considered
Doe's substantial and ongoing criminal history. This satisfied
the case law's command to "consider 'the severity and extent of
the harm the offender would present to the public in the event
of reoffense'" (citation omitted). See Doe No. 496501, 482
Mass. at 659. See also id. at 651 ("because past is prologue, a
hearing examiner would make [the dangerousness] determination
based on the sexual crime or crimes that the offender committed
in the past"). 5 At bottom, "the factors present were sufficient
to support a determination that Doe's degree of dangerousness
5 We also note that the hearing examiner identified Doe's likely
victim pool as "young boys and girls and adult women known to
[Doe]," albeit in a separate section of her analysis. That
conclusion is supported by the record evidence of Doe's
predicate sexual offenses and more recent history of hostility
toward women. See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 651.
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was 'moderate.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 145 (2019) (Doe No.
23656).
2. Factor thirty-seven. Doe next argues that the hearing
examiner erred when she considered, in connection with Doe's
degree of dangerousness, the facts that Doe "repetitive[ly]
sexual[ly] assault[ed] . . . [his stepdaughter (Victim 1)] and
then sexually assault[ed] [a five-year old boy (Victim 2)]"
(emphasis added). Doe argues that this analysis, which was made
under factor 37 (other information related to the nature of
sexual behavior), in essence misapplied factor 2 (repetitive and
compulsive behavior) through the "back door," because factor 2
cannot be applied where, as here, an offender is not confronted
between offenses.
To consider Doe's argument we have to start with what
factor 2 actually says, and compare it to what the hearing
examiner actually said. Factor 2 reads, in relevant part:
"Repetitive and compulsive behavior is associated with a
high risk of reoffense. Factor 2 is applied when a sex
offender engages in two or more separate episodes of sexual
misconduct. To be considered separate episodes there must
be time or opportunity, between the episodes, for the
offender to reflect on the wrongfulness of his conduct"
(emphasis added).
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a). Factor 2 thus considers
repetitive and compulsive behavior as predictive of an
offender's risk of reoffense. Here, the hearing examiner did
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not cite factor 2 in her decision, but did refer to some of
Doe's conduct as "repetitive." However, the hearing examiner's
reference to Doe's "repetitive" assaults had to do with his
degree of dangerousness, not with his risk of reoffense.
Specifically, she said:
"[Doe] sexually assaulted Victim 1 on multiple occasions
beginning at age [five]. While living with a woman and her
four children, [Doe] also sexually assaulted Victim 2. I
find [Doe's] repetitive sexual assaults of Victim 1 and
then sexually assaulting [Victim 2] concerning and consider
it as to [Doe's] degree of dangerousness" (emphasis added).
Relying solely on a Superior Court decision addressing the
legality of factor 2, Doe argues that the hearing examiner's
consideration of Doe's repeat offenses in this manner was
impermissible. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 vs.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., Mass. Super. Ct., No. 201130B, slip
op. (Middlesex County Apr. 16, 2021) (Doe No. 22188 I). In that
case, supra at 26, a Superior Court judge declared that:
"The second and third sentences of [factor 2] unlawfully
exceed [SORB's] authority and violate due process by
attributing a high risk of reoffense whenever an offender
committed two or more episodes of sexual misconduct,
whether or not the offender was discovered, confronted or
investigated between episodes" (emphasis added).
The judge reasoned that factor 2 violated due process, primarily
because the empirical evidence did not "support the notion that
repeated sex offenses, without apprehension, tend to show
compulsion or any increased risk of sexual recidivism" (emphasis
added). See id. at 16. SORB has not challenged this decision,
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and has acknowledged that factor 2 should not be considered to
show an increased risk of reoffense where a perpetrator is not
"discovered, confronted, or investigated" between sexual
assaults. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 804 (2022) (Doe
No. 22188 II).
As noted, here the hearing examiner did not consider Doe's
repeat offenses in analyzing his risk of reoffense, but only his
degree of dangerousness. Doe's reliance on the Superior Court's
reasoning in Doe No. 22188 I is therefore misplaced. Moreover,
the hearing examiner's consideration of Doe's repeat offenses in
assessing his potential for future dangerousness was, in our
view, reasonable. Such a consideration is supported by the SORB
statute itself, which permits SORB to consider "the number, date
and nature of prior offenses" "in determining . . . degree of
dangerousness" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (b)
(iii). The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that the
dangerousness "determination naturally takes place on a
continuum," and on that continuum, for example, "contact
offenders are generally more dangerous than noncontact
offenders." Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 659. It is reasonable
for SORB also to consider repeat contact offenders, such as Doe,
as falling on the "generally more dangerous" side of that
continuum. Furthermore, in other contexts courts have
10
historically assessed an individual's dangerousness based, in
part, on whether an individual is a repeat offender. Similar
analyses occur at dangerousness hearings, G. L. c. 276,
§ 58A (5) (judge shall take into account, inter alia, "record of
convictions" and history of prior abuse prevention orders); in
sentencing, Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Advisory
Sentencing Guidelines 39-43 (2017); and in deciding whether to
stay a sentence pending appeal, Commonwealth v. Hodge, 380 Mass.
851, 855 (1980). We are accordingly confident that the hearing
examiner's application of factor 37 was not "arbitrary or
capricious, an abuse of discretion," a means to thwart the
limitation of factor 2, or contrary to the law. See Doe No.
22188 II, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 804.
3. Internet publication. Doe next suggests that reversal
is warranted because his "liberty and privacy interest[s]
outweigh the public's interest in" Internet publication of Doe's
biographical information. Once again, we disagree. The hearing
examiner explicitly found that publication of Doe's information
would serve public safety by "prevent[ing] young boys and girls
and adult women known to [Doe] . . . from becoming [v]ictims of
sex offenses." Such a decision was supported by substantial
evidence and was in accord with the case law. See Doe No.
496501, 482 Mass. at 655 ("Internet publication . . . almost
invariably serve[s] a public safety interest" where "sexually
11
violent offender presents a moderate risk to reoffend and a
moderate degree of dangerousness").
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Henry,
Desmond & Englander, JJ. 6),
Clerk
Entered: August 3, 2023.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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