John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 524724 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. ( 2024 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    23-P-342
    JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 524724
    vs.
    SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court
    judgment affirming his classification by the Sex Offender
    Registry Board (SORB) as a level two sex offender.              On appeal,
    Doe challenges the classification on various grounds, including
    by arguing that the hearing examiner failed to provide an
    adequate explanation for how Doe presents a moderate risk of
    reoffense.     For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the
    Superior Court judgment and remand for entry of a new judgment
    vacating the final classification and remanding the matter to
    SORB for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and
    order.
    Background.     On May 6, 2014, a nurse at a skilled nursing
    center walked into a patient room and discovered Doe, a
    certified nursing assistant, with a female dementia patient
    (victim).      The nurse saw Doe with the victim behind a curtain
    and that the victim was naked from the waist down with her legs
    spread open.      The nurse asked Doe what he was doing, to which
    Doe responded, "I know I'm in trouble, this looks bad, I'm
    sorry."      Doe claimed that he was changing the victim's diaper,
    but the nurse checked and noticed that the diaper was clean.
    The nurse immediately took the diaper and secured it in a paper
    bag.       Another nursing center employee responded to the incident
    and testified at trial that she saw blood in the victim's vagina
    immediately after the incident.
    When questioned by the police on June 10, 2014, Doe
    admitted to putting his fingers inside the victim's vagina
    during the incident in question, as well as on another occasion
    in January 2014 while he was working an overnight shift.1
    Doe was indicted in Superior Court on two counts of rape;
    after a bench trial on April 12, 2017, Doe was found guilty of
    one count of rape.       Doe was sentenced to six to eight years in
    State prison.
    In the SORB classification proceedings, Doe raised several
    risk-mitigating factors, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016):
    (1) factor 28 (supervision by probation or parole) for having
    Doe was advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to be
    1
    interviewed by the police. Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    2
    strict parole conditions; (2) factor 32 (sex offender treatment)
    because of Doe's completion of sex offender treatment; (3)
    factor 33 (home situation and support systems) due to Doe's
    robust support network of family and friends; and (4) factor 34
    (materials submitted by the sex offender regarding stability in
    the community) as a result of Doe's course completions,
    continued education, and anticipated housing and employment on
    release.    The hearing examiner agreed that these factors applied
    and that three of the four were to be given "full weight."      He
    ultimately concluded that Doe nevertheless presented a moderate
    risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger.    On this
    basis, the hearing examiner classified Doe as a level two
    offender.    Although the hearing examiner's written decision
    included an extensive explanation of how Doe presented a
    moderate degree of dangerousness, it included little explanation
    of why he presented a moderate risk of reoffending.   In fact,
    the hearing examiner's discussion of Doe's risk of reoffense
    cited to only one risk-elevating factor that bore on that issue
    (factor 16, public place).2
    2 The examiner's original decision applied factors 7, 18,
    and 19 to conclude that Doe had an increased risk of reoffense.
    As SORB's brief acknowledges, the examiner then issued an
    amended decision treating these three factors as bearing only on
    Doe's degree of dangerousness. This appears to reflect that
    factor 7's "position of trust" provision refers only to
    "increased level of dangerousness," factor 18 refers only to
    3
    Discussion.    Our review is narrow.   We may set aside or
    modify SORB's decision only if we determine "that the decision
    is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction,
    violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law,
    or is not supported by substantial evidence."    Doe, Sex Offender
    Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    482 Mass. 643
    , 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501).    Moreover, hearing examiners
    have been delegated extensive discretion "to consider which
    statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much
    weight to ascribe to each factor."    Doe, Sex Offender Registry
    Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    470 Mass. 102
    , 109-
    110 (2014).   Our review is principally limited to whether the
    hearing examiner examined the relevant factors and provided an
    adequate explanation for his or her conclusions.    See Doe No.
    496501, supra at 657 (hearing examiner is required to "make
    explicit his or her findings" regarding degree of dangerousness
    and risk of reoffense, and "make clear that each determination
    "danger to public safety," and factor 19 refers only to
    "increased degree of dangerousness." 803 Code Mass. Regs.
    § 1.33(7)(a)(2), (17), (18). We note that in the background
    section of his decision, the hearing examiner did touch on
    factor 35 (psychological or psychiatric profiles regarding risk
    to reoffend), by referencing Doe's scores on the Static-99R and
    Stable-2007 models and attaching "some weight" to those scores,
    but "only to the extent they may be seen as general indicators
    of risk of re-offense." The examiner did not, however, cite
    this factor in his overall assessment of Doe's risk of
    reoffense.
    4
    is supported by clear and convincing evidence").     See also Doe,
    Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry
    Bd., 
    81 Mass. App. Ct. 639
    , 651 (2012) ("SORB's decision must
    show that the classification is based on a sound exercise of
    informed discretion rather than the mechanical application of a
    checklist or some other reflex").
    Our review leads us to conclude that while the hearing
    examiner adequately engaged in the required qualitative and
    objective review that balanced all the relevant risk-aggravating
    and risk-mitigating factors as to Doe's degree of dangerousness,
    he failed to provide sufficient analysis as to Doe's risk of
    reoffense.     As noted, the hearing examiner concluded that the
    four risk-mitigating factors Doe raised applied and that three
    of them should be given "full weight."     In the face of this, the
    perfunctory analysis in which the hearing examiner engaged
    failed adequately to explain how he concluded, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that Doe presented a moderate risk of
    reoffense."3
    3 To be clear, we do not accept Doe's contention that the
    hearing examiner erred in concluding that factor 16 (public
    place) applied. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 390261
    v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    98 Mass. App. Ct. 219
    , 225 (2020),
    quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(16)(a) ("public place"
    includes "any place that is open to the scrutiny of others or
    where there is no expectation of privacy"). Here, Doe assaulted
    the victim in the presence of another patient in a nursing
    center, despite the likely detection by the patient occupying
    5
    The judgment affirming SORB's decision is vacated, and the
    case is remanded for entry of a new judgment vacating the final
    classification and remanding the matter to SORB for further
    proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.4
    So ordered.
    By the Court (Milkey, Sacks &
    Smyth, JJ.5),
    Clerk
    Entered:    August 12, 2024.
    the room and nursing center staff. In addition, Doe did not
    raise this argument before the agency, and therefore waived it.
    See Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    65 Mass. App. Ct. 803
    ,
    810 (2006). Nor do we discern any error in the hearing
    examiner's concluding that Doe presented a moderate degree of
    dangerousness. That conclusion is supported by clear and
    convincing evidence and adequately explained.
    4 In light of this disposition, we need not address Doe's
    argument that a remand is necessary under Doe No. 496501, 
    482 Mass. at 655-657
    , for a particularized finding whether Internet
    dissemination is warranted, making Doe's sex offender registry
    data available to healthcare providers with whom Doe might seek
    employment. The hearing examiner will be able to consider that
    issue on remand. Nothing in this memorandum and order should be
    interpreted as stating any substantive position on how Doe
    should be classified.
    5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-P-0342

Filed Date: 8/12/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/12/2024