Adoption of Veronique. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-692
ADOPTION OF VERONIQUE. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This case involves a child, Veronique, who was removed from
her mother's custody in November 2018, shortly after she was
born, because, among things, cocaine was found in a test of the
child's meconium, and because of the history of the mother's
abuse of her older children, Jasmin and Skye. 2 The mother
appeals from a decree of the Juvenile Court terminating her
parental rights to Veronique pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 26 and
G. L. c. 210, § 3, 3 and approving the plan of the Department of
Children and Families (DCF) for the child's adoption by her
current foster family. The mother argues that the judge erred
1 A pseudonym.
2 Also psuedonyms.
3The father's parental rights were also terminated, but he
does not appeal.
in finding that she was unfit and that termination of her
parental rights was in the child's best interests. She also
argues that the judge erred and abused her discretion in failing
to meaningfully evaluate the competing adoption plans. We
affirm.
1. Termination of parental rights. For a child to be
committed to DCF's custody, DCF must prove, "by clear and
convincing evidence, that a parent is currently unfit to further
the best interests of a child." Care & Protection of Erin, 443
Mass. 567, 570 (2005). For termination of parental rights, DCF
must further prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
child's best interests are served by the termination of parental
rights. Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020). On appeal,
a trial judge's findings are entitled to substantial deference;
they "must be left undisturbed absent a showing that they
clearly are erroneous." Care & Protection of Martha, 407 Mass.
319, 327 (1990). In this case, there was clear and convincing
evidence of the mother's unfitness.
a. Domestic violence and abuse and neglect of the mother's
older children. To begin with, the trial judge considered the
mother's history of domestic violence in finding that she was
unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in the
child's best interests. "Violence within a family is highly
relevant to a judge's determination of parental unfitness and
2
the best interests of the child[]. As such, a judge must
consider issues of domestic violence and its effect upon the
child[] as well as a parent's fitness." Adoption of Gillian, 63
Mass. App. Ct. 398, 404 n.6 (2005), citing Care & Protection of
Lillith, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 139 (2004).
Prior to Veronique's birth, there were several allegations
of domestic violence between the mother and her two older
children. The judge found that in 2011, a report was filed
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report) alleging that the
mother was intoxicated and verbally abusive to her oldest child,
Jasmin, who was thirteen years old at the time. The reporter
claimed having to separate the mother and Jasmin, as Jasmin
threw a chair at the mother while they were arguing. There was
also an allegation in the report that the mother left Skye, the
one year old middle child, outside for five to ten minutes on
multiple occasions and did not recognize that that was a safety
issue. During DCF's investigation, the mother and Jasmin
confirmed that they had fought, although Jasmin told the
investigator that the mother was not intoxicated, but rather
sick with the flu. As a result of this incident, Jasmin was
removed and, according to the mother, not returned to the
mother's care for approximately one year.
The judge also found that another 51A report was filed in
2014, alleging that the mother frequently had loud fights with
3
Jasmin that involved screaming, swearing, and broken furniture.
The report also alleged that there was ongoing marijuana use in
the home and that the mother would frequently send Skye out to
play unsupervised. During the investigation, the mother and
Jasmin confirmed that they had verbal arguments with
inappropriate language, but said they were working through their
issues and did not have physical altercations. The mother also
stated that the neighbor who had made the report had been
harassing her, and that she had a harassment prevention order
against the neighbor. DCF found the allegations unsupported.
According to the judge’s findings, in 2016, two years
before Veronique's birth, a 51A report alleged that, when the
mother was called to discuss Skye's behavior at school, she told
the reporter that she had "just beat the shit out of her" and
was "ready to give [Skye] up." When Skye, who was six years old
at the time, arrived at school, she informed the reporter that
the mother had hit her with a broom handle. She had open wounds
on her palm, hip, and buttocks, and her body was covered in
bruising and red swollen welts. She was also smelly, not
wearing any underwear, and wore soiled clothing. The next day,
another 51A report was filed alleging that Skye had been
sexually abused by a man who babysat her.
During DCF's investigation of these reports, Skye told the
investigator that the mother hit her with a broken broom and
4
punched her, causing a tooth to fall out. She also stated that
she had been locked in her room the night before, was not
allowed to eat or drink, and could not leave the room except to
use the restroom. She was taken to the hospital, where she
denied any sexual abuse. At the hospital, Skye wet the bed and
urinated on herself at least four times. Skye was removed from
the mother's care and was placed in a program, where she stated
that her babysitter had touched her inappropriately several
times, although she later denied the sexual abuse when speaking
to an investigator. The program in which Skye was placed
reported that she had lice. The mother denied that Skye had
lice and denied ever hitting her. Jasmin reported that Skye had
had a hair barrette in her mouth and when the mother removed it,
Skye's tooth also came out. DCF workers observed no locks on
the outside of any of the home's bedrooms. DCF found the
allegations of sexual abuse unsupported but found the
allegations of neglect and physical abuse by the mother
supported. The mother's parental rights to Skye were
subsequently terminated in 2019.
The mother was charged with domestic assault and battery,
to which she pleaded guilty, according to her own testimony.
When questioned about the incident at trial, the mother stated,
"the teacher had lied and said I hit my daughter, and I did not
do it." Later in the trial, when she was asked about the charge
5
again, she stated, "I remember that false lie, yes." The mother
stated during trial that she did not want to talk about her
older children, which the judge found to be indicative of the
mother’s "general pattern of avoidance when things are
challenging for her."
In addition to the allegations that the mother was abusive
toward her two older children, the mother also had a history of
domestic violence with Veronique's father. The judge found that
the mother's relationship with the child's father, which the
mother described as "on and off" and "hot and cold," ended
shortly after the child's birth. The mother alleged that the
father was physically and mentally abusive towards her, and that
she was concerned for her safety a few times during that
relationship. The judge found that the mother had a harassment
prevention order against the father between March 2018 and March
2019. The mother testified that she last had contact with the
father in spring 2020, but the judge did not credit this
testimony, as it contradicted a DCF social worker's testimony
that, according to the mother, she was last in contact with the
father in spring 2021.
During the mother's testimony, she repeatedly stated that
she did not want to talk about the father. The judge found this
to be "indicative of Mother's tendency to avoid topics with
which she is uncomfortable," and was concerned that it meant
6
that the mother was "unwilling[] to reflect on such topics in a
manner that would allow Mother to learn from her history and
demonstrate growth."
The mother argues that the judge's conclusion that she has
not distanced herself from domestic violence concerns is
inconsistent with the finding that she has not spoken with the
father for more than half a year. Relatedly, she contends that,
for the same reason, there is no evidence that the child would
be at risk of domestic violence. We do not find either of the
judge's conclusions to be clearly erroneous. The mother has
shown an inability or unwillingness to discuss concerns
regarding domestic violence, which indicates that she has not
meaningfully reflected on how domestic violence has impacted her
and could again in the future. This is also evidenced by the
judge’s finding that, at trial, the mother was unable to define
a "healthy relationship" beyond making the tautological
statement that it is "not an unhealthy relationship."
Additionally, the judge did not credit the mother's testimony
that she had not seen the father for one and a half years,
instead crediting the social worker's testimony that it had been
only six months.
The mother asserts that the judge's discussion of her 2016
conviction of assault and battery improperly relied on stale
evidence, for which she cites Adoption of Ramona, 61 Mass. App.
7
Ct. 260, 264-266 (2004). The mother is correct that "a
determination of unfitness must be based on current evidence,"
and that "the judge is required to assess whether a parent is
currently fit." Id. at 264. In Ramona, this court vacated the
termination of the mother's parental rights to two of the
subject children, id. at 266, as the "bulk" of the judge's
findings of the mother's unfitness regarding those two children
"rested upon events occurring more than two years prior to
trial, even though recent evidence of the mother's parenting was
available." Id. at 264. However, Ramona is distinguishable
from the case at hand, as the 2016 conviction played only a
small role in the judge's conclusions, and the judge relied
mostly on other, more current information in finding the mother
unfit. Furthermore, the multiple allegations of domestic
violence against the two older children indicated a pattern of
behavior, which the court may consider, see id., and that may
have prognostic value. Finally, the mother's denial regarding
the physical and verbal abuse of her children and her inability
or unwillingness to discuss them demonstrate that the mother has
not taken responsibility for her actions, including those
leading to her conviction.
b. Mental health. Mental health concerns are also
relevant to a determination of parental unfitness if they
"affect[] the parents' capacity to assume parental
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responsibility." Adoption of Frederick, 405 Mass. 1, 9 (1989).
The judge found that the mother has been diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression, and
that she does not currently take medications to treat any of
these disorders. According to the judge’s findings, when the
mother was pregnant with the child, she was hospitalized for
psychiatric reasons, and she told the hospital that if she left
and something happened to her, the hospital would be liable.
The mother denied that she told the hospital that she would harm
herself. The judge found that later, while in the hospital
during and after Veronique's birth, the mother exhibited manic
talking and she asked to tape mittens to the child's hands.
Due to its concerns regarding the mother's mental health,
DCF's action plan for the mother required her to complete a
psychiatric evaluation, engage in therapy, and apply for
services through the Department of Mental Health (DMH). The
mother reported that she had completed a psychiatric evaluation,
although she did not recall when that occurred and DCF has not
received confirmation of any such evaluation. The mother later
attended a single visit with a psychiatrist pursuant to her
action plan and stated that she was told that follow-up
appointments were not needed and that the recommendation was for
her to remain in counseling. The judge found that the mother
was unable to offer insight as to why DCF had requested that she
9
see a psychiatrist. The mother began therapy in December 2018,
switching therapists in September 2021. The mother has not
signed releases, so DCF has been unable to confirm the mother's
engagement in therapy. Despite that, the judge found that the
mother attended therapy consistently for two years. The judge
did not credit the mother's testimony that she applied for DMH
services but that a DCF social worker told her that she did not
need that service, so she did not follow up.
Despite her engagement with mental health services, at
trial, the mother was unable to define a "healthy relationship"
when asked. She then stated that she did not feel like
answering those questions. The mother also testified that she
does not struggle with her depression or PTSD because "life goes
on." The judge found that the mother "has a pattern of saying
she does not recall things or does not want to talk about things
that she does not wish to discuss," and as noted above, that
this behavior is "indicative of Mother's general pattern of
avoidance when things are challenging for her." The judge also
found that the mother "was unable to demonstrate progress
regarding her mental health [and] failed to show growth or apply
skills learned in therapy to her life." The judge was
appropriately concerned that the mother's lack of progress or
focus on her mental health were "worrisome indications that
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Mother is not prepared to appropriately care for the subject
child."
The mother argues that the judge’s finding that she "does
not engage in any preventative care for her mental health
concerns" was clearly erroneous, because the judge also found
that she was attending therapy. While it may have been error
for the judge to state that the mother did not engage in any
preventative mental health care, DCF has been unable to confirm
the mother's engagement in treatment due to her unwillingness to
sign releases. Because the judge acknowledged multiple times
that the mother had been attending therapy for two years and
took that into consideration in making her decision, we conclude
that any error in the challenged finding was harmless.
The mother also contends that it was impermissibly
speculative for the judge to conclude that she has not addressed
her mental health diagnoses because she denied that she
"struggles" with them. We disagree. The judge did not rely
solely on that statement from the mother's testimony, but rather
also considered the mother's inability or unwillingness to
testify regarding topics that upset her, as well as her refusal
to sign releases, which would have allowed DCF to verify whether
or not the mother was progressing in therapy and whether her
psychiatrist believed that she needed medication to
appropriately deal with her mental health diagnoses.
11
Relatedly, the mother challenges the judge's conclusion
that she has "failed to learn from . . . services" as she
addresses her mental health in counseling. Contrary to the
mother's argument, this finding is not contradictory to the
judge's finding that the mother has engaged in therapy; rather,
it implicitly recognizes that she is engaging in services such
as therapy, but concludes that those services have not been
effective. The judge's conclusion that the mother has not
adequately addressed her mental health issues is supported by
the evidence.
c. Physical health. A parent's failure to seek medical
treatment for herself can result in danger to the child. See
Petition of the Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 965, 965 (1983). The mother has
been diagnosed with kidney shrinkage, her left kidney does not
function, and she has a low immune system due to low white blood
cell count. The judge found that the mother has a kidney
doctor, but she does not have a treatment plan and does not see
the kidney doctor for regular appointments, instead going only
when she feels she needs to. At trial, the mother did not
remember when she last saw her kidney doctor. She does,
however, see a primary care doctor for an annual checkup and if
she feels sick.
12
While the mother's physical ailment does not indicate that
she is unfit to care for her child, it raises a concern that the
mother may not be vigilant about her child's healthcare needs.
That inference is supported by the fact that there were
previously concerns about the unmet healthcare needs of the
mother's two older children, and that her prenatal care during
her pregnancy with Veronique was inconsistent. 4
d. Substance abuse. Substance abuse is a relevant
consideration in a determination of unfitness only where it
interferes with a parent's ability to provide minimally
acceptable care of the child. Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass.
App. Ct. 25, 31 (1997). In this case, Veronique was born on
November 1, 2018. A 51A report alleged that the child's
meconium tested positive for cocaine, which is to say she was
born substance exposed. The mother reported that she had used
cocaine and marijuana beginning in the summer of 2018, but had
stopped when she learned that she was pregnant, although she
claimed that was relatively late in the pregnancy. Though the
judge did not make a finding on the point, there was evidence
that the mother had her first prenatal care appointment in May
4 Jasmin is now an adult, but when she was a child, she was
removed from the mother's care on multiple occasions. Skye was
removed from the mother's care in 2016 and the mother's parental
rights to her were terminated in 2019.
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2018, and at another appointment in August, she refused to
submit a urine screen, stating she might not be "clean."
After the child's removal, which occurred only five days
after her birth, there were further 51A reports filed alleging,
among other things, that the mother was using drugs. The mother
testified that she had not used cocaine or any substances other
than alcohol since giving birth. As part of the mother's action
plan, DCF did not require that the mother provide drug screens,
but did require her to complete a substance abuse evaluation,
provide DCF with a copy of the evaluation, and follow all
recommendations. The mother claims that she completed a
substance use evaluation and that she was not diagnosed with a
substance use disorder. She did not provide DCF with
documentation of any such evaluation. The judge found that the
mother was unable to appropriately reflect on her history of
substance abuse, causing the judge concern that the mother might
continue to struggle with substance abuse in the future,
especially as the mother "was unable to demonstrate an
understanding that a history of substance use requires ongoing
efforts to remain sober."
The mother argues that the evidence does not establish a
nexus between any alleged substance abuse and any harm to the
child, which is required under Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass.
App. Ct. at 31, where the termination of parental rights turns
14
on substance abuse. Here it did not. The mother is correct
that the judge said in one conclusion of law that "Mother has a
history of domestic violence, mental health concerns, and
substance abuse." However, a close reading of the judge's
decision makes clear that the primary concerns the judge had in
finding the mother unfit to parent the subject child were the
mother's mental health and her history of domestic violence,
both as a victim and as a perpetrator with respect to her older
children. Additionally, to the extent the judge discussed
substance abuse in her conclusions of law, she addressed only
the fact that the mother denied and did not "take responsibility
for her history of substance abuse concerns." This was just one
part of the judge's assessment that, if the mother did not view
"introspection as important" –- including about her mental and
physical health (and that of her children), domestic violence,
and her physical abuse of her older child -– she would be unable
to demonstrate growth and assure the safety of her children.
Indeed, the mother's failure to recognize and address past
concerns, including through noncooperation with DCF and refusal
to allow it to access her home, is a primary theme of the
judge's assessment of her fitness. Thus, for example, in
discussing whether the mother benefited from services, the judge
concluded that the mother's unfitness was shown by her
"inability to demonstrate that she will make the necessary
15
changes to address domestic violence, substance abuse, and
mental health."
Nonetheless, given the gravity of the mother's other
unaddressed concerns and clear and convincing evidence of
unfitness, even if this use of the mother's substance abuse was
in error under Adoption of Katharine, any error was harmless.
e. Best interests. Finally, the mother argues that the
judge erred in concluding that termination would be in the
child's best interests. Much of this argument relies on the
claimed errors of fact we addressed above, and the claim that
the mother's criminal history was stale. The mother also argues
that the judge was required to find the mother had distanced
herself from domestic violence, and the child faced no risk of
domestic violence, since the mother had not had contact with
father for six months at the time of trial. This argument has
no merit, as the judge's findings on those matters were not
clearly erroneous. The mother also argues it was error for the
judge to find it would be detrimental for the child to return to
the mother due to her bond with her foster family, as there were
no findings that the mother would not be able to alleviate the
harm that would ensue. But the judge's findings about the
mother's lack of insight and inability to parent certainly
suffice.
16
Given all of the above, we conclude that there was clear
and convincing evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion
not only that the mother was unfit to parent the child, but that
termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's
best interests.
2. Placement. In addition to her challenges to
termination, the mother argues that the trial judge erred in
failing to perform a meaningful evaluation of two competing
adoption plans. When DCF and a parent put forward different
adoption plans, the judge must consider both and "determine
which placement will serve the best interests of the child."
Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474-475 (2001). In
deciding between two competing adoption plans, the judge must
"'meaningfully . . . evaluate' what is proposed to be done for
the child." Id. at 475, quoting Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App.
Ct. 30, 31 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 1151 (2000). Such an
evaluation must be "even handed," regardless of which party
offered the plan. Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 226 n.8
(1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S.
1034 (1999).
This appeal was stayed to allow DCF to file in the trial
court a "Motion to Reopen the Proceedings for Additional
Evidence and Further Findings on the Best Interest of the
Child," including an updated DCF proposed adoption plan. The
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motion was allowed, and after taking additional evidence, the
trial judge found DCF's plan to be in the child's best interest.
When Veronique was removed, she was originally placed with
one foster family, but a few months later, in March 2019, she
was placed with her current foster family, and she has lived
with them since. The foster family was approved as a
preadoptive resource in June 2020. A relative applied to be a
preadoptive resource, but withdrew in 2020 due to family
concerns. In October 2020, the child's great aunt came forward
as a kinship placement for the child, and she expressed an
interest in becoming a preadoptive resource. In October 2020,
the mother moved to transfer the child's placement to a kinship
placement, but the court declined to remove the child from her
foster placement. The great aunt submitted her application in
February 2021, and DCF referred her to a private agency for a
home study in March 2021. In October 2021, the great aunt
submitted a background check to the private agency, and the home
study was approved in January 2022. This process took longer
than usual due to an extensive waitlist resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic. The great aunt lives with her three
grandchildren, and if the child were placed with them, she would
share a room with the fourteen year old granddaughter.
In March 2022, DCF held an area clinical review team (ACRT)
meeting to determine which adoption plan was in the child's best
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interests. After the ACRT meeting, in which DCF reviewed home
studies from both placements and considered the length of time
the child had been with the foster family, her attachment and
connection with the family, her developmental growth, and the
foster family's openness to safe and appropriate involvement
with the child's biological family, DCF determined that the
child should remain with her foster family.
The great aunt claims that she attempted to reach out to
the DCF social worker on three occasions, but did not get a
response. The judge found that the great aunt may have called a
phone number associated with DCF, but that the social worker did
not receive any messages from the great aunt. The judge also
found that the great aunt's "minimal efforts to contact [the
social worker] over the course of two years indicate a lack of
commitment to developing a relationship with and taking custody
of [the child]." The great aunt visited the child a few times
via Zoom and a few times in person when she was permitted to
participate in the mother's visits. According to the DCF social
worker, the great aunt had not had any contact with the child
"since before November 2021." The great aunt testified that she
did not have the bond with the child that she would have liked
to have. Based on this and, among other factors, the evidence
of the child's "loving" bond with her foster family, the judge
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concluded that adoption by the child's foster family was in her
best interests.
The mother argues on appeal that the child's bond with her
foster family was the decisive factor in the judge's decision
and, as such, the judge was required, pursuant to Adoption of
Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31, to address whether the
child would be harmed by the severance of those bonds and
whether that harm could be alleviated. However, the mother
fails to recognize that Adoption of Katharine involved the
decision to terminate parental rights, not the decision between
two competing adoption plans. Id. at 27. The standard for
termination of parental rights requires a stricter analysis
because parents have a constitutional right, albeit not
absolute, to maintain custody of their children. See id. See
also Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. at 570. A kinship
placement with a relative who is not a parent, such as the great
aunt in this case, differs because there is no constitutional
right involved. See Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 258,
268 (2021). Therefore, the considerations in Adoption of
Katharine are not required for an evaluation of two competing
adoption plans, even if one of the plans involves a kinship
placement.
The mother next contends that the judge's evaluation of the
competing adoption plans could not have been meaningful without
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expert opinion as to the child's needs and any potential harm
she would suffer if removed from her foster family. The mother
contends that there was no clinical input at the ACRT meeting.
The DCF social worker testified at first that he could not
remember who was at the meeting other than "[m]yself, the area
clinical manager, [and] my supervisor." He stated that the
people who conducted the foster family's home study were not
present at the ACRT meeting, nor was anyone from the private
agency who had met with the great aunt. He later testified that
there were more than three people at the meeting, but he could
not remember who else was there. He did respond in the negative
when asked whether there was "clinical input specific to how
[the great aunt] could deal with the unique needs of [the child]
transitioning to her home."
In support of her argument, the mother again cites Adoption
of Katharine, which is inapplicable for the reasons stated
above. DCF correctly notes that several cases have affirmed a
choice between competing adoption plans, including cases
choosing a foster placement over a kinship placement, without
the requirement of expert opinion. See, e.g., Adoption of
Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. at 272; Adoption of Ilian, 91 Mass.
App. Ct. 727, 731-732 (2017). Even in the context of
termination of parental rights, which, as noted above, requires
stricter analysis due to the constitutional rights at stake,
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expert opinion regarding the child's bonds with the foster
family is not required in all cases. See, e.g., Adoption of
Daniel, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 202-203 (2003).
Finally, the mother argues that DCF failed to follow its
own regulations regarding kinship placements, and for that
reason the judge should not have adopted the ACRT's reasoning.
We first note that the judge did not rely wholly on the ACRT's
reasoning. Although the judge did consider DCF's conclusions
from the ACRT meeting, she also considered testimony from the
DCF social worker, the child's foster mother, and the great
aunt.
We cannot address the claim of the DCF's alleged failure to
comply with its own regulations. It appears to have been raised
below in the motion to transfer the child to kinship placement,
but when the mother's counsel withdrew, the judge withdrew that
motion without prejudice to refiling by successor counsel. The
mother's successor counsel never refiled the motion or sought
other remedies. No request for a ruling was made, and no
factual determinations concerning the regulations have been made
in the trial court. In these circumstances, the issue has not
been preserved for review. See Adoption of Jenna, 33 Mass. App.
Ct. 739, 740-741 (1992).
In any event, even a failure by DCF to follow its own
regulations would not be dispositive in the decision between two
22
competing adoption plans, as the judge must always rule in the
child's best interest. Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 61
(2011) (holding that even where DCF failed to make reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate need for removal pursuant to
G. L. c. 119, § 29C, judge must rule in child's best interests).
Thus, even if DCF had "deliberately attempted to thwart the
applications of the child's relatives," of which there is no
evidence here, "frustration with the department does not justify
an inappropriate placement," which would amount to "penalizing
the child." Adoption of Irene, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 613, 623
(2002).
DCF was not required to place the child with the great aunt
in 2020 when the great aunt came forward, more than a year and a
half after the placement of the child with her current foster
parents. To the extent it is challenged, there was no abuse of
discretion or other error of law in the judge's withdrawal,
without prejudice at the time of counsel's withdrawal, of the
2020 motion by the mother for a kinship placement. Nor was
there any abuse of discretion or clear error of law in the
judge's decision that DCF's adoption plan, which will place the
child permanently with the foster family with whom she has lived
23
since she was less than four months old, was in the child's best
interests.
Decree, as modified by the
judge's April 20, 2023,
supplemental findings of
fact, conclusions of law,
and order, affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin,
Englander & D'Angelo, JJ. 5),
Clerk
Entered: August 14, 2024.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
24