A.Z. v. H.G. ( 2024 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    23-P-900
    A.Z.
    vs.
    H.G.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The defendant, H.G., appeals from the decision of a
    District Court judge to extend an abuse prevention order
    obtained by the plaintiff, A.Z., pursuant to G. L. c. 209A.                   He
    raises several arguments in support of his contention that the
    judge's order should be vacated.          We affirm.
    Background.     On January 30, 2020, the plaintiff sought a
    209A order and submitted an affidavit in the District Court.                  In
    the affidavit, she described a violent relationship with the
    defendant.     A week earlier the defendant threw a heavy slow
    cooker at her, striking her leg.          He previously slapped her,
    threw her belongings in a Dumpster, and poured cold water over
    her bed, among many other abuses over two to three years.                At
    the conclusion of the hearing, the judge issued the order
    requiring the defendant to refrain from abuse, have no contact
    with the plaintiff, stay away from the plaintiff's residence,
    and surrender his firearms.
    By agreement of the parties (as well as scheduling issues
    caused by the pandemic), a two-party hearing was delayed until
    June 30, 2022.    Both parties appeared with counsel, and a second
    judge extended the order for one year.     Following a hearing on
    June 29, 2023, with both parties present with counsel, a third
    judge extended the order for five years.    The defendant filed a
    notice of appeal.
    Discussion.     "The inquiry at an extension hearing is
    whether the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the
    evidence that an extension of the order is necessary to protect
    her from the likelihood of 'abuse' as defined in G. L. c. 209A,
    § 1."   Iamele v. Asselin, 
    444 Mass. 734
    , 739 (2005).   The
    ultimate "criterion for extending the original order is a
    showing of continued need for the order."    Pike v. Maguire, 
    47 Mass. App. Ct. 929
    , 929 (1999).   A judge is to examine the
    totality of the circumstances of the parties' relationship,
    including the basis for the initial order as well as any changes
    in the relationship since the initial order.    Iamele, 
    444 Mass. at 740-741
    .
    2
    "We review the extension of a c. 209A order for an abuse of
    discretion or other error of law" (quotation and citation
    omitted).    Latoya L. v. Kai K., 
    104 Mass. App. Ct. 173
    , 177
    (2024).     "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an
    abuse of discretion where [the reviewing court] conclude[s] the
    judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors
    relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls
    outside the range of reasonable alternatives."     Constance C. v.
    Raymond R., 
    101 Mass. App. Ct. 390
    , 394 (2022), quoting L.L. v.
    Commonwealth, 
    470 Mass. 169
    , 185 n.27 (2014).
    Based on the totality of the circumstances of the parties'
    relationship, viewed in light of the initial abuse prevention
    order, the judge properly exercised her discretion to extend the
    order for a five-year period.    At the hearing on June 29, 2023,
    the judge reviewed the plaintiff's affidavit and heard testimony
    from the defendant as well as arguments of counsel.     The
    defendant acknowledged having loud arguments with the plaintiff,
    but he denied inflicting physical abuse, denied throwing any
    objects, and denied using a firearm.     He also claimed that the
    plaintiff and her daughter prevented him from seeing his
    children and delayed his chance to see his children as part of a
    scheme to obtain a permanent restraining order.     The judge was
    not required to credit the defendant's testimony or agree with
    3
    his contention that the extension was not needed.    See Ginsberg
    v. Blacker, 
    67 Mass. App. Ct. 139
    , 140 n.3 (2006) (even implicit
    credibility determination of judge is entitled to utmost
    deference).   Based on the plaintiff's affidavit, the judge could
    "reasonably conclude that there is a continued need for the
    order because the damage resulting from that physical harm
    affects the victim even when further physical attack is not
    reasonably imminent."    Callahan v. Callahan, 
    85 Mass. App. Ct. 369
    , 374 (2014).    To the extent the defendant contested the
    facts underlying the initial order, those facts were not open to
    dispute at the extension hearing and are not subject to review
    in this appeal.    Iamele, 
    444 Mass. at 740
    .   Arguments directed
    at the propriety of the issuance of criminal complaints, arrest
    by the Brookline Police Department, service of the 209A orders,
    proceedings in the Probate and Family Court, and actions taken
    by the Department of Children and Families are likewise not
    properly presented by this appeal.
    The defendant's brief and reply brief also contain numerous
    and wide-ranging factual allegations that are not found in the
    record of the extension hearing of June 29, 2023.    Because they
    are not part of the record of the hearing that is the subject of
    this appeal, the allegations are "not properly before us," and
    we do not consider them.    Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
    4
    
    387 Mass. 312
    , 324 n.12 (1982).       Also, claims raised for the
    first time in the defendant's reply brief are waived.      See
    Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Zotal, Ltd., 
    394 Mass. 95
    , 97 (1985).
    Finally, to the extent the defendant claims a lack of
    jurisdiction due to his alleged Rhode Island residency, the
    Supreme Judicial Court rejected a similar claim in Caplan v.
    Donovan, 
    450 Mass. 463
    , 468-472 (2008).
    The parties' requests for attorney's fees and costs are
    denied.
    Order dated June 29, 2023,
    affirmed.
    By the Court (Neyman,
    Hershfang & Hodgens, JJ.1),
    Clerk
    Entered:   August 27, 2024.
    1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-P-0900

Filed Date: 8/27/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/27/2024