JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD No. 5322 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. ( 2024 )


Menu:
  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    23-P-75
    JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD No. 5322
    vs.
    SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a judgment entered in
    the Superior Court upholding his classification as a level three
    sex offender.     He claims the evidence did not support the
    hearing examiner's classification decision and did not warrant
    Internet publication of his classification.            We affirm.
    Discussion.     1.   Substantial evidence. The plaintiff first
    claims that the hearing examiner abused his discretion by
    mechanically applying the regulatory factors and rendering a
    decision that was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by
    substantial evidence.       The Sex Offender Registry Board (board)
    "is constitutionally required to prove the appropriateness of an
    offender's risk classification by clear and convincing
    evidence."    Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex
    Offender Registry Bd., 
    473 Mass. 297
    , 298 (2015) (Doe No.
    380316).   "To determine the validity of an agency's decision,
    the reviewing court must determine whether the decision is
    supported by substantial evidence."     Doe, Sex Offender Registry
    Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    88 Mass. App. Ct. 73
    , 76 (2015), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216
    v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    447 Mass. 779
    , 787 (2006).     In
    reviewing the board's decision, a court will "give due weight to
    [the board's] experience, technical competence, and specialized
    knowledge."   Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex
    Offender Registry Bd., 
    482 Mass. 643
    , 649 (2019) (Doe No.
    496501), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v.
    Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    466 Mass. 594
    , 602 (2013).     "We
    review a judge's consideration of an agency decision de novo."
    Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender
    Registry Bd., 
    95 Mass. App. Ct. 85
    , 89 (2019).    Based upon these
    standards, we discern no error.
    Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the hearing
    examiner carefully considered the evidence that was highly
    probative of both the risk of reoffending and the degree of
    dangerousness and included the following:    the plaintiff
    sexually assaulted two female children after having been
    2
    convicted of a previous sex offense against a male child (factor
    2 -- repetitive and compulsive behavior); all his offenses
    involved children (factor 3 -- adult offender with child
    victim); his relationship with the male victim was extrafamilial
    (factor 7 -- relationship between offender and victim); he
    committed his offenses against the female victims while others
    were present (factor 16 -- public place); the three victims were
    of varying ages, genders, familial status (factor 21 -- diverse
    victim type); and the plaintiff sexually assaulted three victims
    (factor 22 -- number of victims).   The examiner also considered
    the offense against a male victim (factor 17 –- male against
    male) as bearing on the risk to reoffend as well as the offense
    against a child under the age of eight (factor 18 --
    extravulnerable victim) as bearing on the degree of
    dangerousness.   Supporting and substantial evidence included the
    police interview of the male victim that led to the charge of
    indecent assault and battery of a child under 14 (G. L. c. 265,
    § 13B), the plaintiff's subsequent guilty plea to that charge,
    and the trial testimony of the female victims.   In each
    instance, the plaintiff took advantage of his trusted positions
    to abuse young children.   This substantial evidence spoke
    directly to the risk to reoffend and the degree of dangerousness
    as identified in the governing regulations and provided "clear
    3
    and convincing" proof of the level three classification.        Doe
    No. 380316, 
    supra at 298
    .
    The plaintiff takes specific issue with the weight the
    examiner accorded to the offense against the male.     In his
    analysis, the examiner gave "full weight" to repetitive and
    compulsive behavior (factor 2) based upon the plaintiff sexually
    assaulting the female victims in 2016 and 2017 following his
    conviction for sexually assaulting the male victim in 1996.       The
    plaintiff contends that full weight should not have been given
    because he remained offense-free for almost twenty years between
    the offense against the male and the offenses against the
    females.   The plaintiff further disputes the examiner's
    consideration of factors 7, 17, 18, 21, and 22, in connection
    with the offense against the male victim "because the supporting
    evidence is extremely dated."   "A hearing examiner, however, may
    consider an offender's older sexual offenses where they are
    relevant to a holistic assessment of the offender's current
    degree of dangerousness."   Doe No. 496501, supra at 651.       We do
    not substitute our judgment for such an assessment that falls
    squarely within the experience, technical competence, and
    specialized knowledge of the examiner.   Id. at 649.
    The plaintiff next contends that the offense against the
    females occurred in a bedroom that should not have been
    4
    considered a public place (factor 16).     We disagree.   A public
    place includes any area "that is open to the scrutiny of
    others."    803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(16)(a) (2016).    Given the
    potential for detection of the offense by the mother and
    siblings who were present within the bedroom when the assaults
    occurred, the examiner could logically conclude that the
    plaintiff exhibited a "lack of impulse control" that bore
    directly on his risk to reoffend.    See Doe, Sex Offender
    Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    447 Mass. 779
    , 789 (2006).
    We also disagree with the plaintiff's contention that the
    examiner engaged in a mere "mechanical listing of the regulatory
    factors rather than the required reasoned analysis."      The
    hearing examiner prepared a carefully reasoned and factually
    supported decision spanning forty pages.    The examiner also
    considered the following risk-mitigating factors in his
    decision:   the plaintiff's age, forty six, at the time of the
    decision (factor 30 -- advanced age); his support network of
    family and friends (factor 33 -- home situation and support
    systems); and his stability in the community (factor 34 --
    materials submitted by the sex offender regarding stability in
    the community).    In addition, the examiner rejected
    consideration of additional allegations of sexual abuse by the
    5
    plaintiff.   We conclude that the classification decision here
    was "based on a sound exercise of informed discretion rather
    than the mechanical application of a checklist or some other
    reflex" (quotation and citation omitted).     Doe, Sex Offender
    Registry Bd. No. 11204 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 564
    , 574 (2020).
    2.   Internet publication.     Finally, the plaintiff contests
    Internet publication and argues that the examiner erred by not
    focusing on the sexual offenses that he recently committed.       He
    further contends that Internet publication "would not have any
    efficacy in warning his potential victim pool" because his
    latest victims were intrafamilial and he is not likely to have
    access to any additional intrafamilial potential victims given
    the stability of his current family situation.    Upon review of
    the record, we discern no error.
    "The efficacy of Internet publication in protecting
    potential victims must be determined based on the facts of each
    individual case."    Doe No. 496501, 
    482 Mass. at 655
    .   The
    examiner here considered the specific facts surrounding the
    offenses and concluded that Internet publication served a public
    safety interest:    "I consider that if the [plaintiff] were to
    reoffend, it would likely be against an unsuspecting child who
    knows him and is engaging in what the child believes to be non-
    6
    sexual play.   The child might be the child of a caregiver who
    has a relationship with [the plaintiff]."   This rationale is
    well supported by the record that showed the plaintiff sexually
    assaulted three children by taking advantage of his special
    access and relationship of trust.
    Judgment affirmed.
    By the Court (Meade,
    Englander & Hodgens, JJ.1),
    Clerk
    Entered:   August 26, 2024.
    1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-P-0075

Filed Date: 8/26/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/27/2024