Commonwealth v. David M. Strachan. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-517
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
DAVID M. STRACHAN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a police officer found the defendant, David Strachan,
unresponsive from an apparent drug overdose, the officer
requested emergency medical assistance; the defendant recovered
and thereafter was charged with possession. A District Court
judge dismissed the charges, concluding that G. L. c. 94C,
§ 34A (b), immunized the defendant from prosecution. We affirm.
1. Background. We briefly recite the undisputed facts.
In the early morning hours of October 17, 2021, Officer Michael
Ramsey of the Pembroke Police Department was on routine patrol
when he observed a vehicle with its lights on and the driver,
later identified as the defendant, slumped over the steering
wheel. Officer Ramsey noticed that drool was coming out of the
defendant's mouth. Although the defendant was still breathing,
Officer Ramsey's multiple attempts to wake him up were
unsuccessful. Officer Ramsey saw what he believed to be drug
residue and paraphernalia in the defendant's car and, believing
that the defendant was overdosing, called dispatch for
assistance. Several other police officers arrived at the scene
and attempted unsuccessfully to wake up the defendant. Officer
Ramsey broke the car window and administered Narcan to the
defendant. Emergency responders with the Pembroke Fire
Department, who soon appeared on the scene, twice more
administered Narcan to the defendant.1
After the defendant was transported to the hospital, police
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, which resulted in
the seizure of drugs found in the center console. The defendant
was charged with one count of possession of a class A substance
(heroin), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34, and one count of
possession of a class B substance (crack cocaine), also in
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
because he was suffering from a drug-related overdose, and
because the drugs were found as a result of a call for medical
attention, he was immune from prosecution under G. L. c. 94C,
§ 34A (b). The Commonwealth argued that the defendant was not
1 While en route to the hospital, the defendant was revived.
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immune because the call for medical assistance was initiated by
a police officer.
2. Discussion. As it presents a question of statutory
construction, we review the judge's decision to dismiss the
criminal charges under G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), de novo.
Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 60 (2016).
"[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that
is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." Commonwealth v. Soto, 476 Mass. 436,
438 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557
(2014). If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and
if its application does not lead to an absurd result, that
language is conclusive of legislative intent. Commonwealth v.
Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573 (2019). We look at the language of
the entire statute, "not just a single sentence," so as to
interpret all of its terms "harmoniously to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature" (quotation omitted). Phillips v.
Equity Residential Mgt., L.L.C., 478 Mass. 251, 257 (2017).
Finally, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, the rule of
lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed
against the Commonwealth and that any ambiguity be resolved in
favor of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass.
740, 742 (1996).
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With this backdrop in mind, we begin our analysis by
reading the plain language of the statute. Commonwealth v.
Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022). Relevant here, G. L.
c. 94C, § 34A (b), provides immunity from prosecution to a
person suffering from a drug overdose if that person, as a
result of receiving medical assistance, is found to be in
possession of drugs.2 This subsection states:
"A person who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in
need of medical assistance and, in good faith, seeks such
medical assistance, or is the subject of such a good faith
request for medical assistance, shall not be charged or
prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance under
said section 34 . . . if the evidence for the charge of
possession of a controlled substance or violation was
gained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical
assistance."
G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Under the plain words of the statute,
if a person experienced a drug overdose and made a good faith
request for medical assistance and, as a result, the police
found the person to be in possession of drugs, immunity would
apply. That same person would also be entitled to immunity if
they were in possession of drugs, experienced a drug overdose,
2 Subsection (a) provides immunity from prosecution to a person
who seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a drug-
related overdose. G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a). So, under this
subsection, a person who calls for help for someone overdosing,
but in the course of the incident is found to be in possession
of drugs, would be immune from prosecution. The Commonwealth
asks that we analyze G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a), to give context to
specific language in G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b). Because, as
discussed below, we find G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b), to be
unambiguous, we do not examine G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (a).
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and did not seek medical assistance themselves but were instead
the subject of a good faith request by someone else for medical
assistance.
Turning to the facts of this case, the defendant was
undoubtedly experiencing a drug-related overdose when police
encountered him. The defendant, unresponsive and slumped over
the steering wheel, was in no condition to call for medical
assistance. He became the subject of a good faith request for
medical assistance when Officer Ramsey called dispatch for
assistance after numerous attempts to wake him were
unsuccessful. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/good%20faith ("good
faith" means "honesty or lawfulness of purpose"). Emergency
responders were called and administered additional doses of
Narcan as a life-saving measure. Finally, while on the scene,
and after the defendant was being transported to the hospital,
drugs were found as a result of an inventory search. In other
words, drugs were discovered by police because the defendant's
overdose caused Officer Ramsey to seek medical assistance, which
caused the defendant to be transported to the hospital and
resulted in the need for his car to be towed and an inventory
search to be completed.
Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude
that the defendant was immune from prosecution for possession
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under § 34 since the drugs were found as a result of his being
the subject of a good faith call for medical assistance while he
was experiencing a drug overdose. We are not persuaded by the
Commonwealth's argument that § 34A (b), when read as a whole,
does not apply when police officers request medical assistance
for an overdose victim. Nothing in the statute differentiates a
citizen seeking medical assistance for someone experiencing a
drug-related overdose from a police officer making that same
request. Contrary to the Commonwealth's position, it is not an
absurd or illogical result that the defendant in this case has
immunity. The Legislature unambiguously expressed its intent to
encourage people, whether it be the person suffering from an
overdose or someone witnessing said overdose, to call for
medical assistance in order to obtain lifesaving treatment. The
Legislative intent, to save the lives of individuals
experiencing a life threatening drug overdose, is accomplished
whether an ordinary citizen, a paramedic, or a police officer
calls for medical assistance to prevent death by overdose.
The Commonwealth asks us to interpret the language of the
statute to exclude police officers from the scope of § 34A (b).
However, as noted above, when the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, and when the result is not illogical, we
must apply the plain language of the statute. Our role
prohibits judicial construction when the language is clear.
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Nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 94C, § 34A (b),
requires that a person who calls for help for someone
experiencing a drug overdose be a nonpolice officer. Without
any ambiguity, we are prohibited from adding language to the
statute in order to effectuate what the Commonwealth argues is a
commonsense reading of the statute. Had the Legislature
intended to narrow the scope of immunity so that it did not
apply when law enforcement seeks medical assistance, it could
have specifically included such language. It did not do so.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
Walsh, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: October 20, 2023.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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