R.B. v. C.C. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-520
R.B.
vs.
C.C.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
C.C. (wife), the former spouse of R.B. (husband), appeals
from a judgment of divorce nisi (divorce judgment) issued by a
judge of the Probate and Family Court, challenging various
aspects of the property division. We affirm.1
Background. We summarize the trial judge's relevant
findings, supplementing them with undisputed facts in the
record, and reserving other facts for later discussion. See
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288 (2009).
During their long-term marriage, the parties enjoyed an
"affluent and upper class" lifestyle.2 The marital lifestyle was
1 The wife also filed a notice of appeal from a supplemental
judgment regarding the award of attorney's fees. As she makes
no separate argument regarding that judgment, we affirm it as
well.
2 The parties purchased the 6,000 square foot, "luxury" marital
home for $3.265 million, to which they made "significant
funded primarily with the husband's income,3 supplemented by
income from the wife's investment accounts and substantial
financial contributions from the wife's parents. In addition to
making annual cash gifts and "periodic larger gifts,"4 the wife's
parents gave her valuable interests in various entities and
several pieces of real property. Moreover, in January 2012, the
wife's mother settled an irrevocable trust, governed by Virginia
law, for the benefit of the wife and the wife's descendants.
The irrevocable trust was indirectly funded with proceeds from
the sale of assets owned by hospital entities established by the
wife's father.5 As a result of the wife's family wealth, the
parties formed a "reasonable expectation of future financial
security" that affected their "spending and saving habits
(including towards retirement assets[6]), [and] the types of jobs
[the] [h]usband took or didn't take," among other things.
renovations." They traveled frequently (including to various
European destinations, Caribbean islands, and ski resorts),
employed a nanny, sent their four children to private schools,
owned boats, maintained a yacht club membership, and made
"significant expenditures" on travel, education, and various
residences that they owned or leased.
3 The husband worked as a physician throughout the marriage,
earning approximately $474,000 per year at the time of trial.
4 In addition to annual gifts, the wife's parents made four
"large gifts" totaling $5.35 million between 2003 and 2012.
5 The wife's parents owned a number of hospital-related entities;
assets owned by those entities were sold in 2012 for $227.5
million.
6 The parties did not "aggressively save" for retirement because
of their "expectation that they would continue to benefit from
the [wife's] family wealth."
2
In June 2015, the husband filed a complaint for divorce;
the wife then filed a counterclaim for divorce. Following an
eleven-day trial held between October 2018 and June 2019, the
judge issued the divorce judgment dividing the marital estate in
August 2020. The judge found that, consistent with a June 2018
stipulation filed by the parties, the wife had already bought
out the husband's interest in the former marital home, paying
him $1.3 million as an "advance distribution of assets."7 The
judge determined that the remaining assets in the marital estate
were worth more than $46 million, with over $43 million of those
assets attributable to the wife. Among the assets included in
the marital estate was the wife's interest in the irrevocable
trust, which the judge found to be worth $12,153,553. The judge
concluded that the husband was entitled to twenty-five percent
of the value of the irrevocable trust, and thirty-five percent
of the remaining marital estate assets. To effectuate the
property division, the judge ordered the wife to make a lump sum
payment to the husband of $12,493,917 within sixty days of the
divorce judgment. The judge found that the wife had sufficient
7 During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the parties
entered into a stipulation providing that they would equally
divide the $2.6 million equity in the marital home, and that the
wife would buy out the husband's share. The wife paid the
husband $1.3 million pursuant to their stipulation, which he
deposited in his UBS investment accounts (which accounts were
excluded from the asset division).
3
assets to make the lump sum payment without utilizing funds from
the irrevocable trust.
The wife thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting,
among other things, "an evidentiary hearing on the tax
implications of liquidating assets" to make the lump sum
payment. The judge denied the wife's request.8 The present
appeal by the wife followed.
Discussion. In an appeal challenging the division of
property in a divorce judgment, "[w]e review the judge's
findings to determine whether she considered all the relevant
factors under G. L. c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any
irrelevant factors." Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245
(2014). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to
property division unless it is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'"
Id., quoting Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).
Here, the wife claims error in the judge's (1) inclusion of
her irrevocable trust interest in the marital estate; (2)
valuation of her revocable trust account (Bessemer account); (3)
treatment of a promissory note held by one of the entities in
which she owns an interest; (4) failure to treat as advance
marital estate distributions allowances made to the husband for
attorney's fees during the pendency of the divorce proceedings;
8 It is undisputed that the wife made the lump sum payment to the
husband.
4
and (5) denial of her request for an evidentiary hearing on the
tax consequences of the lump sum payment. We address the wife's
arguments in turn.
1. The irrevocable trust. The wife first contends that
the judge erred in treating her interest in the irrevocable
trust as a property interest subject to equitable distribution
under G. L. c. 208, § 34. She asserts, among other things, that
her interest is too remote and speculative for inclusion in the
marital estate because she is but one of several beneficiaries
in an open class. We disagree.
"Whether a trust may be included in the . . . marital
estate requires close examination of the particular trust
instrument to determine whether the interest is a 'fixed and
enforceable' property right, . . . or 'whether the party's
interest is too remote or speculative' to be included." Levitan
v. Rosen, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 248, 253 (2019), quoting
Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 111-112 (2016).
This question, which we review de novo, "turns 'on the
attributes' of the specific trust at issue." Levitan, supra,
quoting Pfannenstiehl, supra at 112.9
9 "If an interest in a trust is determined after such examination
to be speculative or remote rather than fixed and enforceable,
and thus more properly characterized as an expectancy, the
interest is to be considered under the G. L. c. 208, § 34,
criterion of 'opportunity of each [spouse] for future
5
Although Massachusetts law governs our ultimate
determination whether the wife's trust interest is includable in
the marital estate under § 34, Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
253, we look to Virginia law when examining the trust to
ascertain the nature of the wife's interest. Id. at 251.10 "In
considering the language of a trust agreement, the intent of the
grantor controls." Harbour v. SunTrust Bank, 278 Va. 514, 519
(2009). "In ascertaining that intention, we must examine the
document as a whole and give effect, so far as possible, to all
its parts." Frazer v. Millington, 252 Va. 195, 199 (1996).
Here, while the trust identifies the beneficiaries as both
the wife and her "descendants living from time to time," a
"plain reading" of the entire trust instrument, "giving
expression to all [its] provisions," shows the settlor's intent
to prioritize the wife over all other beneficiaries. Frazer,
252 Va. at 201. The trust is entitled "IRREVOCABLE TRUST
AGREEMENT . . . FOR THE BENEFIT OF [THE WIFE]." The
"DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS" section of the trust provides that
"[d]uring her lifetime, . . . [the wife], shall be the 'Trust
Beneficiary.'" The wife's right of withdrawal has first
acquisition of capital assets and income.'" Levitan, 95 Mass.
App. Ct. at 253, quoting Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 112.
10 Interpretation of the trust, and the determination whether the
wife's interest is includable in marital estate, are questions
of law we review de novo. See Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
251-253.
6
priority over the rights of withdrawal of all other
beneficiaries. The wife's interest in the trust is not subject
to complete divestment, unlike the interests of all other
beneficiaries, because the trust grants her a power of
appointment to determine who will receive the remaining trust
corpus upon her death. See Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-701 (defining
"[p]ower of appointment" as "a power that enables a powerholder
acting in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an
ownership interest in . . . the appointive property"). The
trust also places special "[d]istribution [l]imitations" on the
wife's grandchildren and more remote descendants, conditioning
their eligibility for distributions on, among other conditions,
being "hard working and productive member[s] of society."
In addition to being the "Trust Beneficiary," the wife is
the sole trustee. The trust grants the wife discretion to make
distributions of income and principal to herself and her
descendants. Her exercise of this discretion is guided by an
ascertainable standard, under which she may make distributions
that she "deem[s] advisable for any such beneficiary's
maintenance, support, health and education." See Va. Code Ann.
§ 64.2-701 (defining "[a]scertainable standard" as "a standard
relating to an individual's health, education, support, or
maintenance within the meaning of § 2041[b][1][A] or 2514[c][1]
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any applicable
7
regulations"). The wife's authority to make distributions to
herself has few limitations. Most notably, she is prohibited
from making distributions that would violate the trust's
spendthrift provision.11 See Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-701 (defining
"[s]pendthrift provision" as "a term of a trust that restrains
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's
interest"). See also Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-743. She also must
ensure that, in making distributions to herself, she does not
breach her fiduciary duties to the other beneficiaries. See,
e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-765 (duty of impartiality); Va. Code
Ann. § 64.2-764 (duty of loyalty).12 The wife's discretion to
make distributions to herself is therefore broad and is only
subject to judicial intervention if she has "clearly abused" it.
Rafalko v. Georgiadis, 290 Va. 384, 396 (2015).
We are unpersuaded by the wife's contention that the
presence of an ascertainable standard "limits [her] control"
thereby rendering her trust interest too remote and speculative
to be treated as a property right. Our courts generally view
the presence of an ascertainable standard in a discretionary
trust as a factor weighing in favor of treating a discretionary
11 The spendthrift clause prohibits the trustee from making any
distribution to a beneficiary if such distribution would be
subject to attachment or assignment.
12 "A violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a
beneficiary is a breach of trust." Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-792(A).
Removal is one remedy. Va. Code Ann. § 64.2-792(B)(7).
8
trust interest as an enforceable property right. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Jones, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 232-233 (2023); Comins
v. Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 30-31 (1992). Here, because
the wife is the sole trustee, her right to receive distributions
is not subject to the condition precedent of a disinterested
trustee having first exercised his or her discretion. See
Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 114. Moreover, the ascertainable
standard guiding the wife's exercise of discretion authorizes
distributions to herself for maintenance, i.e., "with an eye
toward maintaining [her] standard of living in existence at the
time the trust was created." Id. at 113. At the time that the
trust was created, the wife was maintaining an "affluent and
upper class" lifestyle involving "[s]ignificant expenditures."
It is thus difficult to conceive of distributions to the wife
that might exceed the amount needed to fund her exceptionally
high standard of living and thus be deemed inconsistent with the
terms and purpose of the trust. See NationsBank of Va., N.A. v.
Estate of Grandy, 248 Va. 557, 561 (1994) ("Generally, a
trustee's discretion is broadly construed," so long as she
"exercise[s] . . . good faith and reasonable judgment to promote
the trust's purpose"). Moreover, the judge found that the wife
has already made a series of transactions as trustee (including
9
a large withdrawal to satisfy a note due to her) further
demonstrating her level of access and control.13
We are likewise unpersuaded by the wife's contention that
the existence of an open beneficiary class renders her trust
interest too remote and speculative for inclusion in the marital
estate. The wife relies on Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 114, for
the proposition that her discretionary trust interest was too
remote and speculative in part because she was a member of the
open beneficiary class. That case, however, is readily
distinguishable from the case at hand. In Pfannenstiehl, supra,unlike here, the husband was the not the trustee, he did not
have a power of appointment, and the settlor's intent was not to
principally benefit the husband -- rather, it was to provide for
multiple generations. Compare id., with Jones, 103 Mass. App.
Ct. at 233-234 (wife's trust interest includable in marital
estate where trustee's discretion subject to enforceable
standard, wife held power of appointment, and settlor's intent
was to benefit wife rather than subsequent generations);
Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 249-250, 254 (wife's trust
13The judge found that, in 2013, the wife "as trustee, directed
$7,800,502 to be paid out from the [i]rrevocable [t]rust to her
individually in satisfaction of a [n]ote due to her
individually. The proceeds were deposited into [the] [w]ife's
[r]evocable [t]rust . . . but a year later the funds were
transferred by [the] [w]ife back into the [i]rrevocable
[t]rust."
10
interest includable in marital estate where, among other things,
wife was cotrustee with annual right of withdrawal but
independent cotrustee had uncontrolled discretion regarding
distributions, wife held limited power of appointment, and
settlor's primary intent was to provide for wife rather than
subsequent generations); Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500,
511-512 & nn.17, 18 (2000) (trust settled by husband, of which
he was neither trustee nor beneficiary, having open beneficiary
class including his issue, was properly treated as part of
marital estate, given husband's retention of broad powers of
appointment in trust assets); Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31
& n.4 (wife's trust interest includable in marital estate where
wife was beneficiary but not trustee, wife held power of
appointment, and trustee's discretion was subject to
ascertainable standard).
Further support for treating the irrevocable trust as a
marital asset is contained in the judge's findings regarding the
parties' reliance on the wife's family wealth, which allowed
them to maintain a more affluent lifestyle than they could have
with the husband's salary alone. See Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct.
at 32.14 Although the wife seeks to distinguish Comins on the
14In Comins, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 32, this court affirmed the
inclusion of the wife's trust interest in the marital estate,
noting that the trust "provided the parties with a substantial
insurance policy against economic hardship and also permitted
11
basis that she and the husband did not rely specifically on the
irrevocable trust (because it was settled shortly before the
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage), the judge's findings
reflect that the trust was indirectly funded with proceeds from
the sale of the hospital entities' assets, which entities formed
the bulk of the wife's family wealth that the parties relied on
throughout the marriage. Accordingly, the judge's findings
sufficiently demonstrate reliance by the parties on the wife's
family wealth that was redirected into the irrevocable trust
toward the end of the marriage -- which reliance formed the
basis for the parties' elevated lifestyle during the marriage.
See Comins, supra.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the wife's
trust interest is sufficiently "fixed and enforceable" to
constitute a property interest, Levitan, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
253, quoting Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. at 111-112, and the judge
therefore permissibly included it in wife's estate, and assigned
it to her, for purposes of equitable distribution under G. L.
c. 208, § 34. Levitan, supra at 255.
them to direct their other marital assets, such as the husband's
salary, to the maintenance of a higher standard of living than
their earned income allowed." The court held that "[t]he judge
neither committed plain error nor abused his discretion in
concluding implicitly that the trust was an asset upon which the
couple, in the spirit of partnership, relied." Id.
12
2. Bessemer account valuation. The wife next contends
that the judge erroneously inflated the value of her Bessemer
account by approximately $1.3 million by overlooking evidence
that the wife used funds from that account to buy out the
husband's $1.3 million interest in the former marital home. The
wife asserts that this resulted in the husband being "overpaid"
by $455,000. We disagree.
In June 2018, the parties agreed to equally divide the
marital home equity of $2.6 million, with the husband receiving
a $1.3 million buyout payment and the wife retaining the home.
The husband deposited the $1.3 million buyout payment into two
UBS accounts. Both the marital home and the UBS accounts were
excluded from the property division as already-divided assets.
The wife's Bessemer account, however, was included in the
property division. The judge found that the Bessemer account
balance had decreased by approximately $1.3 million between
December 2017 ($13,454,167) and the time of trial ($12,074,505),
without explanation. The judge ultimately valued the Bessemer
account as of December 2017 ($13,454,167), treating it as if the
$1.3 million reduction had never happened, and assigned the
husband thirty-five percent of that amount ($4,708,958.45).
This left the wife with the remaining balance of $7,365,546.55
($12,074,505 minus $4,708,958.45).
13
The wife claims that the judge committed reversible error
because there was "ample evidence" that the $1.3 million
deduction in the Bessemer account balance was attributable to
her buyout of the husband's share of the marital home equity.
We are not persuaded that the wife has demonstrated clear error
in the valuation of the Bessemer account,15 especially where the
judge found that the wife's financial statements "have not
always reflected actual values . . . and have underestimated the
values of some of her assets, sometimes in significant ways."
See Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620-621 (1992) ("A
finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed" [quotations and citations omitted]). However,
assuming arguendo that the wife's calculations were correct, we
still would discern no error in the judge's treatment of the
Bessemer account.
As a result of the predivorce marital home buyout and the
division of the Bessemer account ordered by the judge, the wife
was left with nearly $10 million from the division of those two
assets. If, however, there had been no predivorce buyout of the
marital home (with the equity instead being divided equally in
15Indeed, the wife concedes in her brief that there was no
"direct proof" of this presented to the judge.
14
the divorce judgment and no $1.3 million decrease in the
Bessemer account balance), the wife still would have been left
with approximately $10 million from the division of those two
assets.16 Although the wife claims that the judge's failure to
deduct the marital home buyout payment from the Bessemer account
resulted in a $455,000 overpayment to the husband, it instead
prevented a $1.3 million overpayment to the wife. The parties
agreed to divide the marital home equity of $2.6 million
equally, with the wife retaining the home and using marital
estate funds to buy out the husband's one-half share. This
transaction was intended to result in each party netting $1.3
million. Because both the total marital home equity ($2.6
million) and the accounts holding the husband's $1.3 million
buyout payment were excluded from the property division, the
$1.3 million in marital estate funds that the wife used to buy
out the husband's share was properly added back into the marital
estate (by valuing the Bessemer account as of December 2017,
before the buyout payment occurred). This ensured that the
16If there had been no buyout, and the marital home equity had
instead been divided equally in the divorce judgment, the wife
would have received $1.3 million in equity plus approximately
$8,745,209 (representing sixty-five percent of the December 2017
Bessemer account balance). Instead, the wife retained the
entire marital home having $2.6 million in equity, and the
remaining Bessemer account balance of approximately $7,365,547
(after paying the husband thirty-five percent of the December
2017 balance).
15
wife's net from the marital home buyout transaction remained
$1.3 million (rather than $2.6 million, which would have been
the case if she were permitted to convert $1.3 million of
marital estate funds into real estate equity that was excluded
from the property division).
Accordingly, we cannot say that the judge's valuation of
the Bessemer account was clearly erroneous or that it resulted
in a "plainly wrong and excessive" division of property.
Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 Mass. at 793.
3. The promissory note. The wife next contends that the
judge overvalued one of the family entities in which she holds
an interest (entity 1), by erroneously finding that a $21
million promissory note due to entity 1 from another family
entity (entity 2) remained outstanding. The wife contends that
this was error where the "competent evidence" at trial
demonstrated that the note had been repaid. We disagree.
The wife contends that the note's absence from entity 1's
2014 year-end balance sheet is proof of its repayment in
December 2014. She further contends that the "only contrary
evidence was rank speculation by a nonpercipient witness."
However, the judge's ultimate finding that the note had not been
repaid was based on two credibility determinations, neither of
which we are inclined to disturb. See Johnston v. Johnston, 38
Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995). First, the judge found that the
16
balance sheet was unreliable as it contained inaccuracies and
redactions. Second, the judge credited the testimony of the
wife's brother, who had been responsible for running entity 1
for years and was well-acquainted with its financial holdings
and dealings. The brother testified that the note likely had
not been repaid. In light of the judge's credibility
assessments, the judge was well within her discretion to
implicitly conclude that the brother's testimony represented the
best available evidence of the status of the promissory note.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the valuation of the wife's
interest in entity 1. See Kendall, 413 Mass. at 620-621.
4. Allowances for attorney's fees. The wife next contends
that the judge erred in failing to consider, and treat as
advances of the husband's share of the marital estate, two
"allowances" totaling $475,000 made to him during the pendency
of the divorce action for the payment of his attorney's fees.
[W's br. at 41-42]. The wife asserts that this resulted in a
plainly wrong and excessive award of marital property to the
husband. We disagree.
The first allowance in the amount of $250,000 occurred in
2017; there is no indication in the 2017 temporary order that
this would be treated as an advance of the marital estate. The
second allowance in the amount of $225,000 occurred in 2018;
although the 2018 temporary order stated that the second
17
allowance would be treated as an "advance distribution of the
marital estate," there is no indication in the judge's findings
that she did not treat it as such in the property division. The
judge assigned a substantially larger portion of the marital
estate to the wife. The judge determined that the husband was
entitled to attorney's fees "in addition to the monies paid
during the pendency of trial." The judge also made findings
demonstrating the basis for the fee award.17 On this record, we
cannot say that the judge, in fashioning the property division
here, failed to consider the 2017 and 2018 allowances made to
the husband.18
5. Tax consequences. Finally, the wife contends that it
was an abuse of discretion for the judge to deny her request,
raised for the first time in a postjudgment motion, for an
evidentiary hearing regarding the potential tax consequences to
17 The judge found, among other things, that the wife's
inaccurate financial disclosures "resulted in the obfuscation of
the valuation of" the wife's family assets, resulting in the
husband's "incursion of tens of thousands of dollars in
additional legal fees."
18 Moreover, even if the judge had erroneously failed to consider
them (which we do not suggest), we would deem such error
"insignificant" given that the allowances amount to less than
one percent of the total marital estate. Ross v. Ross, 50 Mass.
App. Ct. 77, 81-82 (2000) ("Mathematical precision is not
required of equitable division of property"; error amounting to
fraction of percentage of marital estate deemed "insignificant"
[citations omitted]).
18
her resulting from liquidating assets to make the lump sum
property division payment to the husband. We disagree.
In dividing the marital estate, "where the issue of tax
consequences has been raised and the judge has been provided
with 'appropriate evidence in the record,' the judge should
consider the tax consequences arising from a judgment" (citation
omitted). L.J.S. v. J.E.S., 464 Mass. 346, 350 (2013). Parties
may ask the judge to consider tax consequences by filing "a
postjudgment motion . . . supported by citations to tax law and
regulations and by illustrative calculations, to amend the
judgment so as to alleviate undue adverse tax consequences"
(emphasis added). Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859,
867 (1989).
Here, the wife's postjudgment motion did not contain any
citations to tax law and regulations, nor did it contain any
illustrative calculations. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 867.
Instead, the wife merely asserted in her motion that "the
evidence does not support a finding that [she] has access to
cash assets sufficient . . . to make a cash lump-sum payment,"
thus "she will have to liquidate investments and will incur
significant capital gains taxes. It is inequitable for the
[w]ife, alone, to bear the burden of the taxes on capital gains
due on the liquidation of investment assets in order to pay a
cash lump-sum property payment." Where, as here, a party has
19
failed to include "reasonably instructive" information regarding
potential tax consequences in her postjudgment motion, "the
probate judge is not bound to grapple with the tax issues," nor
is the judge required to grant a request for an evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 866. See D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488,
510-511 (2004) (affirming denial of husband's request to "tax
effect" his lump sum property division payment to wife where he
failed to "failed to submit adequate evidence at trial
concerning tax issues" and failed "to provide the court with
citations to tax law, illustrative calculations, or other
pertinent information" in his postjudgment motion to amend).
Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to
deny the wife's postjudgment request for an evidentiary hearing
on the tax consequences of the lump sum payment.19
Judgment affirmed.
Supplemental judgment
affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Hand &
Hodgens, JJ.20),
Clerk
Entered: October 6, 2023.
19 The husband is entitled to the costs of the appeal in the
ordinary course pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 26 (a), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1655 (2019). His request for double costs and
appellate attorney's fees is denied.
20 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
20