MARTHA OMORODION-MOGAJI v. A-LOWELL SELF STORAGE & Others. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    23-P-312
    MARTHA OMORODION-MOGAJI
    vs.
    A-LOWELL SELF STORAGE & others.1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment for
    the defendants on the plaintiff's eleven-count amended complaint
    concerning her access to items in a storage unit owned and
    operated by the defendants.2        We affirm the judgment.
    The underlying facts and claims need not be described in
    detail.    It suffices to say that after a motion judge dismissed
    most of the claims for failure to state a claim on which relief
    could be granted, the remaining claims went to trial before a
    jury.   After the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the
    trial judge directed a verdict for the remaining two defendants
    1 A-Tucard LLC, Frank Pollack, and Joseph Dicarlo.
    2 The final judgment itself indicates only that the defendants'
    motion for a directed verdict was allowed. In light of the
    allowance of that motion as to certain claims, and the earlier
    allowance of a motion to dismiss all other claims, we construe
    the judgment as resolving all claims in the defendants' favor.
    on the plaintiff's assault claim and for all four defendants on
    the plaintiff's claims of trespass to chattels and negligence.
    The plaintiff appealed.
    The plaintiff's appellate brief does not rise to the level
    of appellate argument.    See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
    appearing in 
    481 Mass. 1628
     (2019).      See also Maroney v.
    Planning Bd. of Haverhill, 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 678
    , 683 n.8
    (2020).    Her brief also fails to include accurate and
    appropriate record citations as required by rule 16 (a) (9) (A),
    making her claims of error difficult to decipher.      We
    nevertheless briefly address the points in her brief, insofar as
    we are able to discern them.
    1.   Statute of limitations.    The plaintiff first asserts
    that it was error to dismiss any of her claims on statute of
    limitations grounds.     We have reviewed the record and find no
    indication that any of her claims were dismissed on such a
    ground, either at the motion to dismiss or directed verdict
    stages or at any other point in the case.
    2.   Contract.   The plaintiff asserts that the defendants
    failed to acknowledge their contractual obligations until
    damages had resulted.     The motion judge dismissed the contract
    claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert
    it.   The plaintiff does not identify any error in that ruling.
    2
    3.   Negligence.   The plaintiff argues the merits of her
    negligence claim.   She does not address or identify any error in
    the trial judge's ruling ordering a directed verdict for the
    defendants on claim preclusion and issue preclusion grounds,
    based on a prior District Court judgment.3
    4.   Negligence per se.     Under the heading of "negligence
    per se," the plaintiff argues that the defendants' conduct
    violated G. L. c. 184, § 18, and the Attorney General's consumer
    protection regulations.     The amended complaint, however, does
    not appear to contain any such claims.
    5.   Trespass to chattel.   As with her negligence claim, the
    plaintiff argues the merits of her trespass to chattel claim,
    but does not address the trial judge's ruling ordering a
    directed verdict for the defendants on claim preclusion and
    issue preclusion grounds.
    6.   Conversion.   The plaintiff argues the merits of her
    conversion claim.   The motion judge dismissed that claim on the
    ground, among others, that the plaintiff lacked standing to
    assert it.   The plaintiff does not identify any error in that
    ruling.
    3 The plaintiff's reply brief alludes to res judicata and
    collateral estoppel but presents no discernible argument as to
    why either doctrine was inapplicable here.
    3
    7.   Tortious interference with contract rights.     As with
    her conversion claim, the plaintiff argues the merits of her
    tortious interference with contract rights claim, but fails to
    identify any error in the motion judge's dismissal of that claim
    on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff lacked standing
    to assert it.
    8.   Damages.   The plaintiff argues generally that she was
    entitled to damages, but she identifies no specific error in the
    judge's rulings resolving her claims in the defendants' favor.
    She also discusses the constitutional guarantee of equal
    protection of the laws, but nowhere did the amended complaint
    assert an equal protection claim.
    Judgment affirmed.
    By the Court (Milkey, Blake &
    Sacks, JJ.4),
    Clerk
    Entered: October 6, 2023.
    4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-P-0312

Filed Date: 10/6/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/6/2023