Commonwealth v. Christopher Sanchez. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-101
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
CHRISTOPHER SANCHEZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Christopher Sanchez, appeals from
convictions of two counts of armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17,
two counts of armed carjacking, G. L. c. 265, § 21A, one count
of larceny of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a), and one
count of assault and battery by means of a firearm, G. L.
c. 265, § 15E, after a jury trial in the Superior Court.1
Concluding that the police detective's testimony that the
defendant fired a gun into the air ten days prior to the
incidents for which the defendant was convicted was not
prejudicial, we affirm.
1The jury acquitted him of carrying a firearm without a
license, G. L. c. 265, § 10 (a), and assault and battery, G. L.
c. 265, § 13A (a).
1. Standard of review. "[E]vidence of prior bad acts 'is
not admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity
to commit the charged crime.'" Commonwealth v. Facella, 478
Mass. 393, 403 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass.
122, 128 (2006). "[S]uch evidence is admissible when offered
for another purpose, such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or pattern of operation,
so long as its probative value for that purpose is not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Commonwealth v. Welch,
487 Mass. 425, 442-443 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 485
Mass. 145, 163 (2020). "These matters are 'entrusted to the
trial judge's broad discretion and are not disturbed absent
palpable error.'" Commonwealth v. Childs, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 67,
71 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 242
(2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1139 (2018). "As the defendant
timely objected to the introduction of the [prior bad act
evidence], we review the ruling for prejudic[ial error]."
Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 232 (2023).2 "An error
is not prejudicial if it did not influence the jury, or had but
very slight effect." Commonwealth v. White, 103 Mass. App. Ct.
2 At the start of the third day of trial, the defendant
sought to exclude evidence that the defendant had previously
fired the gun, arguing that the Commonwealth was not required to
prove that the defendant knew that the firearm was operable, and
the trial judge denied the motion. See Commonwealth v. Grady,
474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016).
2
655, 659 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Souza, 492 Mass. 615,
627 (2023).
2. Prior bad act evidence. Here, we need not decide
whether the detective's testimony that the defendant fired the
gun into the air ten days prior to the incidents for which the
defendant was convicted was properly admitted because that
evidence did not prejudice the defendant. The evidence was part
of the detective's recitation of the defendant's admissions
during an interrogation, which went unrecorded at the
defendant's request. If the jury accepted those admissions as
true, then they accepted that the defendant committed the far
more serious crimes of which he was convicted. If they had
disbelieved the defendant's admissions (either because they
disbelieved the detective or disbelieved the defendant's
statements to the detective), then they would not have believed
that the defendant fired the gun into the air. In this
particular case, there was no reason why the jury would have
believed one and not the other.3
3 In general, of course, a jury may believe part of a
defendant's statement and disbelieve another part. See
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 211, 217 (2020). Here,
however, we discern no persuasive reason -- nor has the
defendant supplied one -- that the jury would have disbelieved
the powerfully inculpatory admissions by the defendant while not
only believing, but assigning significant weight to, the
defendant's description of firing the gun into the air.
3
Furthermore, the trial judge contemporaneously instructed
the jury not to consider the evidence for propensity purposes.
"We presume, as we must, that a jury understand[ ] and follow[ ]
limiting instructions." Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass.
186, 194 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 Mass. 572,
579 (1981). We discern no prejudice. See Commonwealth v.
Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 137, 154-156 (2023) (in drug-connected
murder case, evidence that defendant's former girlfriend met him
by buying drugs not prejudicial "given the brief nature of the
testimony, the judge's limiting instruction that the evidence
was not admitted for propensity purposes, which we presume the
jury followed, and the strength of the evidence against the
defendant"). See also Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 16
(2014) (discerning no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of
justice where Commonwealth admitted evidence that defendant had
stolen from lumber yard where theft was "relatively minor"
compared to charged "brutal killing").
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Henry & Ditkoff, JJ.4),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: May 2, 2024.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
4