SOEP PAINTING CORP. v. GRAYCOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., & Others. ( 2023 )


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  • NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
    23.0, as appearing in 
    97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
     (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
    as amended by 
    73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001
     [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
    and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
    decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
    court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
    A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
    2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
    above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 258
    , 260
    n.4 (2008).
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
    APPEALS COURT
    22-P-1173
    SOEP PAINTING CORP.
    vs.
    GRAYCOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., & others. 1
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
    The defendant appeals from an amended separate and final
    judgment, entered pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 
    365 Mass. 820
     (1974), awarding the plaintiff $299,538.46 on its breach of
    contract claim.      The judgment resulted from the allowance of the
    plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, which was based
    on its claim that the defendant had violated the Prompt Payment
    Act, G. L. c. 149, § 29E.        In essence, the defendant's argument
    on appeal is that, even assuming that it violated the provisions
    of the Prompt Payment Act, judgment should not have entered
    until its impossibility defense had been adjudicated. 2
    1 Office Tower Owner LP, Pacific Theatres Exhibit Corp., Podium
    Developer LLC, and Podium Owner GP LLC, none of which are
    involved in this appeal.
    2 The defendant did not assert impossibility as an affirmative
    defense in its answer. "Affirmative defenses are waived when
    they are not raised in the first responsive pleading."
    To begin with, we note that the defendant failed to furnish
    an adequate record to support its arguments on appeal.    See
    Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 
    481 Mass. 1637
     (2019);
    G.B. v. C.A., 
    94 Mass. App. Ct. 389
    , 397 n.13 (2018).
    Specifically, the defendant did not include in the appellate
    record the motion for partial summary judgment, the opposition
    thereto, the statement of undisputed facts, or the verified
    complaint.   Nonetheless, on our own initiative, we have obtained
    the relevant filings directly from the trial court, and
    therefore proceed to the merits of the appeal.
    In Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC, 
    491 Mass. 144
    , 151–152 (2023) (Le Fort), the Supreme Judicial Court
    recently explained the doctrine of impossibility in the context
    of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    "The modern impossibility doctrine provides:
    '[W]here from the nature of the contract it appears
    that the parties must from the beginning have
    contemplated the continued existence of some
    particular specified thing as the foundation of what
    was to be done, then, in the absence of any warranty
    that the thing shall exist, the contract is to be
    construed not as a positive contract, but as subject
    Aronovitz v. Fafard, 
    78 Mass. App. Ct. 1
    , 8 (2010). That said,
    the defendant's thirteenth affirmative defense asserted
    frustration of purpose which is a "companion rule" to
    impossibility. Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 
    409 Mass. 371
    , 374 (1991), quoting Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-
    Mixed Concrete Corp., 
    365 Mass. 122
    , 129 (1974). Accordingly,
    for the sake of argument in this appeal, we will treat the
    defense as having been timely raised.
    2
    to an implied condition that the parties shall be
    excused in case before breach performance becomes
    impossible from the accidental perishing of the thing
    without the fault of either party . . . . The
    misfortune which has occurred releases both parties
    from further performance of the contract and gives no
    right to either to claim damages from the other'
    (ellipses in original)."
    
    Id.,
     quoting Boston Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John Bowen Co.,
    
    335 Mass. 697
    , 700 (1957).    The question here is whether the
    summary judgment record could sustain the defendant's burden to
    show that its performance was rendered impossible because of the
    COVID-19 pandemic.   See Le Fort, supra at 154.    The defendant
    failed to meet its burden because, as in Le Fort, the "absence
    of a causal link is fatal."    Id. at 155.   Specifically, the
    summary judgment record did not raise a triable issue of fact
    that the owner's financial difficulties made it impossible for
    the defendant, who was the general contractor, to perform its
    obligations under the contract to the plaintiff, who was the
    subcontractor.
    "The fact that one is unable to perform a contract because
    of the inability to obtain money . . . will not ordinarily
    excuse nonperformance in the absence of a contract
    provision in that regard. . . . [S]imply positing two facts
    -- that the pandemic has occurred, and that a party finds
    it very difficult or even impossible to perform its
    contractual obligations -- is not enough." (Quotations and
    citations omitted.)
    Id. at 156.
    3
    Because the defendant did not raise a triable issue of fact
    concerning impossibility of performance in this case, we need
    not decide whether -- as an abstract matter -- an impossibility
    defense must always be adjudicated before rendering judgment on
    a subcontractor's breach of contract claim based on violation of
    the Prompt Payment Act.   Where, as here, the record was
    insufficient to establish an impossibility defense, the judge
    was correct to conclude the court's decision in Tocci Bldg.
    Corp. v. IRIV Partners, LLC, 
    101 Mass. App. Ct. 133
     (2022),
    controlled in all material respects.
    The amended separate and final judgment entered pursuant to
    Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) on August 1, 2022 is affirmed, and the
    case is remanded for further proceedings. 3
    So ordered.
    By the Court (Wolohojian,
    Shin & Ditkoff, JJ. 4),
    Clerk
    Entered:   September 20, 2023.
    3 We deny the plaintiff's request, made under Mass. R. A. P. 25,
    as appearing in 
    481 Mass. 1654
     (2019), for attorney's fees and
    costs on appeal. The legal issue presented on appeal was not
    frivolous.
    4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-P-1173

Filed Date: 9/20/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/20/2023