Commonwealth v. Miguel C. Fletcher. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-687
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MIGUEL C. FLETCHER.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted
of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 1 After filing a
notice of appeal, the defendant moved for expert funds, for
reconsideration of the denial of that motion, and, accompanied
by a renewed motion for expert funds, for a new trial. He filed
a second notice of appeal from the denials of those motions, and
his appeal from those orders was consolidated with his direct
appeal. In the consolidated appeals, the defendant argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that
the prosecutor asserted facts not in evidence in her closing
argument, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
1 The defendant was also found responsible for a civil infraction
of speeding at a rate exceeding the posted limit. He was
acquitted of operating under the influence.
and that he is entitled to expert funds and a new trial. We
affirm.
Background. We summarize the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). In November 2017 Bridgewater
Police Officer Christopher Paze was working a paid detail at a
restaurant when he saw a car in the parking lot that had "just
been struck." Parked adjacent to the damaged car was an
eighteen-wheeler bobtail tractor without the trailer attached,
"tilting back and forth." Paze approached the tractor and asked
the driver, later identified as the defendant, to get out. The
defendant did not respond and instead "took off at a high rate
of speed." Paze then radioed in the tractor's registration
plate information and direction of travel.
In response to the call, Bridgewater Police Sergeant Carl
MacDermott 2 drove to nearby Central Square to intercept the
defendant. Central Square is a thickly settled business
district with crosswalks, a traffic light, angular parking, and
a rotary with a speed limit of thirty miles per hour. As
MacDermott approached the area with his blue lights on, he saw
the defendant entering "the rotary at a high rate of speed."
The defendant navigated the rotary successfully before turning
2 MacDermott was a lieutenant by the time of trial. We refer to
him by his rank at the time of the offense.
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onto a street with a speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour.
After MacDermott made the same turn, the defendant's "vehicle
. . . shot off." MacDermott had to drive between sixty and
sixty-five miles per hour for seven-tenths of a mile to catch up
with the defendant.
MacDermott activated his siren, and the tractor pulled over
without incident. Because the height of the tractor put
approximately ten feet between the defendant and MacDermott,
making it difficult for them to communicate, MacDermott asked
the defendant to get out. Once the defendant did so, MacDermott
noticed that he seemed "very agitated" and spoke with "thick-
tongued, slurred speech." Without being asked, the defendant
stated that he had consumed three beers and a mixed drink.
Bridgewater Police Officer Ryan O'Connell arrived at the
scene to assist. He observed that the defendant had red
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and smelled moderately of
alcohol. O'Connell administered various field sobriety tests,
which the defendant did not successfully complete. The
defendant could neither recite the alphabet nor count backwards
in the manner requested. While receiving instructions for the
nine-step walk-and-turn test, the defendant was unable to
maintain his balance, and he never properly completed the walk.
He also did not properly perform the one-leg stand test.
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Believing that the defendant was intoxicated, the officers
arrested him.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. We review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to
determine "whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95
Mass. App. Ct. 156, 162 (2019). Inferences supporting a
conviction "need only be reasonable and possible" and "need not
be necessary or inescapable" (quotation and citation omitted).
Id.Negligent operation requires proof that the defendant
"(1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon a public way
(3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might
be endangered." Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377,
379 (2017). The defendant challenges only the third element,
arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he operated
his vehicle in a negligent manner. We disagree.
To satisfy the third element, the Commonwealth must present
proof that the defendant's conduct "might have endangered the
safety of the public, not that it in fact did." Commonwealth v.
Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007). Here, the evidence
showed that the defendant drove a bobtail tractor through a
thickly settled business district at a high rate of speed. The
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evidence also permitted the inference that the defendant had
been drinking before doing so; he failed to successfully perform
any of the field sobriety tests, displayed several physical
signs that he had recently been drinking, and admitted that he
had consumed multiple beers and a mixed drink earlier that
night. See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380 ("The fact that the
jury ultimately did not convict the defendant of OUI does not
preclude their consideration of the evidence of intoxication in
considering the negligent operation charge"). Considering the
defendant's speeding and that he had been drinking, coupled with
the size of the tractor and the thickly settled nature of the
area, the judge had an adequate basis to find the defendant
guilty of negligent operation. See id. at 380-381 (affirming
conviction of negligent operation based on evidence of
intoxication and excessive speeding at night on residential
road); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921-923
(2004) (affirming conviction of negligent operation based on
evidence of excessive speeding through thickly settled
neighborhood on holiday afternoon).
We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the
absence of a measurement or numerical estimate of his speed
necessitates vacating his conviction. Officers observed the
defendant's tractor moving at a high rate of speed on three
separate occasions, including in areas where the speed limit was
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no higher than thirty-five miles per hour. Sergeant MacDermott
also testified that he had to drive between sixty and sixty-five
miles per hour for seven-tenths of a mile to catch up with the
defendant. It was a "reasonable and possible" inference from
this evidence that the defendant was driving in excess of the
speed limit. 3 Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 162.
2. Closing argument. The defendant asserts that the
prosecutor improperly stated facts not in evidence when she
argued that the defendant was "traveling essentially over 60
miles per hour with an officer pursuing him in what appears to
be at least a 30-mile-per-hour zone." As the defendant did not
object at trial, we review to determine whether any error
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 492 Mass. 25, 32 (2023).
We discern no error. The prosecutor's statement that the
defendant was "traveling essentially over 60 miles per hour" was
3 Arguing otherwise, the defendant characterizes Sergeant
MacDermott's testimony as establishing that his seven-tenths of
a mile pursuit of the defendant included a stretch where he
stopped for a red light. But viewed most favorably to the
Commonwealth, MacDermott's testimony was that he stopped at the
red light before pursuing the defendant for seven-tenths of a
mile. In any event, even accepting the defendant's
characterization of MacDermott's testimony, the judge still
could have inferred that the defendant was speeding based on the
evidence that the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed
and "shot off" after exiting the rotary and that MacDermott had
to travel up to sixty-five miles per hour, in a thirty-five mile
per hour zone, to catch up with the defendant.
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a fair inference from Sergeant MacDermott's testimony that he
was driving between sixty and sixty-five miles per hour while
pursuing the defendant. See Cuffee, 492 Mass. at 32 ("A
prosecutor is entitled to marshal the facts in evidence, and any
fair inferences drawn from those facts"). Likewise, the
prosecutor's comment that the speeding occurred in "at least a
30-mile-per-hour zone" was a fair inference from MacDermott's
testimony that the speed limit was between thirty and thirty-
five miles per hour in the areas that the defendant was driving.
We also discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice. Closing argument is "not evidence." Commonwealth v.
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987). And we presume that the judge
based his finding on his own memory of the evidence rather than
the prosecutor's summation of it. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 33
Mass. App. Ct. 304, 308 (1992) ("it is presumed that the judge
as trier of fact applies correct legal principles").
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant next
asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he conceded
during closing argument that "[a]ll you have, in terms of
operation, is really speeding . . . [with] no indicia of
anything other than speeding." This claim, raised on direct
appeal, is at its "weakest form" because it "is bereft of any
explanation by trial counsel for his actions" (citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 289 (2007). A
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court may only resolve an ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal in exceptional circumstances where the basis for the
claim "appears indisputably on the trial record." Id., quoting
Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006).
That is not the case here. Trial counsel made an
"obviously strategic decision" to concede that the defendant was
speeding in light of the testimony of two officers that they
observed the defendant traveling at a high rate of speed, and to
argue instead that speeding alone did not rise to the level of
negligent operation. Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 223
(2019). There is nothing in the trial record to suggest that
this strategy was manifestly unreasonable. See Commonwealth v.
Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006).
4. Postconviction motions. After trial the defendant
moved for funds to retain an accident reconstructionist, seeking
to develop his theory that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to retain an expert on the issue of whether the
defendant was speeding. In support of the motion, the defendant
filed an affidavit from appellate counsel, which stated that
"[b]ased on his preliminary review . . ., the [proposed expert]
believes that it may have been physically impossible for the 18-
wheel bobtail tractor the defendant was driving to navigate the
roundabout without swerving or leaving its marked lane at 60 or
50 miles per hour," but the expert needed to do further testing
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"before he [could] reach an opinion on the matter." The motion
judge, who was not the trial judge, initially denied the motion
as "premature as [a] motion for new trial has not been
litigated." After the defendant moved to reconsider, the motion
judge denied relief on the ground that there was "no affidavit
from the proposed expert supporting the assertions of defense
counsel."
The defendant then filed a "preliminary" motion for a new
trial, together with a renewed motion for funds, asking that no
action be taken on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel until he was able to retain and consult with the
proposed expert. In support of these motions, the defendant
filed two affidavits from appellate counsel, which again stated
that the expert believed that "it may not have been physically
possible" for the defendant to have navigated the rotary while
driving at fifty or sixty miles per hour, but he needed to do
more tests to reach a definitive conclusion. The trial judge
summarily denied the motion for a new trial. 4
It is within a judge's discretion to grant funds associated
with the preparation of a new trial motion. See Commonwealth v.
Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 204 (2003). To be entitled to such funds,
a defendant "must make a sufficient showing that the discovery
4 No separate action was taken on the renewed motion for funds,
but, as the defendant acknowledges, it was implicitly denied.
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is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant
granting a new trial." Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392,
407 (2005). See Evans, supra at 204-205. The defendant's
request must be accompanied by "specific, not speculative or
conclusory, allegations that the newly discovered evidence would
have materially aided the defense" (quotation and citation
omitted). Daniels, supra.We discern no abuse of discretion in the denials of the
defendant's motions here, given their speculative nature. The
affidavits submitted with the motions established only the
expert's "belie[f]" that it "may have been" impossible for the
defendant to have been speeding to the degree described in the
trial testimony. This was insufficient to demonstrate with the
requisite specificity that further testing would have produced
results that would warrant a new trial. See Commonwealth v.
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Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 62-63 (2009); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 102
Mass. App. Ct. 299, 307 (2023).
Judgment affirmed.
Orders denying motion for
expert funds and for
reconsideration affirmed.
Order denying motion for a
new trial and renewed
motion for expert funds
affirmed.
By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
Hodgens, JJ. 5),
Clerk
Entered: December 6, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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