Edward J. Matz v. University of Massachusetts, Amherst. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1162
EDWARD J. MATZ
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Edward J. Matz ("Matz"), the former head
women's soccer coach for the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst (UMass), appeals from a summary judgment entered in
favor of UMass on his age discrimination claim. We conclude
that a rational finder of fact could find that the reason Matz
was terminated from his position was due to his age.
Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
1. Background. Matz played college soccer and after his
graduation in 1989, began a career as the head women's soccer
coach at a university in Vermont. He moved to Boston and
obtained his master's degree while coaching college soccer,
eventually becoming an athletic director where he coached both
men's and women's college soccer at the National Collegiate
Athletic Association Division I level. He later accepted the
position of head coach of the UMass women's soccer team ("the
team") in 2010. His first employment contract was effective
until 2015. Matz signed a second contract in 2014, extending
his employment as the head coach of the team through January
2018.
During his tenure as head coach, the women's soccer team
did not perform consistently. For example, in 2010 the team had
a record of eight wins and eleven losses. Their record improved
in 2011 to fourteen wins, five losses, and three ties. In 2014,
their record declined when the team won only five games, lost
nine and tied five. The following year, for the first time in
seven years, the team failed to qualify for the conference
tournament, and the team's national ranking was lowered, netting
only six wins in the season with eight losses and four tied
games. In 2016, the team won only three games, which
represented the lowest number of wins in a season in the forty-
three seasons of the team's history. In 2017, the team's record
improved slightly when they won seven games, lost nine games,
and tied two games.
During Matz's yearly performance evaluation for the 2015
season, while noting many areas that were satisfactory, UMass
informed Matz that the overall conclusion of his evaluation was
that his work needed improvement as the team's national ranking
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was lowered and the team did not advance to the conference
tournament for the first time since 2008. Ryan Bamford, Matz's
supervisor, told Matz that he wanted to see the team "trending
in the right direction" rather than the sole focus be on the
number of wins and losses.
In 2016, a small group of players requested a meeting
discuss Matz's coaching style with Bamford. Bamford also
received two letters critical of Matz's coaching. In October of
2017, an online survey of the team was conducted by UMass which
resulted in several criticisms of Matz's coaching style.
Bamford hired an independent consultant to evaluate Matz's
interactions with the students. While the consultant did not
provide a written report, the consultant found that Matz was
meeting his expectations as head coach of the team, that his
feedback to the student athletes was appropriate, and that the
student complaints could not be confirmed.
In November 2017, at the age of fifty-one, Matz was
informed that he would no longer be employed as the head women's
soccer coach and that his contract would not be renewed. He
later filed this lawsuit alleging age discrimination.
2. Standard of Review. The grant of summary judgment is
appropriate "where there is no material issue of material fact
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law" (citation omitted). Adams v. Schneider Electric
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USA, 492 Mass. 271, 280 (2023). In employment discrimination
cases based upon disparate treatment, summary judgment is
generally disfavored because proof of a discriminatory motive
"is 'elusive and rarely is established by other than
circumstantial evidence.'" Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
444 Mass. 34, 38 (2005), quoting Blare v. Husky Injection
Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 439, (1995). See
Adams, supra, quoting Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass.
672, 689 (2016). ("Summary judgment is 'a disfavored remedy in
the context of discrimination cases based on disparate treatment
. . . because the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a
factual question'"). In reviewing the grant of summary
judgment, we evaluate the record de novo and accept the facts,
together with all of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 119 (2010).
3. Discussion. In order for Matz to prevail on a
complaint for age discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, he
must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class;
(2) was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) that the
employer bore "discriminatory animus" in taking the action; and
(4) that the animus was the reason for the action. See Bulwer,
473 Mass. at 680. It is undisputed that Matz is a member of a
protected class and that he suffered an adverse employment
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action. As in many cases of this nature, because direct
evidence of discriminatory animus and causation rarely exists,
an employee can survive a summary judgment motion "by providing
indirect or circumstantial evidence [of discriminatory animus
and causation] using the familiar three-stage, burden-shifting
paradigm first set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973)" (citation and quotations omitted).
Id. at 680-681.
The first stage of this paradigm requires the plaintiff to
prove a prima facie case of discrimination. See Bulwer, 473
Mass. at 681. In order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that he is a member
of a protected class, that he performed his job at an acceptable
level, that he suffered an adverse employment action and the
adverse employment action "occurred in circumstances that would
raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."
Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 45. In cases involving termination and
replacement, the employee must prove that the employer sought to
fill the position with a person who possessed similar
qualifications. Id. at 41. If the plaintiff meets this burden,
the second stage requires the employer to rebut the presumption
of discrimination established by the plaintiff by "articulating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse action
(citation omitted). Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 681. Should the
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employer meet their burden, the third and final stage, often
referred to as "the burden of production," requires the
employee/plaintiff to present evidence that "the employer's
articulated justification . . . is not true but a pretext"
citation omitted. Id. Massachusetts is a pretext only
jurisdiction and "[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff need only present evidence from which a reasonable
jury could infer that 'the . . . facially proper reasons given
[by the employer] for its action against [the employee] were not
the real reasons for that action.'" Id. at 682, quoting
Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination,
371 Mass. 130, 139 (1976). While the plaintiff does bear the
burden of production, the burden of persuasion at the summary
judgment stage always remains with the moving party, here UMass.
a. Questions of material fact. With this framework in
mind, we analyze whether Matz established a prima facie case of
age discrimination. UMass concedes that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class but argues that Matz was not
performing his job at an acceptable level and thus challenges
that Matz met his burden under the first stage of the burden-
shifting paradigm: establishing a prima facie case of age
discrimination. In essence, UMass claims that Matz's undisputed
poor record and the student criticisms of his coaching abilities
necessitates a finding that he was not performing his job at
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acceptable levels and thus that summary judgment should be
entered in its favor. We disagree.
Although the record certainly does contain criticisms of
Matz's coaching techniques and his performance evaluation for
the 2015 season indicated that he needed improvement, the record
also contains numerous positive evaluations inconsistent with
these criticisms. Matz only has to establish by a preponderance
of evidence that he was performing his job at an acceptable
level, and he has met his burden. At the summary judgment
stage, "a court does not resolve issues of material fact, assess
credibility, or weigh evidence." Kernan v. Morse, 69 Mass. App.
Ct. 378, 382 (2007). We conclude, as did the Superior Court
judge, that the plaintiff has satisfied his obligation under the
first stage of the burden-shifting paradigm to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination. UMass contends that Matz's
termination was due to his poor record of wins and losses,
reported negative student athlete experiences, and his poor
performance reviews for the 2015 and 2016 seasons. We conclude,
and Matz does not seem to challenge otherwise, that UMass has
proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Matz and,
as a result, UMass has met its burden under the second stage of
the burden-shifting paradigm.
Because UMass met its burden under the second stage of the
burden-shifting paradigm, only the third stage of the analysis
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remains -- whether Matz has produced sufficient evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to infer that UMass' proffered
reason for his termination was pretextual. The plaintiff offers
the following arguments to support an inference that Umass'
alleged nondiscriminatory reasons are not the real reasons his
employment was terminated. He argues his success as a coach was
not solely hinged on wins and losses. Even still, recognizing
the importance of a head coach's responsibility to recruit and
maintain a winning team, he notes that his record of wins more
than doubled between 2016 and 2017. Matz argues that the
improvement in the 2017 season, while admittedly not resulting
in an overall winning season, is evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that the proffered reason was not
true.
As to the student athlete experiences, Matz notes that only
seven out of a total of twenty-eight student athletes complained
about his coaching, thereby creating an inference that the other
twenty-one students were not dissatisfied. The consultant's
findings about Matz's interactions with the student athletes
directly conflict with one of the proffered reasons for Matz's
termination.
While conceding that his performance review for the 2015
season resulted in an overall rating of needing improvement, in
many of the categories of this evaluation Matz either met
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expectations or exceeded expectations. Notably, in the
performance evaluation for the 2014 season, Matz received one
rating of "mastery and expertise," and an overall rating of
"exceeds expectations," despite having only won five games. In
addition, Matz offered some evidence that during the time period
of 2016 to 2018, some UMass coaches whose contracts were not
renewed were replaced with younger coaches.
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment at the
third stage, Matz need only produce sufficient evidence that one
of the proffered reasons by UMass was pretextual. He has done
so here. In sum, although UMass rebutted Matz's prima facie
case of discrimination, there is sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find that UMass terminated Matz because
of his age.
The summary judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded
to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with
this memorandum and order.
So ordered.
By the Court (Vuono, Meade &
Walsh, JJ.1),
Clerk
Entered: December 7, 2023.
1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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