DARRIN WHITMAN v. CAROL A. MICI & Another. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-431
DARRIN WHITMAN
vs.
CAROL A. MICI 1 & another. 2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to
house him in a single cell at the Massachusetts Correctional
Institution at Norfolk (MCI-Norfolk), pursuant to G. L. c. 127,
§ 22. He appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court granting
the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6),
365 Mass. 754 (1974). He also appeals from the denial of his
motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
Discussion. "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de
novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the
1 Individually, and as Commissioner of Correction.
2 Nelson Alves, individually and as superintendent of the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.
complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
plaintiff's favor, and determining whether the allegations
plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief."
Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37,
43 (2022).
The plaintiff is incarcerated at MCI-Norfolk, where he
serves a life sentence on his conviction for murder in the first
degree. See Commonwealth v. Darrin Whitman, 416 Mass. 90(1993). In his complaint, the plaintiff requested a declaration
and permanent injunction pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 22,
requiring the defendants to refrain from housing two inmates in
the same cell. Massachusetts General Laws c. 127, § 22, states
"unless the crowded state of the institution so requires, [any
two prisoners shall not] . . . be allowed to occupy the same
room, except for work" (emphasis added). The plaintiff asserts
that the statute empowers a judge of the Superior Court to
enjoin the defendants from housing more than one inmate in the
same cell.
However, the plaintiff only alleged that six thousand fewer
individuals were incarcerated at the time of the complaint than
were incarcerated at some point in the past. He did not plead
that MCI-Norfolk was insufficiently crowded to warrant housing
any inmate with another, which is what the statute prohibits, or
even that he himself was currently housed or very likely to be
2
housed with another inmate, as would be required to give him
standing to sue. 3 Thus, the plaintiff did not meet his burden to
allege facts "'plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with)' an entitlement to relief." See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor
Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 4
The plaintiff also contends that he has the constitutional
right to a single occupancy cell. This argument also fails, as
there is no constitutional right to a single cell. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) ("We disagree . . . that there
is some sort of 'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
Finally, the plaintiff appeals from the judge's denial of
his motion for reconsideration. "[W]e review the judge's denial
of a motion for reconsideration only for abuse of discretion."
Merchants Ins. Group v. Spicer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 271
3 Nor do the population figures that we requested and that the
defendants provided in their post-argument letter give us reason
to believe the statute is currently being violated at MCI-
Norfolk.
4 The defendants cite several Federal District Court cases for
the proposition that that there is no private cause of action to
enforce G. L. c. 127, § 22. See Smitherman vs. Stevenson, U.S.
Dist. Ct., No. 13-10161 (D. Mass. July 12, 2017); Scott vs.
Dickhaut, U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 10-11348 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2013);
Cryer vs. Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 11-10654 (D. Mass. Mar.
15, 2012). We need not address and do not reach whether there
are no circumstances where a plaintiff may bring a private cause
of action under G. L. c. 127, § 22.
3
(2015). The plaintiff offered nothing new in his motion for
reconsideration, merely asserting that the judge's decision was
"baseless" and stating that she "should not have dismissed" his
claim. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial
of the motion.
Judgment of dismissal and
order denying motion for
reconsideration affirmed.
By the Court (Sacks,
Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ. 5),
Clerk
Entered: December 11, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
4