Commonwealth v. Martin E. Libby. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-787
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
MARTIN E. LIBBY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a bench trial in the District Court, the
defendant, Martin E. Libby, was found guilty of leaving the
scene of an accident involving personal injury, G. L. c. 90,
§ 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1), and negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). He was also found
responsible for a marked lanes violation. See G. L. c. 89,
§ 4A.1 On appeal, he argues that the Commonwealth's evidence was
insufficient to prove either that he was the operator of the
1The defendant was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle
with a suspended license, G. L. c. 90, § 23; operating a motor
vehicle under the influence, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); and
failing to stop for the police, G. L. c. 90, § 25.
truck that crashed into a Toyota Avalon headed in the opposite
direction, or that he drove in a negligent manner. We affirm.
In our review of the denial of a motion for a required
finding of not guilty, "we consider the evidence introduced at
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (2017), quoting
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547 (2017). The relevant
question is whether the evidence would permit the trier of fact
to find guilt, "not whether the evidence requires such a
finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).
1. Operation of the motor vehicle. To establish the
defendant's guilt for both leaving the scene of an accident
involving personal injury and negligent operation, the
Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident. See
Commonwealth v. Rijo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 873 (2020), quoting
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1) ("Whoever operates a motor
vehicle upon any way . . . and without stopping and making known
his name, residence and the registration number of his motor
vehicle, goes away after knowingly colliding with or otherwise
causing injury to any person not resulting in the death of any
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person, shall be punished . . ."); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62
Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 (2004) ("To establish guilt under [G. L.
c. 90, § 24 (2) (a)], the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant (1) operated the motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way,
(3) (recklessly or) negligently so that the lives or safety of
the public might be endangered").
The defendant contends the evidence presented at trial,
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, was insufficient to prove that he was the operator
of the truck that caused the accident. We disagree. "Proof of
operation of a motor vehicle may rest entirely on circumstantial
evidence" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.
Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006). Here, the driver of
the Toyota Avalon testified that his car was hit by a white box
truck driven by a white man. The police detective who responded
to the accident transmitted by radio a description of the truck
and its license plate number, based on information provided by
witnesses to the accident. Ten to fifteen minutes later, a
patrol officer spotted a truck with that license plate number
and matching that description about a mile or two from where the
accident occurred. The defendant was driving the truck. After
being stopped, he told the officer that he had just been in an
accident. There was severe damage to the left, front side of
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his truck. In addition, pink insulation foam, a white exterior
tool compartment panel, and various tools had been found at the
scene of the accident, and the defendant's truck had the same
pink insulation foam and its exterior tool compartment panel had
been ripped off.
Viewed as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, this evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating the truck at
the time of the accident. See Commonwealth v. Shea, 324 Mass.
710, 713 (1949). Even though there was a female passenger in
the truck when the police pulled it over, her presence was
inadequate to "undermine the probative value of the
corroborative evidence" showing the defendant was the driver.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 421 Mass. 289, 292 (1995). That
corroborative evidence included the Toyota Avalon driver's
statement that a man was driving the white box truck, the fact
that the defendant was driving the truck when it was stopped
shortly afterwards, and his admission that he had just been in
an accident. See Commonwealth v. Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct.
196, 201-202 (2016).
2. Negligent operation. The defendant also claims there
was insufficient evidence to prove that he operated the truck
negligently. Under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), negligence "is
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determined by the same standard that is employed in tort law."
Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 922 n.2. At trial, the driver of
the Toyota Avalon testified that the truck crossed over the
double yellow lines and struck the front left side of his
vehicle. Because the truck was "way over the line," he had no
ability to avoid the collision. The officer who stopped the
defendant testified that he seemed "unsteady on his feet," had
"[s]lurred" and "delayed" speech, and, confusingly, stated that
he had already "called the hospital to let them know that an
accident had occurred." Because this evidence of the
defendant's marked lane violation and general disorientation was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
negligently operated his vehicle, the judge did not err in
denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Meade,
Hershfang & Toone, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: October 22, 2024.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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