Commonwealth v. Gabriel Megna. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1332
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
GABRIEL MEGNA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On June 17, 2014, the defendant, Gabriel Megna (Mr. Megna),
was found guilty of seven offenses relating to armed robbery,
assault with a dangerous weapon, and felony firearm possession.
On March 30, 2023, Mr. Megna, as a self-represented litigant,
filed a motion for a new trial asserting that he "was not
available or allowed to attend the Pretrial Conference held June
10, 2013[,] as a Final Pretrial Conference."1 The Commonwealth
opposed the motion, and on July 20, 2023, in a margin
endorsement, the motion was denied "for the reasons set forth in
the Commonwealth's opposition." Indeed, a docket entry
reflected that the pretrial conference scheduled for June 10,
1Mr. Megna and his codefendant previously filed appeals
from their convictions which were affirmed by a panel of this
court. See Commonwealth v. Ginnetti, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1117(2017).
2013, was in fact rescheduled. In response, on July 27, 2023,
Mr. Megna filed a "Verified Rebuttal to the Commonwealth's
Opposition" (rebuttal), claiming for the first time that he was
excluded from the pretrial conference occurring on January 6,
2014.2 Then on August 14, 2023, without the court having acted
on his rebuttal, Mr. Megna filed his notice of appeal from the
July 20, 2023 order denying his motion for new trial which is
the subject of this appeal. We affirm.
Discussion. 1. Mr. Megna's rebuttal. As an initial
matter, because Mr. Megna filed this appeal before his rebuttal
was acted on, we agree with the Commonwealth that "there may be
some question" whether any argument about Mr. Megna's rebuttal
is waived or is properly before us.3 See Commonwealth v.
Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006). However, assuming
without deciding that Mr. Megna's rebuttal is properly before us
his argument is unavailing. We address the merits of Mr.
Megna's appeal below.
2 Neither the docket nor the trial court file reflects that
any action was taken by the court with respect to the rebuttal.
3 Despite its uncertainty, the Commonwealth nevertheless
presumes that Mr. Megna's rebuttal is properly before us for the
following reasons: (1) the motion judge's failure to act on the
rebuttal may be considered an implicit denial; (2) the judge
adopted multiple reasons for denying Mr. Megna's motion, two of
which apply to the January 6, 2014, date raised in the rebuttal;
and (3) Mr. Megna filed the rebuttal soon after his motion was
denied and the rebuttal does not call for any action by the
court, as opposed to a motion for reconsideration.
2
2. Right to be present. The Commonwealth first argues
that Mr. Megna's appeal fails for a lack of sufficient proof
that he was not present for the pretrial conference on January
6, 2014.4 While it is true that defendants have the right to be
present at all critical stages of criminal proceedings,
Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 98 (2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021), even assuming Mr. Megna was not present
at the pretrial conference, his appeal still fails because a
pretrial conference is not a "critical stage" where a defendant
is entitled to be present.
Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (a), 378 Mass.
887 (1979), provides that "the defendant shall be entitled to be
present at all critical stages of the proceedings" (emphasis
added). "This right to be present derives from the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . , the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , and art. 12
[of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]" (citation
omitted). Francis, 485 Mass. at 98. See Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-108 (1934). However, because
"requir[ing] the defendant's presence at all times could in some
instances unduly prolong the disposition of the case . . . , the
4 Indeed, Mr. Megna relies solely on his own affidavit to
support his assertion that he was not in court on January 6,
2014.
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detailing of what stages are deemed critical is left to judicial
determination." Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 18, Mass.
Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 188 (Thomson
Reuters 2023) (Reporters' Notes to Rule 18). Rule 18 (a) (3)
also provides that "[a] defendant need not be present . . . at
any proceeding where evidence is not to be taken." Mass. R.
Crim. P. 18 (a) (3), as amended, 489 Mass. 1503 (2022).
Additionally, "[a]lthough rule 18 does not identify what stages
of court proceedings are critical, fairness demands that the
defendant be present when his substantial rights are at stake"
(quotations and citation omitted). Francis, supra.
Here, Mr. Megna fails to establish that his right to be
present at a critical stage was violated. First, a pretrial
conference is not a proceeding where evidence is taken and
therefore our rules of criminal procedure support a conclusion
that Mr. Megna's presence was not required. See Mass. R.
Crim. P. 18 (a) (3). Second, Mr. Megna has failed to make any
showing that his substantial rights were at stake during the
pretrial conference on January 6, 2014. See Francis, 485 Mass.
at 98. Notably, a pretrial conference is not a proceeding where
defendants confront their accuser, and there is no evidence that
the pretrial conference was made unfair or unjust due to Mr.
Megna's absence. See Reporters' Notes to Rule 18. See also
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-108 (finding defendant's presence "a
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condition of due process to the extent a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence"). Accordingly, because Mr.
Megna's right to be present was not violated, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the denial of Mr. Megna's motion for a
new trial.
Order denying motion for new
trial affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin,
Desmond & Singh, JJ.5),
Clerk
Entered: October 24, 2024.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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