Commonwealth v. Travaun Daley. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1244
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
TRAVAUN DALEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This case involves the allowance of a motion to suppress
brought by the defendant. The Commonwealth sought leave to file
an interlocutory appeal, which was allowed by a single justice
of the Supreme Judicial Court. That appeal is now before us.
Background. The motion judge made detailed findings of
fact, none of which are challenged by the Commonwealth as
clearly erroneous. These facts, "supplemented by other
undisputed evidence introduced at the hearing that is not
contrary to the judge's findings," Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 487
Mass. 661, 662 (2021), include the following: at approximately
8:30 P.M. on December 22, 2018, Sergeant Patrick Byrne of the
Boston Police Department was at the intersection of Dudley
Street and Blue Hill Avenue in the Dorchester section of Boston,
waiting at a red light. He was driving an unmarked cruiser
which had blue lights, sirens, and a computer in the front
windshield area. While waiting, he noticed an alert, which came
up on his laptop. It was a "shot spotter" notification
indicating shots were fired from 41 Blue Hill Avenue.1 Sergeant
Byrne saw this notification even before he then heard the radio
dispatch concerning the shooting.
The address of the intersection at which he was stopped was
effectively "0" Blue Hill Avenue, being at Dudley Street.
41 Blue Hill Avenue was a short distance from the intersection,
and Sergeant Byrne turned left onto Blue Hill Avenue about ten
to fifteen seconds after seeing the "shots fired" notification
on the laptop. He immediately saw three individuals on the
sidewalk, going in the same direction as he, running toward
41 Blue Hill Avenue. He identified these as one female, one
Black male wearing all black, and another larger Black male
wearing black and grey clothing, who was later identified as the
defendant.
1 "A 'shot spotter' purports to detect the sound of
gunshots. Upon activation, the shot spotter transmits a
notification to dispatch officers to the area from which shots
are detected." Commonwealth v. Young, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 548,
549 n.1 (2011).
2
Aware that these three individuals could have seen or heard
something related to the nearby shooting, Sergeant Byrne slowed
his car down and rolled down the window. He asked the three
individuals from inside his car if they had heard anything. The
male wearing all black, who was never identified, said, "yes,"
and approached the sergeant's car to begin talking to Sergeant
Byrne.
Sergeant Byrne pulled over, stopping traffic behind him,
and asked this unidentified male, "what did you hear?" The
defendant said out loud to the unidentified male, "Be cool."
The sergeant believed that the statement could be a hint to the
unidentified male to remain calm or not to talk to the police.
Sergeant Byrne testified that he knows from experience that
there are many reasons why civilians do not wish to talk to
police officers and, particularly, that civilians do not want to
be seen talking to or being cooperative with the police. He had
had many experiences of civilians or possible witnesses not
wishing to speak with him, ignoring him, or leaving the area to
avoid speaking with him.
Both the unidentified male and the female left, going in
the opposite direction, back toward the intersection of Dudley
Street and Blue Hill Avenue. The defendant continued walking
toward 41 Blue Hill Avenue. He began walking faster, with his
hands in front of his body. Sergeant Byrne did not see any of
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the often-testified-to, now familiar indicia of a person
carrying a gun. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass.
691, 708 (2020) (bulge in clothing, keeping hands pressed
against body, and holding hand at waist are indicia of trying to
conceal weapon); Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 371
(2007) (walking with one arm held stiff and straight against
body, looking nervous, and hiding one side from officers' view
are indicia of trying to conceal weapon). In particular,
Sergeant Byrne testified that the defendant's hands were in
front of his body, but Sergeant Byrne did not see his hand reach
into his pocket, nor were his pockets hanging to suggest any
firearm in his pockets.
Sergeant Byrne lost sight of the defendant for a moment.
He then saw the defendant's head reappear by a white Subaru
parked on Blue Hill Avenue, inferring that the defendant had
bent over or crouched down to a lower position, and the
defendant running at full speed back towards Dudley Street,
reversing his original direction of movement. (A video
recording that the sergeant later saw indicated that the
defendant had ducked down by the Subaru, but the sergeant did
not see that at the time.) Sergeant Byrne stopped his car in
the middle of the street, got out, and began chasing the
defendant on the sidewalk of Blue Hill Avenue. He caught up to
the defendant and tackled him to the ground. Sergeant Byrne pat
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frisked the defendant, but he did not find anything. The
defendant was then nonetheless placed in handcuffs and placed in
Sergeant Byrne's cruiser. Sergeant Byrne told other officers
who had arrived at the scene to look by the area of the white
Subaru. After about one to two minutes of search, a firearm was
located under the white Subaru about a foot from the sidewalk.
After being given Miranda warnings, the defendant was asked
if he had a license to carry a firearm, and he responded that he
did not and that he did not have a gun. When asked why he ran,
the defendant stated he didn't know why, but it was because
everyone else was running. The defendant does not challenge the
legality of his interrogation under Miranda, or the
voluntariness of his statements after the arrest.
Discussion. In reviewing a judge's ruling on a motion to
suppress, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear
error and leave to the judge the responsibility of determining
the weight and credibility to be given oral testimony presented
at the motion hearing. Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357,
359 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 32
(2001). We make an independent determination concerning the
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 486 Mass. 328, 333-334 (2020), quoting
Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 857 (2015).
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Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a
police officer is permitted to briefly stop someone if there is
reasonable suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the
individual has committed, was committing, or was about to commit
a crime. See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 423 Mass. 266, 268
(1996). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The initial
question here has to do with the lawfulness of the seizure of
the person of the defendant. The Commonwealth defends its
actions, arguing that there was reasonable suspicion that the
defendant had committed or was committing the crime of carrying
an unlicensed firearm.
The judge correctly concluded that the defendant was seized
under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as soon
as Sergeant Byrne got out of his car and pursued him. See
Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996) ("a pursuit,
which, objectively considered, indicates to a person that he
would not be free to leave the area . . . without first
responding to a police officer's inquiry is the functional
equivalent of a seizure"). With his actions and his words of
telling him to "stop," a reasonable person would not think that
the defendant, although already running, was free to leave.
The Commonwealth is correct that the facts and
circumstances must be assessed in their totality in order to
determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for seizing the
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defendant. See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235
(2017). After assessing all the facts and circumstances in
their totality, we conclude that there was not. Taken together,
the facts found by the motion judge to be known to police at the
time of the seizure did not provide reasonable suspicion that
the defendant had anything to do with the shooting at 41 Blue
Hill Avenue, nor that he, even independent of that, possessed or
discarded a firearm.
To begin with, the defendant's initial running, in the
group of three, does nothing to suggest participation in the
shooting in 41 Blue Hill Avenue. The defendant was running
toward the scene of the shooting. Common sense dictates that
people who are running after committing shootings run away from
the scene, not toward it. Running away from the scene of a
crime creates suspicion of participation. Running toward it
does not.
Telling the other male in the group to "be cool" when he
began to speak to the police may add a little to the calculus,
but given the pervasiveness in Boston of unwillingness to
cooperate with the police, or, especially, to be seen
cooperating with the police, this statement from an individual
who was running toward the scene of the shooting does not
appreciably add to the suspicion that he was actually involved
in the shooting. The evasiveness from the police of the
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defendant, a young Black man, reflected by his walking more
quickly, ducking down by the Subaru, and then running, as we
have been instructed by the Supreme Judicial Court, must be
"significantly discount[ed]" given the history of race-based
policing in Boston. Evelyn, 485 Mass. at 708-709. In addition,
"[i]n the absence of constitutional justification for a
threshold inquiry, 'our law guards a person's freedom to speak
or not to speak to a police officer. A person also may choose
to walk away [or run away], avoiding altogether any contact with
police.'" Meneus, 476 Mass. at 240, quoting Commonwealth v.
Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 538 (2016). With nothing linking the
defendant to the shooting, the fact that he ran to avoid the
police "permits no inference of criminal activity." Meneus,
supra.This leaves only the defendant popping up after having
apparently bent or crouched down by the car, running. The
defendant was not seen discarding anything nor was there any
metallic sound that might have indicated he had disposed of a
weapon. Cf. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 823 (2010)
(police saw defendant throw something over fence and heard
metallic sound when item hit cement or asphalt). The officer
did not testify that such bending or crouching is an action
typically or routinely seen by people discarding guns. The
defendant's action thus does not support an inference that he
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had a gun or was involved in the shooting. Put another way, the
police did not have reasonable suspicion justifying a seizure
because, while trying to avoid them, the defendant bent over or
crouched down next to a parked car and then stood up and ran
away. And, at least with no preexisting reason to think the
defendant had a gun, the facts and circumstances taken as a
whole were not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that he
possessed (or possessed and then discarded) a gun. A fortiori,
there was not a basis for reasonable suspicion the defendant was
armed or dangerous, which was required for his pat frisk. See
Commonwealth v. Villagran, 477 Mass. 711, 727 (2017) (this is
the standard under art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment).
To the extent, if any, there is a dispute or question about
the scope of what was ordered suppressed,2 it was not raised in
the trial court, though it might properly be the subject of a
2 The Commonwealth states that "it is not clear . . . from
the motion judge’s decision, whether she suppressed the
firearm," and argues that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area under the Subaru, and that
the firearm "was not a 'fruit' of an unlawful search or
seizure." The defendant responds that, "The motion judge[]
suppressed the seizure of the defendant, not the firearm. . . .
Therefore the defendant is not addressing the Commonwealth’s
arguments with respect to the recovery of the firearm as they
are moot, not contested and not included in the motion judge’s
ruling."
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motion for clarification; we express no opinion on the merits of
such a motion should it be brought.
Order allowing motion to
suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin,
Ditkoff & Grant, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: October 4, 2024.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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