Commonwealth v. Ronald Martin. ( 2024 )

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
19-P-1713
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RONALD MARTIN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one
count of possessing a class B substance with the intent to
distribute, and two counts of possessing a class E substance.
On appeal, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support
his convictions, and that the judge erred in denying the
defendant's motion to disclose the confidential informant's
identity. We affirm.
1. Sufficient evidence. The defendant claims that there
was insufficient evidence that he possessed the drugs in
question as well as insufficient evidence that he intended to
distribute the "crack" cocaine. We disagree with both claims.
"When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction, an appellate court is not required
to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Rather, the relevant 'question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" (Citations omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Rocheteau, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (2009). See
Commonwealth v. Ormond O., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 233, 236 (2017).
a. Possession. Possession may be constructive and proved
by circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Beverly, 389
Mass. 866, 870 (1983). To prove constructive possession, the
Commonwealth must show "knowledge coupled with the ability and
intention to exercise dominion and control." Commonwealth v.
Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 409 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v.
Rosa, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 498 (1984). In addition,
contraband may be jointly possessed; it need not be exclusive to
the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Dinnall, 366 Mass. 165, 168–
169 (1974).
"When contraband is found in a dwelling shared by a
defendant and one or more other persons, a finder of fact
may properly infer that the defendant is in possession of
the contraband (not necessarily exclusive possession) from
evidence that the contraband was found in proximity to
personal effects of the defendant in areas of the dwelling,
such as a bedroom or closet, to which other evidence
indicates the defendant has a particular relationship."
Commonwealth v. Rarick, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 912 (1986). See
Commonwealth v. Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 99 (2010).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the jury were entitled to find the following.
When police entered the apartment to execute the warrant, they
saw the defendant exiting the bedroom he later told the police
that he shared with his girlfriend. Also, in the bedroom, there
was mail addressed to the defendant at that same apartment. See
Commonwealth v. Schmieder, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303 (2003)
(documentary evidence that defendant rented dwelling is relevant
to constructive possession).
Moreover, that the crack cocaine was found among men's
clothing in the bedroom closet permitted the jury to infer that
the defendant had, at the very least, joint constructive
possession of the drugs. That a large amount of cash, apparent
proceeds of drug distribution, was also found in and among the
men's clothing, and in a shaving kit, further supports this
conclusion. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 700, 704
(1974) (defendant's papers, including mail addressed to
defendant at address, and men's clothing found in same apartment
as drugs and paraphernalia, supported finding of constructive
possession). All these facts taken together provided more than
sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's knowledge,
ability, and intention to exercise dominion and control over the
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area where the drugs were found.1 See Farnsworth, 76 Mass. App.
Ct. at 99. See also Commonwealth v. Clarke, 44 Mass. App. Ct.
502, 504–506 (1998) (defendant had constructive possession of
drugs found in bedroom in which his clothes and various forms of
identification were present).
b. Intent to distribute. As the Commonwealth notes, the
defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence that
he intended to distribute the cocaine depends on viewing the
evidence in isolation. This, we cannot do. In the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could conclude that the
police recovered a little more than four grams of crack cocaine.
The defendant claims that an intent to distribute cannot be
inferred from such a small quantity. "Quantity, however, is not
the only relevant circumstantial evidence of intent to
distribute." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 454
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. La Perle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 424,
429 (1985). Indeed, the cocaine was contained in ten separate
bags, which were all packaged in one bigger bag.2 See
Commonwealth v. Dessources, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 232, 238-239
1 Once the defendant's possession of the crack cocaine had
been established, the jury could easily infer that he had joint
constructive possession of the pills found in plain view on top
of the dresser in his bedroom.
2 The cocaine had a street value of between four hundred and
five hundred dollars.
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(2009). In addition to the individual bags of cocaine were
bundles of cash totaling more than $3,000, which is also
indicative of an intent to distribute. See Pena v.
Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 1015, 1018 (1998) (arrestee "with a
large amount of cash on his person . . . strongly suggests his
direct participation in the drug distribution"). This evidence
was supplemented by testimony from detectives regarding common
features of the drug trade, and that this amount, as packaged,
was more consistent with distribution than personal use. In the
end, from all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, the jury could have rationally concluded that the
defendant possessed the crack cocaine with an intent to
distribute it. See Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341
(1977) (inference drawn from circumstantial evidence "need only
be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or
inescapable").
2. Disclosure of informant's identity. The defendant also
claims that the motion judge abused her discretion by denying
his request that the Commonwealth be ordered to disclose the
identity of the confidential informant (CI). We disagree.
The informant's privilege has long been recognized in the
Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Madigan, 449 Mass. 702, 705-
706 (2007); Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 516 (1990).
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"In order to obtain the identity of a confidential informant,
the burden is on a defendant to demonstrate that an exception to
the privilege ought apply, that is, that the disclosure would
provide him with 'material evidence needed . . . for a fair
presentation of his case to the jury.'" Commonwealth v.
Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 353-354 (2009), quoting Commonwealth
v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 574 (1990).
In this case, contrary to the defendant's claim, the CI did
not participate in or witness the events underlying the drug
charges against the defendant, but merely provided evidence to
support the issuance of the search warrant. See Brzezinski, 405
Mass. at 408. In that posture, the defendant has not made any
showing tipping the balance in favor of disclosure, because
"proof of the crime charged does not require proof of any of the
drug transactions that the informant is alleged to have
witnessed." Commonwealth v. Gandia, 492 Mass. 1004, 1008
(2023). See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 784,
791 (2009) (disclosure not required where government's case did
not depend on "proof that the defendant was involved in any
particular transactions, including the controlled purchases; CI
was patently not a percipient witness to the incidents"
[quotation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 30 Mass. App.
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Ct. 335, 339 (1991) (same). The motion to disclose the CI's
identity was properly denied.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Meade,
Hershfang & Toone, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: October 9, 2024.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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