Attorney Grievance Commission v. Landeo ( 2016 )

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jennifer Vetter Landeo, Misc. Docket AG No. 79,
September Term, 2014
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION FROM
PRACTICE OF LAW IN MARYLAND WITH RIGHT TO APPLY FOR
REINSTATEMENT AFTER NINETY DAYS – Court of Appeals indefinitely
suspended from practice of law in Maryland with right to apply for reinstatement after
ninety days lawyer who, among other misconduct, failed to provide competent
representation; failed to provide diligent representation in time-sensitive immigration
matters and waited months to file documents in three separate immigration cases; failed to
keep clients reasonably informed about status of matters, promptly comply with clients’
reasonable requests for information, and explain matters to extent reasonably necessary to
permit clients to make informed decisions regarding representation; charged and collected
attorney’s fees for services that she failed to provide to any meaningful degree or at all;
failed to deposit attorney’s fees and filing fees into attorney trust account; failed to deposit
attorney’s fees into attorney trust account prior to fees being earned and without clients’
informed consent, confirmed in writing, to different arrangement; failed to reasonably
protect her clients’ interests and timely surrender papers and property to which clients were
entitled; and engaged in conduct that would negatively impact perception of legal
professional of reasonable member of the public. Such conduct violated Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence),
1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b) (Communication), 1.5(a) (Reasonable Fees), 1.15(a), 1.15(c)
(Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That is
Prejudicial to Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 30653-M
Argued: January 7, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 79
September Term, 2014
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
JENNIFER VETTER LANDEO
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: February 19, 2016
This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who, in an extensive amount
of misconduct, failed to provide competent representation; failed to provide diligent
representation in time-sensitive immigration matters and waited months to file documents
in three separate immigration cases; failed to keep her clients reasonably informed about
the status of their matters, promptly comply with her clients’ reasonable requests for
information, and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit her clients to
make informed decisions regarding the representation; charged and collected attorney’s
fees for services that she failed to provide to any meaningful degree or at all; failed to
deposit attorney’s fees and filing fees into an attorney trust account; failed to deposit
attorney’s fees into an attorney trust account prior to those fees’ being earned and without
the clients’ informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement; failed to
reasonably protect her clients’ interests and timely surrender papers and property to which
the clients were entitled; and engaged in conduct that would negatively impact the
perception of the legal professional of a reasonable member of the public.
Jennifer Vetter Landeo (“Landeo”), Respondent, a member of the Bar of Maryland,
represented three immigrants—Brenda Castillo (“Castillo”), Jenny Flores (“Flores”), and
Binia Martinez-Ramos (“Martinez-Ramos”)—in matters concerning their immigration
status. Landeo’s clients and/or family members filed complaints against Landeo with the
Attorney Grievance Commission (“the Commission”), Petitioner.
On December 30, 2014, on the Commission’s behalf, Bar Counsel filed in this Court
a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Landeo, charging her with
violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1
(Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Reasonable Fees), 1.15(a),
1.15(c), 1.15(d) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation), 5.3(a),
5.3(b), 5.3(c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty,
Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That is Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice), 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
On January 15, 2015, this Court designated the Honorable Steven G. Salant (“the
hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to hear this attorney discipline
proceeding. On August 3, 4, and 5, 2015, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On
September 28, 2015, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of
fact and conclusions of law, concluding that: (1) as to the Castillo matter, Landeo had
violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.4, but had not violated MLRPC 1.5; (2) as to
the Flores matter, Landeo had violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.4, but had not
violated MLRPC 1.5 or 5.3;1 and (3) as to the Martinez-Ramos matter, Landeo had violated
MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4, but had not violated MLRPC 1.52, 1.16, or 5.3.3
On January 7, 2016, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we indefinitely
1
The hearing judge noted that Bar Counsel had withdrawn the charge that Landeo
had violated MLRPC 1.1 in the Flores matter; accordingly, the hearing judge did not reach
a conclusion as to whether Landeo had violated MLRPC 1.1 in the Flores matter.
2
The hearing judge stated that the Commission had not charged Landeo with
violating MLRPC 1.5 in the Martinez-Ramos matter, but nevertheless concluded that
Landeo had not violated MLRPC 1.5 in the Martinez-Ramos matter. A review of the
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, however, demonstrates that the Commission
had charged Landeo with violating MLRPC 1.5 in the Martinez-Ramos matter.
3
In making conclusions of law as to all three matters, the hearing judge failed to
specify any subsection of any MLRPC. For example, the hearing judge failed to expressly
reach a conclusion of law as to whether Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty,
Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation).
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suspend Landeo from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for
reinstatement after ninety days.
BACKGROUND
The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.
On December 12, 2001, this Court admitted Landeo to the Bar of Maryland. Since
January 2004, Landeo has worked at Landeo and Capriotti, LLC, which focuses on
immigration law. Landeo is not fluent in any language other than English. Thus, Landeo
uses bilingual office assistants to communicate with Spanish-speaking clients; none of the
office assistants are certified interpreters or translators.
The Castillo Matter
In 2003, Castillo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States
illegally. Castillo is fluent in Spanish, speaks little English, and cannot read English. In
2009, Castillo married Steven Keener, Jr. (“Keener”), a United States citizen. Keener is
fluent in English, but not Spanish.
On February 23, 2012, Castillo and Keener met with Landeo for the first and only
time. Castillo and Keener retained Landeo to file three documents on Castillo’s behalf to
assist Castillo in obtaining legal permanent resident status. The first document—Form I-
130, or an “Immediate Family Petition”—would, if granted, allow Castillo to obtain a green
card4 through “consular processing,” or applying in person at the United States consulate
in Guatemala. The second document—Form I-601, or a “Waiver of Unlawful Presence”—
4
A green card is “[a] registration card evidencing a resident alien’s status as a
permanent [United States] resident.” Green Card, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
-3-
would, if granted, allow Castillo to return to the United States without being subject to the
rule that an illegal immigrant who returns to his or her home country cannot return to the
United States for ten years. The third document was a visa5 application.
Keener paid Landeo a $600 retainer and agreed to pay $200 per month for sixteen
months, for a total of $3,800 in attorney’s fees, plus a $520 filing fee,6 for the Immediate
Family Petition. Keener ended up paying Landeo a total of $3,000 in attorney’s fees and
the $520 filing fee. Landeo did not deposit the attorney’s fees or filing fee into an attorney
trust account, nor did Landeo have Castillo’s and Keener’s consent, confirmed in writing,
to deposit the fees into an account other than an attorney trust account.
Landeo testified that she planned to refrain from filing the Immediate Family
Petition until after the Department of Homeland Security promulgated an amendment to
the regulation regarding waiver of unlawful presence.7 Landeo failed to adequately
convey, either herself or through her staff, to either Castillo or Keener that she planned to
wait to file the Immediate Family Petition.
Landeo provided Castillo and Keener with a retainer agreement that was in English.
Landeo did not provide a retainer agreement that was in Spanish. The retainer agreement
stated: “I/We acknowledge that each and every part of this legal services agreement has
5
“A visa is generally required for the admission of aliens into the United States.”
Visa, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
6
The actual filing fee was $420, but Landeo “routinely added $100 to [the] filing
fee[] for ‘direct costs.’”
7
Specifically, under the amendment, a spouse of a United States citizen could apply
for a “provisional waiver” of unlawful presence while remaining in the United States; once
the applicant received the provisional waiver, he or she could go back to his or her country
of origin with a good chance of returning to the United States soon thereafter.
-4-
been explained to me in Spanish by the person named below as an interpreter.” The retainer
agreement, however, did not name an interpreter, and no interpreter was present at the
meeting; Castillo relied on Keener to communicate with Landeo.
In a letter dated April 16, 2012, Landeo requested that Castillo and Keener provide
the $520 filing fee and the documents that were necessary to file the Immediate Family
Petition. As of July 2012, Castillo and Keener had provided Landeo the filing fee and all
of the documents that were necessary to file the Immediate Family Petition. On July 30,
2012, Landeo signed an attorney appearance form to be attached to the Immediate Family
Petition. Landeo, however, did not file the Immediate Family Petition with the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)8 until nearly eight months later,
on March 28, 2013. In the interim, on January 3, 2013, the Department of Homeland
Security published the amendment to the regulation regarding waiver of unlawful presence;
and, on March 4, 2013, the amendment became effective. The amendment in no way
affected the form or substance of Immediate Family Petitions.
Between May 2012 and March 2013, Landeo never directly communicated with
Castillo or Keener, despite Castillo’s multiple attempts to speak with Landeo. Between
May 2012 and March 2013, Castillo telephoned Landeo’s office at least fifteen times
requesting status updates and information as to the filing of the Immediate Family Petition.
8
USCIS performs tasks that the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service, or INS, had performed until 2003. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
“Our History,” http://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/our-history
[http://perma.cc/VL59-B7SW]. USCIS administers services and processes most of the
forms that immigrants file. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “About Us,”
http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus [http://perma.cc/9UM9-4VTP].
-5-
Castillo requested that Landeo call her back, but Landeo failed to do so. Keener also
attempted to speak with Landeo by telephone. Whenever Castillo and Keener telephoned
Landeo’s office to speak with Landeo, a member of the firm’s staff told them that Landeo
was “unavailable.” When Keener was unable to speak with Landeo by telephone and
requested a meeting with Landeo, the firm’s office manager indicated that, under the
retainer agreement, Keener would need to pay $250 for a meeting with Landeo.
Castillo and Keener decided to check the Immediate Family Petition’s status on
USCIS’s website, but discovered that they needed the receipt number to monitor its
progress. When Castillo and Keener telephoned Landeo’s office, the firm’s office manager
told them that the Immediate Family Petition was “in process,” which they took to mean
that the Immediate Family Petition had been filed, and Landeo was awaiting a receipt
number. On multiple later occasions, Castillo asked Landeo’s office for a receipt number
so that she could check the Immediate Family Petition’s status on USCIS’s website, and a
member of the firm’s staff told Castillo that Landeo was unavailable and that the staff
member was not in a position to provide the receipt number. Landeo never explained to
Castillo or Keener why she delayed in filing the Immediate Family Petition.
In March 2013, Castillo telephoned USCIS and learned that Landeo had not yet filed
the Immediate Family Petition. On March 20, 2013, Keener telephoned Landeo’s office
and stated that he would stop paying fees until Landeo provided a receipt for the filing of
the Immediate Family Petition. Eight days later, Landeo filed the Immediate Family
Petition. Castillo and Keener had been unaware of any plan on Landeo’s part to file the
Immediate Family Petition in mid-March 2013. On April 4, 2013, the firm’s office
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manager telephoned Keener to tell him that he had a receipt number for the Immediate
Family Petition. By that time, however, Keener had already told Landeo’s office that he
and Castillo were terminating Landeo’s representation and were in the process of retaining
a new lawyer. After the termination of her representation, Landeo sent Castillo and Keener
a bill for $4,205.
On April 5, 2013, Castillo and Keener retained a new immigration lawyer, Xavier
Racine (“Racine”), to file an Immediate Family Petition and a Waiver of Unlawful
Presence. On that day, Racine sent to Landeo a letter in which he requested the contents
of Castillo’s file as well as a refund of unearned fees. On April 8, 2013, Landeo received
the letter. In addition to sending the letter, Racine telephoned Landeo’s office to facilitate
the transfer of the file, but was unable to speak with Landeo; instead, Racine was able to
communicate with Landeo only through an office assistant and via e-mail. Landeo’s office
assistant told Racine that the file had been sent to him, but it had not. On May 21, 2013,
in response to an e-mail from Racine, Landeo e-mailed Racine to state that the documents
in Castillo’s file would be scanned and sent to his office. Racine waited until June 13,
2013, but Landeo did not send the documents in Castillo’s file or provide a refund to
Castillo and Keener; as such, Racine filed a complaint with the Commission against
Landeo. As of August 6, 2013, Racine had not received Castillo’s file, and Castillo and
Keener had not received a refund.
The Flores Matter
In July 2002, Flores, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States
illegally. Flores speaks English, but prefers communicating in Spanish.
-7-
On October 1, 2010, Flores met with Landeo and retained Landeo to file two
documents on her behalf. The first document—Form I-360, or an “Abused Spouse
Petition”—is a petition filed by an immigrant who is protected under the Violence Against
Women Act, if he or she is married to a United States citizen and is a victim of domestic
violence.9 The second document—Form I-485, or an “Adjustment of Status”—would, if
approved, allow Flores to get a green card for work authorization.10
In the retainer agreement, Flores agreed to pay Landeo $2,500 in attorney’s fees,
plus a $1,170 filing fee.11 As of June 1, 2011, Flores had paid Landeo $2,500. On August
30, 2012, Flores paid the filing fee. Landeo never placed the fees in an attorney trust
account.
As of June 27, 2011, Flores had provided Landeo with all of the documents that
were necessary to file the Abused Spouse Petition, and Flores had signed the Abused
Spouse Petition; thus, as of that date, the Abused Spouse Petition was ready for filing.
Landeo, however, did not file the Abused Spouse Petition until nearly three months later,
9
According to USCIS, the Violence Against Women Act applies to both men and
women, and permits certain spouses of United States citizens “to file a [visa] petition for
themselves, without the abuser’s knowledge. This allows victims to seek both safety and
independence from their abuser, who is not notified about the filing.” U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, “Battered Spouse, Children & Parents,”
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents [http://perma.cc/4X
9D-MRQ8].
10
Form I-485 is the form used by an immigrant “[t]o apply to adjust [his or her]
status to that of a permanent resident of the United States.” U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, “I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust
Status,” http://www.uscis.gov/i-485 [http://perma.cc/3SQS-P57N].
11
The actual filing fee was $1,070, but Landeo “routinely added $100 for ‘direct
costs.’”
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on September 22, 2011.
At some point after the filing of the Abused Spouse Petition, Landeo’s office
forwarded to Flores letters in which USCIS stated that it had made “a prima facie
determination” as to the Abused Spouse Petition. Between July 6, 2012 and October 1,
2012, Landeo mailed to Flores letters informing Flores that the “prima facie determination”
as to her classification as an abused spouse of a United States citizen had been extended.
Flores requested from Landeo an explanation of USCIS’s prima facie determination as to
the Abused Spouse Petition, but Landeo never provided Flores with an explanation.
In a letter dated July 6, 2012, Landeo recommended filing the Adjustment of Status
before USCIS approved the Abused Spouse Petition; the retainer agreement, however,
provided that the Adjustment of Status would be filed after USCIS approved the Abused
Spouse Petition.12 Although it was not possible to obtain a work permit while the Abused
Spouse Petition was pending, in the July 6, 2012 letter, Landeo stated that Flores “may
wish to proceed with filing [her A]djustment of [S]tatus application so that [she could]
obtain work authorization while” the Abused Spouse petition was pending. In a letter dated
July 10, 2012, Flores agreed to having the Adjustment of Status filed before USCIS
approved the Abused Spouse Petition. Landeo, however, never explained the process to
Flores.
As of September 27, 2012, Flores had provided Landeo with all of the documents
12
At the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding, Jay Marks, an expert in the
field of immigration law, testified on the Commission’s behalf that the Abused Spouse
Petition and the Adjustment of Status may be filed together, but that the Adjustment of
Status is considered only after the Abused Spouse Petition is approved.
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that were necessary to file the Adjustment of Status. Landeo, however, never filed the
Adjustment of Status.
On December 4 and 7, 2012, Flores telephoned Landeo’s office asking for a status
update. During the latter telephone call, a member of Landeo’s staff told Flores that
Landeo would telephone her when the Adjustment of Status was “ready for signature.” On
December 17, 2012, Flores visited Landeo’s office to ask for a copy of her file. At some
point between December 17 and 27, 2012, Flores terminated Landeo’s representation and
retained a new lawyer, Jonathan Bloom (“Bloom”).
On December 27, 2012, Bloom mailed and faxed to Landeo a letter in which he
requested Flores’s file. On January 2, 2013, Landeo mailed to Bloom a letter in which she
stated that would “scan and e[-]mail [Flores’s] file before the end of the week.” As of
January 18, 2013, Bloom had not received anything else from Landeo; on that date, Bloom
sent to Landeo a second letter in which he requested Flores’s file. On January 24, 2013, a
member of Landeo’s staff e-mailed to Bloom scanned copies of Flores’s file. In a letter
dated February 7, 2013, Bloom reiterated his request for the originals of Flores’s file and
requested a refund of the $1,170 filing fee and $1,250 in unearned attorney’s fees. 13 On
February 22, 2013, Landeo mailed to Bloom Flores’s file and a statement of account,
according to which Flores owed Landeo $2,138.72. Landeo never refunded attorney’s fees
to Flores.
13
In the letter, which the hearing judge admitted into evidence, Bloom requested the
refund of $1,250 in unearned attorney’s fees because Landeo had never filed the
Adjustment of Status.
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The Martinez-Ramos Matter
In 1997, Martinez-Ramos, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United
States illegally. Martinez-Ramos does not read or write English, and, at all relevant times,
communicated only in Spanish. On or about November 15, 1999, Martinez-Ramos was
granted “Temporary Protective Status,” which allows an immigrant from a country that is
suffering from war or natural disaster to be protected from deportation, obtain work
authorization, and obtain authorization to leave and return to the United States.
In 2009, without authorization from the United States government, Martinez-Ramos
left the United States and returned to Honduras. Because Martinez-Ramos failed to get
advance permission to leave and re-enter the United States, she was detained when she
attempted to illegally re-enter the United States at the Texas border in 2010. On August
21, 2010, an order for Martinez-Ramos’s removal and deportation was issued. Martinez-
Ramos was released, however, on an “Order of Supervision,” which provided her with a
conditional grace period to remain in the United States. To avoid removal, Martinez-
Ramos had to get her Temporary Protective Status reinstated; in December 2010, USCIS
reinstated Martinez-Ramos’s Temporary Protective Status.
In a letter dated June 14, 2012, USCIS informed Martinez-Ramos that it had
withdrawn her Temporary Protective Status. In the letter, USCIS stated that Martinez-
Ramos could appeal the decision withdrawing her Temporary Protective Status by filing a
Form I-290B, or “Notice of Appeal or Motion,” within thirty-three days of the date of the
letter; USCIS stated: “If a motion or appeal is not filed within [thirty-three] days[,] this
decision is final.” Thus, the deadline for filing the Notice of Appeal or Motion was July
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17, 2012.
On July 6, 2012, Martinez-Ramos met with Landeo, and communicated with
Landeo through one of Landeo’s part-time assistants, who acted as an interpreter. On that
day, Martinez-Ramos retained Landeo to file a “Motion to Reopen/Reconsider
Denied/Revoked” Temporary Protective Status on her behalf. Landeo charged Martinez-
Ramos $1,600 in attorney’s fees and $730 in filing fees and other costs. Landeo did not
deposit the $730 in filing fees and other costs into an attorney trust account.
As of July 10, 2012, Landeo had completed a brief for the Notice of Appeal or
Motion. On July 14, 2012, Landeo signed an attorney appearance form. Thus, the Notice
of Appeal or Motion was ready for filing three days before the deadline. However, Landeo
did not file the Notice of Appeal or Motion until more than three months later, on October
23, 2012. The Notice of Appeal or Motion did not provide any reasons for the late filing.
Landeo never explained the late filing to Martinez-Ramos. On December 13, 2012, USCIS
denied the untimely Notice of Appeal or Motion.
Meanwhile, on September 12, 2012, Martinez-Ramos retained Landeo to file a work
permit application on her behalf. Landeo charged Martinez-Ramos $350 in attorney’s fees
and $565 in filing fees and other costs. Landeo never filed the work permit application.
Landeo did not deposit the $565 in filing fees and other costs into an attorney trust account.
In September 2012, Martinez-Ramos met with her immigration officer. At the
meeting, the immigration officer wrote something on a paper and gave it to Martinez-
Ramos; the note was written in English, and Martinez-Ramos, who speaks and writes only
in Spanish, was unable to understand the note. Accordingly, Martinez-Ramos went to
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Landeo’s office to ask for an explanation of the note, but Martinez-Ramos was unable to
meet with Landeo to have the note explained to her.
On October 1, 2012, Martinez-Ramos visited Landeo’s office to ask for copies of
documents so that she could show her immigration officer that she was represented by a
lawyer and that she had filed a Notice of Appeal or Motion. On October 12, 2012, during
a telephonic conversation, a member of Landeo’s staff told Martinez-Ramos that she could
pick up the documents that day. As of that date, however, Landeo had not filed either the
Notice of Appeal or Motion or the attorney appearance form.
On November 7, 2012, Martinez-Ramos visited Landeo’s office to ask whether
Landeo had heard anything about the Notice of Appeal or Motion, and to inform Landeo
that she would be meeting with her immigration officer on November 26, 2012. On
November 8, 2012, a member of Landeo’s staff informed Martinez-Ramos that Landeo’s
office had not heard anything about the Notice of Appeal or Motion, and that, if Landeo’s
office had still not heard anything by November 26, 2012, Landeo would telephone
Martinez-Ramos’s immigration officer. Landeo failed to telephone Martinez-Ramos’s
immigration officer by November 26, 2012. On November 26, 2012, during her meeting
with her immigration officer, Marinez-Ramos was detained for purposes of deportation.
Between July 6, 2012, when Martinez-Ramos first retained Landeo, and November 26,
2012, when Martinez-Ramos was detained for purposes of deportation, Martinez-Ramos
had no direct contact with Landeo. On November 28, 2012, in an e-mail, Landeo wrote
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that she had spoken with Martinez-Ramos’s immigration officer.14
On November 27, 2012, one day after Martinez-Ramos had been detained for
purposes of deportation, Martinez-Ramos’s sister, Marcia Vasquez (“Vasquez”), and
Vasquez’s husband, Isaac Vasquez (“Isaac”), sought to retain Landeo for “initial
evaluation, review[,] and legal advice” concerning Martinez-Ramos’s detainment. On that
day, Landeo signed an attorney appearance form for an “alien detained.” Three days later,
Vasquez and Isaac went to Landeo’s office to find out what Landeo had learned; at that
time, a member of Landeo’s staff advised Vasquez and Isaac that Landeo was unavailable
and that it would cost $250 to set up an appointment with Landeo. At that point, Vasquez
requested the documents in Martinez-Ramos’s file, but Landeo’s office was unable to
provide the documents and stated that Vasquez would need to wait five business days.
On December 5, 2012, Vasquez retained Landeo to file a Form I-246, or a “Motion
to Stay Removal,” on Martinez-Ramos’s behalf. Landeo charged Vasquez $600, which
Vasquez paid on that date. On December 7, 2012, Landeo mailed the Motion to Stay
Removal to the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).15 On
December 10, 2012, ICE informed Landeo that, per the instructions on Form I-246, the
Motion to Stay Removal needed to be hand-delivered to the ICE office in Baltimore. On
14
In the e-mail, which the hearing judge admitted into evidence, Landeo appears to
update a member of her staff concerning Martinez-Ramos’s situation and, specifically, that
she spoke with Martinez-Ramos’s immigration officer. Indeed, in the opening sentence of
the e-mail, Landeo wrote: “Here is what we have for now . . . so at least [yo]u can give
them an update and tell them where we are.”
15
ICE deports illegal immigrants. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
“Who We Are,” http://www.ice.gov/about [http://perma.cc/P5QG-CFYB].
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that day, Landeo telephoned Vasquez, told her what ICE had stated, and said that she could
travel to Baltimore for another $600. Vasquez told Landeo to “definitely go” to Baltimore,
and provided her credit card information to pay the additional $600.
Ultimately, Landeo’s office could not process Vasquez’s credit card information.
On December 11, 2012, Landeo’s assistant telephoned Vasquez about Landeo’s office’s
inability to process Vasquez’s credit card, and stated that to go to Baltimore Landeo needed
the money to be paid. Vasquez decided not to pay Landeo another $600 because she
believed that Landeo had done nothing since being retained. On that date, Vasquez went
to Landeo’s office to retrieve the documents from Martinez-Ramos’s file.
On December 14, 2012, Martinez-Ramos was deported.
Aggravating Factors and Mitigating Factors
The hearing judge found three aggravating factors: (1) “a pattern of misconduct”;
(2) “multiple violations of the” MLRPC; and (3) a refusal “to acknowledge the
wrongfulness of [Landeo’s] misconduct[.]” The hearing judge found at least one
mitigating factor: “no prior [attorney] disciplinary offenses.”
Without expressly crediting the evidence, the hearing judge discussed evidence of
mitigating factors that Landeo had offered. According to the hearing judge, Landeo
testified as follows. As of 2007, Landeo had two sons. In August 2007, Landeo married
her current husband, with whom she has had two more children. Landeo’s husband was
physically abusive to her and her children. At least two of Landeo’s children had either
physical or developmental issues, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
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pyloric stenosis.16 In early 2014, Landeo separated from her husband.
Landeo suffers from chronic severe anemia, which causes fatigue, mental
cloudiness, and an inability to function. Landeo also suffers from depression and anxiety,
but denied that her mental health affected her ability to represent her clients.
On July 30, 2015—i.e., four days before the hearing in this attorney discipline
proceeding began—Landeo mailed to Flores a check for $1,170, and mailed to Vasquez a
check for $840. Landeo intended the checks to be refunds of filing fees.
As a result of this attorney discipline proceeding, Landeo “sets available dates for
clients to meet with her for questions[.]” However, Landeo’s retainer agreement still states
that if requested by the client a meeting with her after the initial meeting costs $250. Landeo
and her law partner are in the “process” of creating a Spanish version of her retainer
agreement, but, as of the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding, they had not
completed the Spanish version of the retainer agreement. Landeo no longer charges large
retainers up front, and instead charges small monthly payments; Landeo puts only earned
fees into her operating account, and puts unearned fees in trust. 17 Landeo will no longer
have a part-time assistant, but instead will have a full-time assistant who will contact
Landeo with important messages or if a client is upset or concerned.
16
“Pyloric stenosis is an uncommon condition in infants that blocks food from
entering the small intestine.” Mayo Clinic, “Pyloric stenosis,” http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/pyloric-stenosis/home/ovc-20163855 [http://perma.cc/TT6T-JKSU].
17
The changes in Landeo’s office’s financial accounting practices occurred as a
result of Landeo’s partner’s response to a complaint that was filed with the Commission.
In July 2015, Landeo’s partner entered into a conditional diversion agreement with Bar
Counsel, pursuant to which a certified public accountant is to periodically review Landeo’s
office’s bank accounts.
- 16 -
According to Landeo’s counsel, any delays that occurred during Landeo’s
representation of Castillo, Flores, and Martinez-Ramos were because Landeo was either
away from the office or sick with the flu, which became pneumonia in January 2013.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing
judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of
law. See Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Shuler, 443 Md. 494, 501, 117 A.3d 38, 43 (2015) (“[T]his Court
reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact[.]” (Citations omitted)); Md. R.
16-759(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s
conclusions of law.”). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence
establishes that a lawyer violated an MLRPC. See Md. R. 16-757(b) (“The [Commission]
has the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action]
by clear and convincing evidence.”).
DISCUSSION
(A) Findings of Fact
The Commission excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Keener agreed to pay a
“total fee [of] $3[,]800 plus a $520 filing fee” for the Immediate Family Petition. (Footnote
omitted). The Commission contends that, according to the retainer agreement, the $3,800
in attorney’s fees was for not only the Immediate Family Petition, but also the Waiver of
Unlawful Presence and the forms for consular processing. We agree and sustain the
- 17 -
Commission’s exception. The retainer agreement that Castillo and Keener signed stated at
the outset that the “nature of [the] case” was “Spouse Petition [i.e., the Immediate Family
Petition], [and] Waiver for Unlawful Presence with Consular Processing[.]” (Some
capitalization omitted). Under the heading “What Your Anticipated Attorney[’s] Fee
Include[s],” the retainer agreement provided: “Your attorney[’s] fee indicated herein is
presented as an anticipated flat fee based on the estimated billable time that it will take to
complete your case. Your fee of $3[,]800 includes up to [eleven] hours of case-related
work, which should be sufficient to include an interview by USCIS, if scheduled.”
(Bolding, underlining, and some capitalization omitted). Under the heading “Costs and
Fees,” the retainer agreement provided that the anticipated attorney’s fees for “Spousal
Petition, Waiver for Unlawful Presence with Consular Processing” were $3,800. (Bolding
and some capitalization omitted). The retainer agreement did not delineate the separate
costs for the preparation of the Immediate Family Petition, Waiver of Unlawful Presence,
and the forms for consular processing, but instead lumped the items together and stated
that the anticipated attorney’s fees for all of the items were $3,800. In other words, the
retainer agreement did not state that the attorney’s fees for just the Immediate Family
Petition were $3,800, as the hearing judge found. Accordingly, we sustain the
Commission’s exception.
Landeo excepts to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. In support of her
exceptions, Landeo relies on her own testimony at the hearing in this attorney discipline
proceeding. Landeo also relies on her “file,” which her office maintained. At oral
argument, Landeo’s counsel acknowledged that Landeo’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s
- 18 -
findings of fact concerned the hearing judge’s credibility determinations and discrediting
of parts of Landeo’s testimony, but nevertheless urged this Court to “re-weigh” the
evidence presented to the hearing judge.
We overrule Landeo’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. In an
attorney discipline proceeding, it is the role of the hearing judge to credit or discredit
evidence, including testimony, and resolve conflicting versions of events. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 512, 996 A.2d 350, 356 (2010)
(“[W]eighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are
tasks proper for the fact finder . . . . [T]he hearing judge may pick and choose which
evidence to rely upon[.]” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, we
must “give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B). Here, in finding facts as he did, the hearing judge
discredited parts of Landeo’s testimony and the exhibits that she offered. We decline to
second-guess the hearing judge’s determinations of credibility; the hearing judge did not
clearly err in making the findings of fact to which Landeo excepts.
(B) Conclusions of Law
Before addressing the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, for clarity and ease of
reference, we set forth the below table outlining the Commission’s charges (reflected in
italics) and the hearing judge’s conclusions of law as to each matter.
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The Castillo The Martinez-
MLRPC The Flores Matter
Matter Ramos Matter
Charged Charged
1.1 (Competence) Not charged
Charge withdrawn Violated
Charged Charged Charged
1.3 (Diligence)
Violated Violated Violated
Charged Charged Charged
1.4
1.4 violated but no 1.4 violated but no 1.4 violated but no
(Communication)
subsection specified subsection specified subsection specified
1.5(a) (Reasonable Charged Charged Charged
Fees) Not violated Not violated Not violated
1.15(a), (c), and (d) Charged Charged Charged
(Safekeeping 1.15 violated but no 1.15 violated but no No conclusion of
Property) subsection specified subsection specified law made
1.16(d)
Charged Charged Charged
(Terminating
Violated Violated Not violated
Representation)
5.3(a), (b), and (c)
(Responsibilities
Charged Charged
Regarding Not charged
Not violated Not violated
Nonlawyer
Assistants)
Charged Charged
8.4(a) (Violating
8.4 violated but no Not charged 8.4 violated but no
the MLRPC)
subsection specified subsection specified
8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Charged Charged
Fraud, Deceit, or 8.4 violated but no Not charged 8.4 violated but no
Misrepresentation) subsection specified subsection specified
8.4(d) (Conduct
That is Prejudicial Charged Charged Charged
to the 8.4 violated but no 8.4 violated but no 8.4 violated but no
Administration of subsection specified subsection specified subsection specified
Justice)
The Commission excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Landeo did not
violate MLRPC 1.5(a) (Reasonable Fees) in representing Castillo. The Commission also
excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude that Landeo violated MLRPC 1.15
(Safekeeping Property) in representing Martinez-Ramos.
- 20 -
Without referencing MLRPC 1.4, Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion
that she “failed to reasonably communicate with [] Keener and Castillo[.]” (Bolding and
some capitalization omitted). Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she
violated MLRPC 1.15 in representing Castillo. Without referencing MLRPC 1.16(d),
Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she “failed to timely forward
[Castillo’s] file” Racine, her new lawyer (Bolding and capitalization omitted).
Without referencing MLRPC 1.3, Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion
that she “did not act with diligence to file [Flores’s] spousal abuse petition” and that “she
did not act with diligence to file [Flores’s] adjustment of status petition[.]” (Bolding and
capitalization omitted). Without referencing MLRPC 1.4, Landeo excepts to the hearing
judge’s conclusion that she “failed to adequately communicate with Flores[.]” (Bolding
and some capitalization omitted). Without referencing MLRPC 1.16(d), Landeo appears
to except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated MLRPC 1.16(d) by stating
that she “adequately transferred the file to Flores’[s] new counsel[.]” (Bolding and some
capitalization omitted).
Without referencing MLRPC 1.3, Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion
that she “failed to act diligently by failing to perform services [that she] was not hired to
perform” in the Martinez-Ramos matter. (Bolding and capitalization omitted). Without
referencing MLRPC 1.4, Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she “did
not adequately communicate with” Martinez-Ramos. (Bolding and capitalization
- 21 -
omitted).18
Significantly, many of Landeo’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of
law rest on exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, which, in turn, involve the
hearing judge’s determinations of credibility. As discussed above, we overrule Landeo’s
exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Accordingly, to the extent that Landeo’s
exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law rely on her exceptions to the hearing
judge’s findings of fact, we overrule Landeo’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law.
For the below reasons, we: (1) sustain the Commission’s exception to the hearing
judge’s conclusion that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Castillo; (2)
sustain the Commission’s exception to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude that Landeo
violated MLRPC 1.15(a) in representing Martinez-Ramos; (3) overrule all of Landeo’s
exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law; (4) reverse the hearing judge’s
conclusions that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Flores and
Martinez-Ramos; and (5) uphold the rest of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.
MLRPC 1.1 (Competence)
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness[,] and preparation
18
Notably, aside from Landeo’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she
violated MLRPC 1.15 in the Castillo matter, Landeo fails to expressly identify any other
MLRPC in her exceptions. In other words, most of Landeo’s exceptions to the hearing
judge’s conclusions of law are implied without reference to the MLRPC at issue or
pertinent case law. As such, we have inferred through context the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law to which Landeo excepts.
- 22 -
reasonably necessary for the representation.” MLRPC 1.1.
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.1 in representing Martinez-Ramos. The Notice of Appeal or
Motion was ready for filing three days before the deadline. However, Landeo did not file
the Notice of Appeal or Motion until more than three months after the deadline, and the
Notice of Appeal or Motion did not provide any reasons for the late filing. As a result,
USCIS denied the untimely Notice of Appeal or Motion. Additionally, Landeo mailed the
Motion to Stay Removal to ICE despite the fact that, per the instructions on the form, the
Motion to Stay Removal needed to be hand-delivered to the ICE office in Baltimore.
Landeo did not correct the mistake of having mailed the Motion to Stay Removal, and
instead insisted on additional payment from Vasquez to hand-deliver the Motion to Stay
Removal.
MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence)
As mentioned above, Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions that she
violated MLRPC 1.3 in representing Flores and Martinez-Ramos. We overrule the
exceptions.
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.” MLRPC 1.3.
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.3 in representing Castillo. As of July 2012, Castillo and Keener
had provided Landeo the filing fee and all of the documents that were necessary to file the
Immediate Family Petition. On July 30, 2012, Landeo signed an attorney appearance form.
- 23 -
Landeo, however, did not file the Immediate Family Petition with USCIS until nearly eight
months later, on March 28, 2013. In the interim, on January 3, 2013, the Department of
Homeland Security published the amendment to the regulation regarding waiver of
unlawful presence. The amendment in no way affected the form or substance of Immediate
Family Petitions. Even if waiting for the amendment to be published were a valid reason
for delaying in filing the Immediate Family Petition and attorney appearance form, Landeo
still delayed nearly three months after the amendment was published.19
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.3 in representing Flores. Flores provided Landeo with all of
the documents that were necessary to file the Abused Spouse Petition, and Flores signed
the Abused Spouse Petition. Landeo, however, did not file the Abused Spouse Petition
until nearly three months later. Additionally, Flores provided Landeo with all of the
documents that were necessary to file the Adjustment of Status. Landeo, however, never
filed the Adjustment of Status.
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.3 in representing Martinez-Ramos. The Notice of Appeal or
Motion was ready for filing three days before the deadline. However, Landeo did not file
19
To be sure, the amendment to the regulation became effective on March 4, 2013.
Nonetheless, even using this date as a measure, Landeo delayed more than three weeks
after the amendment became effective before filing the Immediate Family Petition and
attorney appearance form with USCIS, despite the circumstance that, as of July 30, 2012,
Landeo had been provided the filing fee and necessary documentation for the Immediate
Family Petition, and Landeo had signed the attorney appearance form. And, in any event,
Landeo failed to adequately convey, either herself or through her staff, to either Castillo or
Keener that she planned to wait to file the Immediate Family Petition.
- 24 -
the Notice of Appeal or Motion until more than three months later. Additionally, Martinez-
Ramos retained Landeo to file a work permit application on her behalf, but Landeo never
filed the work permit application.
MLRPC 1.4 (Communication)
Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions that she violated MLRPC 1.4 in
representing Castillo, Flores, and Martinez-Ramos. We overrule the exceptions.
MLRPC 1.4 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall: . . . (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter; [and] (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information[.]
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
(Paragraph breaks omitted). Comment [5] to MLRPC 1.4 explains that “[t]he client should
have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued . . . .
Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is
involved.”
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4 in representing Castillo. Between May 2012 and March
2013, Landeo never directly communicated with Castillo or Keener, despite Castillo’s
multiple attempts to speak with Landeo. Between May 2012 and March 2013, Castillo
telephoned Landeo’s office at least fifteen times requesting status updates and information
as to the filing of the Immediate Family Petition. Castillo requested that Landeo call her
- 25 -
back, but Landeo failed to do so. Keener also attempted to speak with Landeo by
telephone. Whenever Castillo and Keener telephoned Landeo’s office to speak with
Landeo, a member of the firm’s staff told them that Landeo was “unavailable.” On multiple
occasions, Castillo asked for a receipt number so that she could check the Immediate
Family Petition’s status on USCIS’s website, and a member of the firm’s staff told Castillo
that Landeo was unavailable and that the staff member was not in a position to provide the
receipt number. Landeo never explained to Castillo or Keener why she delayed in filing
the Immediate Family Petition. In sum, Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), and
1.4(b) by: failing to keep Castillo and Keener reasonably informed about the status of the
case generally and the Immediate Family Petition specifically; failing to promptly comply
with Castillo’s and Keener’s reasonable requests for information; and failing to explain the
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit Castillo and Keener to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4 in representing Flores. After the filing of the Abused Spouse
Petition on September 22, 2011, Landeo’s office forwarded to Flores letters in which
USCIS stated that it had made “a prima facie determination” as to the Abused Spouse
Petition. Between July 6, 2012 and October 1, 2012, Landeo mailed to Flores letters
informing Flores that the “prima facie determination” as to her classification as an abused
spouse of a United States citizen had been extended. Flores requested from Landeo an
explanation of USCIS’s prima facie determination as to the Abused Spouse Petition, but
Landeo never explained the matter to Flores. In a letter dated July 6, 2012, Landeo
- 26 -
recommended filing the Adjustment of Status before USCIS approved the Abused Spouse
Petition. In a letter dated July 10, 2012, Flores agreed to having the Adjustment of Status
filed before USCIS approved the Abused Spouse Petition. However, Landeo never
explained the process to Flores. Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), and 1.4(b)
in representing Flores by: failing to keep Flores reasonably informed about the status of
the matter; failing to promptly comply with Flores’s reasonable requests for information;
and failing to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit Flores to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4 in representing Martinez-Ramos. Landeo did not file the
Notice of Appeal or Motion until more than three months after the deadline, and she never
explained the late filing to Martinez-Ramos. Landeo violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(b)
in representing Martinez-Ramos by: failing to keep Martinez-Ramos reasonably informed
about the status of the matter; and failing to explain the matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit Martinez-Ramos to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
MLRPC 1.5(a) (Reasonable Fees)
As stated above, the Commission excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Castillo. We sustain the exception,
and also reverse the hearing judge’s conclusions that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a)
in representing Flores and Martinez-Ramos.
“A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable
- 27 -
fee[.]” MLRPC 1.5(a). “Although a fee for certain services may not be unreasonable on
its face, the fee is unreasonable if the lawyer fails to perform the services to any meaningful
degree.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 445 Md. 379, 393, 127 A.3d 562, 570
(2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224, 46 A.3d 1169, 1178 (2012) (per curiam) (“The
reasonableness of a fee is not measured solely by examining its value at the outset of the
representation; indeed[,] an otherwise-reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the
lawyer fails to earn it.” (Citations omitted).).
Clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Castillo on the
ground that “the [hearing judge could not] find that charging of $3[,]000 for the preparation
of the [Immediate Family Petition was] an unreasonable fee.” The hearing judge’s
conclusion appears to be based, at least in part, on his finding that Keener agreed to pay a
“total fee [of] $3[,]800 plus a $520 filing fee” for the Immediate Family Petition. (Footnote
omitted). As discussed above, the hearing judge’s finding was clearly erroneous because
Keener and Castillo agreed to pay $3,800 in attorney’s fees for not only the Immediate
Family Petition, but also the Waiver of Unlawful Presence and the forms for consular
processing. Keener ended up paying Landeo a total $3,000 in attorney’s fees and the $520
filing fee. Although Landeo filed the Immediate Family Petition after Keener telephoned
Landeo’s office and stated that he would stop paying fees until Landeo provided a receipt
for the filing of the Immediate Family Petition, Landeo never filed the Waiver of Unlawful
Presence or the forms for consular processing. After Keener and Castillo terminated
- 28 -
Landeo’s representation, Landeo sent them a bill for $4,205. Keener’s and Castillo’s new
lawyer requested a refund of unearned fees. However, Landeo never provided Keener and
Castillo with a refund. In essence, although Keener and Castillo paid nearly eighty percent
of the agreed upon attorney’s fees, Landeo only partially performed the services for which
she was retained. In other words, Landeo failed to perform the services concerning the
Waiver of Unlawful Presence and the forms for consular processing to any meaningful
degree, despite the receipt of nearly eighty percent of the total attorney’s fees.
Additionally, a review of Landeo’s final bill to Keener and Castillo reveals that
Landeo charged for items such as “Prepare/Send Payment Reminder” and “Payment by
phone Rec’d and Receipt processed,” as well as for telephone calls from Keener and
Castillo that were handled by someone other than Landeo, at a rate of $15 to $30 per
telephone call, and that were necessitated by Landeo’s lack of communication with Keener
and Castillo. Notably, the retainer agreement that Keener and Castillo signed did not state
that Landeo would charge them for accounting services, such as the processing of payments
and the sending payment reminders, or contain any express statement that they would be
charged for routine telephone calls in which they requested a status update and were unable
to speak with Landeo.20 We conclude that charging fees for these items was unreasonable
20
By contrast, the retainer agreement stated that the anticipated fee did not include
any mail services more than $5 per envelope or package or “any long distance, collect, or
out of country calls[,]” and that the client would “be billed separately for any such
services.” In other words, telephone calls that Landeo would need to make during the
course of the representation that were long distance, collect, or out of country would be
billed separately to Keener and Castillo.
- 29 -
under the circumstances of this case, where Keener and Castillo did not consent to the
charges for accounting services and routine telephone calls to Landeo’s office and where
no extenuating circumstances warranted the imposition of separate fees for those items.
Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 340, 339, 946 A.2d 500, 534
(2008) (We held that a lawyer violated MLRPC 1.5(a) by charging for accounting
services—time that the lawyer spent completing time sheets—absent advance disclosure
and consent from her clients or extenuating circumstances justifying the separate charge;
we stated that “the ordinary and usual costs of operating a law office—rent, utilities,
accounting and administrative services and the like—should not be individually billed to
the client, in additional to the charge for legal representation, absent some other extenuating
circumstances[.]”).
Clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Flores. Flores
provided Landeo with all of the documents that were necessary to file the Adjustment of
Status. Landeo, however, never filed the Adjustment of Status. In other words, Landeo
charged Flores for a service that Landeo failed to provide. Thus, even if Landeo’s fee were
reasonable on its face, Landeo’s fee became unreasonable when she failed to provide
The retainer agreement also provided that, should the client’s case be terminated for
nonpayment of fees, the client would “be billed for all administrative fees, including but
not limited to postage fees, copy fees, mileage fees, or any other fees incurred in [the]
case.” That section of the retainer is inapplicable here because Landeo did not terminate
Castillo’s case for nonpayment of fees. And, in any event, even if applicable, that clause
of the retainer agreement does not provide for the separate billing of accounting services
or telephone calls from the client.
- 30 -
services for which she was retained and paid. Significantly, the Adjustment of Status, if
filed and approved, would have provided the relief that Flores sought when she retained
Landeo—a green card for work authorization. Although, a few days before the hearing in
this attorney discipline proceeding began, Landeo mailed to Flores a check for $1,170 as a
refund of filing fees, Landeo never refunded attorney’s fees to Flores.
Clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Landeo did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in representing Martinez-Ramos.
Landeo failed to timely file the Notice of Appeal or Motion and to provide reasons for the
late filing. USCIS denied the untimely Notice of Appeal or Motion, and Martinez-Ramos
was detained and deported. Additionally, although Martinez-Ramos retained Landeo to
file a work permit application on her behalf and paid Landeo attorney’s fees and filing fees
to do so, Landeo never filed the work permit application. Because Landeo charged
Martinez-Ramos for services that she failed to provide—namely, timely filing the Notice
of Appeal or Motion and filing a work permit application—Landeo’s fee was unreasonable.
As with Flores, a few days before the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding began,
Landeo mailed to Vasquez a check for $840 as a refund of filing fees;21 however, Landeo
never refunded attorney’s fees to Martinez-Ramos or Vasquez.
21
The hearing judge found that Landeo charged Martinez-Ramos $730 in filing fees
and other costs for the Notice of Appeal or Motion and $565 in filing fees and other costs
for the work permit application. These filing fees and other costs total $1,295, which is
$455 more than what Landeo refunded to Vasquez.
- 31 -
MLRPC 1.15(a), (c), and (d) (Safekeeping Property)
As stated above, the Commission excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to conclude
that Landeo violated MLRPC 1.15 in representing Martinez-Ramos, and Landeo excepts
to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated MLRPC 1.15 in representing Castillo.22
We sustain the Commission’s exception and overrule Landeo’s exception.
MLRPC 1.15(a) provides:
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own
property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16,
Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in
accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be identified
specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and
distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds
and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period
of at least five years after the date the record was created.
“MLRPC 1.15(a) requires an attorney to maintain client funds in a trust account, separate
from the attorney’s personal and operating funds. . . . [A lawyer]’s failure to maintain his
[or her] trust account separately from his [or her] personal funds [is a violation of] MLRPC
1.15(a).” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moeller, 427 Md. 66, 73, 46 A.3d 407, 411
(2012) (citations omitted).
MLRPC 1.15(c) provides:
Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different
arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been
paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for
the lawyer’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
22
Landeo does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated
MLRPC 1.15 in representing Flores.
- 32 -
Thus, “fee payments, even if a flat fee [is charged], must be placed in escrow upon receipt
if the work has not yet been performed at the time of payment.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Khandpur, 421 Md. 1, 16, 25 A.3d 165, 174 (2011) (citation omitted).
MLRPC 1.15(d) provides:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except
as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full accounting
regarding such property.
A lawyer violates MLRPC 1.15(d) by, for example, “fail[ing] to promptly deliver
settlement funds to [a] client and to medical providers[,]” and by failing to “pay a client’s
debt from settlement funds[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 163-
64, 904 A.2d 557, 573 (2006).
Here, without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge concluded that Landeo had
violated MLRPC 1.15 in representing Castillo because Landeo had “admitted that none of
the attorney[’s] fees received or USCIS filing fees were held in a trust account[.]” Also,
without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge concluded that Landeo had violated
MLRPC 1.15 in representing Flores because Landeo “failed to place unearned attorney’s
fees and filing fees in a trust account.” The hearing judge failed to make a conclusion as
to whether Landeo had violated MLRPC 1.15 in representing Martinez-Ramos. Although
Landeo excepted to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated MLRPC 1.15 in
representing Castillo, at oral argument, Landeo’s counsel acknowledged that “no money
was placed in a trust account[,]” including attorney’s fees and filing fees; that such a
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practice was a problem under the MLRPC; and that the fees should have been deposited
into an attorney trust account.
In any event, clear and convincing evidence supports a conclusion that Landeo
violated MLRPC 1.15(a) in representing Castillo, Flores, and Martinez-Ramos. The
hearing judge found, and Landeo’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, that no
funds—attorney’s fees or filing fees—were placed into an attorney trust account. Indeed,
the failure to place any funds received from clients into an attorney trust account is a
textbook violation of MLRPC 1.15(a).
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the conclusion that Landeo also
violated MLRPC 1.15(c) in representing Castillo. At the initial consultation, Keener paid
Landeo $600 in attorney’s fees, prior to any work (other than the initial consultation) being
performed in the case. Despite not having obtained Castillo’s or Keener’s informed
consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, Landeo failed to deposit
Keener’s unearned attorney’s fees in an attorney trust account. Such conduct violated
MLRPC 1.15(c).
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the conclusion that Landeo also
violated MLRPC 1.15(c) in representing Flores. Flores agreed to pay $2,500 in attorney’s
fees for the preparation and filing of an Abused Spouse Petition and Adjustment of Status.
As of June 1, 2011, Flores had paid Landeo $2,500 in attorney’s fees, but Landeo never
placed the fees in an attorney trust account. As of the date that Flores paid the attorney’s
fees in full, neither the Abused Spouse Petition nor Adjustment of Status had been prepared
or filed. In other words, despite not having Flores’s informed consent, confirmed in
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writing, to a different arrangement, Landeo deposited Flores’s unearned attorney’s fees
into an account other than an attorney trust account.23 Such conduct violated MLRPC
1.15(c).24
MLRPC 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation)
Landeo excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions that she violated MLRPC 1.16(d)
in representing Castillo and Flores. We overrule the exceptions.
MLRPC 1.16(d) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled[,]
and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been
earned or incurred.
“When a client requests his or her file from an attorney at the end of the representation,
MLRPC 1.16(d) requires the attorney to surrender the portions of the file (or a copy) to
23
We observe that nothing in the hearing judge’s findings of fact indicate that any
of the three clients gave informed consent, confirmed in writing, for Landeo to place
unearned fees into an account other than an attorney trust account.
Moreover, the hearing judge made specific findings of fact that unearned attorney’s
fees in the Castillo matter and the Flores matter were not placed in an attorney trust account.
The hearing judge did not make similar findings of fact in the Martinez-Ramos matter—
i.e., that unearned attorney’s fees were not placed in an attorney trust account. Although,
ostensibly, attorney’s fees that were paid to Landeo in the Martinez-Ramos matter were
unearned at the time they were paid and yet not placed in an attorney trust account, absent
specific findings by the hearing judge that such fees were unearned, we decline to conclude
that clear and convincing evidence supports a conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC
1.15(c) in representing Martinez-Ramos.
24
Nothing in the hearing judge’s findings of fact gives rise to the conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.15(d) in representing Castillo, Flores, or Martinez-Ramos, i.e.,
that Landeo received funds or other property in which her clients or third persons had an
interest and then failed to promptly deliver those funds. Accordingly, clear and convincing
evidence would not support a conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC 1.15(d).
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which the client is entitled (assuming no proper charging lien exists).” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 322, 44 A.3d 344, 359 (2012) (citations omitted).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.16(d) in representing Castillo. As of April 4, 2015, Keener had
informed Landeo’s office that he and Castillo were terminating Landeo’s representation.
On April 5, 2013, Castillo and Keener retained a new immigration lawyer, Racine. On that
day, Racine sent to Landeo a request for Castillo’s file; Landeo received the request on
April 8, 2013. In addition to sending the letter, Racine telephoned Landeo’s office to
facilitate the transfer of Castillo’s file. Landeo’s office assistant told Racine that the file
had been sent to him, but it had not. On May 21, 2013, in response to an e-mail from
Racine, Landeo e-mailed Racine to state that the documents in Castillo’s would be scanned
and sent to his office. Racine waited until June 13, 2013, but Landeo did not send the
documents in Castillo’s file. As of August 6, 2013, Racine still had not received Castillo’s
file. In other words, despite having been advised by Landeo’s office assistant and by
Landeo that Castillo’s file had been, or would be, sent to him, Racine still had not received
Castillo’s file as of four months after Racine’s initial request for Castillo’s file. Thus,
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.16(d) by failing to reasonably protect Castillo’s interests and
to timely surrender papers and property to which Castillo and Racine, Castillo’s new
lawyer, were entitled.
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.16(d) in representing Flores. Sometime between December 17
and 27, 2012, Flores terminated Landeo’s representation and retained a new lawyer,
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Bloom. On December 27, 2012, Bloom mailed and faxed to Landeo a letter requesting
Flores’s file. On January 2, 2013, Landeo mailed to Bloom a letter in which she stated that
she would scan and e-mail to him Flores’s file “before the end of the week.” As of January
18, 2013, Bloom had not received anything else from Landeo; on that date, Bloom sent to
Landeo a second letter requesting Flores’s file. On January 24, 2013, almost a month after
Bloom’s original request, a member of Landeo’s staff e-mailed to Bloom scanned copies
of Flores’s file. In a letter dated February 7, 2013, Bloom reiterated his request for the
originals of Flores’s file. Two weeks later, on February 22, 2013—almost two months
after Bloom’s original request—Landeo mailed Flores’s file to Bloom. Landeo failed to
reasonably take steps to protect Flores’s interests by delaying in transmitting copies and
the originals of Flores’s file to Bloom, thus violating MLRPC 1.16(d).
The hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing evidence did
not establish that Landeo had violated MLRPC 1.16(d) in representing Martinez-Ramos.
On December 11, 2012, Vasquez decided not to pay Landeo any additional money; on that
day, Vasquez went to Landeo’s office to retrieve the documents from Martinez-Ramos’s
file. In other words, there was no delay in surrendering, or failure to surrender, Martinez-
Ramos’s file.
MLRPC 5.3(a), (b), and (c) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants)
MLRPC 5.3 states, in pertinent part:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers
possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm[,] shall make
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reasonable efforts to ensure that the [law] firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the [nonlawyer]’s conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer]’s conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; [and]
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer] that would be
a violation of the [MLRPC] if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in
the law firm in which the [nonlawyer] is employed, or has direct supervisory
authority over the [nonlawyer], and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated[,] but fails to take reasonable
remedial action[.]
Here, the hearing judge was correct in concluding that clear and convincing
evidence did not establish that Landeo had violated MLRPC 5.3(a) or (b) in representing
Flores and Martinez-Ramos, and hearing judge was correct in concluding that Landeo was
not vicariously responsible for any nonlawyer’s conduct under MLRPC 5.3(c). Although
Landeo was a named partner at her law firm, and certainly must have had supervisory
authority over office staff and assistants, the hearing judge did not find that Landeo directly
supervised office staff and assistants at the law firm, or that nonlawyers employed at the
law firm engaged in conduct that was incompatible with Landeo’s professional obligations
or engaged in conduct that would have been a violation of the MLRPC if Landeo had
engaged in it.
MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation)
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] . . . engage in conduct involving
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dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]” MLRPC 8.4(c).
Here, as an initial matter, we observe that the Commission charged Landeo with
violating MLRPC 8.4(c) only in representing Castillo and Martinez-Ramos, not in
representing Flores. And, without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge concluded
that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4 in representing Castillo, stating: “The [hearing judge]
finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Landeo] violated several [MLRPC] in the
context of representation of [Castillo] and therefore violated [MLRPC] 8.4.” Similarly,
without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge concluded that Landeo had violated
MLRPC 8.4 in representing Martinez-Ramos, stating: “There is clear and convincing
evidence that [Landeo] violated M[L]RPC 8.4 based on her multiple violations of other
[MLRPC] in the representation of Martinez[-Ramos.]”
The phrasing of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law as to MLRPC 8.4 leads to
the logical conclusion that the hearing judge determined that Landeo had violated MLRPC
8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC.), not
MLRPC 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]”). In other words, the hearing
judge concluded that, because Landeo had violated other MLRPC in representing Castillo
and Martinez-Ramos, she had also violated MLRPC 8.4(a). Upon our independent review,
we decline to conclude that clear and convincing evidence establishes that Landeo violated
MLRPC 8.4(c) in representing Castillo or Martinez-Ramos. We explain.
In its Exceptions and Recommendation for Sanction, the Commission asserts that
the hearing judge concluded that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(c), stating:
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The [MLRPC] 8.4(c) violation was related to the misrepresentations made to
[] Keener and [] Castillo regarding the status of the [Immediate Family
P]etition. The [MLRPC] 8.4(c) violation in [] Martinez[-]Ramos’s case is
also related to misrepresentations made to [] Martinez-Ramos regarding the
filing of her Motion to Stay and [Landeo]’s lack of candor concerning her
deportation.
What the Commission has identified as the alleged bases for violations of MLRPC 8.4(c),
without more, simply does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence that
Landeo engaged in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]”
And, more importantly, the hearing judge did not find that Landeo engaged in such conduct
or otherwise made misrepresentations warranting the conclusion that she violated MLRPC
8.4(c).25
At oral argument, in support of the contention that the hearing judge concluded that
Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(c), Bar Counsel drew this Court’s attention to a footnote
in the hearing judge’s opinion, in which the hearing judge stated:
It should be noted that [Landeo]’s policy was to charge an additional $100 in
filing fees set by the U[.]S[.] governmental authorities. While she explains
that this was done to “cover direct costs[,]” that is never explained in the
retainer agreement with her client. Further, the retainer notes that
administrative costs will be billed “separately to the client.” Therefore, even
25
At oral argument, Bar Counsel argued that Landeo’s staff’s communications to
Keener and Castillo that the Immediate Family Petition was “in process” was a
misrepresentation because the Immediate Family Petition had not yet been filed with
USCIS. The hearing judge, however, did not find such a misrepresentation had been made.
Indeed, the hearing judge found: “[Landeo]’s office manager told Keener and Castillo that
the [Immediate Family Petition] was ‘in process[,]’ [and] the clients interpreted that to
mean that the form was filed and they were just waiting for a receipt.” In other words, the
hearing judge did not find that Landeo’s office manager told Keener and Castillo that the
Immediate Family Petition was in process with USCIS; rather, Keener and Castillo simply
interpreted the office manager’s words as such. And, as Judge Adkins pointed out at oral
argument, the phrase “in process” can “have a myriad of meanings”; i.e., telling a client
that a form was “in process” did not necessarily mean that the form had been filed.
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if not an unreasonable amount for direct costs, it is certainly confusing and
deceptive when there is no way to tell the relationship of the routinely added
$100 to the actual “direct cost.”
As an initial matter, the above statement is in a footnote in the hearing judge’s discussion
of the findings of facts as to Landeo’s representation of Flores; as mentioned above, Bar
Counsel did not charge Landeo with violating MLRPC 8.4(c) in representing Flores. And,
given its location in the hearing judge’s opinion, it is unclear that the hearing judge intended
the information to be generally applicable to Landeo’s representation of Castillo and
Martinez-Ramos as well. As another matter, the footnote follows a discussion of the expert
testimony on the reasonableness of the fees that Landeo charged Flores. Simply put, the
hearing judge’s comment that Landeo’s practice of charging an additional $100 in filing
fees was “confusing and deceptive” was not made in connection with any analysis of any
MLRPC, let alone MLRPC 8.4(c), and, as pointed out, was made in a footnote in the
findings of fact.
In short, all that can be gleaned from the hearing judge’s opinion is that the hearing
judge concluded that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(a). The hearing judge did not make
findings of fact or include any discussion supporting a determination that the hearing judge
concluded that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(c).26 Absent such findings of fact or
26
At oral argument, Bar Counsel directed our attention to an exhibit from the parties
that supposedly substantiated a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). That exhibit, appended to the
hearing judge’s opinion in the record, is entitled “Landeo Attachment.” Far from
substantiating a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c), however, the Landeo Attachment merely sets
forth verbatim all of the MLRPC with which Landeo was charged with violating, including
subsections of MLRPC with which she was not charged with violating. For example, the
Commission charged Landeo with violating only MLRPC 1.5(a) in all three matters; the
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analysis supporting the conclusion of law, we are unwilling to speculate as to the reasoning
or the rationale of the hearing judge; instead, we decline to conclude that Landeo violated
MLRPC 8.4(c) in representing Castillo or Martinez-Ramos.
MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice)
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MLRPC 8.4(d). “Generally, a lawyer
violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would negatively impact the
perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public[.]” Shuler, 443
Md. at 505, 117 A.3d at 45 (brackets, citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, as an initial matter, we observe that the Commission charged Landeo with
violating MLRPC 8.4(d) in representing all three clients; and, the Commission charged
Landeo with violating only MLRPC 8.4(d), and not any other subsection of MLRPC 8.4,
in representing Flores. As discussed above, the phrasing of the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law as to MLRPC 8.4 with respect to Castillo and Martinez-Ramos leads to the logical
conclusion that the hearing judge determined that Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(a) (“It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC.); the hearing judge did
not provide specific analysis that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4(d) with respect to
Landeo Attachment, however, sets forth MLRPC 1.5 in its entirety, including MLRPC
1.5(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e). Moreover, the Landeo Attachment does not contain any
analysis of the MLRPC violations charged. In sum, the Landeo Attachment provides no
support whatsoever for the contention that the hearing judge concluded that Landeo had
violated MLRPC 8.4(c).
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Castillo and Martinez-Ramos. And, without specifying a subsection, the hearing judge
concluded that Landeo had violated MLRPC 8.4 in representing Flores, stating: “Based
upon the violations found by the [hearing judge] by clear and convincing evidence, the
[hearing judge] finds that [Landeo] violated [MLRPC] 8.4.” This, too, appears to be a
conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(a) in representing Flores. Nonetheless, upon
our independent review, we determine that clear and convincing evidence—credited in the
hearing judge’s findings of fact—supports the conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC
8.4(d) in representing all three clients.
As discussed above, although Castillo and Keener provided Landeo the filing fee
and all of the documents that were necessary to file the Immediate Family Petition, and
Landeo had signed an attorney appearance form, Landeo did not file the Immediate Family
Petition with USCIS until nearly eight months later. Although Flores provided Landeo
with all of the documents that were necessary to file the Abused Spouse Petition and had
signed the Abused Spouse Petition, Landeo did not file the Abused Spouse Petition until
nearly three months later. Additionally, although Flores provided Landeo with all of the
documents that were necessary to file the Adjustment of Status, Landeo never filed the
Adjustment of Status. In representing Martinez-Ramos, Landeo did not file the Notice of
Appeal or Motion until more than three months after the deadline, and failed to provide
any reasons for the late filing. As a result, USCIS denied the untimely Notice of Appeal
or Motion. Additionally, Landeo mailed the Motion to Stay Removal to ICE despite the
fact that, per the instructions on the form, the Motion to Stay Removal needed to be hand-
delivered to the ICE office in Baltimore. Landeo did not correct the mistake of having
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mailed the Motion to Stay Removal. Additionally, Martinez-Ramos retained Landeo to
file a work permit application on her behalf, but Landeo never filed the work permit
application. And, ultimately, Martinez-Ramos was deported.
Moreover, in representing each client, in addition to displaying a lack of diligence,
Landeo failed to deposit attorney’s fees and filing fees into an attorney trust account and
failed to keep her clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and to
explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit her clients to make informed
decisions regarding the representation. Under these circumstances, in representing each
client, Landeo engaged in conduct that would negatively impact the perception of the legal
profession of a reasonable member of the public. A lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) by,
among other things, “failing to represent a client in an adequate manner[,]” and “failing to
keep a client informed about the status of a case.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Brigerman, 441 Md. 23, 40, 105 A.3d 467, 477 (2014) (citations, brackets, and internal
quotation marks omitted). A lawyer also violates MLRPC 8.4(d) by “fail[ing] to keep [his
or her] clients advised of the status of the[] representation or, more grievously, fail[ing] to
represent diligently [his or her] clients.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md.
523, 555, 103 A.3d 629, 648 (2014). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski,
441 Md. 248, 268, 107 A.3d 1159, 1170 (2015) (“Where [a lawyer] failed to competently
and diligently represent [clients], ultimately resulting in the dismissal of their case(s), [the
lawyer] engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of
[MLRPC] 8.4(d).” (Citation omitted)).
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MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC)
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC. MLRPC
8.4(a).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that
Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(a) in representing Castillo and Martinez-Ramos. As
discussed above, Landeo violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.5(a),
1.15(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d) in representing Castillo and/or Martinez-Ramos.27
(C) Sanction
The Commission recommends that we indefinitely suspend Landeo from the
practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety days.28
Landeo recommends that we either reprimand her or suspend her “for a definite and limited
time period.”
In Shuler, 443 Md. at 506-07, 117 A.3d at 46, this Court stated:
This Court sanctions a lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but instead to
protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession. This
27
The Commission did not charge Landeo with violating MLRPC 8.4(a) in
representing Flores, so we decline to conclude that Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(a) in that
instance. However, had the Commission charged Landeo with violating MLRPC 8.4(a) in
representing Flores, we would have no difficulty in concluding that clear and convincing
evidence supports a conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(a) based on Landeo’s
other violations of the MLRPC in representing Flores.
28
On the first page of its recommendation, the Commission mistakenly specified
sixty days. The Commission filed in this Court a corrected version of the first page, which
should have specified ninety days.
Additionally, at oral argument, when asked whether the recommended sanction
would change if this Court concluded that Landeo had not violate MLRPC 8.4(c), Bar
Counsel responded in the negative and stated that the recommendation for an indefinite
suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety days would remain the
same even absent a conclusion that Landeo violated MLRPC 8.4(c).
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Court accomplishes these goals by: (1) deterring other lawyers from
engaging in similar misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer
who is unfit to continue to practice law.
In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this
Court considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s
mental state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have
caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors.
Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a
dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple
violations of the MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the Maryland Rules or
orders of this Court or the hearing judge; (6) submission of false evidence,
false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline
proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature;
(8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of
law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.
Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline;
(2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional
problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the
misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to the Commission
or a cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6)
inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical
disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including
alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the
lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the
chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the
lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the
misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse;
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of
repetition of the misconduct.
(Brackets, citation, and ellipses omitted).
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 317, 324, 318-19, 628 A.2d 178,
- 46 -
181, 179 (1993), this Court indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland
with the right to apply for reinstatement after six months a lawyer who violated MLRPC
1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.15(b), 1.16(d), 5.3(b), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) in
representing four clients. In determining the appropriate sanction, we stated:
As Bar Counsel points out, [the lawyer]’s representation of the[] four clients
was marked by serious neglect and inattention. [The lawyer] failed to return
a fee which was unearned for a period of nine months; he failed to timely
remit funds [that] he received on behalf of a client; he failed to communicate
with his clients; and[,] in connection with the investigation of three of the
complaints, [the lawyer] failed to answer Bar Counsel’s requests for
information. The sanction [that] we impose must provide adequate
protection to the public and motivate [the lawyer] to adopt appropriate
practices in the future.
Id. at 323-24, 628 A.2d at 181.
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 98, 75, 89-90, 94-95, 81,
87-88, 84, 753 A.2d 17, 39, 27, 33-35, 37, 30, 31 (2000), this Court indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety
days a lawyer who violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3),29 1.4(b), 5.1(a), 5.3(b),
8.4(c), and 8.4(d) in representing four clients; we also ordered the lawyer to engage a
monitor to oversee his law practice of law and accounting of funds for two years. In
Mooney, id. at 74, 75, 84, 87, 90, 94-95, 753 A.2d at 26, 27, 32, 33, 35, 37, the lawyer,
among other misconduct, failed to appear at trial, failed to respond to his client’s inquiries
29
At the time, MLRPC 1.4(a)(a) and 1.4(a)(3) did not yet exist; the provisions that
are now in MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(a)(3) were in MLRPC 1.4(a), which provided: “A
lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information.” See Mooney, 359 Md. at 75, 753 A.2d
at 27.
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after he failed to appear at trial, failed to file a motion as originally discussed with a client,
failed to communicate with a client for at least four months, provided incorrect legal advice
through a member of the lawyer’s staff, and failed to take measures to ensure that
nonlawyer assistants conducted themselves in a manner compatible with the lawyer’s
professional obligations. In determining the appropriate sanction, we explained:
The number and similarities of the complaints before this Court are of great
concern. We note that[,] while we have generally suspended lawyers who[,]
for the first time[,] have been found to have violated rules relating to
competency, we have disbarred subsequent offenders. [The lawyer] appears
before us for the first time.
Id. at 98, 753 A.2d at 39 (citation omitted).
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 567, 563, 556, 903 A.2d 895,
908, 905, 901 (2006), this Court indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in
Maryland a lawyer who violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3),30 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.1(b),
and 8.4(d). In Lee, id. at 555-57, 903 A.2d at 901-02, the lawyer, among other misconduct,
failed to timely appear at a scheduled meeting of creditors on his client’s behalf, failed to
diligently pursue his client’s legal matter, failed to keep his client reasonably informed
about the status of the matter, failed to return the client’s file after she terminated his
representation, and failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information. In
determining the appropriate sanction, this Court noted the aggravating factor that the
lawyer had received prior attorney discipline, having been reprimanded in one case for
violating MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), and 1.4(a)(3), and having been indefinitely suspended
30
See supra note 29.
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with the right to apply for reinstatement after one year in another case for violating MLRPC
1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c). Id. at 566, 903 A.2d at 907. Additionally, we
stated that the lawyer had not demonstrated remorse and that we were “not convinced” that
the lawyer’s provision of free services to the complainant was “a remedial act motivated
by true remorse, rather than an attempt to procure a withdrawal of the complaint.” Id. at
567, 903 A.2d at 908. We also noted that the hearing judge had “made no findings as to
whether [the lawyer] established by a preponderance of the evidence any mitigating
factors[,]” and concluded that “nothing in the record suggest[ed] that [the lawyer]’s alleged
medical condition could be a mitigating factor.” Id. at 566, 903 A.2d at 907.
By contrast, in Thomas, 440 Md. at 558, 550-51, 554, 103 A.3d at 650, 645, 647,
this Court disbarred a lawyer who violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 8.1(b),
8.4(c), and 8.4(d) in representing an immigrant client. In Thomas, id. at 551-52, 554, 555,
103 A.3d at 646, 647, 648, the lawyer, among other misconduct, failed to appear at the
client’s hearing and told the client that the client did not need to appear at the hearing,
stopped responding to the client as the client attempted to ascertain the status of the case,
failed to inform the client that the client had been ordered removed from the country, failed
to respond to the Commission’s requests for information, and misrepresented the status of
the case to the client. We noted that there were no mitigating factors and four aggravating
factors, namely: (1) an intentional failure “to participate in the disciplinary proceedings or
comply with the information requests of the Commission”; (2) “a refusal to acknowledge
the wrongful nature of [the lawyer]’s conduct”; (3) “indifference to making restitution to
[the client] for the circumstances in which he was left in the lurch”; and (4) “the vulnerable
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nature of [the client]’s status” as an immigrant. Id. at 557-58, 103 A.3d at 649. In
determining the appropriate sanction, we explained that the lawyer “failed to communicate
with his client, failed to complete any of the work that he was retained to complete, and
failed to participate in the[ attorney discipline] proceeding[] in any way.” Id. at 558, 103
A.3d at 650.
And, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Geesing, 436 Md. 56, 71, 66, 58, 80 A.3d
718, 727, 724, 719 (2013), this Court suspended from the practice of law in Maryland for
ninety days a lawyer who violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), 5.3(a), and 8.4(d) by routinely
authorizing two non-lawyer members of his law firm’s staff to sign his name on
documents—including affidavits that the staff members falsely notarized—in foreclosure
filings. In determining the appropriate sanction, we noted that the lawyer’s conduct was
aggravated by only two aggravating factors—a pattern of misconduct and multiple
offenses—and was mitigated by seven factors, including:
(a) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) the absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive; (c) timely good-faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify
consequences of misconduct; (d) full disclosure to the Commission and
cooperation and participation in the attorney discipline proceeding; (e) good
character and reputation; (f) remorse; and (g) significant press coverage of
the issue and considerable time and effort that the lawyer and the lawyer’s
firm spent correcting the problem.
Id. at 67, 70, 80 A.3d at 725, 726 (citation, ellipsis, internal quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
Here, Landeo violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a),
1.15(c), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d) by: failing to provide competent representation to Martinez-
Ramos; failing to provide diligent representation in time-sensitive immigration matters and
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waiting months to file documents; failing to keep her clients reasonably informed about
the status of their matters, promptly comply with her clients’ reasonable requests for
information, and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit her clients to
make informed decisions regarding the representation; charging and collecting attorney’s
fees for services that she failed to provide to any meaningful degree or at all; failing to
deposit attorney’s fees and filing fees into an attorney trust account; failing to deposit
Keener’s and Castillo’s unearned attorney’s fees and Flores’s unearned attorney’s fees into
an attorney trust account without the clients’ informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a
different arrangement; failing to reasonably protect Castillo’s and Flores’s interests and
timely surrender files to which Castillo’s and Flores’s new lawyers were entitled; and
engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. As to Landeo’s
mental state, the record demonstrates that Landeo acted intentionally in depositing her
clients’ attorney’s fees and filing fees into an account other than an attorney trust account,
and that Landeo, at a minimum, acted negligently, if not knowingly, in failing to provide
competent and diligent representation and in failing to adequately communicate with her
clients.
Landeo injured Castillo by failing to provide agreed-upon services in a diligent
manner, thus necessitating Castillo’s and Keener’s decision to terminate Landeo’s
representation and incur the expense of retaining a new immigration lawyer, and causing
additional delay in the process of Castillo’s obtaining legal permanent resident status.
Similarly, Landeo injured Flores by failing to provide agreed-upon services in a diligent
manner, thus necessitating Flores’s decision to terminate Landeo’s representation and incur
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the expense of retaining a new immigration lawyer, and causing additional delay in the
process of Flores’s obtaining a green card for work authorization. And, Landeo injured
Martinez-Ramos by failing to timely file the Notice of Appeal or Motion, failing to explain
the late filing, and failing to hand-deliver the Motion to Stay Removal as required,
ultimately resulting in Martinez-Ramos’s detention and deportation. Additionally, in each
matter, Landeo engaged in conduct that would negatively impact the perception of the legal
profession of a reasonable member of the public.
The hearing judge found three aggravating factors: (1) “a pattern of misconduct”;
(2) “multiple violations of the” MLRPC; and (3) a refusal “to acknowledge the
wrongfulness of [Landeo’s] misconduct[.]” Upon our review, we note five aggravating
factors. First and second, Landeo engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed
multiple violations of the MLRPC. Third, Landeo has refused to acknowledge the
misconduct’s wrongful nature.31 Fourth, Landeo’s clients were vulnerable victims.32 And,
fifth, Landeo has substantial experience in the practice of law, as she had been a member
31
To be sure, at oral argument, Landeo’s counsel seemingly acknowledged that
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.15(a) by failing to place attorney’s fees and filings fees into an
attorney trust account, i.e., that Landeo’s misconduct with respect to fees was wrongful.
However, the record does not demonstrate that Landeo has acknowledged the wrongfulness
of her misconduct in any other respect.
32
In Thomas, 440 Md. at 558, 103 A.3d at 649, we stated:
We have recognized previously the special vulnerability of immigrants as
clients. See Attorney Grievance Commission of Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642,
31 A.3d 110, 120 (2011) (describing the purposes of the Maryland
Immigration Consultant Act . . . as “to offer simple protection to extremely
vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend
themselves, from being preyed on”).
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of the Bar of Maryland for approximately a decade at the time of her misconduct.33
The hearing judge found one mitigating factor: the absence of prior attorney
discipline. Upon our review, we note only the same mitigating factor. We decline to
determine that Landeo’s refunds to Flores and Vasquez for filings fees constitute a timely
good faith effort to make restitution because the refunds were mailed to Flores and Vasquez
on July 30, 2015, more than two-and-a-half years after Flores terminated Landeo’s
representation and after Martinez-Ramos was detained and deported, and only four days
before the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding began. In other words, the refunds
were untimely.
We also decline to consider as mitigation the circumstance that Landeo’s law firm’s
bank accounts are periodically reviewed by a certified public accountant pursuant to a
conditional diversion agreement entered into by Landeo’s law partner.34 Although
Landeo’s law firm may benefit from the terms of her partner’s conditional diversion
33
Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 46, 85 A.3d 117, 143
(2014) (“[H]aving worked as a prosecutor for over a decade before the events in this case
occurred, McDonald had substantial experience in the practice of law that should have
given him an experiential basis from which to know [that] his actions were unethical.”
(Citation omitted)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Worsham, 441 Md. 105, 136, 112,
114, 105 A.3d 515, 533, 519, 520 (2014) (This Court stated that a lawyer’s misconduct
was aggravated by “substantial experience in the practice of law” where, eleven years after
this Court admitted the lawyer to the Bar of Maryland, the lawyer began frivolously
“arguing that the federal government did not have the authority to tax his earnings as
income.”).
34
Landeo provided us with information regarding her law partner’s conditional
diversion agreement. Normally we would not discuss disciplinary action with respect to a
lawyer other than the respondent. In this case, because Landeo has proffered information
regarding her law partner’s conditional diversion agreement as mitigation, and because the
hearing judge included the information in his opinion, we address the matter.
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agreement, the existence of the conditional diversion agreement does not constitute
mitigation as to Landeo. Indeed, Landeo herself has no obligations under her partner’s
conditional diversion agreement. Moreover, Landeo’s partner did not enter into the
conditional diversion agreement until July 2015—several years after Landeo’s misconduct
occurred. In other words, Landeo did not take it upon herself to timely correct the problems
with her law firm’s accounting practices.
We agree with the Commission that the appropriate sanction for Landeo’s
misconduct is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law in Maryland with the right
to apply for reinstatement after ninety days. Among other misconduct, Landeo failed to
provide diligent representation, failed to adequately communicate with her clients, failed
to place fees into an attorney trust account, failed to timely turn over client files once her
representation was terminated, and engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Landeo’s misconduct resulted in actual injury to her clients—
Castillo and Flores experienced delays in obtaining their desired immigration statuses, and
were forced to terminate Landeo’s representation and seek new counsel, and Martinez-
Ramos was detained and deported. Landeo also engaged in conduct that would negatively
impact the perception of the legal professional of a reasonable member of the public.
Landeo’s misconduct is aggravated by several factors, including a pattern of misconduct
and multiple violations of the MLRPC in representing three clients, a refusal to
acknowledge her misconduct’s wrongful nature, and substantial experience in the practice
of law. Moreover, as immigrants who had entered the United States illegally, Castillo,
Flores, and Martinez-Ramos were vulnerable. To protect the public, we must impress upon
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Landeo, and all other lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate
communication in immigration cases.
Like the lawyer in David, 331 Md. at 318-19, 323, 628 A.2d at 179, 181, Landeo
violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d) in representing multiple
clients, and her representation can be characterized as being “marked by serious neglect
and inattention.” Notably, unlike Landeo, the lawyer in David, id. at 324, 318-19, 628
A.2d at 181, 179—who was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland
with the right to apply for reinstatement after six months (i.e., ninety days longer than the
sanction we impose on Landeo)—violated MLRPC that Landeo did not violate, including
MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c). Additionally, like the lawyer in Mooney, 359 Md. at
97-98, 75, 81, 753 A.2d at 39, 27, 30, where the lawyer was indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety days,
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), and 8.4(d) in connection with
multiple matters, but her misconduct is mitigated by the absence of prior attorney
discipline. And, like the lawyer in Lee, 393 Md. at 567, 563, 556, 903 A.2d at 908, 905,
901, where the lawyer was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Maryland,
Landeo violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d), failed to
diligently pursue her clients’ interests in a timely manner, and failed to keep her clients
reasonably informed about the status of their matters.
Unlike the lawyer in Geesing, 436 Md. at 71, 67, 68, 80 A.3d at 727, 725, however,
where the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law in Maryland for ninety days,
Landeo’s misconduct is aggravated by five factors (not two factors), including the
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vulnerability of the victims and a refusal to acknowledge her misconduct’s wrongful
nature, and is mitigated only by the absence of prior attorney discipline (instead of seven
factors, such as remorse, timely good faith efforts to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct, and good character). Simply put, Landeo’s misconduct is accompanied by
more aggravating factors and far fewer mitigating factors than the lawyer’s misconduct in
Geesing, and necessarily warrants a more severe sanction than the ninety-day suspension
that we imposed in Geesing. Nevertheless, unlike in Thomas, 440 Md. at 558, 551-55, 103
A.3d at 650, 646-48, where the lawyer was disbarred, Landeo did not fail to attend a
hearing, misrepresent the status of the case to a client, fail to tell a client that he or she had
been ordered removed from the country, fail to participate in this attorney discipline
proceeding, or fail to complete any work whatsoever for which she was retained to
complete. In other words, although certainly egregious and displaying a gross lack of
competence, and a pattern of a lack of diligence and adequate communication, Landeo’s
misconduct does not rise to a level warranting disbarment.35
35
Generally, where a lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(c) by engaging in intentional
dishonest conduct, disbarment—not an indefinite suspension—is the appropriate sanction,
absent compelling extenuating circumstances. See, e.g., Thomas, 445 Md. at 402, 127
A.3d at 576 (The lawyer “violated MLRPC 8.4(c)[ by], for the purpose of continuing to
practice law, [] dishonestly refrain[ing] from informing Bar Counsel that he was using
alcohol and/or opiates and that, on two occasions, he had been discharged from a substance
abuse program for failing to attend the required number of counseling sessions. Absent
compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, intentional dishonest
conduct by a lawyer will result in disbarment. Here, there are no mitigating factors, let
alone compelling extenuating circumstances, that would have justified a lesser sanction.”
(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
By contrast, an indefinite suspension is an appropriate sanction where a lawyer
violates multiple MLRPC, but not MLRPC 8.4(c). See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n
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Accordingly, for the above reasons, we indefinitely suspend Landeo from the
practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety days. The
suspension will begin thirty days after the date on which this opinion is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF
THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
RULE 16-761(b), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT
IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
JENNIFER VETTER LANDEO.
v. Mungin, 439 Md. 290, 322, 319, 96 A.3d 122, 140, 138 (2014) (This Court indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement
after six months a lawyer who had violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.15(a), 1.15(d), and 8.4(d),
Maryland Rule 16-609(a)–(c), and Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. (1989, 2010 Repl.
Vol.) § 10-306, but had not violated MLRPC 8.4(c), and had engaged in negligent, rather
than intentional, misconduct in mishandling his attorney trust account.). In other words, a
violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) is not a predicate for imposition of an indefinite suspension.
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