Emerald Hills Homeowners' Ass'n v. Peters , 446 Md. 155 ( 2016 )

Emerald Hills Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. William E. Peters, et ux., No. 32,
September Term, 2015, Opinion by Adkins, J.
REAL PROPERTY — CREATION OF EASEMENT — SUBDIVISION PLAT AS
EXPRESS EASEMENT: Generally, an express easement may be created only in the
mode and manner prescribed by the recording statutes. However, an express easement,
otherwise sufficiently described, can be created by a memorandum that complies with the
Statute of Frauds.
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No.: 12-C-12-000722
Argued: December 4, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 32
September Term, 2015
EMERALD HILLS HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION, INC.
v.
WILLIAM E. PETERS, et ux.
Barbera, C.J.
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Filed: January 27, 2016
Property disputes are a prominent aspect of our state’s legal history. From Frederick
Calvert, 6th Baron Baltimore, commissioning Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon to
complete a survey to resolve a colonial boundary dispute, to the United States Supreme
Court’s adjudication of an interstate water dispute involving the Potomac River in 2003,1
Maryland has long recognized the significance of the various rights that attach to property
ownership. In this case, we are asked to settle a dispute over an easement—one of the most
“complex and archaic bod[ies] of American property law.” Susan F. French, Toward a
Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1261–
62 (1982).
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
In 1969, a corporation controlled by Victor Posner acquired a 64-acre parcel of land
located near Bel Air, Maryland from William and Margaret Sheppard. This property was
next to “Greenridge,” a residential community developed by Posner. In the deed of
conveyance, the Sheppards retained title to a parcel of a little less than an acre, which the
Court of Special Appeals and the parties refer to as “Parcel 765.” Parcel 765 does not front
on a public road, so the Sheppards reserved a non-exclusive right of way over a 50-foot
wide and 100-foot long strip of land (the “Right of Way Parcel”). The Right of Way Parcel
provides access to Southview Road, a public street in the Greenridge subdivision.
In 2000, Posner obtained approval from Harford County to develop what is now
called “Emerald Hills,” a residential community adjacent to the Greenridge subdivision.
1
See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003).
Posner developed Emerald Hills in five phases and recorded a subdivision plat, which he
signed, in the land records for each phase.2 As part of the development process, Posner
constructed Streamview Court, a 50-foot wide public street partially aligned with
Southview Road in the adjacent Greenridge subdivision. Streamview Court ends in a cul-
de-sac so its terminus does not line up precisely with the Right of Way Parcel or Parcel
765. The cul-de-sac, however, shares points of intersection with each parcel. The parties
and Court of Special Appeals refer to this area between the two parcels and the cul-de-sac
as the “Triangular Parcel.”
Parcel 765, the Right of Way Parcel, and the Triangular Parcel are depicted on one
of the five Emerald Hills subdivision plats (the “Emerald Hills Subdivision Plat,”
“Subdivision Plat,” or the “Plat”). Part of the Plat is reproduced below.3
2
Earlier phases of the subdivision were known as “Greenbriar Hills,” but the name
of the development was later changed to Emerald Hills.
3
The image has been cropped to display the relevant portion and is not to scale. In
addition, we have added identifiers for Parcel 765, the Right of Way Parcel, the Triangular
Parcel, and Streamview Court. We have also enhanced the borders around the Right of
Way Parcel.
2
There are three relevant markings on the Plat: grey shading, forward slashes, and
reversed slashes. The Right of Way Parcel and the Triangular Parcel are shaded in a grey
tone. A note on the Plat indicates that this shading “denotes pedestrian and emergency
vehicle right-of-way & drainage and utility easement.” The Triangular Parcel is also
marked with forward slashes, “////.” A note states that these slash marks “denote[] ingress
& egress easement for access to Parcel 765.” Finally, the Right of Way Parcel is marked
with reversed slashes, “\\\\.” The third note on the Plat states that the reversed slash marks
“denote[] existing ingress and egress easement for Parcel 765 as per [the Sheppard Deed].”4
4
Although the slash marks and grey shading are difficult to see in the digitally
scanned image reproduced in this opinion, they are quite distinct on the copy of the Plat in
the record.
3
The Plat also designates the Right of Way Parcel and Triangular Parcel as “Passive
Open Space” areas.5 The Plat was recorded in the land records of Harford County in 2000.
In 2001, Posner, individually and on behalf of Posner, LLC, executed and recorded a Cross
Easement Agreement (“Agreement”). The Agreement recited that Posner was the owner
and developer of the Emerald Hills Subdivision and that Posner, LLC was the owner and
developer of the Greenridge Subdivision. As a condition of preliminary plan approval for
the Emerald Hills Subdivision, the Harford County Department of Planning and Zoning
required that Posner and Posner, LLC create reciprocal easements to permit lot owners in
both subdivisions to enjoy a common right to use and access the open space areas, including
the “Passive Open Space” areas depicted on the Plat. The Cross Easement Agreement
grants the owners of the lots in each subdivision reciprocal, but non-exclusive, rights of
access and use of the recreational areas and passive open space areas designated on the
Plat, as well as on the plats for other phases of the Greenridge and Emerald Hill
Subdivisions.
In 2006, title to the passive open spaces, including the Triangular Parcel and the
Right of Way Parcel, in the Emerald Hills subdivision, was conveyed to the Emerald Hills
Homeowners’ Association (“the Association”).6 The deed conveying the property to the
5
The Plat also designates two other parcels, which are not completely depicted on
the portion of the Plat reproduced in this opinion, as Passive Open Space areas. These
parcels are not relevant to this case.
6
Posner died in 2002. In 2005, Brenda Nestor, acting as the personal representative
of Posner’s estate, conveyed the property to Emerald Hills, LLC. Emerald Hills, LLC then
conveyed the property to the Association.
4
Association did not contain a metes and bounds or other description of the land conveyed.
Instead, the deed referred to the Plat and the other Emerald Hills subdivision plats.
Specifically, the deed stated that it passed title to “[a]ll that property referred to as ‘Passive
Open Space’ . . . as shown on [the various Emerald Hills subdivision plats] and recorded
among the Land Records of Harford County.”
In 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Peters purchased Parcel 765 from William Sheppard’s estate
“together with the rights, privileges, appurtenances and advantages thereto belonging or
appertaining unto and to the proper use and benefit of [Mr. and Mrs. Peters].” Mr. and
Mrs. Peters then applied for an access permit from Harford County for the installation of a
paved driveway on the Triangular Parcel. The County approved the application and Mr.
and Mrs. Peters began construction of a driveway on the Triangular Parcel that would
enable them to access Streamview Court.
The Association filed suit seeking injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and a
declaratory judgment that the Triangular Parcel was not subject to an easement for the
benefit of Parcel 765. Mr. and Mrs. Peters filed an answer and a motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment. The Association then filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment as to its claim for a declaratory judgment. The Circuit Court granted
the Association’s motion for summary judgment and declared that the Triangular Parcel
was not subject to an easement for the benefit of Parcel 765.
The Court of Special Appeals did not see it that way and it reversed. The
intermediate appellate court ruled that the Plat established an express easement over the
Triangular Parcel in favor of Parcel 765 and that the Cross Easement Agreement had no
5
effect on this easement. The Association appealed and we granted its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. The Association presented two questions for review, which we simplify into
the following questions:
(1) Did the subdivision plat for Emerald Hills establish an
express easement?
(2) Did the Cross Easement Agreement extinguish any
easement attached to Parcel 765?
Because we answer yes as to question one and no as to question two, we shall affirm
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts may resolve matters of law by summary judgment in declaratory
judgment actions. Megonnell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 368 Md. 633, 642, 796 A.2d
758, 764 (2002). In reviewing a declaratory judgment entered pursuant to a motion for
summary judgment, we determine whether it was correct as a matter of law and accord no
deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Lindsay v. Annapolis Rds. Prop. Owners
Ass’n, 431 Md. 274, 289, 64 A.3d 916, 925 (2013). The interpretation of plats, deeds,
easements and covenants has been held to be a question of law. White v. Pines Cmty.
Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 31, 939 A.2d 165, 175 (2008). Additionally, the
“primary consideration in construing the scope of an express easement is the language of
the grant.” Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 143, 733 A.2d 1055,
1073 (1999). In construing the Plat, Cross-Easement Agreement, and other relevant
documents in this case, we must “ascertain and give effect to the intention” of the parties.
Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003).
6
DISCUSSION
I. Did The Subdivision Plat For Emerald Hills Establish An Express
Easement?
An easement is a “non-possessory interest in the real property of another that can
arise either by express grant or implication.” Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 424 Md.
253, 268, 35 A.3d 464, 474 (2012). Because there is no deed granting an easement to Mr.
and Mrs. Peters or their predecessors in title, the focus of the parties’ dispute in this case is
whether the subdivision plat for Emerald Hills established an express easement in favor of
Parcel 765. The Association insists that a subdivision plat cannot create an express
easement for a property owner not part of the subdivision under Maryland law. The
Association asserts that “[i]f the Subdivision Plat is to be judicially interpreted as a
conveying instrument, then it should comply with the requirements of other conveying
instruments such as deeds, deeds of trust, and leases.”
This contention overlooks well-settled Maryland law. True, we have stated that
express easements “may be created only ‘in the mode and manner prescribed by the
recording statutes.’” Kobrine, L.L.C. v. Metzger, 380 Md. 620, 636, 846 A.2d 403, 412
(2004) (quoting Brehm v. Richards, 152 Md. 126, 132, 136 A. 618, 620 (1927)).7 But as
7
The Maryland recording statute applicable to deeds provides:
Any deed containing the names of the grantor and grantee, a
description of the property sufficient to identify it with
reasonable certainty, and the interest or estate intended to be
granted, is sufficient, if executed, acknowledged, and, where
required, recorded.
Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article (“RP”) § 4-101(a)(1).
7
the Court of Special Appeals correctly recognized, this is simply a “general rule.” Peters
v. Emerald Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n, 221 Md. App. 338, 345, 109 A.3d 131, 136 (2015).
In Dubrowin v. Schremp, we limited to deeds the requirement that a right of way
over land can be created only in the mode and manner prescribed by the recording statutes
and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could be created by a
memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds. 248 Md. 166, 171, 235 A.2d 722,
724–25 (1967).8 The Court reaffirmed this principle in Kobrine when it recognized that a
plat could create an easement by express grant. 380 Md. at 636–37, 846 A.2d at 412–13
(stating that “a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, [can] validly be created” by
something other than a deed if it “complie[s] with the Statute of Frauds, i.e., a writing
signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent”) (citing Dubrowin, 248
Md. at 171, 235 A.2d at 724–25).
The Kobrine Court, however, determined that the plat at issue failed to satisfy the
requirements necessary to establish an express easement because it did not comply with
Maryland’s Statute of Frauds and did not sufficiently describe the right of way. Viewing
the legend on the plat as the “ultimate source of any easement,” the Court concluded that
8
Maryland’s Statute of Frauds stipulates that:
No corporeal estate, leasehold or freehold, or incorporeal
interest in land may be assigned, granted, or surrendered,
unless it is in writing signed by the party assigning, granting,
or surrendering it, or his agent lawfully authorized by writing,
or by act and operation of law.
RP § 5-103.
8
the plat was insufficient to create an express easement for three reasons: (1) neither the
name nor the signature of the grantor appeared anywhere on the plat; (2) the plat failed to
identify the lot owners whom the grantor intended to benefit; and (3) the nature of the
interest the grantor intended to convey was “entirely unclear.” Id. We agree with the Court
of Special Appeals that the Plat does not suffer from any of the Kobrine defects.
The Association asserts that the circumstances underlying Dubrowin are factually
distinguishable and that Dubrowin’s holding that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently
described, could be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds
“cannot be separated from the material facts in that case.” This effort to cabin the
Dubrowin holding is untenable. Although Dubrowin did not involve a plat, Kobrine did,
and we applied the Dubrowin rule without reservation. So, our next steps are to examine
this particular plat in light of Dubrowin and Kobrine to determine if it complies with the
Statute of Frauds and sufficiently describes the right of way.
Compliance with Statute of Frauds
Unlike the plat in Kobrine where neither the name nor the signature of the grantor
appeared, Victor Posner’s name and signature appear twice on the Emerald Hills
Subdivision Plat. Mr. and Mrs. Peters rely on these signatures in asserting that the Plat
satisfies the Statute of Frauds. The Association counters that “Posner did not sign the
Subdivision Plat for the purpose of granting an easement to [Mr. and Mrs. Peters] or their
predecessors.” The Association claims that the “signature block clearly limited the purpose
for which roads and open spaces were shown on the Subdivision Plat” and that Posner
9
“grant[ed] only one easement in this signature block.” It points to the following language
in the signature block for support:
Unless otherwise provided on this plat, the streets, roads,
open spaces and public sites shown hereon, and the mention
thereof in deeds are for the purpose of description only and the
same are not intended to be dedicated to public use.
***
The owner hereby grants to Harford County, Maryland, an
easement for the construction, maintenance, repair, and
replacement of water, sewer, and storm drainage lines within
the drainage and utility easements and road improvement
rights of way as shown on the plat.
(Emphasis added.)
In arguing that “[n]o grants of any kind are made by Mr. Posner as a result of his
signing the Subdivision Plat other than the grant of an easement to Harford County,” the
Association ignores crucial language in the signature block and erroneously examines this
language in isolation from the rest of the Plat. The opening phrase “[u]nless otherwise
provided on this plat” in the signature block qualifies the limiting language that follows.
The markings on the Triangular Parcel and Right of Way Parcel, as well as the notes
explaining these markings are definite and clear, and thus fall within the “unless otherwise
provided” classification. We reject the Association’s argument that these designations are
simply for the “purpose of description.”
The Association also contends that there must be evidence of a contract or
agreement in order for Maryland’s Statute of Frauds to apply. The Association states that
there is “no evidence in the record of any agreement, contract, or promise between [the
10
parties] . . . regarding the disputed Triangular area” and thus, the Plat cannot satisfy the
Statute of Frauds because a prerequisite for the statute’s applicability has not been satisfied.
In support of its claim, the Association directs the Court to Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl.
Vol.), § 5-901 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) 9 and MEMC
Electronic Materials v. BP Solar International, 196 Md. App. 318, 340, 9 A.3d 508, 521
(2010).
The Association misunderstands CJP § 5-901. This section, by its plain terms,
simply sets out the circumstances in which contracts must be in writing to be enforceable.
Writing for the Court of Special Appeals, Judge Kehoe aptly noted that the issue here is
“not whether the Association is contractually obligated to convey an easement over the
Triangular Parcel” to Mr. and Mrs. Peters; rather “the relevant question is whether the Plat
had the legal effect of subjecting the Triangular Parcel to an easement for the benefit of
Parcel 765.” To answer that question, we look to Maryland’s Statute of Frauds, Md. Code
9
CJP § 5-901 states:
Unless a contract or agreement upon which an action is
brought, or some memorandum or note of it, is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged or another person lawfully
authorized by that party, an action may not be brought:
(1) To charge a defendant on any special promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another person;
(2) To charge any person on any agreement made
on consideration of marriage; or
(3) On any agreement that is not to be performed
within 1 year from the making of the agreement.
11
(1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-103 of the Real Property Article (“RP”), which the Plat
satisfies.
Relying on Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 524 A.2d 777 (1987), the Association
claims that the Plat cannot satisfy the requirements of RP § 5-103 because “[w]ords such
as ‘grant,’ ‘convey,’ ‘transfer,’ ‘assign,’ or their equivalent evidencing a present
conveyance of an interest in realty are absent from the Subdivision Plat.” The issue in
Bruce was whether the parties’ tenancy by the entireties was severed by the terms of their
marital separation agreement, which called for the parties to list the marital residence for
sale and to divide any proceeds. 309 Md. at 424–25, 524 A.2d at 778–79. In concluding
that the separation agreement did not sever the estate, the Court observed that, at common
law, spouses who desired to sever a tenancy by the entirety could do so only through a
straw deed and that the General Assembly modified the common law rule by enacting what
is now codified as RP § 4-108(b).10 Bruce, 309 Md. at 429–31, 524 A.2d at 781–82. The
Court explained that although the statute had removed the need for a straw conveyance, the
10
RP § 4-108(b) provides:
Any interest in property held by a husband and wife in tenancy
by the entirety may be granted, (1) by both acting jointly, to
themselves, to either of them, individually, or to themselves
and any other person, in joint tenancy or tenancy in common;
(2) by both acting jointly, to either husband or wife and any
other person in joint tenancy or tenancy in common; and (3) by
either acting individually to the other in tenancy in severalty,
without the use of a straw man as an intermediate grantee-
grantor. These grants, regardless of when made, are ratified,
confirmed, and declared valid as having created the type of
ownership that the grant purports to grant.
12
statute had not changed the requirement that, absent divorce, a tenancy by the entirety could
be severed only by deed from both spouses. Id. at 431–32, 524 A.2d at 782–83. The Court
of Special Appeals correctly recognized that the Bruce holding turned largely on the
Court’s interpretation of RP § 4-108(b) as requiring a deed to sever a tenancy by the
entirety, and was not applicable to other real property interests. Emerald Hills
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 221 Md. App. at 350, 109 A.3d at 139. Accordingly, we reject the
Association’s argument that a plat cannot satisfy RP § 5-103 unless the “[w]ords such as
‘grant,’ ‘convey,’ ‘transfer,’ ‘assign,’ or their equivalent evidencing a present conveyance
of an interest in realty” appear therein.
Sufficient Description of the Right of Way
The Association posits that the Plat suffers from the same defect as in Kobrine in its
failure to indicate which lot owners were intended to benefit from the easement. Although
the legend does not name a specific individual as the grantee, the legend unambiguously
identifies Parcel 765 as the dominant estate and the Triangular Parcel as the servient estate.
Interpreting Kobrine, we consider this difference material. Our concern there was lack of
clarity as to the dominant estate:
[A]lthough the servient lot is identified, the plat does not
indicate which lot owners are intended to be benefitted—only
those owning lots in Section Two or also those owning lots in
Section One—thereby making both the grantees and a clear
description of the dominant property impossible to identify
from just the face of the document[.]
13
380 Md. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412–13 (emphasis in original). With its clear identification
of the dominant and servient parcels, the Emerald Hills Subdivision Plat does not suffer
from that deficiency.
The Association further maintains that the nature of the interest Posner intended to
convey is unclear because the Plat “does not describe the extent and nature of the access
easement proposed or specify the burdens attached to such easement.” In particular it
complains that the “Parcel 765 Legend does not describe whether ingress was for
pedestrians exclusively, traffic exclusively, or both.” The legend, however, need not
describe the nature of an easement to that degree of specificity for there to be a sufficient
description of the right of way.
In Kobrine, the legend on the subdivision plat merely stated “Area Reserved For
The Use Of Lot Owners.” 380 Md. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412. The Circuit Court found an
express recreational easement based on this language, but this Court vacated the trial
court’s judgment because the nature of the interest intended to be conveyed was “entirely
unclear.” Id. at 635–37, 846 A.2d at 411–13. Indeed, the Kobrine Court was forced to ask
“what use may the dominant lot owners make of the servient lot?” Id. at 636–37, 846 A.2d
at 413 (emphasis in original). Troubled by this “uncertaint[y],” the Court held that the plat
did not create an express easement. Id. at 637–38, 846 A.2d at 413–14. In contrast to there
being “no way to tell . . . what kind of easement was being conveyed” by the plat in
Kobrine, 380 Md. at 638, 846 A.2d at 414, the legend here describes the kind of easement
being conveyed—an “ingress & egress easement.” Thus, the legend’s notation that the
interest intended to be conveyed is an access easement constitutes a sufficient description
14
of the nature of the right of way. As the owners of an “ingress & egress easement for
access to Parcel 765,” Mr. and Mrs. Peters can make reasonable use of this easement. See
Mahoney v. Devonshire, 86 Md. App. 624, 587 A.2d 1146 (1991) (prescriptive easement
for road included right to improve road by grading and asphalting); 7 Thompson on Real
Property § 60.04(a), at 527 (Thomas 2d ed. 2006) (“The owner of easement rights can make
reasonable use of them.”). The installation of a mountable curb and driveway is reasonable
under the language of the easement grant in the Plat.
Because a deed is not required to create an easement and the Plat satisfies
Maryland’s Statute of Frauds as well as sufficiently describes the easement, we shall affirm
the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that the Plat established an access easement over the
Triangular Parcel for the benefit of Parcel 765. We turn now to the parties’ dispute over
whether the 2001 Cross Easement Agreement terminated the easement.
II. Did The Cross Easement Agreement Extinguish The Easement Attached
To Parcel 765?
Generally, the owner of a servient estate cannot unilaterally extinguish an express
easement. See Miller, 377 Md. at 350, 833 A.2d at 545 (concluding that the owners of a
servient estate “may not unilaterally modify or reduce [a] right-of-way in a manner or
extent that is inconsistent with the intention of the parties as gleaned from the language of
the deed granting the right-of-way”); Brooks v. Voigt, 224 Md. 47, 50–51, 166 A.2d 737,
739 (1961) (holding that an easement created by express grant cannot be narrowed
unilaterally by the servient tenement); see also Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297,
111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955) (“It is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot
15
close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as
to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment.”); 7 Thompson on Real Property §
60.08(b)(2), at 561 (Thomas 2d ed. 2006) (“Any easement, no matter how created, may
terminate by the agreement of both the dominant and servient parties, through a formal
release.”). Here, it is undisputed that neither Mr. and Mrs. Peters nor their predecessors in
interest of the dominant estate were signatories to the Cross Easement Agreement. Rather,
Posner, individually, and on behalf of Posner, LLC, executed the Cross Easement
Agreement for the benefit of third party property owners. Because Mr. and Mrs. Peters
were not parties to the Cross-Easement Agreement, nothing contained therein could
interfere with their express easement. See Miller, 377 Md. at 350, 833 A.2d at 545; Brooks,
224 Md. at 50–51, 166 A.2d at 739.
III. Conclusion
Dubrowin and Kobrine make clear that a plat can establish an express easement in
certain circumstances and we have no difficulty holding that the Emerald Hills Subdivision
Plat established an express easement over the Triangular Parcel for the benefit of Parcel
765. In addition, we hold that the Cross Easement Agreement did not extinguish this access
easement.
Finally, the access easement does not impose any particular hardship on the
Association because it took title to the property with constructive knowledge of the
easement. It is well-settled that reference to a plat in a deed incorporates that plat as part
of the deed. Lindsay, 431 Md. at 291, 64 A.3d at 926 (“Under the common law, a reference
to a plat in a deed incorporates generally that plat as part of the deed.”); see Boucher v.
16
Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 689, 484 A.2d 630, 636 (1984) (recognizing “the common law rule
that a deed reference to a plat incorporates that plat as part of the deed.”). The 2006 deed
granting property to the Association expressly referenced the Emerald Hills Subdivision
Plat and the Plat’s legend denoting “ingress & egress easement for access to Parcel 765” is
unobscured. Moreover, Maryland statutory law provides that unless “a contrary intention
appears by express terms or is necessarily implied . . . every grant or reservation of an
easement passes or reserves an easement in perpetuity.” RP § 4-105. In light of the
Association’s taking title to the property with constructive knowledge of the easement over
the Triangular Parcel for the benefit of Parcel 765, we agree with Mr. and Mrs. Peters that
the easement works no particular hardship on the Association.
For these reasons we affirm the intermediate appellate court’s judgment and remand
this case so that a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion can be entered.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
17