Chase v. State , 449 Md. 283 ( 2016 )

Ira Chase v. State of Maryland, No. 85, September Term, 2015. Opinion by Battaglia, J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – REASONABLE
SUSPICION
Reasonable suspicion to support a lawful investigatory stop and frisk under Terry v. Ohio
is satisfied when presented with particularized facts in support a belief that the suspect
may be armed and dangerous.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – ARREST
Use of handcuffs does not elevate an investigatory detention to an arrest when concern
that weapons are present and officer safety provide the bases. Continued use of handcuffs
after a frisk of the suspect reveals no weapons does not convert the detention into an
arrest when the suspect’s unsearched vehicle remains in close proximity, the criminal
investigation is unfolding and the duration the suspect is in handcuffs before arrest is
short.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Criminal Case No. 03-K-13-005785
Argued: May 9, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 85
September Term, 2015
______________________________________
IRA CHASE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.,
Greene,
Adkins,
McDonald,
Watts,
Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Retired, Specially
Assigned,
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired, Specially
Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 19, 2016
This case presents us with the opportunity, yet again, to explore the parameters of
reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop,1 as well as what constitutes an arrest for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Ira Chase, Petitioner, presents the following questions for
our review:
1. Does reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in drug activity,
by itself, constitute reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and
dangerous?
2. Under this Court’s case law recognizing that a display of force by the
police, such as placing a suspect in handcuffs, constitutes an arrest
requiring probable cause absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and dangerous, was Petitioner under arrest when he and the co-
occupant of Petitioner’s Jeep Cherokee were removed from the Jeep and
placed in handcuffs, where the police had reasonable suspicion that the two
men were engaged in drug activity in the Jeep but lacked reasonable
suspicion that they were armed and dangerous?
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe
that Petitioner and his co-occupant were armed and dangerous when they
were removed from the Jeep and handcuffed, was that reasonable suspicion
dispelled when the officers patted them down and found no weapons,
thereby rendering their continued detention and questioning by the officers
while awaiting the arrival of a drug sniffing dog an arrest, and not a mere
detention, that was not supported by probable cause?
In 2013, Chase was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, manufacturing cocaine, possession of
cocaine and possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana. He moved to suppress various
pieces of evidence seized by Baltimore County police officers from his person, that being
a motel key, and from the motel itself, to include narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia;
1
A Terry stop is an investigatory detention and frisk for weapons based upon an officer’s
reasonable suspicion that the individual may be armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
he alleged that his detention in handcuffs while a car that he had been driving was
searched constituted an unlawful arrest and the attendant seizure of the motel key and
discovery of physical evidence in the motel room were the fruits of that arrest. Judge
Patrick Cavanaugh of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Chase’s motion to
suppress, and Chase, thereafter, entered a conditional guilty plea2 to one count of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Judge Cavanaugh, in denying the motion
to suppress, determined:
Okay. It's a very interesting case. I'm familiar with all the cases you've
handed up, Mr. Tompsett. The Carter case is of particular interest, it's one
of Judge Moylan's shorter opinions. The man was stopped or he wasn't
stopped, he's already parked under the policeman's observation when the
other car pulls in. They're backed in next to each other, it's a high crime
area. I'm familiar with the area. I don't know how many cases I've had from
2
Entry of a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Rule 4-242(d) “reserves” the right to
appeal:
(d) Conditional Plea of Guilty.
(1) Scope of Section. This section applies only to an offense charged
by indictment or criminal information and set for trial in a circuit
court or that is scheduled for trial in a circuit court pursuant to a
prayer for jury trial entered in the District Court.
(2) Entry of Plea; Requirements. With the consent of the court and the
State, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty. The plea
shall be in writing and, as part of it, the defendant may reserve the
right to appeal one or more issues specified in the plea that (A) were
raised by and determined adversely to the defendant, and, (B) if
determined in the defendant's favor would have been dispositive of
the case. The right to appeal under this subsection is limited to those
pretrial issues litigated in the circuit court and set forth in writing in
the plea.
(3) Withdrawal of Plea. A defendant who prevails on appeal with
respect to an issue reserved in the plea may withdraw the plea.
-2-
that side of town involving drugs. They're in the parking lot of the hotel,
nobody gets out of the car, goes into a hotel, don't do anything except meet
each other at a car. The furtive acts give me some concern because of the
officer’s safety. They see this going on inside the vehicle as they're
approaching. The inconsistent stories, you know, one's watching the
ballgame, the other one is going to Maryland Live Casino. I think that's
what really triggered the call for the K–9 to come out and it was fairly
quick after they were stopped. I believe the K–9 arrived within ten minutes
of the police approaching the vehicle to begin with. I think it is a classic
Terry case, (inaudible) to the high crime in the area, drugs, we know that
guns are involved with drugs. So I can understand the concern for officers’
safety. The dog alerts on the side of the vehicle that Mr. DeLillo just got
out of and he's the one who later on states, you know, I came to buy an
eight ball to get, got fourteen grams, got more than he came for. Certainly,
got more than he came for when he got the cuffs on him. I believe I don't
have any choice but to deny your Motion, Mr. Cardin. I think it's a good
stop, it's a good search. I was concerned about the cuffs going on when they
went on and the comments that were made by the two gentlemen were after
they were read Miranda. They were Mirandized right away. I know you
disagree with me, Mr. Davis, you've been sitting there shaking your head
sideways since you came in the door today. The Motion to Suppress is
denied.
Chase appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported opinion, Chase v.
State, 224 Md. App. 631, 121 A.3d 257 (2015), affirmed.3
3
Our standard for the review of a denial to suppress evidence is:
In reviewing a Circuit Court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress
evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the
information contained in the record of the suppression hearing, and not the
trial record. Where, as here, the motion is denied, we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party on the motion. Although we extend great deference to the
hearing judge’s findings of fact, we review independently the application of
the law to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in
violation of law and, accordingly, should be suppressed.
Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489, 500, 921 A.2d 221, 228 (2007) (internal citations
omitted) (internal quotation omitted). See also Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 457–58, 78
A.3d 415, 423 (2013); Reid v. State, 428 Md. 289, 305–06, 51 A.3d 597, 607 (2012);
Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135–36 (2007).
-3-
During the suppression hearing, Detective Andrew Melnyk of the Baltimore
County Police Department testified that in September of 2013 he and his partner,
Detective Young,4 assigned to the Vice/Narcotics Unit, were patrolling the area around
Security Boulevard. Detective Melnyk related that the area was “known for illicit
narcotic activity,” as it is close to Interstate 70 and the Baltimore Beltway.
Detective Melnyk further noted that on the evening of September 10th he and
Detective Young were in the area around the Days Inn on Whitehead Court, which they
knew to be a “high area of drug trafficking.” Detective Melnyk testified that “My unit as
well as myself have participated in numerous search warrants and apprehensions
resulting in the seizure of illicit drugs and U.S. currency, as well as weapons[,]” and
continued to describe the events of that evening in which two individuals interacted in a
Jeep Cherokee:
STATE: And do you recall what time of day you were on the parking lot at
the Days Inn?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: It was the evening shift, around 6:00, 6:45.
STATE: And was it, was it, what position did you take on the parking lot of
the Days Inn?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: As we pulled in the parking lot, we noticed a, a
white Jeep Cherokee parked on the lot occupied later identified by the
Defendant. He was utilizing his cell phone backed into a parking spot, so
we took up a position where we could maintain surveillance on this vehicle.
***
STATE: And how long did you watch the Defendant’s vehicle for?
4
Detective Young’s first name is not in the record.
-4-
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Approximately two minutes when we observed a
second vehicle, a Lexus, back into a parking spot, he actually backed in
catty-corner, taking up two parking spots next to the Jeep Cherokee.
***
DETECTIVE MELNYK: The driver of the Lexus exited his vehicle,
approached the Jeep Cherokee and got into the passenger side of the Jeep
Cherokee, leaving his vehicle parked like I explained in two parking spots.
STATE: Does this type of behavior have any type of significance to you?
***
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Through, through my, I’ve taken a forty hour
basic narcotic investigator class as well as a weeklong class in the Academy
for drug identification and characteristics of people that are involved in the
distribution of illegal narcotics, often times nowadays people utilize
vehicles to conceal the transactions from law enforcement as well as the
hotel that they’re at –
***
DETECTIVE MELNYK: They use the hotel to conceal the identity of their
home address. So with the Defendant in his vehicle, as well as the Lexus
pulling in and the driver of the Lexus getting out of his vehicle into the
Defendant’s vehicle, as well as the area that they’re in, it’s a known high
drug area, they did not utilize any services of the Days Inn, which is where
they were parked. We believed that there was illegal drug activity taking
place, or criminal activity at that matter.
Detective Melnyk further related that after waiting a short period of time to see if any
further activity occurred, he and Detective Young approached the Jeep, identified
themselves as police officers and removed its occupants:
DETECTIVE MELNYK: We waited a brief period to, to see if there was
going to be any activity farther and there wasn’t. At that point, we drove
our vehicle, identified ourself as police, approached the vehicle and
detained both occupants inside the white Jeep Cherokee.
-5-
STATE: And why did you detain those two subjects?
***
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Based on the reasonable suspicion that they were
involved in illegal activity based on the totality of the circumstances, the
location, the lack of activity involving the hotel room and the way they
were parked, as well as the mannerisms that, from the driver entering the
Grand Cherokee from the Lexus.
On cross-examination, Detective Melnyk testified in more detail about the furtive
movements of the driver in reaching under his seat and putting his hand in his pocket
which precipitated the removal of the driver, who turned out to be Chase, and his
companion from the Jeep Cherokee and handcuffing them:
MR. CARDIN: All right. Now, when you say they were detained, they
were handcuffed?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Yes.
MR. CARDIN: All right.
DETECTIVE MELNYK: The reason we take them out of the vehicle, Your
Honor, is to prevent them from accessing any sort of weapons that could
harm us. . . . They were, they were asked to step from the vehicle at which
point we placed them in handcuffs.
MR. CARDIN: I see.
***
STATE: Why did you place them in handcuffs prior to the K-9 alerting for
probable cause?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: We noticed, as we were approaching the vehicle,
the driver specifically, as well as the passenger, they were moving, looks
like they were moving things around there, reaching under the seat. The
passenger immediately put his hands in his pocket. At that point, for the
safety of myself and Detective Young, they were requested to exit the
vehicle and we put them in handcuffs just to make sure they didn’t have
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any weapons and detaining them. They were not free to leave. The, the
reason for the handcuffs were solely based on the safety of everybody
involved, based on the furtive movements that we observed inside the
vehicle as we were approaching the vehicle.
Detective Melnyk continued his testimony, recounting the differing stories given by
Chase and the other man and the detectives’ decision to request that a K-9 unit come to
the location:
STATE: And starting with the individual who got out of his Lexus and into
Mr. Chase’s car, this Defendant’s car, what, if anything, did he tell you
about what was going on there?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: He advised that he was meeting Phil and that him
and Phil were going to a hotel room to watch the Oriole game.
STATE: And did you speak to Mr. Chase?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: I did.
STATE: And what did Mr. Chase advise?
***
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Mr. Chase advised that he was going to meet his
cousin and attend the Maryland Live Casino.
***
STATE: Can you explain to the Court Mr. Chase’s demeanor while you
were speaking with him?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: He was, he was very irate with the police
presence. He claimed that he had done nothing wrong and I explained to
him our observations which caused us to maintain the detention of the
Defendant.
STATE: So with the maintained detention and now these two different
stories, what, if anything, did you do?
-7-
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Based on reasonable suspicion, I notified via my
police radio dispatch to start a K-9 to our location to further the
investigation.
Officer Bernardo Tubaya of the Baltimore City Police K-9 Unit also testified. He
recounted that he was dispatched to the motel parking lot at 6:52 pm and arrived
approximately eight minutes later. He also related that the police dog alerted to the
presence of narcotics during the “sniff” of the Jeep Cherokee:
STATE: And what type of response, if any, did your dog give for [the Jeep
Cherokee]?
OFFICER TUBAYA: When he scanned the vehicle, he gave me indicators
and he alerted to the passenger side door.
STATE: Okay and how does your dog alert?
OFFICER TUBAYA: He, his breathing pattern changes, he stops, he looks
at the door and he gives me a sit alert, in which he sits and looks at the
door.
STATE: Okay and he did all those things in this case?
OFFICER TUBAYA: Yes.
Detective Melnyk related that he subsequently performed a search incident to arrest, after
the police dog had alerted, which produced a motel room key:
STATE: And when the K-9 officer arrived, did you explain to him what
was going on at the scene?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: I did. . . .
STATE: And did he use his dog?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: He did use his dog.
STATE: And did his dog alert on either one of the vehicles?
-8-
DETECTIVE MELNYK: His dog alerted on the Jeep Cherokee.
STATE: And the Jeep Cherokee belonged to which Defendant?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: Defendant Chase.
STATE: Okay. When the dog alerted, what, if anything, did you and your
partner do?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: We initially questioned the Defendant for illegal
substances within his vehicle. At that point, he began to ignore our, our
requests and stop talking to us, which at that point, it became an arrest.
STATE: And did you search the Defendant incident to that arrest?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: I did.
STATE: And what, if anything, did you find?
DETECTIVE MELNYK: We found some currency as well as a room key
for the Days Inn.
Detective Melnyk related that he and Detective Young then applied for and
obtained a search warrant for the room associated with the key found during the search of
Chase’s person; the subsequent search of the room uncovered 138 grams of cocaine and
narcotics paraphernalia.
Chase contends that he was subject to an unlawful arrest when he had been
removed from the Jeep and handcuffed without the officers having a reasonable suspicion
that he possessed a weapon, citing a footnote in Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 101, 821
A.2d 372, 381–82 (2003), in which we acknowledged that, “[w]eapons and guns are
widely known to be used in narcotics trafficking,” but that “[w]hile this may be a factor
in a totality determination of whether the officers possessed the requisite reasonable
suspicion to fear for their safety, this, merely coupled with evidence of drug trafficking,
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normally will not be the determinative factor.” Id. at n.4, 821 A.2d at 381–82 n.4. Chase
asserts that Detective Melnyk offered no particularized facts in his testimony to support a
belief that he was armed and dangerous and, therefore, lacked the reasonable suspicion
necessary to lawfully detain him.
The State argues, conversely, the totality of the circumstances supported the
officers’ actions, as Detectives Melnyk and Young were patrolling an area known for
illegal narcotic activity, observed Chase and his associate engaging in behavior indicative
of illegal drug activity and observed movements by Chase and his companion that raised
concern regarding the possibility that the individuals were armed, thereby compromising
the safety of the officers. Thus, according to the State, Detective Melnyk articulated
particular facts to support his having placed handcuffs on Chase.
Under the Fourth Amendment, “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1884–85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968), the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the investigatory detention and frisk of an individual for weapons
was violative of the Fourth Amendment.
In Terry, a lone police officer, McFadden, observed two men, including Terry,
pacing back and forth in front of a store. Based upon his experience, McFadden suspected
that the men were “casing a job, a stick-up” and, when a third man arrived, intervened.
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Id. at 6–7, 88 S.Ct. at 1872, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 897. Dissatisfied with their answer to his
request for their names and concerned that the men may have been armed, McFadden
patted-down the exterior of their clothing, feeling for a gun. Id. at 7, 88 S.Ct. at 1872, 20
L. Ed. 2d at 897. He recovered a gun from the pocket of the overcoat of one of the men,
later identified as Terry, as well as another gun from the pocket of one of the other men’s
coats. Id.
The Supreme Court determined that McFadden’s actions in stopping Terry and
frisking him for the presence of weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment based
upon the officer’s belief that Terry was armed and dangerous. In so doing, the Court
balanced officer and public safety against the individual’s right against intrusion:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of
case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.
Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909. The Court iterated, however, that the
officer’s reasonable belief that the person is armed must be based on more than an
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27,
88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909.
Almost a decade later, the Court reiterated in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977), that officer safety could justify a Terry stop
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and frisk. In Mimms, two police officers on patrol spotted a vehicle bearing an expired
license plate and stopped the car. 434 U.S. at 107, 98 S.Ct. at 331, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 334. As
Mimms, responding to a request from one of the officers, stepped out of the car, one of
the officers noticed a “bulge” under Mimms’s jacket. Id. Concerned that the bulge could
be a gun, the officer frisked Mimms and recovered a loaded .38 caliber gun from
Mimms’s waistband. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Mimms’s conviction
for carrying a concealed weapon and for the unlawful possession of a firearm without a
license on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the rationale of Terry, which
justified the police ordering Mimms out of the car, once he had been lawfully detained.
Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 335–36. The Court stressed that the safety of the
officers was of paramount concern:
We think it too plain for argument that the State's proffered justification—
the safety of the officer—is both legitimate and weighty. “Certainly it
would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks
in the performance of their duties.” Terry v. Ohio, supra. And we have
specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile.
Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336. The Court iterated that the request by the
officer that Mimms step out of the car was de minimis, and “at most a mere
inconvenience [that] cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concern for the
officer’s safety.” Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337.
Following Terry and Mimms, we have had a number of occasions to refine our
jurisprudence regarding what is reasonable suspicion and the level of particularization
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necessary to warrant a Terry stop. In Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 970 A.2d 894 (2009),
we articulated that which constitutes an officer’s reasonable suspicion under a “totality of
the circumstances”:
There is no standardized test governing what constitutes reasonable
suspicion. . . . First, reasonable suspicion is a “ ‘common sense,
nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily
life and how reasonable and prudent people act.’ ” While the level of
required suspicion is less than that required by the probable cause standard,
reasonable suspicion nevertheless embraces something more than an
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ”
Second, a court's determination of whether a law enforcement officer acted
with reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, “the court must ... not parse out each individual
circumstance for separate consideration.”. . . In making its assessment, the
court should give due deference to the training and experience of the law
enforcement officer who engaged the stop at issue. Such deference “allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available
to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” To be sure, “[a]
factor that, by itself, may be entirely neutral and innocent, can, when
viewed in combination with other circumstances, raise a legitimate
suspicion in the mind of an experienced officer.”
Third, the reasonable suspicion standard carries limitations; it “ ‘does not
allow [a] law enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct
was suspicious to him or her.’ ” Rather, the officer must explain how the
observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other
circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of criminal activity. As
this Court observed previously, we shall not “ ‘rubber stamp’ conduct
simply because the officer believed he had the right to engage in it.” In
other words, there must be an “articulated logic to which this Court can
defer.”
408 Md. at 507–09, 970 A.2d at 903–04 (internal citations omitted).
We have explored the level of particularization needed to justify a Terry stop
when based on officer and public safety on a number of occasions, most notably in
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Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 572 A.2d 1086 (1990); Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582,
611 A.2d 592 (1992); State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 693 A.2d 749 (1997); Dashiell v.
State, 374 Md. 85, 821 A.2d 372 (2003); Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 816 A.2d 901
(2003); Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (2005); Williamson v. State, 398 Md.
489, 921 A.2d 221 (2007); and Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 924 A.2d 1129 (2007).
In Quince v. State, a police officer responded to a call over the radio that an armed
black man, accompanied by a black female, had been seen in “the lower dining room” at
Towson State University. The manager of the dining hall had reported that the man with
the gun seen “wandering about the dining hall” was a former employee who had picked
up his last pay check. Co-workers of the employee indicated that he “always carried a
firearm.”
The officer, thereafter, spotted Quince, who matched the description of the armed
man, standing with a black female at a bus stop. After confirming that Quince met the
description received over the police radio, the officer approached Quince and asked if he
had a gun, to which Quince responded in the negative. A pat-down of Quince, however,
revealed a .357 magnum pistol in his waistband.
We noted the Supreme Court’s emphasis on public safety as it related to a Terry
stop,
. . . the Supreme Court has made it clear that strong concerns for public
safety and for effective crime prevention and detection clearly justify the
application of Terry principles where there exists reasonable suspicion of
ongoing or imminent criminal activity.
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319 Md. at 434, 572 A.2d at 1088, and concluded that the officer had reasonable
suspicion that Quince was unlawfully carrying a weapon, based on the information
provided by the dining hall manager; the report of a man with a gun in a public place also
raised concerns for public safety:
The need for urgent action was apparent. A report of a man with a gun in
any public place is a serious matter. The additional information that the
subject was a former employee, present to pick up his final check, and was
“wandering about the dining hall,” did nothing to assuage legitimate
concerns.
Id. at 435, 572 A.2d at 1088. Clearly, we determined, the officer possessed a reasonable
suspicion that Quince was armed:
The record reflects that the information was conveyed to the police in such
a manner that the fact that former employees had reported that Quince
“always” carries a gun was reasonably understood by the police to be
supplemental to and in confirmation of the initial report that Quince had a
gun in the dining hall. Officer Garland was emphatic that the initial
dispatch to him was that a man with a gun was in the lower dining room,
and in a later transmission he was warned that former co-employees were
saying that this man “always carried a firearm.” He testified:
I followed my instructions of the dispatcher. The first call I received
was that the defendant was armed, was a man with a gun, that was my
first response. All other information that came over was just more
substantial, more to make sure that I would protect myself.
Id. at 436–37, 572 A.2d at 1089.
In Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 611 A.2d 592 (1992), Corporal Thomas of the
Maryland State Police observed, through his stationary radar operation, a brown sports
car driving 89 miles per hour on Interstate 270. Corporal Thomas pursued the car, which
he pulled over into the highway median strip without incident. The driver, later identified
as Derricott, complied with Corporal Thomas’s instruction to furnish his permit and
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registration. Derricott did so without hesitation or nervousness. Corporal Thomas, who
stood beside the driver’s door, testified that he noticed several indicia of a “drug courier”
profile. Corporal Thomas’s check of the permit and registration indicated both were
valid, the car had not been reported stolen and no warrants had been issued against
Derricott.
Corporal Thomas, however, requested a back-up officer and “drug dog” for the
purpose of conducting a “sniff.” When the back-up officer arrived, Corporal Thomas
ordered Derricott, who had been sitting in the car and had not exhibited any suspicious
behavior, to get out of the car, after which he conducted a pat-down search of Derricott
for weapons; no weapons were found. Corporal Thomas then approached the open
driver’s door of the car and looked inside whereupon he observed a cellophane bag
containing smaller glassine bags containing a substance he thought was cocaine. Derricott
was, thereafter, convicted of possession of a dangerous substance with the intent to
distribute and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
We reversed Derricott’s conviction, noting that, “It is only when the circumstances
also support the articulable suspicion that the person detained is armed and dangerous
that the frisk of outer garments and the limited search of a passenger compartment may
be authorized.” 327 Md. at 588, 611 A.2d at 595. Evaluating the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether a reasonable officer in a similar situation would have
believed his or another’s safety was being compromised, we stated:
By Corporal Thomas’ own testimony, the only facts which contributed to
his decision to search Derricott and his vehicle were those that
corresponded to the drug courier profile. No other behavior aroused
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Corporal Thomas’ suspicion; nothing else suggested to the trooper that he
was engaged in more than a routine traffic stop.
Id. at 588, 611 A.2d at 596. We were not, then, persuaded that Corporal Thomas
possessed a reasonable suspicion that Derricott was armed and dangerous, as required by
Terry.
In State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 693 A.2d 749 (1997), a Baltimore Police Officer,
responding to a report that individuals were selling drugs and discharging firearms at a
corner in Baltimore, observed Smith tuck something into his waistband as the group of
men he was standing with dispersed. Believing that Smith was sticking a gun into the
waist of his pants, the officer stopped Smith. After detaining Smith, the officer conducted
a frisk of his person for weapons and, finding nothing, pulled Smith’s shirt out of his
pants, which caused a small plastic bag containing cocaine to fall out. Smith moved to
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and
frisk him. Although the trial court denied the motion, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed and held that while the initial pat-down was proper, the pulling out of Smith’s
shirt was not.
We affirmed, noting that, “The purpose of a Terry frisk is not to discover
evidence, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from harm.” 345 Md. at
465, 693 A.2d at 751. The intrusion, we noted, should have been reasonably designed to
discover readily available items that could have been used to harm, because “the proper
balance between the sometimes competing interests of the police officer and the
individual requires that the police officer employ the least intrusive means of discovering
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and neutralizing any concealed weapons.” Id. at 468, 693 A.2d at 753. We determined
that the initial stop and frisk of Smith was justified under Terry:
Officer White had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Smith was armed
and dangerous, and thus was entitled to engage in a minimally intrusive
frisk for concealed weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–24, 88 S.Ct. at
1880–81, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906–07. Upon encountering Smith, Officer White
conducted a pat-down of Smith's exterior clothing. This initial frisk was
clearly proper.
Id. at 469, 693 A.2d at 753.
In Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 821 A.2d 372 (2003), Rashida Dashiell, who was
present in the home to be searched pursuant to a warrant, was handcuffed and frisked,
although she was not named in the warrant. The search warrant contained specific
information, obtained from informants, stating that narcotics and several guns were inside
the home. As a result of the frisk, a plastic bag removed from Dashiell’s pocket contained
what she described as “dope.” Dashiell was placed under arrest; a subsequent search
uncovered crack cocaine and marijuana in Dashiell’s possession.
In refuting Dashiell’s allegation that her initial detention was unlawful because she
had not been named in the warrant and the police had no basis to stop her, we stated:
The objective reasonable suspicion standard is considerably less than the
preponderance or probable cause standards. While absolute certainty is not
required, a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion will not suffice. [We]
[have] said that reasonable suspicion “is a common sense, nontechnical
conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how
reasonable and prudent people act.” Determinations of whether a
particularized reasonable suspicion exists should be analyzed under the
totality of the circumstances.
374 Md. at 97, 821 A.2d at 379. We held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
police held a reasonable belief that Dashiell could have been armed and dangerous as the
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result of particularized facts contained in the application for the search warrant; including
reference to drug trafficking at the house as well as particularized information that guns
were located in the house where Dashiell was present.
It is true though, as Chase argues, that in Dashiell v. State, we iterated in a
footnote that the officers’s training and experience that persons involved with drug
trafficking carry weapons would not normally, alone, provide the necessary reasonable
suspicion to support an investigatory frisk:
While this may be a factor in a totality determination of whether the
officers possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to fear for their safety,
this, merely coupled with evidence of drug trafficking, normally will not be
the determinative factor. Generally, this factor by itself would amount to
nothing more than a “hunch” as described in Terry.
374 Md. at 101 n.4, 821 A.2d at 381–82 n.4. We, however, in Dashiell, relied on the facts
in the search warrant that particularized the presence of weapons and drugs in the home.
In Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 816 A.2d 901 (2003), Deshawn Ransome was on
the sidewalk with another man in an area of Baltimore City that had had numerous
reports of narcotics activity and loitering. Three police officers on patrol in an unmarked
car spotted the pair and, although the officers did not observe Ransome doing anything
out of the ordinary, approached. Ransome turned to look at the car as it came to a stop.
One officer, Officer Moro, regarded Ransome suspiciously and noticed a bulge in one of
Ransome’s pockets. The officer, who was not in uniform, approached Ransome, asked
him several questions and then conducted a pat down. The frisk revealed a bag of
marijuana in Ransome’s waist area, but the officer did not investigate the bulge that had
drawn his attention initially. The officer placed Ransome under arrest and, after an
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additional search, recovered ziplock bags, some cocaine, and a roll of cash which
constituted the bulge.
Ransome moved to suppress the evidence taken from his person. His motion was
denied, and Ransome was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
We reversed our intermediate appellate court, holding that the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to support the stop and frisk of Ransome. Our conclusion was based
on the officer’s lack of particularized facts to support a belief that Ransome was armed
and dangerous:
Officer Moro never explained why he thought that petitioner's stopping to
look at his unmarked car as it slowed down was suspicious or why
petitioner's later nervousness or loss of eye contact, as two police officers
accosted him on the street, was suspicious. As noted, Terry requires the
officer to point to “specific and articulable facts” justifying his conduct.
Unlike the defendants in the cited cases, or indeed in Terry, petitioner had
done nothing to attract police attention other than being on the street with a
bulge in his pocket at the same time Officer Moro drove by. He had not
committed any obvious offense, he was not lurking behind a residence or
found on a day care center porch late at night, was not without
identification, was not a known criminal or in company with one, was not
reaching for the bulge in his pocket or engaging in any other threatening
conduct, did not take evasive action or attempt to flee, and the officer was
not alone to face him.
373 Md. at 109–10, 816 A.2d at 907.
In Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (2005), a lengthy four-year
investigation into an alleged open-air drug market resulted in the issuance of a warrant to
search a residence, outbuildings and vehicles located on the property. Although only
three individuals were named in the warrant, it averred that other persons with violent
criminal histories could have been present. When police executed the warrant and began
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to search the property, Steven Cotton was present, was detained, as well as handcuffed by
the police. Cotton remained handcuffed and was left to sit on a log for ten minutes while
the house was secured before an officer approached and gave him his Miranda warnings,
at which point Cotton stated that he possessed marijuana.
Cotton moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that he was merely a
bystander and that the police had no probable cause to believe he was involved in any
criminal activity and, therefore, his detention was an unlawful arrest. We noted that the
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones. In
that particular case, the presence of individuals at a location where a warrant was issued
presented concern for safety:
[I]n executing a warrant such as that issued here, for a premises known to
be an open-air drug market where the police are likely to encounter people
who may well be dangerous, they are entitled, for their own safety and that
of other persons, to take command of the situation and, except for persons
who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and who clearly
present no potential danger, essentially immobilize everyone until, acting
with reasonable expedition, they know what they are confronting. It really
cannot be otherwise. The police do not know who may be at the scene
when they arrive. The people they find there, in or on the property to be
searched, are not wearing identifying labels—supplier, customer, processor,
bodyguard, innocent bystander. It would be decidedly unreasonable to
expect the police simply to give a friendly greeting to the folks there and
proceed to search the house without another thought as to who those people
are or what they may do.
386 Md. at 258–59, 872 A.2d at 92–93. We held, therefore, that the fact that Cotton was
placed in handcuffs, guarded and given his Miranda warnings did not establish a de facto
arrest:
In summary, Cotton's reliance on the facts that he was handcuffed, placed
under guard, and given Miranda warnings as establishing that he was de
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facto arrested either upon his initial detention or after fifteen to twenty
minutes of it finds no substantial support in either Federal or this Court's
current jurisprudence. Acceptance of that view would place both police
officers and innocent bystanders at considerable risk.
Id. at 267, 872 A.2d at 97. Rather, the officers’s concern for their safety as well as the
safety of the public permitted the initial and continued detention.
In Williamson v. State, 398 Md. 489, 921 A.2d 221 (2007), Williamson was
detained a short distance away from a house being searched pursuant to a warrant and
returned to the house; the issue was whether he had been subject to a valid Terry stop.
Williamson had been seen leaving the house and was 20 to 30 feet away when he was
detained by the police, placed in handcuffs and brought back to the house. Subsequently,
Williamson was questioned and indicated to the officer that drugs were located in the
house. A search of the home uncovered cocaine and other drug paraphernalia.
Williamson sought to suppress the evidence and statements he had made to the officer,
arguing his detention was an arrest unsupported by probable cause.
We determined, however, that the detention and return of an occupant who was 20
to 30 feet away from a house during the execution of a search warrant was not an arrest.
The justification for the detention and return of Williamson to the house was his
proximity to the house and concern for officer safety, for, as we stated, “courts . . . have
evaluated off-premises detentions of occupants based upon their proximity to the location
to be searched taking into consideration the law enforcement interests that were
articulated to justify the detention.” 398 Md. at 511, 921 A.2d at 234. Importantly, the
testimony had been adduced that Williamson was “just handcuffed for our safety” and
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that he was a known occupant of the house for which the search warrant had been
obtained. Thus, “[b]ecause the police, to promote officer safety, detained Williamson
immediately after he left the house, before he entered his car and drove away, police were
justified in detaining him and bringing him back into the house during the search.” Id.
Finally, in Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 924 A.2d 1129 (2007), we held that
police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. After a confidential
informant had provided information to police officers, they then observed Longshore
meeting with people in a mall parking lot for several minutes. Longshore was later
stopped by police as he was driving out of the mall. The officers removed Longshore
from his vehicle and placed him in handcuffs while awaiting the arrival of a K-9 unit,
having suspected drug activity was afoot. Two minutes later, the drug dog arrived and
alerted to the presence of drugs in the center ceiling console area of the vehicle.
A search of the vehicle revealed a pill bottle containing crack cocaine in the center
ceiling console, and Longshore later was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. He moved to suppress the narcotics. Longshore’s motion was denied, and he
was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
We reversed, emphasizing that while the officers believed Longshore possessed
drugs, they did not have any particularized facts to believe that Longshore was armed or
dangerous or that the officers were concerned with their safety:
The arresting officer acknowledged that, despite Longshore’s nervousness,
he was cooperative and did not exhibit any threatening behavior. The
officers did not indicate that they were, in any way, concerned for their
safety.
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Id. at 514, 924 A.2d at 1145. The totality of the circumstances, then, did not support
Longshore’s detention under Terry, because concern for officer safety was not evident.
In the present case, we determine that the police officers possessed reasonable
suspicion to stop Chase and ask him to leave the Jeep, based upon their belief that Chase
may have been armed and dangerous. Detectives Melnyk and Young had observed
behavior by Chase and his companion in the Jeep consistent with the hiding of illegal
drugs as well as “furtive” movements that suggested weapons could have been secreted
in the vehicle. We, again, emphasize concern for officer safety when weapons may be
present may overcome concern about a limited Terry intrusion, such as asking Chase to
get out of the Jeep.
Chase, however, also argues that even were there to have been reasonable
suspicion to support his being asked by the officers to get out of the Jeep, his having been
placed in handcuffs converted his detention from an investigatory stop into an arrest that
required probable cause. Further, Chase asserts that his continued restraint in handcuffs
amounted to an arrest after an unfruitful frisk of his person was completed.
The State argues, conversely, that the use of handcuffs did not elevate Chase’s
detention to an arrest, because the officers’s concern for safety had not dissipated because
the Jeep had not been searched for weapons. Releasing Chase from the handcuffs, the
State asserts, could have provided Chase the opportunity to get a weapon.
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While it is true that continued detention, once begun validly under Terry, can
transform into an arrest, Longshore v. State, 399 Md. at 486, 924 A.2d at 1129,5 it is also
true that the detention may remain a Terry stop, if officer safety is an issue. In re David
S., 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 (2002).
In Longshore, supra, we recognized that, absent any special circumstances to
justify the use of handcuffs by the police, such action transformed a Terry stop into an
arrest:
. . . [W]e hold that Longshore was arrested when he was asked to step out
of the car and placed in handcuffs, and that no special circumstances
existed that justified the police officers placing him in handcuffs. The
officers conceded that he was stopped because they believed him to possess
drugs. Unlike the circumstances in In re David S., there was no suspicion
that a violent crime had occurred, nor any reason to believe that Longshore
was armed or dangerous. The arresting officer acknowledged that, despite
Longshore’s nervousness, he was cooperative and did not exhibit any
threatening behavior. The officers did not indicate that they were, in any
way, concerned for their safety. Moreover, there was no reason to believe
that Longshore was a flight risk. There was no indication by the police that
they believed, nor any objective basis for concluding, that Longshore would
run.
399 Md. at 514, 924 A.2d at 1145.
In the present case, Chase relies on our decision in Longshore, arguing that
Detective Melnyk did not have reasonable suspicion that Chase was armed or that he
represented a flight risk and, therefore, was unjustified in his use of handcuffs. Chase’s
reliance on Longshore, however, is misplaced. In that case, the officers presented no
5
Chase also argues that our decision in Reid v. State, 428 Md. 289, 51 A.3d 597 (2012),
supports his argument. Reid is inapposite, however, because use of a Taser gun with
metal darts on Reid transformed the stop into a de facto arrest.
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particularized observations nor did they indicate a belief that Longshore was armed,
dangerous or that they were concerned with their safety. Under those circumstances, we
held that the officers had no justification for placing Longshore in handcuffs. The instant
case differs significantly from Longshore in that Detective Melnyk testified that the
“reason for the handcuffs were solely based on the safety of everybody involved, based
on the furtive movements that we observed inside the vehicle as we were approaching the
vehicle.”
The difference between Longshore and the instant case is significant because we
have recognized that fear for officer and public safety can justify a continued detention
by police. In In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 (2002), a police officer saw one
of the participants in a drug transaction run away and, moments later, meet with David S.
David S. then walked behind a building, reemerged displaying an object to another
person, which David S. then tucked into his waistband; the officer believed the object to
be a gun. The officer then chased David S., forced him to the ground, and handcuffed
David S; cocaine was seized from David S.’s waistband.
After David S. was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals had affirmed, we
determined that the officer, based on the conduct he observed, had reasonable suspicion
to believe that criminal activity was afoot and that David S. had a gun in his waistband.
We opined that the use of handcuffs did not automatically elevate the investigatory Terry
stop of David S. into an arrest as the officer possessed a reasonable belief that a threat to
his safety existed.
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One of our sister state courts also has had the opportunity to address the use of
handcuffs during a Terry stop. In State v. Wells, 859 N.W.2d 316 (Neb. 2015), the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the use of handcuffs during a Terry stop did not
elevate a detention into an arrest. 859 N.W.2d at 316. In that case, two plain clothes
officers in an unmarked car observed Wells’s car in a parking lot known to be an
“epicenter of narcotics”. Id. at 322. Several people were observed to approach the
driver’s side window, stay momentarily and then leave, behavior consistent with the sale
of narcotics. Id. at 323.
Wells was then seen flagging down a car and walking over to the car after it pulled
into a parking lot. The officers entered the parking lot and approached Wells’s car with
their badges and firearms visible. As one officer approached the rear passenger door, he
observed Wells “digging into [his] right pocket” and holding his arm under his jacket. Id.
The officer “testified that he ‘was very concerned [Wells] was either retrieving or hiding
a weapon, or hiding narcotics on his person[,]’ ” removed Wells from the car and placed
him in handcuffs. Id. A pat-down uncovered a baggie in the coin pocket of Wells’s pants,
which the officer suspected contained drugs. Id. at 323–24.
The court recognized that the use of handcuffs was appropriate when it was
“reasonably necessary to protect officer safety during an investigative stop[,]” id. at 326
and so held:
The record indicates that Cronin detained Wells in a reasonable manner
under the circumstances, which stopped short of a full custodial arrest.
Cronin had a strong suspicion Wells was in possession of a controlled
substance. As Cronin approached the car, he witnessed Wells appear to be
digging into his pocket, and when Cronin arrived at the car, Wells’ right
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arm was concealed underneath his jacket. The nature of Wells' suspected
crime, trafficking narcotics, further justified Cronin’s action. In Cronin’s
past experience as a member of the Lincoln/Lancaster County drug task
force, he knew that narcotics users and traffickers often carry weapons. . . .
Based on Wells' furtive movements and his apparent attempt to conceal
something, Cronin had an immediate need for action. It does not appear that
Cronin could have made the stop and, at the same time, ensured his safety
in a less threatening manner. Finally, we note that Wells was detained only
for a brief period of time before he allegedly assaulted Cronin and was
placed under arrest.
Id. at 328.
We agree with the Nebraska Supreme Court, based upon our jurisprudence, that
the use of handcuffs per se does not ordinarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest.
Chase, however, relies on Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1992), for
the proposition that the continued use of handcuffs after a frisk of an individual fails to
reveal any weapons elevates a Terry stop into an arrest. Chase’s reliance on Reynolds v.
State is unavailing. In that case, pursuant to a tip from a confidential informant regarding
an area known for high sale and consumption of drugs, police officers spotted a car
believed to have been involved with drug trafficking and followed it to a gas station.
Three officers intercepted Reynolds when he emerged from the car and one placed him in
handcuffs. After a pat-down failed to reveal any weapons, Reynolds remained handcuffed
and twice consented to be searched, which revealed two bags suspected to contain
marijuana. Id. at 1084. The trial court denied Reynolds’s motion to suppress.
Reviewing the denial of the motion to suppress, the Supreme Court of Florida
noted that the use of handcuffs during an investigatory Terry stop had been upheld,
generally, where the use of the handcuffs was reasonably necessary to protect the
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officer’s safety or to prevent the suspect from fleeing. Id. at 1084. The action of
handcuffing, therefore, “depends on whether it is a reasonable response to the demands of
the situation.” Id. at 1085. The court determined that the initial handcuffing of Reynolds
was permitted, but that continued use was unlawful because the officers had no reason to
believe that weapons were present:
Although we find that the initial handcuffing of Reynolds was appropriate,
we find that the continued use of handcuffs after the pat-down was illegal.
At that point, the officers had no reason to believe that weapons were
present. According to the testimony of one of the officers, the suspects
offered no resistance, were not particularly belligerent, and did not make
any threats. Under these facts, the use of handcuffs after the pat-down was
not reasonably justified under the circumstances.
Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
To the contrary, in the present case the officers believed weapons may have been
present because of the actions, mannerisms and “furtive” movements of Chase and his
companion as the Detective approached the Jeep. Although no weapons were found on
Chase’s person after the frisk, the officers continued to fear that weapons were in the
Jeep. It was reasonable to detain Chase in handcuffs during the two minutes necessary to
search the car and during the K-9 search.
We hold, therefore, that the continued use of handcuffs by Detective Melnyk
constituted a Terry stop because of an ongoing concern for officer safety.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
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