Alexis v. State ( 2014 )


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  • Jamaal Garvin Alexis v. State of Maryland, No. 45, September Term, 2013
    CRIMINAL LAW — SIXTH AMENDMENT — RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
    CHOICE — DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL: Although a criminal defendant is
    afforded a presumption in favor of his or her counsel of choice under the Sixth
    Amendment, this right is qualified in many important respects. In deciding whether to
    disqualify a criminal defendant’s selection of counsel due to a conflict of interest, a trial
    court is afforded wide discretion. In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
    matter and made evidentiary-based findings that the interests of fairness and maintenance
    of ethical standards outweighed the defendant’s right to counsel of choice due to a
    conflict of interest arising from the chosen counsel’s prior representation of one of the
    State’s material witnesses. Such an exercise of discretion was not so far beyond the
    fringe of the court’s discretionary range as to require reversal.
    CRIMINAL LAW — RULE OF LENITY — SENTENCING MERGER —
    SOLICITATIONS: Petitioner was convicted of violating Criminal Law Article § 9-302
    (solicitation for the purpose of preventing future testimony) and § 9-303 (solicitation for
    the purpose of retaliating for prior testimony). Both statutes have a subsection that
    precludes merging the sentence for that offense with a contemporary other sentence for
    conviction of “any crime.” Thus, because the plain language of the statutes indicates
    explicitly that the General Assembly did not intend the sentences to merge, the rule of
    lenity was inapplicable.
    CRIMINAL LAW — “FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS” — SENTENCING
    MERGER — SOLICITATIONS: Because the plain language of Criminal Law Article
    §§ 9-302(d) and 9-303(d) indicated that the General Assembly did not intend the
    sentences to merge with a contemporaneous conviction for any other crime, the principle
    of “fundamental fairness” that, at times, require merger of sentences in cases where the
    rule of lenity and the doctrine of merger are inapplicable, does not apply.
    Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
    Case Nos. CT08-0504X; CT09-1040B
    Argued: 10 January 2014
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
    MARYLAND
    No. 45
    September Term, 2013
    JAMAAL GARVIN ALEXIS
    v.
    STATE OF MARYLAND
    Barbera, C.J.,
    Harrell,
    Battaglia,
    Greene,
    Adkins,
    McDonald,
    Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
    Specially Assigned),
    JJ.
    Opinion by Harrell, J.
    Filed: March 24, 2014
    Following a sixteen-day trial (4 – 29 October 2010) of consolidated cases, a jury
    in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County convicted Petitioner, Jamaal Garvin
    Alexis (“Alexis”), in the first case (CT08-0504X), of second-degree murder and robbery
    with a dangerous weapon of Raymond Brown, use of a handgun in the commission of a
    crime of violence, common law conspiracy to commit theft over $500, and two counts of
    theft over $500.    In the second case (CT09-1040B), the jury convicted Alexis of
    solicitation to obstruct justice by preventing Bobby Ennels, a purported witness to the
    murder of Brown in the first case, from testifying at trial in that case, and solicitation to
    obstruct justice by retaliating against Ennels for his prior testimony before the grand jury
    in the first case. On 14 December 2010, Alexis was sentenced to a total of one hundred
    and forty years of incarceration, twenty of which was for the first solicitation conviction
    and another twenty of which was for the second solicitation conviction.
    The cases were consolidated for appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which
    affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment. Alexis v. State, 
    209 Md. App. 630
    , 
    61 A.3d 104
    (2013). We shall affirm as well, holding first that the trial court exercised its discretion
    properly in disqualifying one of Alexis’s defense counsel, who had represented
    previously a key State’s witness in an unrelated and earlier criminal matter (which
    conflict of interest the witness refused to waive) and, second, that merger is precluded for
    convictions of the two counts of solicitation where the relevant statutes contained parallel
    anti-merger provisions.
    I.       PERTINENT FACTS
    A. The Background 1
    1. The murder of Raymond Brown and related crimes.
    On the morning of 13 October 2006, Danielle Steele Brown and her husband,
    Raymond Brown, were awakened by the raucous sound of Mr. Brown’s car alarm. From
    a window of their dwelling in the Largo area of Prince George’s County, Ms. Brown
    observed a tow truck towing away Mr. Brown’s car, a black Chrysler 300. The Browns,
    in an attempt to locate a sign in the community with the name of the company that
    occasionally towed cars parked illegally in the area, drove in Ms. Brown’s car to the
    entrance of their community, where they saw the tow truck with the Chrysler attached.
    According to Ms. Brown’s testimony at trial, Mr. Brown got out of the car and, as Mr.
    Brown approached the tow truck, a man standing next to the truck ran away. Gunfire
    came from the driver’s side of the tow truck. Mr. Brown fell to the ground, injured. The
    tow truck drove away with the Chrysler. Mr. Brown was taken to a local hospital where
    he died as a result of a gunshot wound to his chest.
    Later that day, law enforcement officers recovered the Chrysler, which had been
    abandoned (sans tires and with a broken door window on the driver’s side), as well as an
    abandoned, stolen Snatchman tow truck with a broken door window on the driver’s side
    as well. Inside the cabin of the tow truck, the officers found a cartridge casing. When
    1
    The “facts” we report are those borne out by the State’s presentation of the case
    and apparently believed by the jury. Alexis disputes much of these “facts.” For purposes
    of the arguments on appeal, however, the details of this dispute do not add value and,
    thus, are omitted.
    -2-
    the officers “dusted” the vehicles for fingerprints, they were able to “lift” a latent
    fingerprint belonging to Neiman Marcus Edmonds from the hood of the Chrysler.
    Corroborating Edmonds’s involvement in the events of October 13, approximately six
    months after the shooting, Ms. Brown identified Edmonds from a photographic array as
    the man who had been standing next to the tow truck on the night of her deceased
    husband’s shooting and ran.
    According to the testimonies of Edmonds and the other State’s witnesses at
    Alexis’s trial, Alexis had a history of stealing cars using a Snatchman tow truck 2 for the
    purpose of stripping the tires off the cars to sell the rims, and then abandoning the car.
    Some of these witnesses claimed that Alexis admitted to shooting and killing Brown.
    Edmonds testified that Alexis, Ennels, and he drove to Largo to steal a car in the late
    evening of 12 October 2006. Alexis drove a stolen Snatchman tow truck. Bobby Ennels
    drove his car, with Edmonds asleep in the back seat. Alexis backed the tow truck into the
    Browns’ driveway, put the forks under the Chrysler 300 (which had 22-inch rims), and
    picked it up. When Alexis picked up the Chrysler, the car’s alarm sounded. Alexis drove
    the truck (with the car attached) to the front of the community, where Ennels broke the
    Chrysler’s door window on the driver side and popped the hood so that Edmonds could
    disable the alarm.
    2
    Testimony at trial established that, with a Snatchman tow truck, a driver is able
    to attach to the tow truck (and take) another car by backing the truck up to the car, sliding
    the forks under the car, and driving the truck away with the car attached. This towing
    process permits the truck driver to tow the car away without getting out of the truck.
    -3-
    As Edmonds disabled the alarm, another car approached. When a man stepped out
    of the second car, Edmonds ran to Ennels’s car. Edmonds testified that, as he ran to the
    car, he heard a “slight pow” and glass breaking.      Ennels and Edmonds drove to a
    previously agreed upon meet-up location, where they found Alexis with the tow truck
    (with a newly broken window) and the Chrysler attached. Edmonds asked Alexis if the
    man in the second car shot at them; Alexis did not reply. The trio stripped the Chrysler
    of its tires, “wiped down” the car and the tow truck, and abandoned both vehicles. The
    next day, according to Edmonds’s testimony, Alexis, Edmonds, and Ennels were at the
    house of Brian Barnes (a mutual acquaintance) when Alexis told Edmonds that he shot
    Brown (the man in the second car) because he saw Brown get out of the car with
    something in his hand.
    On 27 March 2008, the State charged Petitioner, Jamaal Garvin Alexis, with
    murder, carjacking, and related crimes with respect to Brown.
    2. The murder of Bobby Ennels.
    Also, according to Edmonds’s testimony, Ennels was present at Barnes’s house on
    14 October 2006 during the conversation in which Alexis admitted to shooting Brown the
    previous day. According to Edmonds, this conversation led Ennels to “freak[] out,”
    which, in turn, caused Alexis to worry that Ennels might “snitch.” Edmonds asserted to
    Alexis that Ennels would not do that. Approximately one month later, Alexis asked
    Edmonds if he thought Alexis should kill Ennels if Ennels tried to snitch. Edmonds re-
    affirmed his confidence in Ennels. Nevertheless, Alexis suggested that Edmonds get
    -4-
    Ennels drunk one night and in a car, pull up to a stop light, and let Alexis “do the rest.”
    Edmonds refused.
    On 3 October 2008, Alexis, while detained at the Prince George’s County
    Detention Center, called Deaundrey Shropshire, who was raised with the Alexis family
    and was the current roommate of Alexis’s brother, Rashadd. Alexis asked him, “What’s
    going on with my M?” Shropshire responded, “You still haven’t told me what you want
    me to do with that [guy].” 3
    Three days later, on 6 October 2008, according to the State’s witness, Ms. Frances
    Lammons, Ennels, Anthony Cash, III, and Lammons drove to a location on Nalley Road
    in the County. Upon arrival, Ennels called someone and stated, “You all can come on
    down . . . .” Approximately two minutes later, two men approached the car. Lammons
    testified that one man was “brown skin[ned with a] short haircut,” and the second man
    was “brown skin[ned] with dreads.” According to Lammons, Ennels told the men, “You
    all don’t have to worry about nothing[;] It’s okay. It’s cool.” Whereupon, the man with
    the short haircut shot Ennels. Upon being shot, Ennels put the car into reverse and
    crashed into a tree. Lammons and Cash got out of the car and ran. Lammons was shot in
    the elbow while fleeing.
    Ennels was found dead in the driver’s seat of the car. Cash was found dead, as a
    result of gunshot wounds to the back, forearm, and knee, in the driveway of a nearby
    home at 406 Nalley Road. In a neighboring house at 404 Nalley Road, law enforcement
    3
    At trial, the State introduced an audiotape of this call.
    -5-
    officers found a black skull cap, which contained a mixed DNA profile.            Analysts
    determined later that Alexis’s brother, Rashadd Alexis, was the major contributor to the
    DNA on the skullcap.
    Officer Juan Nolasco testified that, on the morning of the Ennels-Cash murders,
    around 1:00 AM, he observed two vehicles speeding from the area of Nalley Road where
    the bodies of Ennels and Cash were found later. The Officer stopped one of the vehicles,
    a Buick Regal, registered to Shropshire. The driver of the stopped vehicle was Rashadd
    Alexis, who, according to Officer Nolasco, was very nervous and appeared to have blood
    on his shirt. Rashadd Alexis was released at that time, pursuant to an order from a
    detective at the scene of the shooting.     Shortly thereafter, while Lammons was in
    hospital, the Prince George’s County Police Department showed her a photographic
    array. She selected a picture of Barnes as someone who looked familiar to her and as a
    person that “resembled” a man present at the Nalley Road shootings. Lammons was
    shown a picture of Rashadd also, but could not identify or recognize him.
    As part of the investigation of Cash’s and Ennels’s murders, law enforcement
    officers discovered that the last call to Ennels’s cellular telephone before his murder was
    from a telephone number associated with a prepaid telephone purchased in Landover,
    approximately a mile from Rashadd Alexis’s house. Phone records disclosed that only
    thirteen telephone calls were made from this particular number. All thirteen calls were
    made to Ennels’s cellular telephone between 23 September 2008 and 7 October 2008, the
    day of Ennels’s murder. Additionally, law enforcement officers discovered that the calls
    -6-
    utilized cellular telephone towers located near Swan Terrace, where Rashadd Alexis’s
    and Petitioner’s aunt lived and a half mile from where Rashadd’s girlfriend lived.
    3.       Jalloh, the jailhouse informant.
    Amadu Sulamon Jalloh, an inmate with pending criminal charges, was
    incarcerated with Jamaal Alexis and Donnell Hunter (a/k/a “Fat Rat”) at the Prince
    George’s County Detention Center.        Jalloh informed his attorney that he overheard
    conversations between Alexis and Fat Rat regarding the murder of Brown and the
    potential killing of a witness. Jalloh’s attorney arranged a meeting between Jalloh and an
    Assistant State’s Attorney. According to Jalloh’s ultimate grand jury testimony, 4 Alexis
    confessed to him in jail that he murdered Brown. Moreover, Jalloh stated that, on one
    occasion, he heard Fat Rat tell Alexis that “the only way you can go home is to kill the
    witness.” Jalloh testified also that, at some point after Jalloh’s meeting with the Assistant
    State’s Attorney, Alexis told Jalloh that he was going home because “[his] brother got rid
    of the witness.” According to Jalloh, Alexis told him that three people had been shot:
    two men were killed and a girl was injured.
    On 30 July 2009, the State charged Alexis with the murder of Bobby Ennels, a
    purported witness to the Raymond Brown murder, as well as with attempted murder,
    conspiracy to commit murder, solicitation to obstruct justice by preventing Ennels’s
    future testimony, and solicitation to obstruct justice by retailiating against Ennels for his
    grand jury testimony.
    4
    When Jalloh refused to testify at trial, the trial judge permitted the State to read
    his grand jury testimony aloud to the jury.
    -7-
    B. Pre-Trial Events Relating to the Disqualification of Alexis’s Lead
    Defense Counsel.
    On 13 October 2006, when Petitioner was charged initially with the first degree
    murder of Raymond Brown, and related charges, attorney Luis J. Martucci represented
    Alexis. Subsequent to the indictment on 1 April 2008, an additional attorney, John
    McKenna, entered an appearance on behalf of Alexis. The case against Alexis was
    scheduled initially for a motions hearing on 1 July 2008 and for trial on 6 August 2008.
    After several continuances, Messrs. Martucci and McKenna withdrew the pending
    motions and the case was set for trial on 9 March 2009. On 18 December 2008, Harry
    Tun, Esquire, filed a Motion for Substitution of Counsel (replacing Martucci and
    McKenna), which the Circuit Court granted on 29 December 2008.                 Tun filed
    additionally a motion to continue the trial date to 13 April 2009, which the Circuit Court
    granted as well.
    Several months later, on 1 April 2009, the State filed a Motion to Strike the
    Appearance of Defense Counsel Tun. In their Memorandum of Law in support of their
    motion, the State explained that Jalloh was a material witness in its case because he
    agreed to testify about Alexis’s confession to murdering Brown and other related
    conversations. The State sought to strike the appearance of Tun as defense counsel for
    Alexis because of a conflict of interest arising from Tun’s prior representation of Jalloh
    with respect to charges pending against Jalloh in State of Maryland v. John Doe, aka
    Kamara Mohamed, CT07-2450X, in the Circuit Court (apparently Jalloh was known also
    as Kamara Mohamed).
    -8-
    To summarize the facts regarding this prior representation, as presented to the
    Circuit Court at the hearing on the motion to disqualify counsel, Tun’s representation of
    Jalloh against the then still pending charges of attempted murder and associated charges
    in a matter unrelated to the case against Alexis lasted from 18 December 2007 until 5
    February 2008. During that time, according to Tun, he met with Jalloh “at least five
    times going over [ ] the case that he was involved [in].” As part of Tun’s representation
    of Jalloh, he received from the State discovery in Jalloh’s case on 2 January 2008,
    represented Jalloh at a bond hearing on 18 January 2008, and filed a motion to sever
    Jalloh’s case from that of a co-defendant on 25 January 2008. After Tun’s representation
    of Jalloh was terminated, Jalloh filed a complaint on 19 February 2008 against Tun with
    the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.
    In light of this prior representation, the State moved to strike the appearance of
    Tun. The State averred that a conflict of interest existed between Tun’s representation of
    Alexis and his prior representation of Jalloh, a State material witness, because “Tun was
    provided with confidential privileged attorney-client information concerning Mr. Jalloh’s
    background and the facts and circumstances of Mr. Jalloh’s case.” In support of this
    assertion, the State attached an affidavit by Jalloh indicating that he provided
    “confidential information pertaining to [his] case” to Tun. Particularly because the State
    predicted that Jalloh’s credibility would be a “center-point of both the State’s
    examination and the Defense’s cross-examination,” the State asserted that the conflict of
    interest would violate the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, see Md.
    Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 & 1.8, because Jalloh refused to waive his attorney-
    -9-
    client privilege.   Additionally, the State argued that the court should strike defense
    counsel’s appearance because any conviction of Alexis obtained with Tun as Alexis’s
    counsel would be overturned on appeal or during collateral review on the basis of
    ineffective assistance of counsel if Tun were permitted to continue representing Alexis in
    view of the conflict of interest with Jalloh.
    On 9 April 2009, Tun filed, on behalf of Alexis, a Memorandum of Law in
    Opposition to the State’s motion. Tun acknowledged that he had represented Jalloh,
    whom he knew at the time as Kamara Mohamed, but argued that the representation was
    for “a brief and limited period of time,” less than two months. Tun stated that, during the
    representation, he had “focused chiefly on procedural matters” and had not prepared for
    trial at that time. “[Tun] estimate[d] that he spent less than 20 hours working on Mr.
    Mohamed’s case altogether.” Moreover, Tun stated that, when he was retained by Alexis
    on 18 December 2008, “[he] was unaware that Jalloh had any involvement or personal
    stake in [] Alexis’s matter.”
    Tun maintained that the Circuit Court should not strike his appearance for several
    reasons. First, Tun averred that the information that Tun gained about Jalloh during his
    representation of him was not privileged because it had become known generally to the
    State (the opposing party) through Jalloh’s voluntary divulgements and through Jalloh
    detailing his case in his complaint filed against Tun with the Attorney Grievance
    Commission of Maryland.         Second, Tun argued that he should not be disqualified
    because effective safeguards in the trial of Alexis could eliminate any conflicts associated
    with his prior representation of Jalloh. Specifically, Tun proffered that “the limited
    -10-
    appearance of attorney Antonio Jones for the purpose of cross-examining [ ] Jalloh at trial
    will create a ‘Chinese wall’ that will effectively serve to isolate any conflict of interest [ ]
    Tun’s previous limited representation of [ ] Jalloh might have upon the Defendant.” Tun
    believed that “this screen will address any concerns that a conflict of interest in [ ] Tun
    representing [ ] Alexis while maintaining any privileged communications from [ ] Jalloh”
    because Tun screened effectively himself from any conflict associated with Jalloh.
    Lastly, Tun argued that Alexis would suffer less prejudice if he is permitted to retain his
    current counsel.
    Also on 9 April 2009, defense co-counsel, Ross D. Hecht, filed a motion to
    exclude Jalloh’s statements. In that motion, Hecht made several statements indicating
    that it was his understanding that Jalloh had a history of serving as a jail house snitch:
    It is undersigned counsel’s understanding that Mr. Jalloh has cooperated
    with the State as an informant in several criminal matters in an effort to
    benefit his own circumstances. . . . It is undersigned counsel’s
    understanding that Mr. Jalloh has been cooperating with the law
    enforcement for some time. . . . It is submitted that throughout the tenure of
    Mr. Jalloh’s cooperation, Mr. Jalloh has been actively seeking information
    and trying to gain details from other inmates to help himself. . . . At the
    time that Mr. Jalloh obtained such information, he was working as a
    criminal informant for law enforcement in several different criminal cases
    in an effort to compel the prosecution to pursue a more lenient sentence in
    his own pending criminal matters.
    On 10 April 2009, the Circuit Court held a hearing to address the various motions,
    including the motion to disqualify defense counsel and the motion to exclude Jalloh’s
    statements. The court stated that it would allow each side a chance to make an opening
    and “then we’ll call witnesses as necessary” on the motions. After hearing the parties’
    arguments on the motion to disqualify counsel, the hearing judge stated:
    -11-
    THE COURT: Anything else?
    MR. TUN: No, your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. On the State’s motion to strike Mr. Tun as
    attorney for the Defendant, for some reason, I don’t know what the
    statistical likelihood of this happening is, the Defendant in this case and Mr.
    Tun’s former client, Mr. Amadu Jalloh, were placed in the same jail cell at
    the County Correctional Center and apparently have some conversations
    which I believe the State intends to use, if I’m not mistaken.
    [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: While Mr. Alexis has waived whatever conflict Mr. Tun
    might have, . . . Jalloh . . . has not and, in fact, takes significant exception to
    Mr. Tun continuing to participate in this case when he [Jalloh], in fact, is
    going to be a witness for the State. The conflict is a significant one and I
    think we all agree there is, in fact, conflict. There is conflict with the duty
    of loyalty. I appreciate Mr. Tun represented him [Jalloh] for a short period
    of time but, I think, that duty of loyalty continues and, in fact, there is really
    is truly a conflict were this case to go to trial with Mr. Tun at the table.
    To say that we can create a Chinese wall, a masonry wall, a brick or a block
    wall that solves this problem I think is folly. I just don’t believe that we
    can do that. Having said all that, accordingly, I’m going to direct the Clerk
    to strike Mr. Tun’s appearance.
    During a recess in the court proceedings, Hecht approached the court in chambers (which
    was recounted on the record after the recess concluded) to ask whether the court would
    reconsider its ruling striking Tun’s appearance if Tun was not present in the courtroom
    during any examination of Jalloh. The Circuit Court replied on the record: “I’m really
    not inclined to reconsider that ruling. I just think if I do, I’ll be doing this case twice.”
    -12-
    C. Trial: Jury Instructions, Jury Verdict, & Sentencing.
    The cases against Alexis were tried together in a sixteen-day trial in October of
    2010.    Prior to closing arguments, the Circuit Court instructed the jury as to the
    solicitation charges as follows:
    The defendant is charged with two separate counts of the crime of
    Solicitation to Commit Obstruction of Justice. That is preventing witness
    testimony or retaliation for testimony. A criminal solicitation is an effort to
    persuade another person to commit a crime. In order to convict the
    defendant of Solicitation, the State must prove, one, that the defendant
    urged, advised, induced, encouraged, requested, or commanded another
    person to commit Obstruction of Justice by Preventing Witness Testimony
    and/or Obstruction of Justice in Retaliation for Testimony; and two, that at
    the time the defendant made the oral or written efforts to persuade another
    person to commit Obstruction of Justice by Preventing Witness Testimony
    and/or Obstruction of Justice by Retaliation for Testimony, the defendant
    intended that the Obstruction of Justice Preventing the Witness Testimony
    and/or Obstruction of Justice for Retaliation for Testimony be committed.
    The crime of Solicitation is in the asking. It is not necessary that the
    Obstruction of Justice Preventing the Witness Testimony and/or
    Obstruction of Justice Retaliation for Testimony actually be committed.
    With respect to the first case, the jury convicted Alexis of second degree murder
    of Brown, robbery with a dangerous weapon of Brown, use of a handgun in the
    commission of a crime of violence, conspiracy to commit theft over $500, and two counts
    of theft over $500.     With respect to the second case, the jury convicted Alexis of
    solicitation of Rashadd Alexis to obstruct justice and murder Ennels to prevent his future
    testimony and solicitation of Rashadd Alexis to obstruct justice by retaliating against
    Ennels for his grand jury testimony.
    At the sentencing hearing on 14 December 2010, defense counsel argued that
    Alexis was “found guilty of two offenses which the lesser charge would merge with the
    -13-
    second” and, thus, the solicitation to obstruct justice by retaliation for the testimony of
    Ennels before the grand jury would merge with the solicitation to obstruct justice by
    preventing Ennels’s testimony at trial. The State responded, arguing that the solicitation
    sentences should not merge for several reasons. First, the solicitation convictions are two
    separate offenses (C.L. §§ 9-302 and 9-303) that “refer to two separate aspects. One is
    retaliation for testifying against the grand jury. The other is an inducement to not testify
    at trial.” Moreover, because “the solicitation is in the asking[,] . . . it has to be asked two
    separate times, to retaliate and to prevent.” Lastly, “they refer to two separate dates; one
    being March of #08 for the grand jury and the second being the October 2010 eventual
    trial.” The Circuit Court rejected defense counsel’s merger argument and sentenced
    Alexis to two consecutive sentences of twenty years for the solicitation convictions.
    The two cases were consolidated on appeal.           The Court of Special Appeals
    affirmed, in Alexis v. State, 
    209 Md. App. 630
    , 
    61 A.3d 104
    (2013), the Circuit Court’s
    judgment. On 20 June 2013, this Court issued a writ of certiorari, in response to Alexis’s
    petition, to consider the following questions:
    (1) Did the trial court err by disqualifying petitioner's attorney, who had
    previously represented a State's witness, when the witness refused to
    waive the conflict of interest and appellant's counsel had arranged for
    co-counsel to cross-examine the witness?
    (2) Are consecutive sentences appropriate where petitioner was convicted
    of two counts of solicitation where both counts were predicated on the
    same evidence?
    -14-
    II.       TRIAL COURT’S DISQUALIFICATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.
    The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the
    Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
    has the right to assistance of counsel for his defense. 5 The Supreme Court recognizes
    that “this right was designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process,” Wheat,
    
    486 U.S. 153
    , 159, 
    108 S. Ct. 1692
    , 1697, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    (1988) (citing United States v.
    Morrison, 
    449 U.S. 361
    , 364, 
    101 S. Ct. 665
    , 667, 
    66 L. Ed. 2d 564
    (1981)), and that “the
    purpose of providing assistance of counsel ‘is simply to ensure that criminal defendants
    receive a fair trial.’” 
    Id. (quoting Strickland
    v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 689, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2065, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984)). Additionally, included as part of the right to
    assistance of counsel, is the qualified right of a defendant to select and be represented by
    one’s preferred attorney. See 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159
    , 108 S.Ct. at 1697, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    ; State v. Goldsberry, 
    419 Md. 100
    , 117-18, 
    18 A.3d 836
    , 847 (2011); McCleary v.
    State, 
    122 Md. 394
    , 400, 
    89 A. 1100
    , 1103 (1914).
    As the Supreme Court observes, “[i]n evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, ‘the
    appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship
    with his lawyer as such.’” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Cronic, 
    466 U.S. 648
    , 657, n. 21,
    
    104 S. Ct. 2039
    , 2046 n. 21, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 657
    (1984)). Thus, “while the right to select and
    5
    The Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all
    criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
    Counsel for his defence.” Similarly, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
    provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be allowed
    counsel . . . .”
    -15-
    be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the
    essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
    defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the
    lawyer whom he prefers.” 
    Id. (citing Morris
    v. Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 13–14, 
    103 S. Ct. 1610
    , 1617–1618, 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 610
    (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 
    103 S. Ct. 3308
    ,
    
    77 L. Ed. 2d 987
    (1983)). Accordingly, the right of a defendant to counsel of choice is
    “circumscribed in several important respects.” 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159
    , 108 S.Ct. at
    1697, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    . See also 
    Goldsberry, 419 Md. at 118
    , 18 A.3d at 847 (“The right
    to counsel of choice . . . is qualified.”). For example, a defendant may not “insist on the
    counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing
    party, even when the opposing party is the Government.” 
    Id. The question
    raised in the
    present case is the extent to which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choice of
    counsel is qualified by the fact that the chosen attorney has a previous attorney-client
    relationship with a material witness of the opposing party.
    A. Standard of Review
    In multiple cases involving requests for disqualification of counsel due to alleged
    conflicts of interest, the Supreme Court and this Court applied the abuse of discretion
    standard of review. See, e.g., 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163
    , 108 S.Ct. at 1699, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    (stating that “[w]e do not think it can be said that the court exceeded the broad latitude
    which must be accorded it in making this decision” on the motion for substitution of
    counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest); 
    Gatewood, 388 Md. at 538-40
    , 880 A.2d at
    329-30 (concluding, after review of prior case law, the appropriate standard of review in
    -16-
    such cases is abuse of discretion) (citing Lykins v. State, 
    288 Md. 71
    , 
    415 A.2d 1113
    (1980); Young v. State, 
    297 Md. 286
    , 
    465 A.2d 1149
    (1983)). In Wheat, the leading
    Supreme Court case on the disqualification of counsel due to a conflict of interest, the
    Court held that “the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers
    of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be
    demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict
    exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.” 
    Id., 486 U.S.
    at 
    163, 108 S. Ct. at 1699
    . The Court explained that wide latitude was necessary
    for the following reasons:
    [A] district court must pass on the issue whether or not to allow a waiver of
    a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the wisdom of
    hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial context
    when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. The
    likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously
    hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials. It is a
    rare attorney who will be fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his
    own client, much less be fully apprised before trial of what each of the
    Government's witnesses will say on the stand. A few bits of unforeseen
    testimony or a single previously unknown or unnoticed document may
    significantly shift the relationship between multiple defendants. These
    imponderables are difficult enough for a lawyer to assess, and even more
    difficult to convey by way of explanation to a criminal defendant untutored
    in the niceties of legal ethics. Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness
    of an attorney to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse
    relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary information to
    them.
    
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162-63
    , 108 S. Ct. at 1699, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    . 6
    6
    Alexis points out that these cases involved conflicts of interest arising from
    multiple representation (an attorney with a conflict or potential conflict between two or
    more current clients) and not successive representation (an attorney with a conflict or
    (continued…)
    -17-
    In applying the abuse of discretion standard in Wheat, the Supreme Court
    concluded that the trial judge “relied on instinct and judgment based on experience in
    making its decision” on the motion for substitution of counsel due to alleged conflict of
    interest and, thus, the decision should be given wide deference. 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163
    ,
    108 S.Ct. at 1699, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    . See also 
    Gatewood, 388 Md. at 540
    , 880 A.2d at 330
    (acknowledging similarly that, in reviewing a circuit court’s decision regarding the
    disqualification of counsel request for alleged conflicts of interest created by past client
    representation, “the trial judge is in a unique position to ‘sense the nuances’ of the
    situation before him or her.”) (quoting 
    Lykins, 288 Md. at 85
    , 415 A.2d at 1121). The
    Supreme Court acknowledged that “[o]ther district courts might have reached differing or
    opposite conclusions with equal justification,” but emphasized “that does not mean that
    one conclusion was ‘right’ and the other ‘wrong.’” 
    Id., 486 U.S.
    at 
    164, 108 S. Ct. at 1700
    , 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    .
    Similarly, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review in this case.
    Consequently, we pause to review the contours of this standard of review. “Abuse of
    discretion,” although used and applied with great frequency by appellate courts, has been
    (…continued)
    potential conflict with at least one former client), as is present in this case. Alexis
    suggests in his brief that, because multiple representation and successive representation
    pose different dangers, different standards may apply. At oral argument, however,
    Alexis’s counsel conceded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of
    discretion. Such a concession was proper because, even were we to acknowledge that
    conflict of interests may pose different dangers depending on the source of the conflict,
    the reasoning for our wide deference to the trial court’s determinations remains
    applicable regardless of the source of conflict.
    -18-
    described aptly as a “very general, amorphous term[] . . . .” North v. North, 102 Md.
    App. 1, 
    648 A.2d 1025
    (1994). This perception is due, in large part, to the multitude of
    definitions for the term and, in some other part, to the necessity for its nature to change
    according to the legal context at issue.
    In regards to the multitude of varying definitions of “abuse of discretion,” as we
    recognized previously, “[o]ne of the more helpful pronouncements on the contours of the
    abuse of discretion standard comes from Judge . . . Wilner’s opinion in North v. North,
    
    102 Md. App. 1
    , 
    648 A.2d 1025
    (1994),” when he was the Chief Judge of the Court of
    Special Appeals. King v. State, 
    407 Md. 682
    , 697, 
    967 A.2d 790
    , 798 (2009). In North,
    Judge Wilner explained:
    “Abuse of discretion” . . . has been said to occur “where no reasonable
    person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court
    acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been
    said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been
    made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic
    and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is
    “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and
    denying a just result,” when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” or
    when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works
    an injustice.”
    
    North, 102 Md. App. at 13
    –14, 648 A.2d at 1031–32 (alterations in original) (emphasis
    added) (internal citations omitted). Judge Wilner observed that a “certain commonality
    [exists] in all these definitions”: “the notion that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of
    discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would
    not have made the same ruling.” 
    Id., 102 Md. App.
    at 
    14, 648 A.2d at 1032
    (emphasis
    added). Rather, “[a] court's decision is an abuse of discretion when it is ‘well removed
    -19-
    from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that
    court deems minimally acceptable.’” Gray v. State, 
    388 Md. 366
    , 383, 
    879 A.2d 1064
    (2005) (quoting Dehn v. Edgecombe, 
    384 Md. 606
    , 628, 
    865 A.2d 603
    (2005)) (some
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    As Judge Wilner explained, “That kind of distance can arise in a number of ways.”
    North, 102 Md. App. at 
    14, 648 A.2d at 1032
    . For example, the circuit court’s ruling is
    “beyond the fringe” if it “either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it
    supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective.”           
    Id. Because we
    give such deference to a trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion
    standard of review, it is well established that “[t]he exercise of discretion ordinarily will
    not be disturbed by an appellate court.” 
    Gatewood, 388 Md. at 540
    -41, 880 A.2d at 330
    (citing Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 
    381 Md. 378
    , 413, 
    849 A.2d 504
    , 525 (2004)).
    In our cases elaborating on the definition of abuse of discretion, the notion that
    this term of art “connotes, by definition, some range within which discretion may be
    legitimately exercised one way or the other without constituting an abuse” is repeated
    frequently. We must remember:
    The notion of a range of discretion, however, is not an immutable and
    invariable criterion in all of its myriad applications. The range of discretion
    frequently changes with the subject matter calling for the exercise of
    discretion. In handling the progress of a trial, for instance, as where the
    judge rules on a leading question, permits a continuance, or assesses the
    need for a mistrial, the range of discretion is very broad and the exercise of
    discretion will rarely be reversed. On the issue now before us [referring to
    a trial judge’s ruling that the suit was filed within the applicable statute of
    limitation and that there was no justifiable reason for the delay], by way of
    contrast, the discretionary range is far more narrow. It is circumscribed by
    strong policy considerations and well-articulated guidelines.
    -20-
    Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 
    66 Md. App. 635
    , 648, 
    505 A.2d 858
    , 864 (1986).
    In this case, the discretionary range is governed by strong policy considerations
    that underlie the Sixth Amendment constitutional rights, as well as (potentially) by
    guidelines articulated recently in State v. Goldsberry, 
    419 Md. 100
    , 
    18 A.3d 836
    (2011).
    Thus, we explore now the picket lines of the constitutional right and the applicable
    guidelines to understand better the limits of the range within which a trial court may act
    properly.
    B. The Constitutional Right to Counsel
    This Court addressed recently in Goldsberry what is “require[d] of a trial court in
    making the important and weighty assessment presented by a choice of counsel issue.”
    We recognized that the baseline considerations for this assessment are founded on the
    Supreme Court’s pronouncement “that the proper balance is struck when ‘the district
    court [ ] recognize[s] a presumption in favor of [the defendant’s] counsel of choice,’
    which ‘may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing
    of a serious potential for conflict.’”   
    Goldsberry, 419 Md. at 120
    , 18 A.3d at 848
    (emphasis added in Goldsberry) (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 
    164, 108 S. Ct. at 1700
    , 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 140
    ).      Goldsberry provided guidance how this “important and weighty
    assessment” is made:
    [B]efore a trial court is permitted to disqualify a criminal defendant's
    privately obtained counsel (regardless of whether counsel is the defendant's
    only attorney or one of several on the defense team), the court must
    conduct a hearing on the matter, “scrutinize closely the basis for the
    -21-
    claim,” and make evidence-based findings to determine . . . whether
    there is “actual or serious potential for conflict” that overcomes the
    presumption the defendant has to his or her counsel of choice.
    
    Goldsberry, 419 Md. at 123
    , 18 A.3d at 850 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
    In other words, “‘the trial court cannot vitiate [the right to counsel of choice] without first
    scrutinizing closely the basis for the claim.’” 
    Goldsberry, 419 Md. at 123
    , 18 A.3d at
    850 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Peeler, 
    828 A.2d 1216
    , 1225 (Conn. 2003)).
    In Goldsberry, we required additionally that “[t]he record must reflect that the trial
    court contemplated relevant factors in conducting the test that balances the right to one’s
    counsel of choice against the necessity to uphold ‘the ethical standards of the profession’
    that ensure that ‘legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.’” 
    Goldsberry, 419 Md. at 124
    , 18 A.3d at 850 (emphasis added) (citing 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160
    , 108
    S.Ct. at 1698; Fuller v. Diesslin, 
    868 F.2d 604
    , 608, 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
    Perretti v. Fuller, 
    493 U.S. 873
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 203
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 156
    (1989)). The findings
    should be based on factors such as (1) “the likelihood that defense counsel will have
    divided loyalties;” (2) “the State’s right to a fair trial;” (3) “the appearance of impropriety
    should the jury learn of the conflict;” and (4) the likelihood that permitting defense
    counsel’s continued representation “will provide grounds for overturning the conviction.”
    
    Id. (quoting Illinois
    v. Ortega, 
    808 N.E.2d 496
    , 502 (Ill. 2004)).
    -22-
    Alexis argues that the trial court “did not properly contemplate and apply the
    relevant factors [as required by Goldsberry] when denying [ ] his counsel of choice.” 7
    According to Alexis, the trial court should have stated on the record its consideration of
    each of the factors. We do not hold the trial court to such a high standard. It is apt to
    note that we have announced many times that “‘[t]here is no requirement that the trial
    court's exercise of discretion be detailed for the record, so long as the record reflects that
    the discretion was in fact exercised.’” Gray v. State, 
    388 Md. 366
    , 384, 
    879 A.2d 1064
    ,
    1074 (2005) (brackets in Gray) (quoting Williams v. State, 
    344 Md. 358
    , 371, 
    686 A.2d 1096
    , 1102–03 (1996)). Thus, so long as the record as a whole reflects expressly or
    implicitly that the Circuit Court contemplated the relevant factors and reaches a decision
    that does not constitute an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an
    injustice,” North, 102 Md. App. at 
    14, 648 A.2d at 1032
    , we may conclude that the
    exercise of discretion is within the proper range. 8
    7
    In response, the State argues that this argument is not before this Court properly
    because Alexis did not raise it in his Petition for Certiorari. Moreover, the State points
    out that “Alexis does not claim that he raised any of those ‘factors’ in his trial court
    pleading[s] or at the hearing on the motion to disqualify.” Thus, the State argues, “[t]he
    trial court should not be faulted for failing to address an argument Alexis did not raise.”
    We do not fault the trial court. Rather, we shall dispose of Alexis’s argument.
    8
    The State argues additionally that the Goldsberry decision is inapplicable to this
    case. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument somewhat summarily in its
    decision. See Alexis v. State, 
    209 Md. App. 630
    , 659-60, 
    61 A.3d 104
    , 121 (2013)
    (stating that “[the court] need not explore the Zenobia principles to conclude that
    Goldsberry is applicable to the case”). Because we resolve the issue in the State’s favor,
    even assuming that Goldsberry applies, we do not address whether the case has a
    prospective reach to cases pending at the time of its decision.
    -23-
    In the present case, we conclude that the record reflects satisfactorily consideration
    of these requirements. The trial judge held a hearing on the matter. At the close of the
    hearing, the trial judge found that all involved parties agreed that “there is, in fact,
    conflict.” He described “[t]he conflict [as] a significant one” and, even though Tun’s
    prior representation of Jalloh was for a short period of time, the “duty of loyalty
    continues . . . .” Moreover, the trial judge rejected explicitly Tun’s proffered “Chinese
    wall” remedy: “To say that we can create a Chinese wall, a masonry wall, a brick or a
    block wall that solves this problem I think is folly. I just don’t believe that we can do
    that.” Thus, the judge concluded “there is really is [sic] truly a conflict were this case to
    go to trial with Mr. Tun at the table” and struck Tun’s appearance.
    The Court of Special Appeals summarized the Circuit Court’s findings on this
    matter as follows: “In sum, the [C]ircuit [C]ourt found that there was a conflict of interest
    that could not be cured. . . . In the [C]ircuit [C]ourt's view, the risk of conflict outweighed
    appellant's right to counsel of choice.” 
    Alexis, 209 Md. App. at 660
    , 61 A.3d at 121. The
    intermediate appellate court panel agreed with that determination, see 
    id., and concluded
    that it was “not persuaded that the circuit court erred or abused its discretion by refusing
    to accept appellant’s waiver of Tun’s personal conflict of interest.” 
    Id., 209 Md. App.
    at
    
    661, 61 A.3d at 121
    .
    Without reaching necessarily a determination whether we would have decided the
    motions as did the Circuit Court, we conclude that such an exercise of discretion was
    proper; there was no abuse of discretion here.         Contrary to Alexis’s contention, “a
    defendant’s waiver of the conflict is not always sufficient to cure the conflict.” Alexis,
    -24-
    209 Md. App. at 
    661, 61 A.3d at 121
    . That the trial judge held a hearing and articulated
    his reasoning for his ruling indicates that he recognized the severity of the issues at stake
    and we assume he considered all relevant arguments tendered. Moreover, the trial judge
    “was not required to adopt use of co-counsel as a solution where the court perceived that
    the risk of conflict would persist.” 
    Id., 209 Md. App.
    at 
    661, 61 A.3d at 121
    . See also 
    id. (citing United
    States v. Agosto, 
    675 F.2d 965
    , 974 (8th Cir. 1982), as “explain[ing] why
    appointment of co-counsel [for the purpose of cross-examination of a witness] is not
    always a cure-all”). Even if we were to admit that, in light of the weighty and important
    constitutional right to counsel of choice, the trial judge’s decision may be close to the
    edge of the continuum of the proper exercise of discretion, it is our view that the decision
    does not venture into the far fringes of impropriety that require reversal. The Circuit
    Court’s rulings were not violative of fact or logic, or beyond the fringe of what is
    minimally acceptable, but rather were evidentiary-based as Goldsberry requires.
    As explained earlier in this opinion, “the trial judge is in a unique position to
    ‘sense the nuances’ of the situation before him or her.” 
    Gatewood, 388 Md. at 540
    , 880
    A.2d at 330 (quoting 
    Lykins, 288 Md. at 85
    , 415 A.2d at 1121). This statement is true
    especially in a circuit court’s decision regarding the disqualification of counsel for
    alleged conflicts of interest created by prior representation of a key witness for the State.
    As such, we conclude that “[t]he trial court, whose ‘finger [is] on the pulse of the trial,’
    State v. Hawkins, 
    326 Md. 270
    , 278, 
    604 A.2d 489
    , 493 (1992), had a sound basis to
    decide . . .” that a waiver of the conflict of interest was improper and that the proffered
    cure was not adequate. See 
    Dehn, 384 Md. at 628-29
    , 865 A.2d at 616 (holding the trial
    -25-
    court’s evidentiary rulings was not an abuse of discretion). Thus, we affirm the Circuit
    Court’s ruling to strike defense counsel Tun’s appearance.
    III.    THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF SEPARATE SENTENCES.
    Alexis was charged with and convicted of two counts of solicitation. First, he was
    charged with and convicted of soliciting his brother Rashadd for the purpose of
    preventing future testimony, in violation of Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.),
    Criminal Law Art., § 9-302(b)(ii). Secondly, Alexis was charged with and convicted of
    soliciting Rashadd for the purpose of retaliating for prior testimony, in violation of
    Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Law Art., § 9-303(b). At sentencing,
    defense counsel argued that “solicitation to obstruct justice by retaliation for testimony of
    Bobby Ennels would merge with solicitation to obstruct justice [in the] murder of Bobby
    Ennels.” The trial court rejected Alexis’s merger argument, and imposed two 20-year
    separate and consecutive sentences. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the trial
    court, finding that the separate sentences were warranted. 9
    9
    It appears that Alexis adds an insufficiency of the evidence question to his appeal
    before us: “The only remaining question is whether there was factual support for two
    separate solicitation convictions.” Alexis argues that “there is no concrete evidence that
    the jury could have found two solicitations based on different acts.” Specifically, Alexis
    avers that (1) the jury instruction did not distinguish between the two solicitation counts,
    and (2) the prosecution never argued that “there were in fact two separate solicitations.”
    We resolve that, to the extent that Alexis raises an insufficiency of the evidence
    argument, it was not preserved properly for our consideration. Because the proposition
    raised to and addressed by the trial court was limited to merger of the sentences, and did
    not address insufficiency of the evidence, we limit our review to Alexis’s actual merger
    argument.
    -26-
    Under Maryland law, the doctrine of merger is examined under three distinct tests:
    (1) the required evidence test; (2) the rule of lenity; and (3) the principle of fundamental
    fairness.   Petitioner does not argue that merger applies here based on the required
    evidence test. See, e.g., Miles v. State, 
    349 Md. 215
    , 227, 
    707 A.2d 841
    , 847-48 (1998)
    (“‘When two offenses do not merge under the required evidence test, we have applied as
    a principle of statutory construction the ‘rule of lenity’ . . . .’”) (quoting Williams v. State,
    
    323 Md. 312
    , 321, 
    593 A.2d 671
    , 675 (1991)); Monoker v. State, 
    321 Md. 214
    , 222, 
    582 A.2d 525
    , 529 (1990) (noting that, in cases where two offenses do not merge under the
    required evidence test, “there are nevertheless times when the offenses will not be
    punished separately”).
    A. Rule of Lenity
    The rule of lenity is a common law doctrine that directs courts to construe
    ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of criminal defendants. In the context of whether
    two offenses may be punished separately, it is well-understood that “[t]wo crimes created
    by legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the legislature intended the
    offenses to be punished by one sentence.” 
    White, 318 Md. at 744
    , 
    569 A.2d 1271
    . The
    rule of lenity provides that, “if we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing
    offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we, in effect, give the defendant
    the benefit of the doubt and hold that the crimes do merge.” 
    Monoker, 321 Md. at 222
    ,
    582 A.2d at 529 (citations omitted). See also 
    Miles, 349 Md. at 227
    , 707 A.2d at 847
    (stating that the rule of lenity “‘provides that doubt or ambiguity as to whether the
    legislature intended that there be multiple punishments for the same act or transaction
    -27-
    will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.’”) (quoting
    
    White, 318 Md. at 744
    , 569 A.2d at 1273) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The
    driving engine behind the rule is “‘that the Court will not interpret a . . . criminal statute
    so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation
    can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’” 
    White, 318 Md. at 744
    , 569 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Simpson v. United States, 
    435 U.S. 6
    , 15, 
    98 S. Ct. 909
    , 914, 
    55 L. Ed. 2d 70
    (1978)). This statutory construction principle applies, however,
    only when the statute is ambiguous as to whether the Legislature intended to impose
    multiple punishments. 
    Id. In evaluating
    the legality of the imposition of separate sentences from the same
    act, the Court of Special Appeals explained the proper approach in Morris v. State, 
    192 Md. App. 1
    , 
    993 A.2d 716
    (2010):
    To evaluate the legality of the imposition of separate sentences for the same
    act, we look first to whether the charges “arose out of the same act or
    transaction,” then to whether “the crimes charged are the same offense,”
    [Jones v. State, 
    357 Md. 141
    ,] 157, 
    742 A.2d 493
    [(1999)], and then, if the
    offenses are separate, to whether “the Legislature intended multiple
    punishment for conduct arising out of a single act or transaction which
    violates two or more statutes....” 
    Id. at 163,
    742 A.2d 493
    .
    
    Id., 192 Md. App.
    at 
    39, 993 A.2d at 738
    .
    With regard to the first step of this analysis—whether the charges arose out of the
    same act or transaction—the Morris court explained further:
    The “same act or transaction” inquiry often turns on whether the
    defendant's conduct was “one single and continuous course of conduct,”
    without a “break in conduct” or “time between the acts.” The burden of
    proving distinct acts or transactions for purposes of separate units of
    prosecution falls on the State. Accordingly, when the indictment or jury's
    -28-
    verdict reflects ambiguity as to whether the jury based its convictions on
    distinct acts, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted). Our intermediate appellate court brethren found in the
    present case that the conduct underlying the solicitation convictions “was not predicated
    on a single act or harm”:
    Appellant spoke with multiple people on different dates about the intent to
    murder Ennels. Edmonds testified that approximately one month after the
    October 13, 2006, murder of Brown, appellant spoke to him about “killing
    Ennels.” On October 3, 2007, four days before Ennels's murder, appellant
    talked to Shropshire about what to do. According to Jalloh, while in
    custody awaiting trial, appellant told him he was trying to locate the
    witness and he heard appellant say killing the witness was the only way he
    could go home. The evidence demonstrated that appellant's intent to murder
    Ennels formed shortly after the murder of Brown and resulted in Ennels's
    death approximately two years later.
    
    Alexis, 209 Md. App. at 682
    n.13, 61 A.3d at 134 
    n.13.
    We disagree with this characterization of the relevant events. The evidence at trial
    indicated that Alexis solicited Edmonds to assist in the murder of Ennels in November of
    2006. The charges in the indictment did not depend on, however, events occurring in
    2006.    Specifically, the indictment charged that Alexis solicited “Rashadd . . . and
    unknown others” for the purpose of retaliating against Ennels for prior testimony and of
    preventing his future testimony “between the 21st day of May, two thousand and eight,
    and the 7th day of October, two thousand and eight.” (Emphasis added.)
    Examining the jury instruction and the jury verdict sheet, it appears that the main
    distinction between the two solicitation charges and convictions were described solely in
    terms of the purpose or motivation for the solicitation. As such, there may be ambiguity
    as to whether the jury based its convictions on distinct and separate acts, particularly in
    -29-
    light of the fact that the prosecutor did not distinguish separate acts clearly. Thus,
    because we resolve any ambiguity in favor of the defendant, we proceed here on the
    assumption that the convictions were based on the same act (even if conducted with
    multiple objectives).
    We look next to whether the crimes charged constitute the same offense. In this
    case, the crimes charged are two separate offenses: (1) solicitation for the purpose of
    retaliation for prior testimony under § 9-303; and (2) solicitation for the purpose of
    preventing future testimony under § 9-302. As the Court of Special Appeals explained:
    Although involving the same victim, appellant was charged under two
    distinct laws prohibiting retaliation for former testimony and preclusion of
    future testimony. By the murder of Ennels, appellant punished or retaliated
    against him for testifying before the grand jury. By the murder of Ennels,
    appellant also achieved the goal of insulating himself from Ennels's
    anticipated testimony at trial. Although the case involves a single victim,
    two separate and distinct goals or harms were caused by appellant's conduct,
    and one offense was not necessarily the overt act of the other. The second
    offense required separate and distinct intent.
    
    Alexis, 209 Md. App. at 682
    -83, 61 A.3d at 134. We agree.
    To resolve the sole remaining question—whether the Legislature intended
    multiple punishments for conduct arising out of a single act or transaction which violates
    two or more statutes—we embark on an exercise in statutory analysis. Each solicitation
    statute contains the following identical sentencing clause:
    Sentence.—A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from
    and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on
    the act establishing the violation of this section.
    C.L. § 9-302(d); § 9-303(d) (emphasis added). The plain language of these subsections
    indicates that the General Assembly intended punishment for convictions under either
    -30-
    statute not to merge with a conviction for any other offense, including a conviction
    under the other statute. Moreover, the legislative history of this subsection does not
    indicate to the contrary of the plain meaning of these provisions.
    Alexis argues that, even though the plain language states “any crime” and the
    legislative histories of these statutes do not indicate an intent to the contrary, that we
    should adopt the legislative intent from other statutes that contain language nearly
    identical to subsection (d) in §§ 9-302 and 9-303. For example, in Fisher v. State, 
    367 Md. 218
    , 
    786 A.2d 706
    (2001), we analyzed the legislative history of § 35C(b)(3), the
    sentencing clause of the statute criminalizing child abuse at that time. This subsection
    provided, as of 25 June 1997:
    The sentence imposed under this section may be imposed separate from and
    consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any offense based upon the
    act or acts establishing the abuse.
    Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 35C(b)(3). In Fisher, we summarized the
    legislative history on this subsection as follows:
    What is now § 35C(b)(3) was enacted by Chapter 604 of the Acts of 1990
    for the express purpose of overruling the holdings in Nightingale v. State,
    
    312 Md. 699
    , 
    542 A.2d 373
    (1988), and in White v. State, 
    318 Md. 740
    , 
    569 A.2d 1271
    (1990), which had applied the rule of lenity to multiple
    sentences in child abuse cases. In Nightingale, this Court treated a
    conviction of second degree sexual offense under § 464A(a)(3) as a lesser
    included offense of sexual child abuse, and we struck the additional
    sentence that had been imposed by the trial court for the sexual offense
    violation. In White, consecutive sentences had been imposed for murder in
    the first degree and for child abuse. Applying the rule of lenity we merged
    the child abuse conviction into the murder conviction.
    The purpose clause of Chapter 604 of the Acts of 1990 declares that the
    Legislature intended to allow the imposition of multiple sentences “if a
    conviction is entered against an individual for murder, rape, sexual offense,
    -31-
    any sex crime, or any crime of physical violence, and a conviction is also
    entered for child abuse.” The philosophy underlying present § 35C(b)(3) is
    articulated in a letter from an Assistant Attorney General to the Chairman
    of the House Judiciary Committee urging adoption of the bill that enacted §
    35C(b)(3). In part the letter reads:
    “Child abuse and the underlying crimes involve separate societal
    evils. The underlying crime is one of violence against a member of
    society. Child abuse is a breach of custodial or familial trust. The
    two crimes should be punished separately and the person who
    violates both laws should be exposed to a greater possible penalty.”
    
    Fisher, 367 Md. at 242-43
    , 786 A.2d at 720-21.
    According to Alexis, grafting this legislative history onto the solicitation statutes’
    sentencing clauses, it is apparent that the clauses were intended as anti-merger provisions,
    but only for the narrow purpose of the underlying crime that is solicited by the defendant.
    In support of his assertion, Alexis points-out that the language in the sentencing clauses
    of the solicitation statutes is found only in statutes for criminal offenses typically
    interrelated with other criminal offenses. See, e.g., Md. Code, Crim. Law Art. § 3-601(e)
    (child abuse and any crime); § 4-204(b)(1)(i) (use of a handgun and a felony or crime of
    violence); § 5-613(d) (use of a weapon in drug trafficking crime and the drug trafficking
    crime); § 5-627(d) (distribution of a controlled dangerous substance near a school and
    distribution of the controlled dangerous substance).
    We do not find Alexis’s argument so persuasive as to cloak in ambiguity the
    meaning of the solicitation statutes. The plain language of these anti-merger provisions is
    clear: “A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or
    concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act establishing the violation of
    this section.” C.L. § 9-302(d); § 9-303(d) (emphasis added). If the Legislature intended
    -32-
    that the anti-merger provision be limited narrowly to the underlying crime, the
    Legislature would have stated so.       Accordingly, abiding by the direction of the
    Legislature in this case, we conclude that the sentences should not merge under the rule
    of lenity.
    B. Merger Under the Principle of Fundamental Fairness
    Even where two offenses do not merge under the rule of lenity, this Court has
    “looked to other considerations in deciding whether two offenses, when based on the
    same conduct, should be deemed the same.” Williams v. State, 
    323 Md. 312
    , 321, 
    593 A.2d 671
    , 675 (1991).      In Monoker, we explained that “[o]ne of the most basic
    considerations in all our decisions is the principle of fundamental fairness in meting out
    punishment for a crime.” 
    Monoker, 321 Md. at 223
    , 582 A.2d at 529 (citing 
    White, 318 Md. at 746
    , 
    569 A.2d 1271
    ; Whack v. 
    State, 288 Md. at 142
    , 
    416 A.2d 265
    ; Brooks v.
    State, 
    284 Md. 416
    , 423, 
    397 A.2d 596
    (1979); Cousins v. State, 
    277 Md. 383
    , 397, 
    354 A.2d 825
    ). The Monoker Court concluded first that the common law doctrine of merger
    was inapplicable. Additionally, the Court found that the rule of lenity was inapplicable
    because the rule applies only to statutory offenses and the two offenses at issue in that
    case were common law offenses. Despite the inapplicability of these two doctrines, the
    Court held that the sentences should merge on the basis of “fundamental fairness”:
    While solicitation and conspiracy do not merge under the required evidence
    test, we find it unfair to uphold convictions and sentences for both crimes.
    Although solicitation is not always a lesser included offense of conspiracy,
    in Monoker's case the conspiracy to burglarize the Dubin home certainly
    did ripen from the solicitation of Almony to commit that same crime. See
    White v. 
    State, 318 Md. at 748
    , 
    569 A.2d 1271
    (statutory offense of child
    abuse does not merge into common law crime of murder under strict
    -33-
    application of the required evidence test, but the offenses still merge
    because the abuse and subsequent death of the child are so closely
    connected as to constitute an integral part of the homicide; the child abuse
    offense is therefore very much like a traditional included offense of
    murder). Similarly, here, we conclude that because the solicitation was part
    and parcel of the ultimate conspiracy and thereby an integral component of
    it, it would be fundamentally unfair to Monoker for us to require him to
    suffer twice, once for the greater crime and once for a lesser included
    offense of that crime. For that reason his sentences should merge.
    
    Monoker, 321 Md. at 223
    -24, 582 A.2d at 529.
    In this case, Alexis argues that Monoker should control because the principles of
    fairness require that his solicitation sentences merge. We disagree. In Monoker, there
    was no evidence that the Legislature (or the common law) intended for Monoker to suffer
    twice for his crimes. As such, if the crimes were statutory offenses, rather than common
    law offenses as they were at that time, the rule of lenity would have applied. In contrast,
    in the solicitation statutes at issue in the present case, the plain language of the sentencing
    clauses of the statutes indicate that the Legislature intended to preclude merger of
    sentences for a person convicted of violating either solicitation prohibition, as well as of
    another crime (which could include violating the other solicitation statute).            Thus,
    although we acknowledge the spirit of fundamental fairness, we do not believe it should
    rule the day here where the clear and plain language of the relevant statutes indicates that
    merger is precluded.
    We hold that the Circuit Court imposed properly separate sentences for the
    conviction of solicitation for the purpose of preventing future testimony (C.L. § 9-302)
    and the conviction of solicitation for the purpose of retaliation (C.L. § 9-303).
    -34-
    JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
    SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS
    TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
    -35-