Attorney Grievance Commission v. Reno ( 2014 )

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Sandra Lynn Reno, Misc. Docket AG
No. 5, September Term, 2013
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – MARYLAND LAWYERS’ RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4 – Court of Appeals denied Attorney Grievance
Commission’s request to dismiss attorney discipline proceeding and held that lawyer
violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.4 (d) (Conduct
Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC) by giving
handgun to person who could not legally possess regulated firearm. Court gave parties
opportunity to file recommendations as to appropriate sanction.
Circuit Court for Cecil County
Case No. 07-C-13-000559
Argued: December 10, 2013
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 5
September Term, 2013
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
SANDRA LYNN RENO
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: January 24, 2014
This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who purchased
and gave a handgun to a person who could not legally possess a regulated firearm.
The State charged Sandra Lynn Reno (“Reno”), Respondent, a member of the Bar
of Maryland, with violating the statute that is currently codified as Md. Code Ann., Pub.
Safety (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2013 Supp.) (“PS”) § 5-144. 1 Reno pled not guilty
pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, which stated that Reno had given a handgun to
Cortney Stevens (“Stevens”), who could not legally possess a regulated firearm. Reno
was found guilty, received probation before judgment, and reported herself to the
Attorney Grievance Commission (“the Commission”), Petitioner.
On March 19, 2013, in this Court, the Commission, through Bar Counsel, filed a
“Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against Reno, charging her with violating
Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.4 (Misconduct). On
March 22, 2013, we referred the attorney discipline proceeding to the Honorable Jane
Cairns Murray (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Cecil County. On
September 4, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On October 25, 2013, the
hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of fact, and conclusions of
law indicating that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c)
(Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice), or 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
1
The State charged Reno with violating the statute that, at the time, was codified as
Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (2003, 2011 Repl. Vol.) § 5-143. To avoid confusion, we
refer to the current version of the statute.
On November 8, 2013, in this Court, the Commission filed a “Notice of
Dismissal,” requesting that this Court dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding. On
December 10, 2013, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we: decline to
dismiss the attorney discipline proceeding; conclude that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d)
and 8.4(a); and give the parties an opportunity to recommend sanctions. 2
BACKGROUND
Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact
In her opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.
On December 19, 1991, this Court admitted Reno to the Bar of Maryland. In
2002, Reno began practicing criminal law at the Law Offices of Jim Baldwin.
On or about February 18, 2004, Cortney Stevens was convicted of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana. In 2005, Reno met Stevens and
later served as his lawyer. In 2008, while represented by someone other than Reno,
Stevens was convicted of making a false prescription. Sometime before 2010, Stevens
informed Reno “that he had a prior drug charge for which he received probation before
judgment.” “Stevens also informed [Reno] of a prescription forgery charge.”
On or about September 14, 2010, Stevens visited Chesapeake Guns, a firearms
store in Stevensville. At Chesapeake Guns, Stevens completed an application to buy a
2
Generally, this Court grants a request by the Commission to dismiss an attorney
discipline proceeding. See generally Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685,
707, 73 A.3d 161, 174 (2013). Nonetheless, this Court has the discretion to deny such a
request. See generally Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 102, 76
A.3d 1198, 1209 (2013) (“This Court[ has] original and complete jurisdiction over
attorney disciplinary proceedings[.]” (Citations omitted)).
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.45 caliber 1911 handgun. In a letter dated September 22, 2010, the Firearms
Registration Section of the Maryland State Police informed Stevens that his application
had been disapproved. The letter did not include the reasons for Stevens’s application’s
disapproval. Reno learned of the letter and testified that she thought that the reason for
Stevens’s application’s disapproval was “a minor issue such as a failure [by] Stevens to
have paid a fine.”
On November 6, 2010, Reno visited On Target, a firearms store in Severn. At On
Target, Reno obtained a .45 caliber 1911 handgun (“the handgun”). Reno immediately
transported the handgun to Stevens’s place of employment, where she gave the handgun
to Stevens.
On November 16, 2010, at her home, Reno was visited by Corporal Marcus
Jackson and Senior Trooper First Class Ryan List (“the troopers”) of the Gun
Enforcement Unit of the Maryland State Police. The troopers told Reno that they were
conducting a handgun investigation. Reno “escorted the troopers to [] Stevens’[s home]
and retrieved the” handgun, which the troopers confiscated.
Sometime between November 4, 2011, and November 16, 2011, Reno learned that
the State had charged her with violating the statute that is currently codified at PS § 5-
144. On February 28, 2012, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Reno pled
not guilty and joined the agreed statement of facts. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County granted Reno probation before judgment. Sometime before October 21, 2013,
the records of Reno’s criminal case were expunged.
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Testimony and Findings as to Reno’s Knowledge
At the hearing in this attorney discipline proceeding, as a witness for the
Commission, Reno testified:
[A]t the time that I asked [] Stevens to hold the gun for me, I was not aware
that he was a prohibited person[, i.e., a person who cannot legally possess a
regulated firearm]. I took that plea anyway because I felt like I should
have known better. The statute that I pled not guilty to and agreed
statement of facts said that I knowingly participated in the receipt of a
regulated firearm by a prohibited person. The truth is I did not know he
was a prohibited person, but I felt that it was appropriate to accept
responsibility because I should have known.
(Emphasis added).
In her opinion, the hearing judge stated: “The evidence . . . merely shows a set of
circumstances that [Reno] should have known [that] Stevens was a prohibited person,
but it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that [Reno] in fact knew [that
Stevens] was a prohibited person.” (Emphasis added).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing
judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law. See Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity
of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 104, 76 A.3d 1198, 1210 (2013) (“[A] hearing court’s
findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that they are clearly
erroneous.” (Citation omitted)); Md. R. 16-759 (b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall
review de novo the circuit court judge’s conclusions of law.”).
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DISCUSSION
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. We, therefore,
“treat the findings of fact as established[.]” Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(A).
Neither party excepts to any of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.
“Ordinarily, we will not look for additional violations where [the Commission] file[s] no
exceptions.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707, 73 A.3d 161, 174
(2013). Nonetheless, here, clear and convincing evidence persuades us to reverse the
hearing judge’s conclusion that Reno did not violate MLRPC 8.4(d), which states: “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]” “In general, an attorney violates M[L]RPC 8.4(d) when his
or her conduct impacts negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or
legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96, 981 A.2d 1234,
1242 (2009) (citation omitted).
Reno negatively impacted the public’s perception of the legal profession through
committing an illegal act. As the hearing judge found, it is undisputed that Reno gave the
handgun (i.e., a regulated firearm) 3 to Stevens, who had been convicted of disqualifying
crimes. 4 We do not address the hearing judge’s finding that Reno did not know that
3
“‘Regulated firearm’ means[ ] a handgun[.]” PS § 5-101(r)(1).
4
Specifically, Stevens was convicted of two disqualifying crimes: (1) possession
of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana; and (2) making a false
prescription. See PS § 5-101(g) (“‘Disqualifying crime’ means: (1) a crime of violence;
(2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a
misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years.”
(Paragraph breaks omitted)); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“CL”)
(Continued...)
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Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime; thus, we do not conclude that Reno
violated PS § 5-144(a)(1), which states: “[A] . . . person may not[ ] knowingly participate
in the illegal . . . transfer . . . of a regulated firearm in violation of this subtitle[.]”
(Emphasis added).
That finding of fact–that Reno did not knowingly participate in transferring the
handgun–does not preclude us from determining that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2), 5 a
regulatory provision, which states that: “A . . . person may not . . . transfer a regulated
firearm to a . . . transferee who the . . . person knows or has reasonable cause to believe
. . . has been convicted of a disqualifying crime[.]” (Emphasis added). Although the
hearing judge did not address whether Reno had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens
had been convicted of a disqualifying crime, we need not remand for the hearing judge to
make additional findings of fact. As a conclusion of law–applying the facts found by the
hearing judge to PS § 5-134(b)(2)’s legal standard of “reasonable cause”–we conclude
that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Reno violated PS § 5-134(b)(2).
For two reasons, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Reno had reasonable
cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime.
§ 5-601(c)(1) (Possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana is a
misdemeanor that is punishable by up to four years of incarceration.); CL §§ 5-606(a), 5-
607(a) (Making a false prescription is a felony that is at least punishable by up to five
years of incarceration.).
5
It does not matter that Reno was not charged with violating PS § 5-134(b)(2).
“[T]he absence of criminal prosecution does not necessarily mean [MLRPC 8.4(d)] has
not been violated[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Katz, 429 Md. 308, 320, 55 A.3d
909, 915 (2012) (second alteration and emphasis in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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First, in Reno’s criminal case, based on the agreed statement of facts that Reno
joined, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Reno had violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer
of a regulated firearm. 6 If the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that Reno
violated PS § 5-144(a)(1) by knowingly participating in the illegal transfer of a regulated
firearm, then Reno necessarily had reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been
convicted of a disqualifying crime and violated PS § 5-134(b)(2) by transferring the
handgun to him.
Second, independent of the findings of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, Stevens’s statements to Reno, credited in the hearing judge’s findings of fact,
provided reasonable cause to believe that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying
crime. The hearing judge found that: (1) Stevens informed Reno “that he had a prior
drug charge for which he received probation before judgment”; and (2) “Stevens also
informed [Reno] of a prescription forgery charge.” Even if Stevens did not tell Reno that
he had been convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than
marijuana and making a false prescription, it was incumbent upon Reno to ask Stevens
whether one or both charges resulted in convictions before giving the handgun to
Stevens. Indeed–as Reno explicitly conceded, and as the hearing judge explicitly found–
6
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County could not have placed Reno on
probation before judgment without first having “found [Reno] guilty[.]” Md. Code Ann.,
Crim. Proc. (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2013 Supp.) § 6-220(b)(1). Indeed, at oral argument,
Reno’s counsel stated that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that Reno
“knew or should have known.”
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Reno “should have known” that Stevens had been convicted of a disqualifying crime.
(Emphasis added). 7 For the above reasons, we are satisfied that clear and convincing
evidence establishes that Reno committed an illegal act in violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2).
It is abundantly clear that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(d), which provides: “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]” We have described “[a]n act prejudicial to the administration
of justice [as] one that ‘tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute.’” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 128, 43 A.2d 988, 995 (2012) (citation
omitted). As the hearing judge found, Reno knew that: (1) Stevens had applied to buy a
.45 caliber 1911 handgun; and (2) the Firearms Registration Section of the Maryland
State Police disapproved Stevens’s application. Nonetheless, Reno gave Stevens a
handgun of the exact type for which he had applied. Even if (as the hearing judge found)
Reno thought that the reason for Stevens’s application’s disapproval was “a minor issue
such as a failure [by] Stevens to have paid a fine[,]” Reno nonetheless circumvented the
law by giving the handgun to Stevens. As such, Reno, a criminal defense attorney,
provided a gun to a person, a former client, whom she had reason to know was prohibited
from possessing a firearm. Reno circumvented the law–and, indeed, violated the law–as
to a prohibited person’s possession of a firearm. Thus, Reno engaged in behavior
7
We reject any notion that Reno lacked reasonable cause to believe that Stevens
had been convicted of a disqualifying crime because Reno did not know whether
possession of a controlled dangerous substance other than marijuana and/or making a
false prescription were disqualifying crimes. Ignorance of the law is no excuse,
especially for an experienced criminal defense lawyer.
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prejudicial to the administration of justice as well as conduct “impact[ing] negatively the
public’s perception . . . of the . . . legal profession.” Rand, 411 Md. at 96, 981 A.2d at
1242 (citations omitted).
We also conclude that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(a), which states: “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate . . . the” MLRPC.
From the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we ascertain no basis to conclude,
however, that Reno violated MLRPC 8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects) or 8.4(c)
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Although Reno
committed an illegal act by violating PS § 5-134(b)(2), a violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2)
alone does not appear to be a criminal act as Title 5 (“Firearms”) of the Public Safety
Article does not set a penalty for violation of PS § 5-134(b)(2).
Because the Commission moved to dismiss, neither party recommended a sanction
for Reno’s misconduct. Instead of determining an appropriate sanction on our own
initiative, we give Reno and the Commission the opportunity to recommend a sanction
for Reno’s violation of MLRPC 8.4(d) and 8.4(a). The parties shall file
recommendations within thirty days of the date on which this opinion is filed. “Within
15 days after service of . . . recommendations, the adverse party may file a response.”
Md. R. 16-758(c). After receiving recommendations and responses (if any), we will
schedule oral argument regarding the appropriate sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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