NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. Carlsen , 439 Md. 427 ( 2014 )

NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc., et al. v. Soren Carlsen, Misc. No. 11, September Term,
2013
FINDER’S FEE ACT – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – OTHER SPECIALTY –
Court of Appeals held that alleged violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975, 2013
Repl. Vol.) § 12-805(d) (which is part of Maryland Finder’s Fee Act) is not “other
specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJP”) § 5-
102(a)(6) (which is twelve-year statute of limitations), and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101
(which is default three-year statute of limitations).
United States District Court for
the District of Maryland
Civil No. WDQ-12-1524
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Argued: June 4, 2014
OF MARYLAND
Misc. No. 11
September Term, 2013
______________________________________
NVR MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC., ET AL.
v.
SOREN CARLSEN
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: July 21, 2014
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“the federal court”)
certified to this Court the following question of law: “Is [an alleged violation of] the
Maryland Finder’s Fee Act [(“the FFA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975, 2013 Repl.
Vol.) (“CL”) §§ 12-801 to 12-809,] a[n] ‘[other] specialty’ . . . under [Md. Code Ann.,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJP”)] § 5-102(a)(6)[, which is a twelve-year
statute of limitations]?”
Because this case involves only CL § 12-805(d), we reformulate the certified
question of law 1 as follows: “Is an alleged violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975,
2013 Repl. Vol.) § 12-805(d) an ‘other specialty’ under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 5-102(a)(6), which is a twelve-year statute of
limitations?”
We answer the reformulated certified question of law “no” and hold that that an
alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6),
and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the default three-year statute of limitations.
BACKGROUND
In the certification order, the federal court stated the following facts, 2 which we
summarize.
In 2004, Soren Carlsen (“Carlsen”), Appellee, and NVR, Inc., Appellant, entered
into a contract under which NVR, Inc. would build a home for Carlsen, who would use
1
This Court “may reformulate a question of law certified to it.” CJP § 12-604.
2
Where another court certifies a question of law to this Court, this Court “accept[s]
the statement of facts” in the certification order. Lewis v. Waletzky, 422 Md. 647, 651
n.2, 31 A.3d 123, 125 n.2 (2011) (citations omitted).
NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. (“NVR Mortgage”), Appellant, 3 to obtain financing for the
home. Carlsen applied for a mortgage from NVR Mortgage, but Carlsen and NVR
Mortgage did not close on the mortgage. Afterward, Carlsen used NVR Mortgage to
apply for a mortgage from C&F Mortgage Corporation. In 2005, Carlsen and C&F
Mortgage Corporation closed on the mortgage, and Carlsen paid NVR Mortgage a broker
fee.
More than three but fewer than twelve years later, in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Carlsen sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (together, “NVR”), for
allegedly violating CL § 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Carlsen and
similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. 4
NVR removed this case to the federal court, in which NVR moved to certify a question of
law to this Court. The federal court granted the motion to certify and stayed proceedings
in the federal court pending this Court’s response.
DISCUSSION
NVR contends that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL §
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than
having been created solely by CL § 12-805(d). Alternatively, NVR argues that the
3
For purposes of proceedings in this Court, the federal court designated NVR, Inc.
and NVR Mortgage as “Appellants” and Carlsen as “Appellee.”
4
Specifically, Carlsen alleged that NVR failed to disclose: (1) the finder’s fee in a
separate written agreement; (2) the terms of the proposed broker agreement before NVR
undertook to assist him in obtaining a loan; and (3) the amount of the finder’s fee.
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General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) not to be an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), as the General Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 (which
is the default three-year statute of limitations) in 1973, and enacted CL § 12-805(d) in
1979. Alternatively, NVR asserts that, here, the alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is
not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because Carlsen does not seek damages
that are liquidated, fixed, or readily ascertainable by applying clear statutory criteria.
Carlsen responds that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL §
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced is created solely by CL § 12-805(d), rather than
existing as a matter of common law. Carlsen contends that the General Assembly
intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6), as, during the General Assembly’s 2012 Regular Session, the House Economic
Matters Committee gave an unfavorable report to House Bill 674, which would have
added a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA. Carlsen argues that, here, the alleged
violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because he
seeks damages that are readily ascertainable by applying clear statutory criteria.
Unabridged, CL § 12-805(d) (which is part of the FFA) states:
(1) A finder’s fee may not be charged unless it is pursuant to a written
agreement between the mortgage broker and the borrower which is separate
and distinct from any other document.
(2) The terms of the proposed agreement shall:
(i) Be disclosed to the borrower before the mortgage broker
undertakes to assist the borrower in obtaining a loan or advance of money;
(ii) Specify the amount of the finder’s fee; and
(iii) Contain a representation by the mortgage broker that the
mortgage broker is acting as a mortgage broker and not as a lender in the
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transaction.
(3) A copy of the agreement, dated and signed by the mortgage broker and
the borrower, shall be provided to the borrower within 10 business days
after the date the loan application is completed.
“Any mortgage broker who violates any provision of [the FFA] shall forfeit to the
borrower the greater of: (1) Three times the amount of the finder’s fee collected; or (2)
The sum of $500.” CL § 12-807 (paragraph breaks omitted). The FFA does not contain
a statute of limitations.
CJP § 5-101 provides: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from
the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of
time within which an action shall be commenced.” CJP § 5-102(a) states: “An action on
one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action
accrues . . . (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public
officer’s bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other
specialty.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). 5
Whether an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP
§ 5-102(a)(6) is the basis of the reformulated certified question of law. CJP § 5-102(a)(6)
is a “‘relatively narrow catchall[.]’” AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc.,
417 Md. 386, 399, 10 A.3d 745, 753 (2010) (quoting Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409
Md. 51, 70, 972 A.2d 864, 875 (2009)). An alleged violation of a statute is an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) if and only if:
5
In 2014, the General Assembly amended CJP § 5-102(c). See 2014 Md. Laws
Ch. 592. The amendment to CJP § 5-102(c) does not affect this case.
-4-
(1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right sought to be enforced is
created or imposed solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not
otherwise exist as a matter of common law; (2) the remedy pursued in the
action is authorized solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not
otherwise exist under the common law; and (3) if the action is one for civil
damages or recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages are
liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory criteria, are readily
ascertainable.
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d at 750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70,
972 A.2d at 875).
In Crowder, 409 Md. at 55, 70-72, 972 A.2d at 867, 875-76, this Court held that
certain alleged violations of the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (“the SMLL”),
CL §§ 12-401 to 12-415, were “other specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). This Court
stated:
(1) the duties, obligations, prohibitions, and rights sought to be enforced by
the plaintiffs [were] created and imposed solely by the SMLL, (2) the
remedy pursued—forfeiture of all interest and unlawfully assessed fees, or,
in the class action cases, forfeiture of three times the amount of interest
charged—[was] authorized solely by the SMLL, and (3) . . . those amounts
[were] readily ascertainable.
Id. at 72, 972 A.2d at 876 (footnote omitted).
By contrast, in AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 398, 10 A.3d at 746, 752, this
Court held that an alleged violation of the Maryland Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“the MTCPA”), CL §§ 14-3201 to 14-3202, is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA, a plaintiff can
seek actual damages instead of liquidated damages. In dicta, this Court observed that
“the common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversion” “addressed” both the
duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA and the
-5-
remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA. Id. at 400, 10 A.3d
at 753.
Here, we conclude that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL §
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than
having been created solely by CL § 12-805(d). A mortgage broker owes to a borrower a
common law duty to “disclose . . . all facts or information which may be relevant or
material in influencing the judgment or action of the [borrower] in the matter.” St. Paul
at Chase Corp. v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 215-16, 278 A.2d 12, 24, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971) (citations omitted). 6 Under CL § 12-805(d), a mortgage
broker must disclose to a borrower in a prescribed manner a finder’s fee’s existence,
which is information that may be relevant in influencing the borrower’s judgment in the
matter. An alleged violation of a statute is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) where, in an action for an alleged violation of the statute, “the duty . . . sought
to be enforced . . . exist[s] as a matter of common law[,]” rather than having been
“created . . . solely by the statute[.]” AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d at
750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875)); see also AGV Sports Grp., 417
Md. at 389, 400, 10 A.3d at 746, 753 (This Court held that an alleged violation of the
MTCPA is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and observed that “the
6
In St. Paul at Chase, 262 Md. at 215-16, 201, 278 A.2d at 24, 17, although this
Court stated that “a real estate broker” owes such a duty, this Court applied that duty to
the defendant, which was “a mortgage broker.”
-6-
common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversion” “addressed” both the duty
sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA and the remedy
pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA.). 7 Accordingly, an alleged
violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and thus
is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the default three-year statute of limitations. 8
We reject Carlsen’s contention that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an
7
An alleged violation of a statute is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) where, in an action for an alleged violation of the statute, “damages are [not]
liquidated, fixed, or” “readily ascertainable” “by applying clear statutory criteria[.]”
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d at 750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70,
972 A.2d at 875).
Here, it is unclear whether Carlsen seeks readily ascertainable damages. In the
complaint, Carlsen alleged that NVR “collected, directly or indirectly, at least
[]$7,782.48 in illegal and undisclosed fees from [Carlsen], and may have collected
additional illegal fees.” In the certification order, the federal court stated that, despite a
“significant amount of discovery[,]” “Carlsen states that he cannot yet . . . determine the
amount of finder’s fees he has paid until additional discovery is completed.” Similarly,
in his brief, Carlsen stated: “[B]ecause of the state of discovery in this case,” Carlsen
“had not obtained a definitive answer to what indirect amounts . . . NVR received in
connection with brokering” his mortgage. At oral argument, however, Carlsen’s counsel
conceded that Carlsen “may not be entitled to [indirect] damages.” Thus, as this case
illustrates, damages based on a finder’s fee that a broker allegedly indirectly imposed
may not be readily ascertainable in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d).
Moreover, it is unclear whether, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-
805(d), CL § 12-807(1), like similar statutes which provide for treble damages, caps
damages at “[t]hree times the amount of the finder’s fee collected[.]” CL § 12-807(1)
does not state whether treble damages constitute the sole remedy. This Court has not
addressed whether treble damages are the sole remedy for a violation of CL § 12-805(d).
Cf. Stevenson v. Branch Banking & Trust Corp., 159 Md. App. 620, 659, 861 A.2d 735,
758 (2004) (Writing for the Court of Special Appeals, the Honorable Sally D. Adkins
explained that “the treble damages provision of [the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law] caps an employee’s award at three times the unpaid wage.”).
8
Although we acknowledge that CL § 12-805(d)’s purpose is to protect borrowers,
a court cannot create an “equitable exception” to a statute of limitations. Anderson v.
United States, 427 Md. 99, 120, 46 A.3d 426, 438 (2012) (citation omitted).
-7-
“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of
CL § 12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced is created solely by CL § 12-805(d),
rather than existing as a matter of common law. Carlsen points out that, for example,
under CL § 12-805(d)(1), a mortgage broker must disclose a finder’s fee’s existence in a
“written agreement[.]” CL § 12-805(d) did not create a statutory duty for mortgage
brokers; instead, CL § 12-805(d) prescribed the manner in which a mortgage broker must
fulfill the mortgage broker’s common law duty to the borrower to “disclose [certain] facts
or information which may be relevant or material in influencing the judgment or action of
the [borrower] in the matter.” St. Paul at Chase, 262 Md. at 215-16, 278 A.2d at 24(citations omitted). The duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation
of a statute exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by
the statute, where the statute prescribes the manner in which a common law duty must be
fulfilled. See AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 400, 10 A.3d at 746, 753 (This Court
held that an alleged violation of the MTCPA is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6), and observed that “the common law actions of trespass to chattel and
conversion” “addressed” both the duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged
violation of the MTCPA and the remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of
the MTCPA, which prescribes the manner in which telemarketers must fulfill common
law duties.). As NVR points out, if we accepted Carlsen’s contention, then an alleged
violation of any statute that supplements the common law in any superficial way would
be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), which would no longer be a “‘relatively
narrow catchall[.]’” AGV Sports Grp., id. at 399, 10 A.3d at 753 (quoting Crowder, 409
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Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875).
We are unpersuaded by Carlsen’s reliance on Crowder, 409 Md. at 68, 972 A.2d at
874 (“If the statute imposes an obligation, and gives a special remedy therefor, which
otherwise could not be pursued, but at the same time a remedy for the same matter exists
at common law independently of the statute, and the statute does not take away the
common law remedy, the bar of the statute [of limitations] is effectual when the
common-law duty or liability is pursued, but is not applicable when the special statutory
remedy is employed.” (Alteration in original) (citation omitted)) for the contention that
an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6)
even if, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d), the duty sought to be
enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by CL
§ 12-805(d). An alleged violation of a statute is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) only if the statute creates both “the duty . . . sought to be enforced” in an action
for an alleged violation of the statute and “the remedy pursued in [an] action” for an
alleged violation of the statute. AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395, 10 A.3d at 750(quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875); see also Crowder, 409 Md. at 73,
972 A.2d at 877 (This Court held that certain alleged violations of the SMLL were “other
specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) only insofar as the plaintiffs sought the statutory
remedy of civil penalties instead of the common law remedy of having the loans declared
void or voidable.).
We are unpersuaded by Carlsen’s reliance on Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
274 F.R.D. 525, 553 (D. Md. 2011), in which the federal court held that an alleged
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violation of the FFA is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). Although the
federal court stated that “[t]he [FFA] meets [the Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at
875] requirements[,]” Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553 (quoting Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 n.4 (D. Md. 2009)), the federal court did not address
whether, in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA, the duty sought to be enforced
exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by the FFA. In
Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553, the federal court stated that, in a previously issued
memorandum opinion, it had “addressed” the defendants’ contention that “the fees
proscribed and recoverable under the FFA are also recoverable under common law claims
of unjust enrichment and for restitution[.]” In Minter, id. at 553, the federal court
addressed only the remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA, not
the duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA. Thus, we
decline to adopt Minter’s reasoning insofar as it applies to CL § 12-805(d). 9
Carlsen points out that, during the General Assembly’s 2012 Regular Session (i.e.,
after the federal court issued Minter, 274 F.R.D. 525), members of the General Assembly
sponsored House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451, which would have added a three-year
statute of limitations to the FFA. The House Economic Matters Committee gave an
9
Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 551, 551 n.31, was an action for alleged violations of both
CL § 12-805(d) and CL § 12-804(e) (“A mortgage broker may not charge a finder’s fee
in any transaction in which the mortgage broker or an owner, part owner, partner,
director, officer, or employee of the mortgage broker is the lender or an owner, part
owner, partner, director, officer, or employee of the lender.”). As noted above, this case
involves only CL § 12-805(d). Thus, we do not address whether an alleged violation of
any part of the FFA other than CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6).
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unfavorable report to House Bill 674, which its sponsors withdrew. Thus, Carlsen
contends, the General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an
“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).
We disagree. Because a bill might fail “for a myriad of [] reasons[,]” the bill’s
failure “is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining [the General
Assembly’s] intent[.]” City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299,
329, 910 A.2d 406, 424 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This
principle is especially true here, as the record indicates that House Bill 674 and Senate
Bill 451 failed primarily because they would have amended the FFA to allow finder’s
fees for “table funding.” “A ‘table-funded’ transaction is a closing at which a loan is
funded by a contemporaneous advance of loan funds and an assignment of the loan to the
person advancing the funds.” Petry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 597 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563
(D. Md. 2009) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marshall v.
James B. Nutter & Co., 816 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. Md. 2011) (A “table-funded”
transaction is one in which an individual advances funds to a broker, who, in turn, makes
the loan and then, upon closing, immediately assigns the loan to the individual, the actual
funding party.).
House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451 were entitled: “Credit Regulation - Finder’s
Fees - Table-Funded Loans.” House Bill 674’s and Senate Bill 451’s purpose paragraphs
stated:
FOR the purpose of altering the definitions of “finder’s fee”, “lender”, and
“mortgage broker” for purposes of certain provisions of law governing
finder’s fees charged by mortgage brokers to clarify that, in a table-funded
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mortgage loan transaction, fees charged by the person named as the lender
in certain documents evidencing the loan indebtedness are not considered
finder’s fees; establishing a certain statute of limitations; defining a certain
term; providing for the application of this Act; and generally relating to
finder’s fees.
Opposition to House Bill 674 was primarily based on amending the FFA to allow
finder’s fees for table funding, not adding a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA.
Carlsen directs our attention to seven letters in which stakeholders urged the House
Economic Matters Committee to give an unfavorable report to House Bill 674. In all
seven letters, stakeholders opposed House Bill 674 on the ground that House Bill 674
would have amended the FFA to allow finder’s fees for table funding. However, in fewer
than half of the seven letters did stakeholders also oppose House Bill 674 on the ground
that House Bill 674 would have added a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA. In
most of the seven letters, stakeholders—including the Consumer Protection Division of
the Office of the Attorney General and a law firm that identified itself as plaintiffs’
counsel in Bradley Petry, et al. v. Prosperity Mortgage Co., et al., which, at one point,
was consolidated into Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553, in which the federal court held that an
alleged violation of the FFA is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6)—did not
even mention that House Bill 674 would have added a three-year statute of limitations to
the FFA. Thus, the failure of House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451 does not indicate that
the General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).
Indeed, there is evidence that the General Assembly intended an alleged violation
of CL § 12-805(d) not to be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). The General
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Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 (which is the default three-year statute of limitations) in
1973, and enacted CL § 12-805(d) in 1979. CJP § 5-101’s predecessor—Md. Code Ann.,
Art. 57 § 1 (1957)—listed multiple causes of action with a three-year limitations period.
By contrast, CJP § 5-101 is “a blanket three-year provision, with exceptions for other
limitations[.]” Revisor’s Note, CJP § 5-101; see also Governor’s Commission to Revise
the Annotated Code, Commission Report No. 3F to the General Assembly of Maryland,
at 40 (July 16, 1973) (CJP § 5-101 “is a blanket three[-]year limitation covering all civil
causes of action for which no other limitation is specifically provided.”); Greene Tree
Home Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453, 461 n.1, 749 A.2d 806,
810 n.1 (2000) (CJP § 5-101 is “a ‘catch all’ for actions based on statutes that internally
did not provide a period of limitations.”). Thus, in enacting statutes after enacting CJP §
5-101, the General Assembly has been aware that, generally, CJP § 5-101 applies to
alleged violations of statutes that, like the FFA, do not contain statutes of limitations.
It is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly intended CJP § 5-101 to
generally apply to alleged violations of statutes that the General Assembly enacted after
enacting CJP § 5-101, whereas CJP § 5-102(a)(6) (which is the statute of limitations for
“other specialt[ies]”) would apply only to alleged violations of statutes that the General
Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101. Such an inference would comport
with this Court’s holdings in this and every other case in which this Court has considered
CJP § 5-102(a)(6) after the General Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 in 1973. Compare
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 10 A.3d at 746 (This Court held that an alleged
violation of the MTCPA—which the General Assembly enacted in 2004—is not an
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“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).) with Crowder, 409 Md. at 55, 70-72, 972
A.2d at 867, 875-76 (This Court held that certain alleged violations of the SMLL—which
the General Assembly enacted in 1967—were “other specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6).). 10
For the above reasons, an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the
default three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, we answer the reformulated
certified question of law “no.”
REFORMULATED CERTIFIED QUESTION OF
LAW ANSWERED. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED
EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
10
In Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, 358 Md. at 455, 461 n.1, 749 A.2d at 807,
810 n.1, this Court held that certain alleged violations of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, CL §§ 13-101 to 13-501—whose private remedy provision the General
Assembly enacted in 1973 before enacting CJP § 5-101—were not “other specialt[ies]”
under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). This Court’s holding in Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, id.
at 455, 749 A.2d at 807, gives rise to the inference that, although the General Assembly
intended CJP § 5-102(a)(6) to apply only to alleged violations of statutes that the General
Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101, the General Assembly did not
necessarily intend CJP § 5-102(a)(6) to apply to alleged violations of all statutes that the
General Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101.
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