<img alt="Brand" src="/images/eLaws/logo-elaws.png" class="img-responsive pull-left logo-head" />

.
Similar to the corroborating evidence in Thanos, the State provided additional evidence to
establish consciousness of guilt independent of the jail call recordings, including a text
message exchange, witness testimony, forensic evidence, a 911 call recording, pictures,
and video footage of the incident. Therefore, the Court concluded any error was harmless.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 135035C
Argued: September 14, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 4
September Term, 2021
__________________________________
ERIC ANTONIO ALARCON-OZORIA
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________
Getty, C.J.,
McDonald,
Watts,
Hotten,
Booth,
Biran,
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Hotten, J.
Watts, J., dissents.
Adkins, J., concurs.
__________________________________
Filed: December 21, 2021
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2021-12-21
10:28-05:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
This appeal arises from a shooting outside a restaurant in Silver Spring, Maryland
shortly after 1:00 a.m. on June 9, 2018. Witnesses and security camera footage identified
two suspects involved in the shooting. Following an anonymous tip, law enforcement
identified one of the men as Ruben Gilbert. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant
for Mr. Gilbert’s cell phone and gathered evidence implicating Eric Alarcon-Ozoria
(“Petitioner”) as the other person involved in the shooting.
Petitioner was charged with assault in the first-degree, use of a firearm in the
commission of a crime of violence, and illegal possession of a firearm after a felony
conviction. Mr. Gilbert was charged as a co-conspirator, but the State entered a nolle
prosequi disposition in June 2019. Petitioner’s jury trial was scheduled for Monday,
August 5 through Thursday, August 8, 2019 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
On the morning of August 5 before trial, the State shared with defense counsel for
the first time approximately 200 jail call recordings of conversations between Petitioner
and Mr. Gilbert. The State had requested recordings of calls made by Petitioner from a
state correctional facility on Wednesday, July 31, and received the calls on Friday, August
2. The State reviewed the recordings over the weekend, and on Sunday, August 4,
requested additional recordings of any outgoing calls from the jail to Mr. Gilbert’s phone.
At 6:00 a.m. on Monday, August 5, the correctional facility provided one additional
recording of a jail call between Mr. Gilbert and a person originally identified as another
inmate but later identified as Petitioner. During an on-the-record chambers conference, the
State identified twelve recordings received on Friday, August 2 that it might use for
impeachment purposes and the one recording received Monday, August 5 that it said it
planned to use in its case-in-chief.
Over objection of defense counsel, the circuit court admitted the jail call recordings
with the State’s assurance that it would not use the recordings in its case-in-chief or as
impeachment evidence until the second day of trial, to give defense counsel time to review
the recordings.
The jury convicted Petitioner of illegal possession of a firearm. The circuit court
sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with all but twelve years suspended
and upon release five years of supervised probation. Petitioner timely appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals, which affirmed.
We granted certiorari on April 9, 2021 to address the following questions:
1. Does the State’s obligation to exercise due diligence in identifying and
disclosing relevant materials in criminal litigation extend to phone call
recordings collected and preserved by the State’s jail facilities?
2. In a criminal case, does a recording of a defendant’s own statement that
is not disclosed until the morning of trial constitute an unfair surprise to the
defense, such that it requires relief?
We answer both questions in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court
of Special Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Underlying Incident
On June 9, 2018, a shooting occurred outside Abyssinia, an Ethiopian restaurant in
downtown Silver Spring, Maryland. The shots occurred in a nearby and “heavily
populated[]” alleyway by the outdoor side patio bar. No one was injured. The restaurant
2
had an outdoor surveillance camera facing the alleyway, but the view of the shooting was
blocked by restaurant awnings.
Amir Abdella, the manager of Abyssinia, heard the first gunshot and turned to see
a person running away, followed by the shooter, later identified as Petitioner, holding a
gun pointed towards the victim running away. A second man, who was later identified as
Mr. Gilbert, walked behind the shooter. Mr. Abdella testified that he was only five to six
feet away when he watched the shooter fire a second shot at the person running away. He
heard a third shot, but did not see it.
Mr. Abdella testified that he saw the shooter and the second man earlier sitting
together in the restaurant. He recognized these men because they sat with a group of
women not eating or drinking and “saw the discomfort of the [women.]” He eventually
called security to ask them to leave. Mr. Abdella provided to law enforcement security
footage depicting the two men sitting together at a table and identified one of the men as
Petitioner. Mr. Abdella described the shooter at trial, but admitted that he might not be
able to identify the shooter again if he saw him.1 At least one other witness, Christopher
Parkes, a security guard at the adjacent Kaldi’s Social House restaurant, heard multiple gun
shots and saw muzzle flashes followed by people scattering in the alleyway. A firearms
1
The description of the shooter provided by Mr. Abdella at trial contradicted, in
part, his description of the shooter made during the initial 911 call. During trial, he testified
that the shooter was 5’8” wearing a white shirt and black pants, but during the 911 call, he
described the shooter as about 5’1” or 5’2” and wearing a white shirt with a black logo,
black pants, and black sneakers.
3
expert corroborated the testimony of Mr. Parkes and opined that the two collected shell
casings came from the same weapon.
The State also produced another nearby restaurant surveillance video that depicted
the two suspects: a taller man and a shorter man holding a gun. On July 30, law
enforcement issued a press release seeking the public’s help in identifying the two men
involved in the shooting. An anonymous tip identified the taller man as Mr. Gilbert. Law
enforcement compared the Motor Vehicle Administration photo of Mr. Gilbert with the
surveillance footage and determined they were the same person. Law enforcement
obtained a search warrant of Mr. Gilbert’s phone and found the following text conversation
between Mr. Gilbert and Petitioner:
[Petitioner:] Is dere a camera At dat lil side bar[?]
[Petitioner:] And Erin just asked me bout you[.]
[Mr. Gilbert:] Tell her hit me[.]
[Mr. Gilbert:] N id[]k we Gucci doe babe[.]
This text exchange occurred approximately one hour after the shooting. According to the
detective assigned to the case, the “[s]idebar” referred to Abyssinia’s outdoor side patio
bar in the alleyway—“the only [s]idebar in this entire area.” The detective also explained
that the phrase “we Gucci” is slang for “we’re good.”
Law enforcement executed an arrest warrant for Petitioner and Mr. Gilbert. Officers
seized clothes in the home of Petitioner consistent with those worn by the shooter in the
surveillance video. The Grand Jury for Montgomery County indicted Petitioner on charges
of assault in the first-degree, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and
illegal possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. A jury trial was scheduled for
4
August 5 through August 8, 2019 in the circuit court. Mr. Gilbert was charged as a co-
conspirator, but a nolle prosequi disposition was entered for Mr. Gilbert in June 2019.
Legal Proceedings
A. Discovery
On January 23, 2019, defense counsel filed a discovery request, “in accordance with
Maryland Rule 4-263:[2] . . . [for all] material and information in the possession or control
of the State’s Attorney . . . and any others who have participated in the investigation or
evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or, with reference to the particular
case, have reported to the State’s Attorney of his/her office.” (Emphasis added). The
purpose of the request was to “obtain disclosure of material and information to the fullest
extent authorized and directed by Maryland Rule 4-263[.]” (Emphasis added). On May
15, 2019, defense counsel requested additional discovery pursuant to the State’s
2
Maryland Rule 4-263(c) provides:
(c) Obligations of the Parties.
(1) Due Diligence. The State’s Attorney and defense shall exercise due
diligence to identify all of the material and information that must be
disclosed under this Rule.
(2) Scope of Obligations. The obligations of the State’s Attorney and the
defense extend to material and information that must be disclosed under
this Rule and that are in the possession or control of the attorney,
members of the attorney’s staff, or any other person who either reports
regularly to the attorney’s office or has reported to the attorney’s office
in regard to the particular case.
Cross reference: For the obligations of the State’s Attorney, see State v.
Williams,

[,

] (2006).
5
obligations under the Maryland Rules and State v. Williams,

(2006), for any “recordings . . . or other materials concerning any . . . statements made by”
Mr. Gilbert or Petitioner.
The State assured defense counsel that it would “open its evidentiary file” so defense
counsel could see the State did not possess any “written statements by any witnesses
otherwise not provided.” The State also assured the circuit court about its good faith
compliance with discovery obligations: “I think it’s important that the Court know that we
have met with counsel. . . . Open file discovery is the policy of my office, and open file
discovery has been the practice in this case. We have met no less than two times . . . where
we’ve gone through the file to make sure everything in counsel’s file reflects everything in
the State’s file[.]” The circuit court acknowledged the two parties’ cooperation during a
status hearing on July 25, 2019: “I appreciate counsel working together as you obviously
are doing to try to work out as many of these issues as you can.”
On July 26, the State disclosed additional evidence that it intended to introduce.
The evidence was an activity log, gathered from Mr. Gilbert’s cellular phone, that
purportedly counted Mr. Gilbert’s steps during different time frames on the night of the
shooting. Defense counsel moved to exclude the evidence as untimely and non-compliant
with Md. Rule 4-263(c). On July 31, the circuit court agreed with defense counsel that the
evidence should be excluded, but not because of a bad faith or unduly late disclosure on
behalf of the State. The circuit court found the disclosure unfair to the defense under the
circumstances “given that the parties had reached an agreement on . . . the scope of the
6
information that would be used from the cell phone [seized from Mr. Gilbert].” The
activity log exceeded the scope of the parties’ stipulation and was excluded.
On July 31, in preparation for trial, the State requested from Mr. Amando Gomes,
an employee at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility, any recordings of jail calls
made by Petitioner as an inmate at the correctional facility. Counsel for the correctional
facility delivered 201 jail call recordings to the State’s Attorney on Friday, August 2. The
assigned prosecutor took them home over the weekend and began reviewing the calls on
Saturday, August 3.
The recordings contain calls made by Petitioner from December 19, 2018 to August
1, 2019. Petitioner first made a call to Mr. Gilbert on April 15, 2019 and subsequently
called Mr. Gilbert “no less than 12 times.” The last call Petitioner made to Mr. Gilbert
occurred on July 16, 2019. Each call lasted approximately twenty minutes.
The State characterized most of the conversations as “sundry discussi[on]” and
devoid of a “smoking gun in terms of [‘]I did this.[’]” A few of the conversations discussed
the case and referenced the unwillingness of Mr. Gilbert to provide testimony. The “State
was concerned at the potential of suborning perjury and obstruction of justice. . . .” The
State concluded that it would not use these calls in its case-in-chief, but could use some of
them for impeachment if Mr. Gilbert testified.
The State emailed Mr. Gomes on Sunday, August 4, requesting a backwards search
of Mr. Gilbert’s phone number to identify any jail calls made to his phone. Mr. Gomes
replied via email at 6:00 a.m. on Monday, August 5 with one jail call made to Mr. Gilbert
on April 2 (“the April 2 call”) from the account of another detainee with the last name
7
Pinto.3 In the April 2 call, Mr. Gilbert answered the phone and asked if the person calling
was named “Sosa”—a nickname used by Petitioner. Petitioner answered in the affirmative
and they proceeded to discuss the case over the course of a fifteen-minute conversation.
The State shared the call recordings with defense counsel at the courthouse on the
morning of August 5. During an on-the-record chambers conference, the State identified
twelve calls between Petitioner and Mr. Gilbert that could be used to impeach Mr. Gilbert
during his testimony. The State also proffered the April 2 call between Mr. Gilbert and
Petitioner to use in its case-in-chief. While the call was made through another inmate’s
PIN number, the State explained that the call was between Petitioner and Mr. Gilbert.
Defense counsel objected to the proposed evidence as untimely and requested a one-
day continuance. The State argued that Petitioner waived any right to challenge the call
because he attempted to conceal it using another inmate’s PIN number. The State offered
to withhold reference to the recordings in its opening statement and not to call Mr. Gilbert
until the second day of trial because “the State certainly d[i]dn’t want to catch [defense
counsel] by surprise.” The State also asked the circuit court and defense counsel to
“understand the predicament the State is bound in when [it’s] listening to calls of
obstruction of justice within this trial. And then [it] learn[s] of a call that was made by the
defendant that was hidden and was [not] meant to be [] found which [the State] found.”
3
Each inmate at Montgomery County Correctional Facility receives an individual
personal identification number (“PIN”) to make outgoing calls.
8
The circuit court did not rule on whether the State violated its discovery obligations,
but denied the request for continuance. The circuit court articulated its belief that defense
counsel would have an opportunity to review the April 2 call by the second day of trial.
B. The Trial
The State neither mentioned the April 2 call during its opening statement, nor called
Mr. Gilbert as a witness on the first day of trial. In addition to Mr. Gilbert’s testimony, the
State called thirteen witnesses, consisting of civilians, members of law enforcement, and
forensic experts. The State also presented fifty-eight exhibits, including three surveillance
videos from nearby establishments. When the State called Mr. Gilbert, on the second day
of trial, he testified that he was friends with Petitioner, and they were together at Abyssinia
on the night of the shooting. He testified that the surveillance video depicted him and
Petitioner, but that he did not see Petitioner with a gun, nor did he see Petitioner fire any
shots.
Over a renewed objection from Petitioner, the State introduced the jail call
recording:4
Mr. Gilbert: Who is this, is this Sosa?
[Petitioner]: Yeah, yeah.
***
[Petitioner]: I said I’m trying to figure something out []. . . .
Mr. Gilbert: Uh-huh. It’s still looking like nothing going, man. . . . So, I
ain’t worried about this, get you back on the brick, bro.
[Petitioner]: Yeah, yeah. []. . . .
***
Mr. Gilbert: []. Sorry, I’m trying to get you situated. . . . I feel like you were
with that bitch. And that bitch was fucking with (unintelligible). . . . It was
her or somebody close to us.
4
This excerpt of the recording omits numerous lines of unintelligible dialogue.
9
***
Mr. Gilbert: I ain’t done nothing.
[Petitioner]: Shut up.
Mr. Gilbert: Hey, I don’t. That’s how it is bro. That’s how I’m going to be,
you feeling me? . . . There wasn’t no problem when you did that.
[Petitioner]: Yeah.
Mr. Gilbert confirmed that the call was between him and Petitioner, even though the call
was made using the PIN number of another inmate.
At the close of evidence, the circuit court granted judgment of acquittal as to first-
degree assault and use of firearm in a crime of violence. The jury convicted Petitioner of
illegal possession of a firearm. The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years’
imprisonment, with all but twelve years suspended, and upon release five years of
supervised probation.
C. The Court of Special Appeals
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unreported opinion.
Alarcon-Ozoria v. State, No. 2149, Sept. Term, 2019,

2020 WL 7706980

 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Dec. 29, 2020). The Court reached the merits of the discovery violation, even though
the circuit court did not find a discovery violation, and Petitioner failed to insist upon a
ruling “as he is required to do[.]” Id. at *5. In the absence of a “specific finding as a matter
of law that the State violated the discovery rule,” the Court “exercise[d] independent de
novo review to determine whether a discovery violation occurred[.]” Id. (quoting Williams
v. State,

364 Md. 160

, 169,

771 A.2d 1082

, 1087 (2001)).
The Court concluded that the State did not violate its discovery obligations. Id. at
*6. According to the Court, the disclosure of the jail call recordings did not violate Md.
10
Rule 4-263 because the State did not have an underlying obligation to seek or obtain the
jail call recordings. Id. The Court explained, “the State was not under a duty to disclose
materials that it did not have.” Id. The Court rejected the argument that the State had an
obligation to seek the records at any point prior to trial. Id.
The Court also found that the State exercised due diligence. According to the Court,
“[i]t is significant that [Petitioner] attempted to conceal the call by using another inmate’s
phone number to make the call, and we agree that [Petitioner] cannot claim unfair surprise”
when Petitioner was “an active concealer.” Id.
Finally, the Court found that the State was sufficiently prompt in providing the
recordings to Petitioner. The State shared the recordings after having an opportunity to
review the materials over the weekend. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion,
according to the Court, by declining to continue the case for a day. Id. The circuit court
fashioned an appropriate remedy by allowing the State to refrain from mentioning the
recording in its opening statement and to delay calling Mr. Gilbert so Petitioner could
review the recording. Id.
Petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court granted on April 9,
2021. Alarcon-Ozoria v. State,

474 Md. 220

253 A.3d 1076

 (2021).
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The circuit court is vested with broad discretion in administering discovery.
Williams v. State,

416 Md. 670

, 698,

7 A.3d 1038

, 1054 (2010). Therefore, this Court
“reviews for abuse of discretion a [circuit] court’s decision to impose, or not impose a
11
sanction for a discovery violation.” Dackman v. Robinson,

464 Md. 189

, 231,

211 A.3d 307

, 332 (2019) (citing Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester Cty. Bd. of Educ.,

419 Md. 194

, 232,

18 A.3d 890

, 913 (2011)).
If the circuit court “made no specific finding as a matter of law that the State violated
the discovery rule, we exercise independent de novo review to determine whether a
discovery violation occurred.” Williams,

364 Md. at 169

771 A.2d at 1087

.
We review any discovery violation for harmless error. Johnson v. State,

360 Md. 250

, 269,

757 A.2d 796

, 806 (2000); Green v. State,

456 Md. 97

, 165,

171 A.3d 1162

, 1201
(2017) (“Having established that the State violated [Md.] Rule 4-263[] . . . we must next
inquire as to whether the error was harmless.”). “If the trial judge erred because the State
did in fact violate the discovery rule, we consider the prejudice to the defendant in
evaluating whether such error was harmless.” Williams,

364 Md. at 169

771 A.2d at 1087

(citation omitted).
The Contentions of the Parties
Petitioner contends that the State violated its discovery obligations by producing jail
call recordings on the morning of the trial. According to Petitioner, the State had a
mandatory and automatic obligation to disclose the jail call recordings without delay or
request pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263. This obligation extended to material in the possession
or control of the correctional facility because, according to Petitioner, the State exercised
a supervisory relationship over the facility.
Petitioner argues that the supervisory relationship can be demonstrated by the
State’s direct and informal access to materials held by the correctional facility. The State
12
received the recordings within 48 hours of an email request, and the recordings were “hand-
delivered” to the State’s Attorney’s Office. According to Petitioner, private counsel would
need to wait at least nine days pursuant to Md. Rule 4-265(d)5 before a subpoena request
for jail call recordings would be enforceable.
Because the jail call recordings were purportedly under the constructive possession
and control of the State, Petitioner asserts that the State violated its obligation of due
diligence pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) by failing to identify and disclose the jail call
recordings until the morning of trial. Petitioner cites this Court’s definition of due diligence
from Argyrou v. State,

349 Md. 587

, 604,

709 A.2d 1194

, 1202 (1998), which examined
due diligence in the context of Md. Rule 4-331(c) (providing the grant of a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence). Petitioner notes that due diligence requires both good
faith and timeliness. According to Petitioner, the State’s effort to locate the jail recordings
on the eve of trial violated the timeliness component of due diligence. The lack of
knowledge of the recordings, according to Petitioner, did not excuse the State from its
obligation of due diligence during discovery. Petitioner also argues the State’s assertion,
5
Maryland Rule 4-265(d) provides:
(d) Filing and Service. Unless the court waives the time requirements of
this section, a request for subpoena shall be filed at least nine days before
trial in the circuit court, or seven days before trial in the District Court, not
including the date of trial and intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.
At least five days before trial, not including the date of the trial and
intervening Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, the clerk shall deliver the
subpoena for service pursuant to [Md.] Rule 4-266(b). Unless impracticable,
there must be a good faith effort to cause a trial subpoena to be served at least
five days before the trial.
13
that Petitioner deliberately concealed his conversation with Mr. Gilbert by using the PIN
number of another inmate is unsupported by the record.
Finally, Petitioner contends that the late disclosure prejudiced his defense and
necessitates vacating his conviction. Petitioner notes that the purpose of discovery is to
assist the defendant in preparing a defense and to prevent unfair surprise. According to
Petitioner, both of these purposes were violated by the State. Petitioner did not learn about
the jail call recordings until the morning of the trial, which meant that it had no time to
adjust its trial strategy that had been in the works for months. Petitioner asserts that the
State intentionally delayed seeking the calls and in doing so, engaged in “gamesmanship”
in violation of discovery rules. The call itself provided evidence of Petitioner’s
consciousness of guilt, which meant the jury was presented incriminating evidence without
an adequate opportunity for the defense to respond.
The State argues that the scope of its discovery obligations did not extend to the
correctional facility, because the scope of its obligations extends only to materials under
the possession or control of the State’s Attorney, or someone who reports regularly to the
State’s Attorney, such as a staff member or law enforcement. A correctional facility staff
member, according to the State, is not a person who regularly reports to the State’s
Attorney. The State asserts that its discovery obligations may extend to persons outside of
its office only if they constitute a prosecutorial arm of the government. A correctional
facility, like other state agencies including mental health facilities or juvenile detention
facilities, do not operate for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting cases. Nor does a
correctional facility, unlike a prosecutor or a police officer, report to the State’s Attorney.
14
The State contends no reporting relationship emerged between the correctional
facility and the State’s Attorney’s Office in the case at bar. The State requested the calls
from a correctional facility employee, who did not respond until the next day. The
Assistant State’s Attorney also emailed the employee over the weekend preceding the trial
and did not receive a response until Monday morning. In both of these instances, according
to the State, the correctional facility fulfilled requests for information, which does not
establish a reporting relationship as contemplated by Md. Rule 4-263(c).
The State also raises practical concerns about Petitioner’s interpretation of the
State’s discovery obligations. Incarcerated defendants, including Petitioner, may make jail
calls from the time of arrest until trial. The State argues that it would be impractical to
require continuous requests for jail calls during this time period. Interpreting the scope of
Md. Rule 4-263(c) to include a correctional facility, according to the State, would place an
undue burden on prosecutors because it would extend mandatory disclosures from within
the State’s Attorney’s Office and its agents to virtually any state agency that may possess
discoverable information.
The State also rejects Petitioner’s contention that its late disclosure constituted
“strategic, last-minute gamesmanship[,]” by drawing a distinction between the State’s
capacity to acquire the jail call recordings at an earlier date and the State’s obligation to
acquire the jail call recordings at an earlier date. The State notes that it could have made
an earlier inquiry, but it was not required to do so.
Therefore, the State asserts that its obligation to act promptly in disclosing the jail
calls did not materialize until the State gained possession of the material. The State
15
received the calls on Friday, August 3, reviewed them over the weekend to identify which
calls were relevant, and disclosed the calls on Monday, August 5. The State notes that the
April 2 call—used in its case-in-chief—was not obtained by the State until Monday,
August 5. The State alternatively argues that even if it had an obligation to disclose the
jail recordings sooner, Petitioner’s attempt to conceal the call from detection prevents any
finding of unfair surprise.
Assuming arguendo that a discovery violation occurred, the State argues that the
circuit court imposed an appropriate remedy. The State contends that the circuit court has
discretion to impose or not impose a sanction for a discovery violation. In this case, the
circuit court declined the defense’s request for a one-day continuance, but accepted the
State’s offer to delay mentioning the April 2 call or Mr. Gilbert’s testimony until the second
day of trial to give defense counsel an opportunity to review the recording. The circuit
court’s exercise of discretion, according to the State, appropriately remedied any violation
that may have arisen from the State’s morning-of disclosure.
Finally, the State argues that even if the circuit court erred by not continuing the
trial one day for a fifteen-minute phone recording that the State received and disclosed
within the same day, the error was harmless. Defense counsel reviewed the call but did
not make any arguments during trial relating to its late disclosure. The State conceded the
call was not a “smoking gun” because it only contained speculation about who made the
anonymous tip to police about the identity of Mr. Gilbert. The recording tended to
demonstrate consciousness of guilt of Petitioner, but according to the State, did not affect
16
the verdict given the panoply of other evidence that more clearly demonstrated
consciousness of guilt.
Application of Md. Rule 4-263(c)
A. The scope of the State’s mandatory disclosure obligations pursuant to Md.
Rule 4-263(c)(2) does not include jail call recordings held by a state
correctional facility that has not reported to the State in a particular case.
Md. Rule 4-263(c) provides:
(c) Obligations of the Parties.
(1) Due Diligence. The State’s Attorney and defense shall exercise due
diligence to identify all of the material and information that must be disclosed
under this Rule.
(2) Scope of Obligations. The obligations of the State’s Attorney and the
defense extend to material and information that must be disclosed under this
Rule and that are in the possession or control of the attorney, members of the
attorney’s staff, or any other person who either reports regularly to the
attorney’s office or has reported to the attorney’s office in regard to the
particular case.
Cross reference: For the obligations of the State’s Attorney, see State v.
Williams,

[,

] (2006).
“To interpret [discovery rules], we use the same canons and principles of
construction used to interpret statutes.” Williams,

392 Md. at 206

896 A.2d at 980

 (quoting
State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella,

331 Md. 270

, 274,

627 A.2d 1055

, 1057 (1993)). We
begin our analysis by looking at the plain meaning of the rule. Johnson,

360 Md. at

264–
65,

757 A.2d at 804

.
“When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any
further. . . . Only when the language of the rule is ambiguous is it necessary that we look
elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.” Williams,

392 Md. at 207

896 A.2d at

980
17
(quoting Strazzella,

331 Md. at

274–75,

627 A.2d at 1057

) (citations omitted). This Court
may “search[] for rulemaking intent in other indicia, including the history of the Rule or
other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the rulemaking process, in light of: (1) the
structure of the Rule; (2) how the Rule relates to other laws; (3) the Rule’s general purpose;
and (4) the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Green,
456 Md. at 125, 171 A.3d at 1178 (citations, quotations, and other marks omitted).
“We may also consider other persuasive sources beyond the text of the rule,
particularly case law interpreting the rule in question.” Williams,

364 Md. at

171 n.13,

771 A.2d at

1088 n.13. Case law interpreting prior versions of the rule is both persuasive and
instructive.

771 A.2d at

1088 n.13.
This Court in Williams examined the plain text of the substantially similar
predecessor to Md. Rule 4-263.6 The scope of mandatory discovery obligations for the
State comprised three groups: (1) the State’s Attorney, (2) his or her staff members, (3) and
those “who have participated, or are participating, in the case itself, by, for example,
participating ‘in the investigation or evaluation of the action[,]’ regularly reporting to the
6
The previous version of Md. Rule 4-263(c), which was formerly labeled Md. Rule
4-263(g), stated:
The obligations of the State’s Attorney under this Rule extend to material
and information in the possession of the State’s Attorney and staff members
and any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the
action and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular
action have reported, to the office of the State’s Attorney.
Williams,

364 Md. at

176–77,

771 A.2d at 1091

.
18
State’s Attorney’s Office, or, with respect to the case under review, have reported to the
State’s Attorney’s Office.”

392 Md. at 208

896 A.2d at 981

 (emphasis added).
While the Williams Court did not address whether the scope of the State’s discovery
obligations extended to other State agencies, this Court held that such mandatory
disclosures would only apply in limited circumstances, precisely enumerated by the rule.

 at 209–10,

896 A.2d at 982

 (“We hold that by referring only to the ‘State’s Attorney
and staff members,’ without any restriction, and then including ‘any others,’ restricted to
those with a direct present or past involvement with the particular action, [the rule] draws
a distinction between the State’s Attorney’s Office and those outside that Office who are
on the prosecution team.”) (Emphasis added).
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Thomas v. State,

397 Md. 557

919 A.2d 49

 (2007). In Thomas, a defendant told an FBI Agent, following his arrest, that “God has
forgiven me.”

Id. at 564

919 A.2d at 53

. The case proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court
for Charles County. The prosecutor advised the circuit court that he learned of the “God
has forgiven me” statement one week before trial and informed defense counsel the same
day.

919 A.2d at

53–54. The defense objected to the untimely disclosure as a violation
of Md. Rule 4-263, but the circuit court determined that there was no discovery violation.

Id. at 565

919 A.2d at 54

. The defendant was convicted and appealed.

 at 565–66,

919 A.2d at 54

. Noting that FBI agents do not regularly report to the State’s Attorney’s Office,
the Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant’s statements to the FBI agent did not
fall within the State’s disclosure obligation until the agent first “reported” that information
19
to the State’s Attorney. Thomas v. State,

168 Md. App. 682

, 695,

899 A.2d 170

, 178
(2006).
This Court agreed that the scope of discovery obligations generally does not extend
to agents outside the State’s Attorney’s Office:
Ordinarily, the obligation to . . . provide discovery [and] impute information
within the knowledge of a State agent to the State’s Attorney, does not apply
to federal agents because they do not usually participate in the investigation
or evaluation of the action and do not either regularly report, or with
reference to the particular action, actually report to the office of the State’s
Attorney.
Thomas,

397 Md. at 569

919 A.2d at 56

 (emphasis added). However, the FBI agent in
Thomas may have triggered the discovery obligations of the State because “[h]e
participated in the investigation as a member of the Washington, D.C. Cold Case Unit, he
arrested [Thomas], and he wrote a report in the matter.”

919 A.2d at 56

.7
This Court’s prior interpretation of the scope of the State’s discovery obligations
demonstrates that a jail call recording, held by a correctional facility, does not trigger the
State’s mandatory disclosure requirements pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(c) because the
correctional facility is not part of the State’s Attorney’s Office, nor does it directly or
regularly report to the State’s Attorney in this case. This Court considered extending the
scope of Md. Rule 4-263(c) to an FBI agent in Thomas because the record demonstrated
that the FBI agent was working hand in glove with Maryland law enforcement and the
State’s Attorney. Unlike the FBI agent in Thomas, who arrested the defendant, solicited
7
This Court never determined whether the statement made to an FBI agent triggered
the mandatory disclosure obligation of the State because it concluded the belated disclosure
was not prejudicial.

Id. at 569

919 A.2d at 56

.
20
an incriminating statement during a criminal investigation, and wrote a report, a
correctional facility generally takes no part in the investigation or prosecution of someone
who happens to be detained in that facility.
We reject Petitioner’s contention that the correctional facility reported to the State’s
Attorney in this particular case by providing the jail call recordings upon request. The
State requested material held by the correctional facility that was equally available to both
parties. The correctional facility, like any state agency responding to an information
request, fulfilled a ministerial function. See Blundon v. Taylor,

364 Md. 1

, 17 n.9,

770 A.2d 658

, 667 n.9 (2001) (“[c]lerical duties are generally classified as ministerial”)
(citations and quotation omitted).
We are not persuaded by the claim of Petitioner that requesting the records via
email, as opposed to subpoena pursuant to Md. Rule 4-265(d), demonstrates preferential
treatment, thereby establishing a reporting relationship between the correctional facility
and the State’s Attorney. The plain text of the rule does not define “reports regularly” or
“has reported[,]” but Petitioner’s interpretation of the rule would lead to untenable results.
See Frost v. State,

336 Md. 125

, 137,

647 A.2d 106

, 112 (1994) (“[W]e seek to avoid
constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.”). If
information sharing between state entities without a subpoena established a reporting
relationship, then there would be no limit to the State’s Attorney’s disclosure obligations.
Petitioner’s interpretation would significantly expand the scope of the rule as articulated
by this Court in Williams and Thomas, which held that mandatory disclosure only extends
21
to the State’s Attorney’s Office, its support staff, and agents who regularly participate in
the investigation or prosecution of a case, or who have participated in the specific case.
We hold that the scope of the State’s discovery obligations did not extend to a jail
call recording in the possession of a state correctional facility, a facility that was not part
of the State’s Attorney’s Office, nor did it participate in the investigation or prosecution of
the instant case.
B.     The State exercised due diligence in disclosing the jail call recordings under the
circumstances.
Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) obligates parties to exercise due diligence in identifying
all information and material that must be disclosed under the rule. This Court has not
examined the due diligence requirement pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) since its addition
to the rule in a 2008 amendment. Like Md. Rule 4-263(c)(2), we interpret the plain text of
Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) in light of the object and purpose of the rule, and may consult its
enactment history and case law for interpretive guidance.
The plain text of Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) indicates that the obligation for due diligence
only attaches to material “that must be disclosed under this Rule.” (Emphasis added).
Material must be disclosed when two conditions are satisfied. First, as discussed above,
the material must fall within the scope of discovery obligations pursuant to Md. Rule 4-
263(c)(2), i.e., “in the possession or control of the attorney, members of the attorney’s staff,
or any other person who either reports regularly to the attorney’s office or has reported to
the attorney’s office in regard to the particular case.” Md. Rule 4-263(c)(2).
22
Second, the material must satisfy one of the several categories of information
enumerated by Md. Rule 4-263(d).          Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1) is the category of
information relevant to the instant case because it pertains to statements of the defendant.
It requires the State’s Attorney to provide the defense, without a request, “[a]ll written and
oral statements of the defendant and of any co-defendant that relate to the offense charged
and all material and information, including documents and recordings, that relate to the
acquisition of such statements[.]” Md. Rule 4-263(d)(1) (emphasis added). We assume
without deciding that at least some of the jail call recordings between Petitioner and Mr.
Gilbert satisfied Md. Rule 4-263(d)(1) because the material contained statements of the
defendant that referenced the ongoing prosecution.
The statements did not meet the first condition necessary for mandatory
disclosure—“in the possession or control” of the State’s Attorney or a person that reports
regularly to the State’s Attorney or had reported in the particular case—until Friday,
August 5 when the State received the recordings from the correctional facility. Md. Rule
4-263(c)(2). Therefore, the obligation to exercise due diligence, according to the plain text
of the rule, did not attach until it came into the actual or constructive possession or control
of the State’s Attorney. See Warrick v. State,

302 Md. 162

, 170–71,

486 A.2d 189

, 193
(1985) (“There are, nevertheless, limitations on the State’s obligations under Md.[ ]R. 741
a 2 [the predecessor to Md. Rule 4-263]. . . . [The rule] limits that which is discoverable .
. . to material and information in possession or control of [the State’s Attorney, of]
members of his [or her] staff and of any others who have participated in the investigation
or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular
23
case have reported to his [or her] office.”) (quotation and footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
This plain text interpretation of due diligence is consistent with the object and
purpose of discovery, the history of Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1), and relevant case law. Berry v.
Queen,

469 Md. 674

, 688,

233 A.3d 42

, 50 (2020) (“In addition to the plain language, the
modern tendency of this Court is to continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain
meaning . . . in order to ‘check [] our reading of a statute’s plain language[.]’. . .”) (quoting
In re: S.K.,

466 Md. 31

, 50,

215 A.3d 300

, 311 (2019)) (citations omitted).
The main objective of the discovery rule is to assist the defendant in preparing his
defense, and to protect him from surprise. Hutchins v. State,

339 Md. 466

, 473,

663 A.2d 1281

, 1285 (1995); Mayson v. State,

238 Md. 283

, 287,

208 A.2d 599

, 602 (1965). The
rule accomplishes its purpose through its mandatory disclosure provisions. Collins v. State,

373 Md. 130

, 146–47,

816 A.2d 919

, 928 (2003) (quoting Williams,

364 Md. at 172

771 A.2d at 1089

). There is nothing in the plain text of Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) that requires due
diligence in identifying material that falls outside mandatory disclosure provisions. State
v. Cork,

322 Md. 93

, 103,

585 A.2d 833

, 838 (1991) (noting that the Maryland Rules are
“precise rubrics” to be strictly followed). The obligation of due diligence helps protect the
defendant from unfair surprise, but the underlying purpose of Md. Rule 4-263 does not
warrant extending the obligation of due diligence to materials beyond the grasp of the
State’s Attorney. The State should always err on the side of disclosure, State v. Brown,

327 Md. 81

, 95,

607 A.2d 923

, 930 (1992), but the right to discovery is not unlimited. Derr
v. State,

434 Md. 88

, 124,

73 A.3d 254

, 275 (2013).
24
The history of Md. Rule 4-263 supports the conclusion that the obligation of due
diligence does not attach until the material comes within the possession or control of the
State’s Attorney, or a person who regularly reports to the State’s Attorney, or has reported
to the State’s Attorney in the particular case. The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (“the Rules Committee”) submitted its One Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report to
this Court in 2007, in which it proposed the addition of the due diligence requirement to
Md. Rule 4-263. The purpose of the amendment was to “to clarify the State’s discovery
obligations . . . and make other changes to discovery in a criminal action in a circuit
court[.]” Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, One Hundred Fifty-
Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 4 (Sept.
26, 2007). The Committee Note8 explained the addition of due diligence to the rule:
The due diligence required by subsection (a) (1) does not require affirmative
inquiry by the State with regard to the listed examples [of materials that must
be disclosed under the rule] in all cases, but would require such inquiry into
a particular area if information possessed by the State, as described in
subsection (a) (2), would reasonably lead the State to believe that affirmative
inquiry would result in discoverable information.
Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
The Committee Note highlights that the obligation for due diligence is not an
affirmative duty, but one triggered by information in possession of the State. As an
example, the Committee Note provides that “[d]ue diligence does not require the State to
obtain a copy of the criminal record of a State’s witness unless the State is aware of the
8
A Committee Note is incorporated into the Maryland Rules. Green, 456 Md. at
145 n.8, 171 A.3d at 1189 n.8.
25
criminal record. If, upon inquiry by the State, a witness denies having a criminal record,
the inquiry and denial generally satisfy due diligence unless the State has reason to question
the denial.” Id. at 110–11 (emphasis added). A criminal record, like a recorded statement
of the defendant, constitutes a type of material that the State’s Attorney shall provide to the
defense without request. Md. Rule 4-263(d)(2). The Committee Note indicates that the
State would not have an obligation to track down a criminal record with due diligence,
unless the State is at least aware of the criminal record.
The history of Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1) demonstrates that the State’s Attorney does not
have an obligation to track down a recording made by the defendant in the possession of a
third party, unless the State’s Attorney was at least made aware of the existence of that
recording. Once the State became aware of the recording held by a third party, it likely
would have the obligation to exercise due diligence in identifying and obtaining the
recording. This conclusion is underscored by the reporter’s note which acknowledged that
the obligation of due diligence attaches to material that each party is required to provide.
Id. at 119. Nothing in the report submitted by the Rules Committee indicated that due
diligence obligates the State to proactively request materials that may or may not be held
by third parties.
In the case at bar, the State did not become aware of the recorded statements made
by the Petitioner while incarcerated at the correctional facility until it requested and
received such statements on Friday, August 2. Upon receipt of the materials, the State had
had an obligation to exercise due diligence in identifying whether any of the recordings
must be disclosed pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(d)(1). We find nothing in the record that
26
indicates the State’s prior awareness of the recorded statements until it received the
materials from the correctional facility on Friday, August 2, 2019.
Petitioner argues that the requirement of due diligence pursuant to Md. Rule 4-
263(c)(1) should have obligated the State to investigate the existence of any jail call
recordings prior to the week before trial. Even if the State was not actually aware of the
recordings, Petitioner contends that the State should have been aware of the recordings.
Petitioner’s argument is not supported by the text or history of the rule. The plain
text of the rule expressly omits any language that the State should proactively discover
materials held by third parties uninvolved in the prosecution or investigation of a case. The
history of the rule indicates that this omission was not inadvertent. Following a hearing on
the One Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report, the Rules Committee undertook “a further review
of the discovery process in criminal cases in light of the ABA Standards, what is ultimately
required under both Federal and Maryland Constitutional law, and how the discovery
process can be clarified, made more effective, and promote greater fairness and efficiency
in overall criminal procedure.” Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Supplement to the One Hundred Fifty-Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure at 2 (Mar. 28, 2008) (“the Supplement”). The rule as it stands
now reflects the changes proposed by the Rules Committee.
In its review, the Rules Committee:
obtained and considered both the ABA Standards and the ABA Commentary
to them. It had available to it the discovery rules applicable in Federal
criminal cases and the rules adopted in other States, along with relevant case
law. All of the individuals and groups that had indicated an interest in the
matter were invited to submit written comments regarding the ABA
27
Standard[s,] and whether, or to what extent, there should be any departure
from them. The Criminal Rules Subcommittee met, [and] gave initial
consideration to the ABA Standards and the written comments that had been
received[.] . . .
Id.
This Court considered but declined to fully adopt the more permissive ABA
Standards with respect to Md. Rule 4-263. Id. at 3. “[O]ne of the principal objectives of
the rewriting of [Md.] Rule[] . . . 4-263 is to bring greater clarity to what is required, so
that disputes can be avoided and the process can work more effectively. To that end, [Md.]
Rule 4-263 provides some common examples of information . . . [that] would need to be
disclosed. Those examples are not intended to extend the scope of discovery but better to
define it.” Id. at 3–4 (emphasis in original).
The Supplement also reveals an intent to make the due diligence obligation less
demanding than the ABA counterpart. Appendix C of the Supplement9 noted that the due
diligence requirement “is generally consistent with [ABA Standards] but is stated in
somewhat broader terms.” Supplement, App’x C at 3.10
9
“Unlike a Committee Note, an appendix to a Report of the Rules Committee does
not become incorporated into the Maryland Rules.” Green, 456 Md. at 145 n.8, 171 A.3d
at 1189 n.8.
10
Assuming arguendo that the more permissive ABA due diligence obligation was
the Maryland Rule, the State presumably still would have not violated discovery rules.
Standard 11-4.3(b) requires the [prosecutor] to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that information relevant to the defendant and the offense is provided
to the prosecutor by investigative personnel. Standard 11-4.3(c) provides
that, if the prosecutor is aware of discoverable information possessed by a
government agency that does not report to the prosecutor’s office, the
(continued . . . )
28
The Rules Committee added to Md. Rule 4-263(c) the cross-reference to State v.
Williams,

 (2006), to illustrate, in part, the limits of the
obligation of due diligence. Williams concerned exculpatory information pertaining to a
registered police informant that was unknown to the assigned prosecutor, but was well
known to the Baltimore City Police Department and the State’s Attorney.

Id. at 200

896 A.2d at 976

. While describing the disclosure obligations under Brady, this Court remarked:
[I]t is proper to consider the State’s Attorney Office as a single entity. As
the seeker of truth, the State, as prosecutor, cannot seek to insulate itself from
its constitutionally mandated duty by dividing itself into pieces, thus
permitting one piece to claim ignorance of the knowledge of the other pieces.
. . . By enforcing a consistent standard applicable to all in the State’s
Attorney’s Office, we believe that nondisclosures such as the one leading to
this appeal will be avoided.

Id. at 223

896 A.2d at 990

 (emphasis added). The State violated its obligation of due
diligence in Williams because it failed to overcome artificial divisions within its office and
law enforcement to provide material to the defendant. The material was at all times within
the possession, control, or at least knowledge, of the State’s Attorney or one of its agents,
but the State failed to take reasonable steps to deliver the information to defense counsel.
(. . . continued)
prosecutor must disclose the existence of that information.

 (Emphasis added). The ABA rule requires due diligence once the information comes
into the possession of an investigator or the prosecutor becomes aware of the information.
Like its Md. Rule 4-263 counterpart, the ABA rule notably omits language such as “should
have been aware” of the information. The correctional facility was not a State investigator,
and the State could not have been aware about the discoverable material until it received
the recordings on August 2.
29
Pursuant to the plain text of Md. Rule 4-263(c)(1), persuasive commentary of the
Rules Committee and relevant case law, the obligation of due diligence did not take effect
in the case at bar until the State received the jail call recordings on Friday, August 2. Once
the State acquired the recordings, it satisfied its due diligence obligation by disclosing the
material within several days. Whether a party exercised due diligence depends on the
circumstances of the case. See Argyrou,

349 Md. at 605

709 A.2d at 1203

 (noting the
assessment of due diligence, at least in the context of newly discovered evidence, must be
assessed “in light of the totality of circumstances”); Joyner v. State,

208 Md. App. 500

,
529,

56 A.3d 787

, 805 (2012) (holding no discovery violation occurred when the State
disclosed expert testimony eight days before trial because State fulfilled its continuing duty
to disclose); Raynor v. State,

201 Md. App. 209

, 229,

29 A.3d 617

, 629 (2011) (concluding
that defendant may have been surprised by the reference to previously undisclosed emails
during trial, but the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a mistrial).
In anticipation of trial, the State requested jail calls made by Petitioner from an
employee at the correctional facility on Wednesday, July 31. The employee responded
Thursday, August 1 and informed the State that it would deliver the material on Friday
August 2. The State reviewed the calls on Saturday. The State contacted the employee on
Sunday to request a reverse-look up of Mr. Gilbert’s number, and received the April 2 call
at 6 a.m. on Monday, August 5.
Three days elapsed between the State’s possession of the 201 recordings of calls
made by Petitioner and sharing with defense counsel. The State could have immediately
disclosed all 201 calls that it received on Friday, but under the circumstances, it would have
30
only provided at most two days extra notice to defense counsel. Considering these calls
arrived on the eve of trial, sending 201 recordings, most of which the State decided not to
use for trial, could have unduly burdened the defense with extraneous discovery review
during a period of critical trial preparation. Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti,

227 Md. 8

, 13,

174 A.2d 768

, 771 (1961) (noting the purpose of discovery is to “eliminate, as far as
possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled
state of mind[.]”). The April 2 recording—used in the State’s case-in-chief—was shared
with defense counsel on the same day that it was received. The State could not have shared
the April 2 call any sooner.
The State’s decision to request a reverse look-up of Mr. Gilbert’s phone number
also tends to demonstrate the exercise of due diligence under the circumstances. The initial
request of jail calls made by Petitioner did not include the April 2 call because it was made
through the PIN number of another inmate. Regardless of whether Petitioner deliberately
attempted to conceal the call by using another inmate’s PIN number, it would not have
been found but for the endeavor of the State under the circumstances. We conclude that
the State exercised due diligence in this case.
C.     Even if the State violated its discovery obligations through its late disclosure,
the error was harmless.
In the past, this Court has applied harmless error review when assessing the impact
of a discovery violation. Green, 456 Md. at 165, 171 A.3d at 1201. The purpose of the
harmless error rule is to prevent a small error, “assuming, [arguendo], that [there] was
error[,]” from setting aside convictions for a defect that would not have changed the result
31
at trial. State v. Babb,

258 Md. 547

, 552,

267 A.2d 190

, 193 (1970). Assuming arguendo
that the State’s disclosure of the jail call recordings on the morning of trial violated its
discovery obligations, it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
“[W]hen a discovery violation comes to light in the course of trial, whether any
sanction is to be imposed and, if so, what it is to be, is in the first instance committed to
the discretion [of] the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion includes evaluating
whether a discovery violation has caused prejudice.” Warrick,

302 Md. at 173

486 A.2d at 194

 (citations omitted). The rule “does not require the court to take any particular action
or any action at all.” Bellard v. State,

229 Md. App. 312

, 340,

145 A.3d 61

, 78 (2016)
(quoting Thomas,

397 Md. at 570

919 A.2d at 57

) (emphasis added).
The determination of the circuit court “will be disturbed on appellate review only if
there is an abuse of discretion. That review, however, does not involve a search of the
record for grounds, not relied upon by the [circuit] court, which the appellate court believes
could [or could not] support the [circuit] court’s action.” North River Ins. Co. v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore,

343 Md. 34

, 47–48,

680 A.2d 480

, 487 (1996). “An
appellate court does not reverse a conviction based on a [circuit] court’s error or abuse of
discretion where the appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the [circuit]
court’s error or abuse of discretion did not ‘influence the verdict’ to the defendant’s
detriment.” Hall v. State,

437 Md. 534

, 540–41,

87 A.3d 1287

, 1291 (2014) (citations
omitted). A discovery violation that unfairly surprises a defendant and prejudices the
ability of a defendant to mount an adequate defense generally “cannot be construed as
harmless error.” Collins,

373 Md. at 148

816 A.2d at 929

; Thomas,

397 Md. at 574

, 919
32
A.2d at 59 (explaining that prejudice pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263 turns on the harm
resulting from delay in disclosure).
In Thanos v. State,

330 Md. 77

622 A.2d 727

 (1993), the circuit court declined to
grant relief for an asserted discovery violation by the State.

Id. at 96

.
According to the defendant in Thanos, “the State neglected to provide him with the names
of three witness whom it called at trial, in violation of Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(1).[11]”

Id. at 96

 (footnote omitted). This Court held that assuming the State violated
Md. Rule 4-263 by failing to provide the names of three witnesses called at trial, “any error
in the State’s discovery violations was harmless” given ample corroborating evidence.

Id. at 97

. The defendant had confessed to the crime, and the State provided
testimony of a medical examiner that “independently corroborated [the defendant’s]
confession[.]”

. “The [circuit] court’s failure to grant relief for the
State’s discovery violations was not reversible error.”

622 A.2d at

736–37.
Similar to the State’s corroborating evidence in Thanos, in the case at bar, the State
presented evidence that established consciousness of guilt independent of the April 2 call.
The State introduced the April 2 call to establish that Petitioner knew about the security
camera footage of the shooting and that somebody had revealed the identity of Petitioner
or Mr. Gilbert to law enforcement:
Mr. Gilbert: It was her or somebody close to us.
***
Mr. Gilbert: I ain’t done nothing.
11
Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(1) formerly required the State provide the defense
without request the names of each State’s witness. This requirement is now provided by
Md. Rule 4-263(d)(3)(A).
33
[Petitioner]: Shut up.
Mr. Gilbert: Hey, I don’t. That’s how it is bro. That’s how I’m going to be,
you feeling me? . . . There wasn’t no problem when you did that.
[Petitioner]: Yeah.
The conversation does not directly reference the shooting or the camera, and was
hampered by unintelligible dialogue when played before the jury. Conversely, the text
exchange between Petitioner and Mr. Gilbert expressly demonstrates relief that certain
events were not caught on film by the alleyway camera where the shooting took place:
[Petitioner:] Is dere a camera At dat lil side bar[?]
[Petitioner:] And Erin just asked me bout you[.]
[Mr. Gilbert:] Tell her hit me[.]
[Mr. Gilbert:] N id[]k we Gucci doe babe[.]
The State also provided additional evidence that established the guilt of Petitioner,
including forensic evidence, pictures and video footage of the scene, 911 audio, and
multiple witnesses’ testimony.
The call also did not unfairly surprise the defendant or prejudice the ability of the
defendant to mount a defense. Thomas,

397 Md. at 574

919 A.2d at 59

. Petitioner was
already prepared to negate the allegation of consciousness of guilt from the text exchange
between Petitioner and Mr. Gilbert. Petitioner emphasized throughout the trial that the
State relied on circumstantial evidence, and the April 2 call was another example of the
State using a chain of inferences, instead of an express statement by Petitioner, to
demonstrate consciousness of guilt. Petitioner also chose not to address the April 2 call in
his case-in-chief, instead presenting an argument about its authentication.          Finally,
Petitioner argued throughout the trial, and even before this Court, that the State had a weak
case.
34
We find no indication that the April 2 call, coupled with other evidence presented
over the course of two days at trial, had substantial bearing on the outcome of the case.
The disclosure of evidence in this case was undoubtedly last minute, but the impact of the
disclosure did not unduly surprise the defendant, undermine the ability to prepare a defense,
or substantially influence the jury. Thomas,

397 Md. at 574

919 A.2d at 59

. Therefore,
the decision of the circuit court not to find a discovery violation, assuming arguendo that
it was made in error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously explained, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.
35
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 135035C
Argued: September 14, 2021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 4
September Term, 2021
______________________________________
ERIC ANTONIO ALARCON-OZORIA
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Getty, C.J.
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Booth
Biran
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: December 21, 2021
Respectfully, I dissent. I cannot join the Majority’s determination that in a criminal
case the State’s requirement to exercise due diligence with respect to discovery extends no
further than to material already within the State’s Attorney’s possession or control. See
Maj. Slip. Op. at 22. Such an interpretation of Maryland Rule 4-263 is contrary to its plain
language and rulemaking history. Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) obligates the State’s
Attorney to “exercise due diligence to identify all of the material and information that must
be disclosed under this Rule.” The plain language of the subsection is not qualified or
limited by a requirement that the State’s Attorney use due diligence to identify only
discoverable information that is already in the State’s possession or control.
I would not read into the subsection a requirement that does not exist and that the
history of the Rule does not support. I would hold that the State’s Attorney in this instance
failed to exercise due diligence by waiting until the Wednesday before a trial was scheduled
to begin on Monday to request, as part of “last-minute” trial preparation, jail call recordings
and by disclosing the recordings on the first day of trial. I would determine that a discovery
violation occurred and that the error was not harmless.
I share the view that a correctional facility does not become an agency that reports
to the State’s Attorney by virtue of having responded to a request for jail call records and,
as such, the records were not under the control of the State’s Attorney within the meaning
of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(2). See Maj. Slip. Op. at 21. A contrary result could lead to
the illogical conclusion that any agency, or perhaps any individual, would “report” to the
State’s Attorney within the meaning of the Rule by simply responding to a request for
information. See Maj. Slip. Op. at 21.
This inquiry, however, distracts from recognizing the State’s Attorney’s obligation
under Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1), which provides: “The State’s Attorney and defense shall
exercise due diligence to identify all of the material and information that must be disclosed
under this Rule.” Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(2) provides:
The obligations of the State’s Attorney and the defense extend to material
and information that must be disclosed under this Rule and that are in the
possession or control of the attorney, members of the attorney’s staff, or any
other person who either reports regularly to the attorney’s office or has
reported to the attorney’s office in regard to the particular case.
Clearly, material and information that must be disclosed under the Rule may be distinct or
different from material and information that is possessed by or under the control of the
State’s Attorney. Under a plain reading of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1), the State’s Attorney
is required to use due diligence to identify all of the material and information that must be
disclosed under the Rule regardless of whether the material and information is in the
possession or control of the State’s Attorney.
Maryland Rule 4-263(d) sets forth a list of material and information that the State’s
Attorney is required to disclose without the necessity of a request. Under Maryland Rule
4-263(c)(1), the State’s Attorney must use due diligence to identify all material and
information that must be disclosed under section (d); and, under Maryland Rule 4-
263(c)(2), the State’s Attorney is required to disclose all such material and information that
is in the State’s Attorney’s possession or control. Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) does not limit
the duty of the State’s Attorney to identify material and information that must be disclosed
to a discrete look at what the State already possesses or controls. Rather, Maryland Rule
4-263(c)(1) requires that the State’s Attorney identify or promptly follow up on identifying
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information that must be disclosed under the Rule, such as a defendant’s oral statements,
regardless of whether the information is in the State’s possession or control.
Under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1), “[w]ithout the necessity of a request, the State’s
Attorney shall provide to the defense[ a]ll written and oral statements of the defendant and
of any co-defendant that relate to the offense charged[.]” No one disputes that the jail calls
at issue in this case are “oral statements of the defendant” under Maryland Rule 4-
263(d)(1). Because a defendant’s oral statements constitute material that the State’s
Attorney would be required to disclose under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1), the plain
language of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) obligated the State’s Attorney to exercise due
diligence in identifying the existence of the statements. The Majority concludes that
material must be disclosed when two conditions are met—first, “the material must fall
within the scope of discovery obligations pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(c)(2),” and second,
“the material must satisfy one of the several categories of information enumerated by Md.
Rule 4-263(d).” Maj. Slip Op. at 22-23. But, the Majority fails to give effect to the plain
language of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1).
The construction of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) that is consistent with its plain
language is that a State’s Attorney must exercise due diligence to identify material and
information that must be disclosed. The plain language of (c)(1) does not confine the
State’s Attorney’s due diligence requirement to the scope provision of (c)(2) or use any
limiting language. In other words, if the circumstances of a case indicate to the State’s
Attorney that material and information described in Maryland Rule 4-263(d) exists outside
of the State’s Attorney’s office’s possession or control, the State’s Attorney may not delay
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in identifying the material and information. The choice of the word “identify” in Maryland
Rule 4-263(c)(1) is instructive. Logically, if the State’s Attorney’s obligation to exercise
due diligence with respect to oral statements of the defendant applied only to material that
the State’s Attorney already possessed or controlled, the requirement that the State’s
Attorney “identify” material and information that must be disclosed would be rendered
meaningless. The plain language interpretation of the Rule would prevent the absurd
outcome of permitting the State’s Attorney to be aware of the likelihood of oral statements
by a defendant or exculpatory information, for example, but having no duty to exercise due
diligence to identify the statements or exculpatory information because the statements or
exculpatory information are in the custody of a third party and not in the State’s Attorney’s
possession or control.
In addition to its plain language, the history of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) supports
the proposition that the due diligence obligation extends beyond material in the possession
and control of the State’s Attorney. In 2007, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (“the Rules Committee”) undertook a major overhaul of the criminal
discovery rules and issued its 158th Report, in which it, among other things, proposed
amendments to Maryland Rule 4-263. See Rules Committee, 158th Report at 1 (Sept. 26,
2007), available at https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/rules/reports/
158thReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU9T-RDTE]. In a cover letter to this Court dated
September 26, 2007, Judge Joseph H. Murphy, then Chair of the Rules Committee,
explained that “[a]mendments to Rule 4-263 [were] proposed to clarify the State’s
discovery obligations under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83

 (1963) and its progeny and
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make other changes to discovery in a criminal action in a circuit court, as explained in the
Reporter’s note that follows the Rule.” 158th Report at 4. In the 158th Report, the
Committee note following proposed sections (a) and (b) of Maryland Rule 4-2631
explained the due diligence requirement as follows:
The due diligence required by subsection (a)(1) does not require affirmative
inquiry by the State with regard to the listed examples in all cases, but would
require such inquiry into a particular area if information possessed by the
State, as described in subsection (a)(2), would reasonably lead the State to
believe that affirmative inquiry would result in discoverable information.
Due diligence does not require the State to obtain a copy of the criminal
record of a State’s witness unless the State is aware of the criminal record.
If, upon inquiry by the State, a witness denies having a criminal record, the
inquiry and denial generally satisfy due diligence unless the State has reason
to question the denial.
158th Report at 110-11 (underlining omitted).
This Court held an open meeting on the 158th Report and deferred consideration of
the proposed amendment to Maryland Rule 4-263 “pending further study[.]” Court of
Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order at 3 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at https://www.courts.
state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/rules/rodocs/ro158.pdf      [https://perma.cc/RC3C-
UPDX]. After we deferred consideration of the 158th Report for further study, on March
7, 2008, the Rules Committee held a meeting and discussed the proposed amendment of
Maryland Rule 4-263. See Rules Committee, Minutes of Meeting at 4 (Mar. 7, 2008),
available at https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/minutes-rules/20080307.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QA6Q-FGX3]. Subsequently, in a Supplement to the 158th Report, the
1
Proposed Maryland Rule 4-263(a) and (b) later became Maryland Rule 4-263(c)
and (d), respectively.
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Rules Committee explained Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1)’s relationship to the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) Standards for Criminal Justice. See Rules Committee, Supplement
to 158th Report at 2 (Mar. 25, 2008), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/
import/rules/reports/158supplementappx.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW5A-AGHV].
In the Supplement, the language of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) was substantively
identical to the language in subsection (a)(1) in the 158th Report. See 158th Report at 108;
Supplement to 158th Report at 14. However, the Committee note describing the due
diligence requirement no longer existed. See 158th Report at 110-11; Supplement to 158th
Report at 14-15. Instead, in an appendix to the Supplement, the Rules Committee stated
that Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) “is generally consistent with Standard 11-4.3(b) and (c)
but is stated in somewhat broader terms.” Supplement to 158th Report, App. C at 3.
According to the Rules Committee, ABA “Standard 11-4.3(b) requires the prosecutor to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that information relevant to the defendant and the offense
is provided to the prosecutor by investigative personnel.”

 (emphasis in original). And,
ABA “Standard 11-4.3(c) provides that, if the prosecutor is aware of discoverable
information possessed by a government agency that does not report to the prosecutor’s
office, the prosecutor must disclose the existence of that information.”

Considering this history, it is clear that the Rules Committee intended a State’s
Attorney’s due diligence obligation under Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) to extend beyond the
scope of Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(2). The Rules Committee expressly informed this Court
that Maryland Rule 4-263(c)(1) was intended to be “generally consistent with” ABA
Standards 11-4.3(b) and (c), but “somewhat broader[.]”