Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Sanderson , 465 Md. 1 ( 2019 )

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland Montgomery Jarrat Sanderson, Miscellaneous
Docket No. 3, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT:
Respondent, Garland Montgomery Jarrat Sanderson violated several provisions of the
Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland
Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) in his representation of former
clients Olugboyega Odubanjo, Sharon Ozel, Duane Wilkinson, Darren Parham, and
Toumany Sangare. He also violated these provisions with respect to a non-client Tuesday
Isom-Cyrus. Mr. Sanderson engaged in a pattern of mismanaging client funds held in
escrow, including making cash withdrawals, depositing funds from his operating account
to his attorney trust account, and failing to timely deliver settlement proceeds. In addition,
Mr. Sanderson failed to maintain records associated with his attorney trust account, failed
to appear in court on behalf of several clients, failed to respond to requests by both Bar
Counsel and clients, urged a former client to provide Bar Counsel with misinformation in
attempt to interfere with the investigation, and failed to adequately communicate with his
clients.
Mr. Sanderson violated: (1) MLRPC 1.1; (2) MLRPC 1.2; (3) MLRPC 1.3; (4) MLRPC
1.4; (5) MLRCP 1.5; (6) MLRCP 1.15; (7) MLRPC 3.4; (8) MLRPC 8.1; (9) MLRPC
8.4; (10) Maryland Rule 19-407; (11) Maryland Rule 19-408; (12) Maryland Rule 19-410;
and Md. Code (1984, 2014 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations and Professions § 10-306.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-18-002381 AG
Argued: April 5, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 3
September Term, 2018
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
GARLAND MONTGOMERY JARRAT
SANDERSON
Barbera, C.J.
Greene,
McDonald,
Watts,
Hotten,
Getty,
Battaglia, Lynne A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Getty, J.
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
Filed: July 23, 2019
2019-07-23 13:02-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-721, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, Garland Montgomery Jarrat Sanderson,
in this Court on March 26, 2018. In the Petition, Bar Counsel charged Mr. Sanderson with
multiple violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct,1 throughout
his representation of several clients, including: (i) MLRPC 1.1 (Competency); (ii) MLRPC
1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney);
(iii) MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence); (iv) MLRPC 1.4 (Communication); (v) MLRPC 1.5 (Fees);
(vi) MLRPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); (vii) MLRPC 8.1 (Bar
Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and (viii) MLRPC 8.4 (Misconduct). The Petition
also alleged several violations of the provisions regulating attorney trust accounts
including: (i) Maryland Rule 19-407; (ii) Maryland Rule 19-408; (iii) Maryland Rule 19-
410; and (iv) Md. Code (1984, 2014 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations and Professions
(“BOP”) § 10-306.
The charges emanated from various complaints filed with Bar Counsel against Mr.
Sanderson, stretching across Mr. Sanderson’s representation of several clients. Pursuant
to Maryland Rule 19-722, we referred the Petition to Judge John S. Nugent of the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City for a hearing to determine findings of fact and recommended
1
On July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) were
renamed to the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”). Mr.
Sanderson’s violative conduct occurred before and after recodification of the Rules. We
will therefore refer to the to the rules under the designation MLRPC as there is no
substantive difference between the two.
conclusions of law. See also Md. Rule 19-727. The hearing spanned two days occurring
on November 26 and 27, 2018.
On January 10, 2019, the hearing judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Therein, he concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1; 1.2 (a) and (c);
1.3; 1.4(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b); 1.5(c); 1.15(a), (b), (c), and (d); 3.4;2 8.1; and 8.4(a), (c), and
(e). The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated Maryland Rules 19-
410(b), 19-407, 19-408, and BOP § 10-306.
Both Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. In terms of his factual findings,
both parties agree that the hearing judge incorrectly determined that Mr. Sanderson owed
one of his clients, Ms. Sharon Ozel, $6,900 instead of $4,900. Mr. Sanderson also took
exception to several of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, and each will be discussed
at length within our analysis. Bar Counsel’s sole exception to the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law concerned the hearing judge’s failure to find that Mr. Sanderson
violated MLRPC 8.4(d). In terms of an appropriate sanction, Bar Counsel urged this court
to disbar Mr. Sanderson; whereas, Mr. Sanderson recommended a more lenient sanction –
a six-month suspension with an ability to reinstate once he satisfies certain conditions.
This Court held oral argument in the matter on April 5, 2019. Although Larry
Rogers, Esq., entered his appearance as counsel to represent Mr. Sanderson in these
2
The hearing judge failed to specify which subsection of MLRPC 3.4 Mr. Sanderson
violated.
2
proceedings and although Mr. Rogers was present at oral argument, Mr. Sanderson argued
on his own behalf. By per curiam order dated April 5, 2019, we disbarred Mr. Sanderson.
In this opinion, we explain the reasons for that order.
BACKGROUND
We summarize the hearing judge’s findings of fact and the record submitted at the
attorney grievance hearing as follows.
Mr. Sanderson’s Legal Practice
Mr. Sanderson has been a member of the Bar of Maryland since 2005. He operates
as a solo practitioner with offices in Baltimore City and Silver Spring. His practice has
primarily focused on child in need of assistance (“CINA”) cases, personal injury, criminal
and immigration cases. Throughout the events described herein, Mr. Sanderson maintained
a Maryland attorney trust account with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”).
Bar Counsel Docket No. 2013-297-04-14
The first complaint against Mr. Sanderson originated from his representation of a
client, Olugboyega O. Odubanjo before Judge Patricia Mitchell of the District Court of
Maryland sitting in Montgomery County. In short, Mr. Sanderson failed to appear in court
on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo. As a result, Judge Mitchell filed a complaint against him with
Bar Counsel.
On January 24, 2013, Mr. Odubanjo was charged with three potentially incarcerable
traffic offenses. Mr. Odubanjo’s initial trial date was set for August 9, 2012. After
appearing before the court without counsel, Mr. Odubanjo requested a continuance so that
3
he could retain counsel. The district court granted the continuance and rescheduled the
hearing for January 24, 2013.
The day before Mr. Odubanjo’s trial, i.e., January 23, 2013, Mr. Sanderson filed a
motion for continuance and an entry of appearance on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo.3 In the
motion, Mr. Sanderson explained that he was unable to participate in the hearing scheduled
for the following day because of a scheduling conflict. Further, Mr. Sanderson entered his
appearance of Mr. Odubanjo the day prior to trial, knowing full well he would be unable
to appear before the court if his motion were denied. On the morning of January 24, 2013,
the district court denied the motion because the court determined that Mr. Sanderson’s
action of “accepting a case knowing of [ ] existing, conflicting trial dates did not constitute
good cause for a [second] continuance.”4
Unaware of the motion or its denial, Mr. Odubanjo appeared before the district court
on January 24, 2013. When Mr. Odubanjo’s case was called, Judge Mitchell delayed the
hearing in attempt to locate Mr. Sanderson. Ultimately, Mr. Sanderson failed to appear on
behalf of Mr. Odubanjo despite Judge Mitchell’s denial of his motion for continuance. Mr.
Sanderson’s absence caused further delay in the resolution of Mr. Odubanjo’s case and
required the court to schedule a third hearing. Consequently, Mr. Odubanjo then
3
In Mr. Sanderson’s entry of appearance, he indicated that he began representing Mr.
Odubanjo on January 18, 2013. However, the motion was not filed in the district court
until January 23, 2013.
4
February 18, 2013 Letter from Judge Patricia Mitchell, District Court of Maryland,
Montgomery County to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.
4
terminated Mr. Sanderson’s representation, and Judge Mitchell filed a complaint with Bar
Counsel regarding Mr. Sanderson’s conduct.
On March 14, 2013, after receiving Judge Mitchell’s complaint, Bar Counsel sent a
letter to Mr. Sanderson requesting he explain in writing why he failed to appear in court on
Mr. Odubanjo’s behalf. The communication indicated that Bar Counsel required additional
information to determine whether the matter should be classified as a formal documented
complaint or non-disciplinary in nature. Additionally, Bar Counsel’s letter provided Mr.
Sanderson with fifteen days to respond to the request. In a letter dated April 29, 2013, Mr.
Sanderson provided Bar Counsel with an untimely response. Therein, he represented that
he understood his actions were inappropriate but argued they were driven by a desire to
assist Mr. Odubanjo.
In correspondence dated March 14, 2013, Bar Counsel informed Mr. Sanderson that
his case required additional review to determine whether he violated provisions of the
MLRPC throughout his representation of Mr. Odubanjo. On May 23, 2013, Bar Counsel
sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson that requested he provide Bar Counsel with a copy of his
entire client file for Mr. Odubanjo. In the letter, Bar Counsel provided Mr. Sanderson with
a fifteen-day period to respond. Again, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond in a timely manner.
On July 3, 2013, Mr. Sanderson responded to Bar Counsel’s request for Mr. Odubanjo’s
client file. In this correspondence, with reference to a client file corresponding to his
representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson replied that “no such documents or
documents [sic] exist[,]” and denied that Mr. Odubanjo ever retained him as his attorney.
Mr. Sanderson continued by stating, “I attempt [sic] to get a postponement for Mr.
5
Odubanjo, and if that would have been granted we were to make arrangements for
representation.”
Conditional Diversion Agreement
On January 6, 2014, based on Mr. Sanderson’s alleged misconduct in his
representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel entered into a Conditional
Diversion Agreement (“CDA”), pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-716.5 The agreement was
for a period of two years and therein Mr. Sanderson agreed that he had violated MLRPC
1.1 by failing to appear on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo. As a condition of his agreement with
Bar Counsel, Mr. Sanderson consented to the appointment of a monitor. The monitor’s
role involved providing oversight of certain aspects of Mr. Sanderson’s practice,
conducting regular communication and meetings with Mr. Sanderson, and filing reports
with Bar Counsel at specified intervals. Under the CDA, Mr. Sanderson was also required
to attend two legal education courses sponsored by the Maryland State Bar Association
(“MSBA”): one course focusing on managing a law office and a second concerning
attorney trust account management. The Attorney Grievance Commission approved the
CDA on February 14, 2014 and stayed the corresponding disciplinary matter.
From the time of the CDA until Bar Counsel filed a petition to revoke the CDA on
April 25, 2017, Midgett S. Parker Jr., Esq. of the Law Office of Linowes & Blocher, LLP
served as Mr. Sanderson’s monitor. Within this period, Mr. Parker filed twelve reports
5
At the time, Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel entered into the CDA, the Rule authorizing
and regulating CDAs was codified as Maryland Rule 16-736.
6
with Bar Counsel. During Parker’s tenure as Mr. Sanderson’s monitor, he met with and
counseled Sanderson multiple times. Following the meetings, Mr. Parker would draft
communications regarding Mr. Sanderson’s progress and communicate his conclusions to
Bar Counsel. In each report, Mr. Parker indicated that Mr. Sanderson was receptive to his
suggestions and guidance.
Over the two-year time frame of the CDA, Mr. Sanderson completed several of the
requirements. Despite this, the twelfth and final report by Mr. Parker, dated September 12,
2016, noted that Mr. Sanderson failed to attend any courses sponsored by the MSBA
involving law office and attorney trust account management. On December 15, 2016, Bar
Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson advising of his failure to comply with the CDA. At
the time, Mr. Sanderson did not respond to or contest Bar Counsel’s assertion.
Consequently, Bar Counsel revoked the CDA and lifted the stay on the underlying
disciplinary proceedings. While Mr. Parker monitored Mr. Sanderson, Bar Counsel
received four other complaints against Mr. Sanderson. Bar Counsel engaged in further
investigation into two of the four complaints.
Bar Counsel Docket No. 2017-0152
Shortly after Bar Counsel sent notice to Mr. Sanderson regarding his failure to
comply with the CDA, Bar Counsel received a communication from Wells Fargo notifying
it of an overdraft on Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account in the amount of $114.83. On
January 25 and March 7, 2017, Bar Counsel sent letters to Mr. Sanderson which informed
him that Bar Counsel was aware of the overdraft on his attorney trust account, requested a
complete explanation of the overdraft, and requested access to records concerning Mr.
7
Sanderson’s attorney trust accounts. In both correspondences, Bar Counsel requested that
Mr. Sanderson respond within ten days. However, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to
either of Bar Counsel’s inquiries. On April 10, 2017, Bar Counsel issued a subpoena
requesting that Wells Fargo produce any and all records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s
trust account from January 1, 2016 until the date of the subpoena.
A month after Bar Counsel issued the subpoena, Mr. Sanderson left a voicemail for
Bar Counsel in which he stated that he could “submit the documents next week.” Bar
Counsel returned Mr. Sanderson’s call, was unable to reach him, and left a voicemail. On
May 11, 2017, Bar Counsel wrote again to Mr. Sanderson, mentioned the voicemail, and
requested that Mr. Sanderson provide the requested documents by May 19, 2017. On June
15, 2017, Bar Counsel sent a letter to Mr. Sanderson reiterating the contents of the previous
letter and providing Mr. Sanderson with a revised deadline to supply the documents – June
25, 2017. In the correspondence, Bar Counsel also requested to be informed if Mr. Rogers
was representing Mr. Sanderson in the instant disciplinary matter.
On June 19, 2017, Wells Fargo responded to Bar Counsel’s subpoena and provided
extensive records concerning Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust and operating accounts. On
June 22, 2017, Mr. Rogers wrote to Bar Counsel but failed to clarify the reason for the
overdraft. Instead, Mr. Rogers only indicated that the overdraft was related to a filing fee
in a civil case and the deficiency had since been rectified. Additionally, Mr. Rogers
referred to Mr. Sanderson’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the CDA and stated his
intention to discuss subsequent complaints filed against Mr. Sanderson with Bar Counsel
at a later date. On July 13, 2017, Bar Counsel sent another correspondence to Mr.
8
Sanderson, and he again failed to respond. Altogether, Bar Counsel wrote Mr. Sanderson
six times requesting an explanation for the overdraft.6 With respect to each
correspondence, Mr. Sanderson failed to timely respond, failed to offer an adequate
explanation, and failed to provide any records associated with his attorney trust account.
In the interim, Charles E. Miller, IV, an investigator for the Attorney Grievance
Commission, began to investigate Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account records as a
result of the overdraft notice provided by Wells Fargo. During the review, in addition to
the overdraft that acted as a catalyst for the investigation, Mr. Miller determined that Mr.
Sanderson engaged in several impermissible practices on multiple occasions, including: (i)
making cash disbursements from his attorney trust account; (ii) transferring funds from his
operating account into his attorney trust account; (iii) failing to maintain client funds in
trust until earned; and (iv) using client funds to pay other clients.7
Mr. Miller determined that Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account overdraft
originated from his representation of Sharon Ozel. In 2015, Ms. Ozel retained Mr.
Sanderson to represent her in a personal injury matter involving a car accident. Initially,
Ms. Ozel met with Mr. Sanderson at the Juvenile Justice Center in Baltimore to discuss the
representation. During the meeting, Mr. Sanderson failed to adequately explain to Ms.
6
This includes the correspondences between Bar Counsel and Mr. Rogers after it learned
that Mr. Rogers was representing Mr. Sanderson in this attorney discipline matter.
7
The facts underlying some of the financial allegations against Mr. Sanderson will be
detailed at great length within the relevant portion of our analysis to obviate any needless
recitation of facts.
9
Ozel the amount of his fee, but she testified at the disciplinary hearing that she believed he
would receive a $2,000 sum from any settlement or judgment in the matter. Mr. Sanderson
later negotiated a settlement in Ms. Ozel’s personal injury action.
In July 2016, Mr. Sanderson contacted Ms. Ozel and asked her to meet him at a
movie theater in Owings Mills to provide her with a check for $2,000. Ms. Ozel testified
that Mr. Sanderson had her sign a form to release the $2,000, and never informed her of
the $6,900 settlement check from USAA. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Mr.
Sanderson had her sign the settlement check and a form to release $2,000.00. However,
he failed to provide Ms. Ozel with a copy of the form, never mentioned the $6,900 total,
and did not provide her with the $2,000 check they had previously discussed.
The hearing judge determined that “[i]n late July 2016, [Mr. Sanderson] provided
Ms. Ozel with an additional $2,000 and told her that money was still owed from a worker’s
compensation claim.” Next, in December of 2016, Mr. Sanderson provided Ms. Ozel with
a check for $2,900 which he represented emanated from a worker’s compensation claim.
Approximately a year later, while under investigation by Bar Counsel, Mr. Sanderson
contacted Ms. Ozel. In a telephone conversation, Mr. Sanderson asked Ms. Ozel if she had
been contacted by anyone regarding his representation of her. She informed him that, at
the time, she had not been contacted by anyone. Approximately four or five days later,
Ms. Ozel encountered Mr. Sanderson at the Baltimore City Juvenile Court. She testified
that during this encounter, he again asked whether she had been contacted by anyone
regarding his representation of her. He then instructed her that, if anyone were to contact
her, she should inform them that she retained him in a different matter in addition to the
10
personal injury matter, later changed her mind, and requested that he refund the $2,900.
The record reflects that Ms. Ozel never retained Mr. Sanderson in another matter and
therefore the statement he urged her to provide to any potential investigators was patently
false. He then requested that Ms. Ozel repeat the information back to him in an apparent
attempt to ensure that she memorized the narrative of falsehoods. According to Ms. Ozel’s
testimony, approximately one month later, he called her again. When she answered, he
told her “I’m sorry,” and then hung up the phone.
Mr. Miller’s review of the financial records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s
attorney trust account revealed that Mr. Sanderson had mismanaged client funds for several
of his clients including Darren Parham and Duane Wilkinson. First, Mr. Miller determined
that Mr. Sanderson used funds belonging to one client, Darren Parham, and used them to
pay another client, Mattie Hines.
During his representation of Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Sanderson received a settlement
check for $40,000 from the Cincinnati Insurance Company. On November 28, 2016, he
deposited the check into his attorney trust account. Of these funds, Mr. Sanderson paid
Mr. Wilkinson $22,933.28. After disbursing his fee in the matter, funds remained in the
trust account stemming from Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Wilkinson. The record
does not reflect the eventual fate of these funds.
BC Docket No. 2016-1374
Toumany Sangare is an immigrant from Guinea and was a resident of Montana at
all times relevant to these grievance proceedings. In 2005, Mr. Sangare married a United
States citizen, and his wife filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
11
(“UCIS”) a Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130”) and an Application to Register Permanent
Residence or Adjust Status (“I-485”) on his behalf in March of 2006. On September 16,
2010, UCIS denied Mr. Sangare’s I-130 and I-485 petitions and referred Mr. Sangare for
removal proceedings. On December 1, 2010, the U.S. Immigration Court held a hearing
on Mr. Sangare’s removal proceedings. At the removal hearing, the court granted Mr.
Sangare a continuance to allow him opportunity to retain counsel. Mr. Sangare’s next
hearing was then scheduled for March 16, 2011. On that date, the court granted Mr.
Sangare a second continuance and rescheduled the hearing for July 6, 2011.
On June 22, 2011, Mr. Sangare remarried. 8 On the date scheduled for Mr. Sangare’s
hearing, Mr. Sanderson filed a motion for continuance and a notice of entry of appearance
on behalf of Mr. Sangare, dated June 28, 2011. In his motion, Mr. Sanderson represented
that he had another court appearance on the same date and at the same time in the District
Court of Maryland Sitting in Baltimore County. Mr. Sangare appeared before the court
without counsel and the court continued the matter until August 24, 2011. On August 11,
2011, Ms. Hamrick, Mr. Sangare’s new wife, filed a new I-130 petition on Mr. Sangare’s
behalf.
The court held Mr. Sangare’s removal hearing on August 24, 2011. When the case
was initially called, both Mr. Sangare and Mr. Sanderson failed to appear. Therefore, the
court moved the case to the end of its docket and, by the time the case was recalled, Mr.
8
The record does not adequately reflect at what point Mr. Sangare’s first marriage was
terminated.
12
Sanderson appeared. In his interaction with the court, Mr. Sanderson conceded that Mr.
Sangare was subject to removal but indicated that he would file another I-130 petition
based on Mr. Sangare’s second marriage. The record indicates that Mr. Sanderson failed
to inform Mr. Sangare that he would not appear at the hearing.
In the interim, UCIS denied Mr. Sangare’s second I-130 petition. The court
provided Mr. Sanderson with notice of the denial, but he failed to advise Mr. Sangare of it
or its significance. On July 17, 2013, Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Sangare appeared again
before the U.S. Immigration Court for a status hearing. There, the court requested the basis
for UCIS’ denial of Mr. Sangare’s I-130 petition but Mr. Sanderson indicated that he had
not yet had a chance to review it with his client and therefore was unable to respond to the
court’s inquiry. Thereafter, the court set the matter for a voluntary departure hearing.
On August 2, 2013, the court scheduled an individual hearing for Mr. Sangare for
November 14, 2013 and sent notice of the hearing to Mr. Sanderson. Mr. Sanderson
informed Mr. Sangare of the November hearing date. Afterwards, Mr. Sangare attempted
to contact Mr. Sanderson to ascertain the time of the hearing. Mr. Sanderson failed to
respond to Mr. Sangare’s inquiry. On November 12, 2013, however, Mr. Sanderson called
Mr. Sangare and inquired as to the time of the hearing. Mr. Sangare was unsure and
informed Mr. Sanderson that he believed it would occur at 1:30 p.m. – the time at which
the court had scheduled his prior hearings. Mr. Sangare asked Mr. Sanderson to confirm
the time of the hearing and to contact him with that information but Mr. Sanderson
ultimately failed to do so.
13
At the November 14, 2013 hearing, the court called Mr. Sangare’s case; he and Mr.
Sanderson were not present. As a result, the court deemed the case abandoned and entered
an order of removal against Mr. Sangare. At 1:30 p.m., Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Sangare
appeared before the court and learned of the order of removal. Mr. Sanderson filed a
motion to re-open Mr. Sangare’s case but ultimately failed to provide the court with any
required supporting affidavits. The court denied the motion on December 3, 2014. In the
interim, Mr. Sanderson filed an appeal on behalf of Mr. Sangare.
On June 20, 2016, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals denied Mr.
Sangare’s appeal. On July 11, 2016, Mr. Sangare filed a complaint against Mr. Sanderson
with Bar Counsel. On July 18, 2016, Bar Counsel forwarded a copy of the complaint to
Mr. Sanderson and requested that he provide a written response within fifteen days of
receipt. Mr. Sanderson failed to reply in a timely manner in writing. Therefore, Bar
Counsel sent another correspondence to Mr. Sanderson via certified mail requesting that
Mr. Sanderson respond to the complaint within ten days. On approximately August 22,
2016, Mr. Sanderson’s agent received the correspondence. Mr. Sanderson again failed to
provide a timely response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry. On September 16, 2016, Bar Counsel
wrote to Mr. Sanderson yet again, including copies of the prior correspondences, advising
him that an investigation was forthcoming, and requesting a response within ten days.
Again, Mr. Sanderson failed to provide a timely response to Bar Counsel’s correspondence.
BC Docket No. 2015-2413
On November 26, 2015, Mr. Sanderson was representing the parent of a child in a
CINA case at a hearing before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Tuesday Racquel
14
Isom-Cyrus, a social worker for Baltimore County Department of Social Services
(“BCDSS”), testified at the hearing. After the hearing ended, Mr. Sanderson approached
Ms. Isom-Cyrus in the hallway outside of the courtroom and, after a brief but heated
exchange of words, he called her a “baby-snatching bitch.”
On November 30, 2015, Ms. Isom-Cyrus filed a complaint against Mr. Sanderson
with Bar Counsel in reference to the incident that occurred four days earlier. On December
10, 2015, Bar Counsel sent a correspondence to Mr. Sanderson regarding Ms. Isom-Cyrus’
complaint and requested that he respond within ten days. Mr. Sanderson failed to respond
to Bar Counsel’s inquiry in a timely manner. Therefore, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr.
Sanderson again requesting that he respond within ten days. Again, Mr. Sanderson failed
to provide Bar Counsel with a timely response. After failing to obtain a response from Mr.
Sanderson, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Parker, Mr. Sanderson’s monitor, requesting Mr.
Sanderson provide a response to their inquiries. In a letter dated January 19, 2016, Mr.
Sanderson responded to Bar Counsel’s previous communications and indicated that he did
not recall using any profanity toward Ms. Isom-Cyrus.
On February 3, 2016, Bar Counsel sent another letter to Mr. Sanderson requesting
additional information regarding his interaction with Ms. Isom-Cyrus. Mr. Sanderson
failed to respond to the request. Accordingly, on March 15, 2016, Bar Counsel wrote to
Mr. Sanderson again and requested that he provide the additional information requested in
the prior correspondence. On April 27, 2016, Mr. Sanderson contacted Bar Counsel and
requested an extension of time to provide the information. However, Mr. Sanderson
ultimately did not comply with this extension and he failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s
15
communication. Therefore, on June 15, 2017 Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Sanderson again
requesting that he provide additional information within ten days. Again, Mr. Sanderson
failed to respond, and on July 10 Bar Counsel re-issued the prior communication requesting
a response. On July 17 Mr. Sanderson responded to Bar Counsel’s request and reiterated
that he did not use any vulgarities towards Ms. Isom-Cyrus.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court reviews the hearing judge’s findings
of fact for clear error and reviews the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference.
See Md. Rule 19-741(b) (indicating that, in reviewing the hearing judge’s findings of fact,
this “Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses[,]” but where this Court reviews the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law, the de novo standard applies.). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Maldonado, 463 Md. 11, 32-33 (2019); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ghatt, 461 Md.
228, 261 (2018). In cases where either party files exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings
of fact, this Court must determine whether the factual findings are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B); Md. Rule 19-727(c). In addition, “Bar
Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing
evidence.” Md. Rule 19-727(c).
DISCUSSION
A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact
Mr. Sanderson notes several exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.
Specifically, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s findings regarding the
16
impetus for his entry into the CDA with Bar Counsel and the balance due to Ms. Ozel
stemming from Mr. Sanderson’s representation of her in the personal injury action.
With regard to the first exception, Mr. Sanderson contends that the hearing judge
improperly determined that he entered into the CDA with Bar Counsel because of his
failure to provide competent representation to Mr. Odubanjo. Instead, Mr. Sanderson
represents that he entered into the CDA primarily due to Bar Counsel’s concerns over the
management and oversight of his law practice. However, there is little merit to Mr.
Sanderson’s exception. The CDA itself is included in the record and sets forth the
circumstances surrounding Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA. The document provides
the following summary of events which led to Mr. Sanderson’s first encounter with Bar
Counsel and ultimately his entry into the CDA:
In his representation of Olugboyega O. Odubanjo, the Respondent failed to provide
competent representation. Specifically, he failed to appear at trial on a motor
vehicle matter on behalf of his client, Mr. Odubanjo, in the District Court of
Maryland for Montgomery County before the Honorable Patricia Mitchell. Mr.
Odubanjo was charged with three (3) incarcerable traffic violations. At the time
Mr. Odubanjo retained [Mr. Sanderson], [Mr. Sanderson] was aware that he would
be unable to appear at Mr. Odubanjo’s scheduled hearing due to a conflict in which
he had a court appearance on a separate client matter. [Mr. Sanderson] assumed
that a continuance of the hearing would be granted by the court. [Mr. Sanderson]
filed a motion for continuance the day before Mr. Odubanjo’s hearing, which was
denied by the court. Subsequently, [Mr. Sanderson] did not appear at Mr.
Odubanjo’s hearing. Mr. Odubanjo terminated [Mr. Sanderson’s] representation.
No refund was rendered to Mr. Odubanjo since he had not yet paid [Mr.
Sanderson’s] attorney’s fee.
The CDA additionally indicates that Mr. Sanderson’s conduct constituted a violation
MLRPC 1.1 and that “[b]y signing this Agreement, [Mr. Sanderson] acknowledges that he
has engaged in conduct that constitutes professional misconduct and warrants that he has
17
not concealed from or misrepresented to Bar Counsel any material facts pertaining to his
conduct or to the Agreement.” Id.
Therefore, the agreement clearly indicates that Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA
was compelled by his representation of Mr. Odubanjo which ran afoul of MLRPC 1.1. Mr.
Sanderson’s exception to this particular finding is driven by a piecemeal review of the
agreement and, to some extent, a mischaracterization of its contents. In particular,
paragraph six of the agreement summarizes Mr. Sanderson’s admissions with respect to
the complaint originating from his representation of Mr. Odubanjo. It provides that Mr.
Sanderson did not maintain a written calendar system and “did not have any training in law
practice [management].” Id. Therefore, although Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA was
in part caused by Bar Counsel’s concerns over Mr. Sanderson’s office procedures, these
concerns became known to Bar Counsel through investigation of Mr. Sanderson’s
competency, or lack thereof, during his representation of Mr. Odubanjo.
Accordingly, we determine that the hearing judge did not err in determining the
catalyst of Mr. Sanderson’s entry into the CDA with Bar Counsel. The agreement itself
indicates that, although Mr. Sanderson failed to establish sufficient management and
oversight procedures within his legal practice, the primary causal thrust for Bar Counsel’s
initial investigation of Mr. Sanderson, which led to his eventual entry into the CDA, was
Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Odubanjo. Accordingly, Mr. Sanderson’s exception
as to this finding is without merit and therefore overruled.
Next, both Mr. Sanderson and Bar Counsel take exception to the hearing judge’s
finding regarding the total amount due to Ms. Ozel and the number of payments Mr.
18
Sanderson made to her. First, the hearing judge found that the total amount due to Ms.
Ozel was $6,900 rather than $4,900. Before this Court, both Bar Counsel and Mr.
Sanderson contend that the amount due to Ms. Ozel was actually $4,900, instead of $6,900.
In his opinion, Judge Nugent found that “[i]n late July 2016, [Mr. Sanderson] provided Ms.
Ozel with an additional $2,000.00[.]” (emphasis added). However, Ms. Ozel’s testimony
reflects that she only received two payments from Mr. Sanderson – one check for $2,000
in late July and another for $2,900 on December 12, 2016.
During the hearing, Ms. Ozel also testified that, although Mr. Sanderson neglected
to discuss his fee with her in great detail, she understood that he would receive $2,000 from
the settlement. Similarly, Mr. Sanderson agrees that the total amount owed to Ms. Ozel
was $4,900. Although the settlement check from USAA General Indemnity Company
(“USAA”) was made payable to both Ms. Ozel and Mr. Sanderson, was for $6,900 the
record indicates that $2,000 of the sum constituted Mr. Sanderson’s fee and Ms. Ozel was
only entitled to recover $4,900. Therefore, the hearing judge clearly erred with respect to
the amount of money due to Ms. Ozel, and we therefore sustain this exception.
Another related exception involves the balance in Mr. Sanderson’s escrow account
during the period surrounding his receipt of funds from USAA and their disbursement. Mr.
Sanderson argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that, two days after receiving the
settlement check from USAA, Mr. Sanderson transferred $500 from the escrow account to
his business account which brought the balance below the amount owed to Ms. Ozel.
However, this is primarily based on and related to the hearing judge’s error regarding the
total amount of funds Mr. Sanderson owed to Ms. Ozel.
19
As mentioned above, Mr. Sanderson received the $6,900 settlement check from
USAA on July 18, 2016 and deposited it into his attorney trust account. The next day, Mr.
Sanderson transferred $2,000 of the settlement funds to his operating account. On July 20,
Mr. Sanderson withdrew a second $2,000 from the trust account, with the memo “Garland
Atty[.]” Based on the record before us, it is unclear as to which payment eventually made
its way to Ms. Ozel, but we presume the transfer of funds on July 19 was likely associated
with Mr. Sanderson’s fee. Therefore, the $2,000 withdrawal the following day was likely
Mr. Sanderson disbursing a portion of the settlement to Ms. Ozel. 9 After this withdrawal,
his attorney trust account held $2,905.00.
Also, on July 20, Mr. Sanderson transferred $500 from the account to his business
operating account. As a result, the balance in his attorney trust account dropped to
$2,405.00, $495 less than the amount Mr. Sanderson owed to Ms. Ozel at the time. In fact,
the balance remained below $2,900 until July 27, 2016, when Mr. Sanderson deposited
$700 under Ms. Ozel’s client name without any descriptive phrase or words in the memo
line, which brought the attorney trust account’s balance up to $2,905.
Ultimately, this surplusage of funds was short lived, because on August 4, 2016,
Mr. Sanderson transferred $250 from his attorney trust account to his operating account,
again under the client name of Ms. Ozel, but neglected to provide any indication as to its
purpose. At this point, the balance in his attorney trust account fell to $2,605, leaving the
9
As discussed later in our analysis, cash withdrawals from an attorney trust account are
not permitted under the Maryland Rules governing attorney trust account management.
See Md. Rule 19-410(b).
20
trust account underfunded with respect to the amount that Mr. Sanderson still owed Ms.
Ozel. This pattern continued until Mr. Sanderson ultimately paid Ms. Ozel the $2,900 over
four months later on December 12, 2016. In the interim, Mr. Sanderson would routinely
receive client funds, withdraw or transfer portions of it, and allow the attorney trust account
to become underfunded, with the account holding as little as $5 on September 26, 2016 and
as much as $44,759.55 on December 1, 2016. Although the hearing Judge erred with
respect to the total amount Mr. Sanderson owed to Ms. Ozel, he correctly identified that
Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account became underfunded, with respect to the amount
that he owed Ms. Ozel, on the same day that Mr. Sanderson disbursed $2,000 to Ms. Ozel.
Accordingly, we overrule this exception.
Next, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s factual findings
concerning potential misappropriation of funds from his former client, Ms. Brown. With
reference to a monetary exchange between Mr. Sanderson and Ms. Brown, the hearing
judge found Mr. Sanderson deposited a settlement check from the Maryland Automobile
Insurance Fund (“MAIF”) in the amount of $8,601.88 into his attorney trust account on
June 28, 2016 which is adequately supported by the record. However, the same cannot be
said for the hearing judge’s ultimate determination regarding Mr. Sanderson
misappropriating funds from Ms. Brown. The hearing judge found that, two days after the
check was deposited, Mr. Sanderson withdrew $8,101.88 on June 30, 2016 and that “there
is no evidence that payment was ever made to Ms. Brown.” However, the hearing judge’s
finding is problematic in two respects.
21
First, in the initial complaint, Bar Counsel failed to raise any averments regarding
Mr. Sanderson’s potential misappropriation of funds from Ms. Brown. In fact, the only
reference to Ms. Brown within the initial Petition is paragraph 53, which indicates that Mr.
Sanderson provided a waiver of conflict agreement with regards to his representation of
Ms. Brown. Aside from this, any allegations of misconduct regarding his representation
of Ms. Brown are completely absent from the Petition. Previously, this Court has
recognized that a hearing judge’s findings must be appropriately limited to charges filed
by Bar Counsel through the Petition. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409,
418-19 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 378-79 n. 7 (2002)
(citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968)). Therefore, the hearing judge erred with
respect to this determination. The purpose of limiting the hearing judge’s findings to
allegations contained within the complaint stems from procedural due process concerns.
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550. Particularly, this procedure is intended to ensure that an
attorney is given fair notice of all of the charges filed against the attorney. Id.
In the instant grievance proceedings, Bar Counsel’s Petition lacked any
corresponding allegations of disciplinary action with respect to Mr. Sanderson’s
representation of Ms. Brown, and therefore, Mr. Sanderson was not adequately notified of
the charges against him. Moreover, the finding is not sufficiently supported by the record.
Although the records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account do not
indicate that the withdrawal made on June 30, 2016 was given to Ms. Brown, during Bar
Counsel’s deposition of Mr. Sanderson, he stated under oath that Ms. Brown accompanied
him to the bank and received the payment upon withdrawal, because she did not hold a
22
checking account. He also indicated that the $500 discrepancy between the amount of the
MAIF check and the withdrawal on June 30, 2016 corresponded to his fee in the matter.
Id. In contrast, Bar Counsel failed to offer evidence, aside from copies of ledgers
associated with Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account, which demonstrates that Mr.
Sanderson misappropriated funds from Ms. Brown. Accordingly, we sustain Mr.
Sanderson’s exception to this finding.
Lastly, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding of fact
emanating from his representation of Ms. Ozel. More specifically, he asserts that he did
not promptly disburse $2,900 of settlement funds to her because he was in the process of
settling a “boni [sic] fide lien from the Worker’s Compensation fund[.]” In support of his
position, Mr. Sanderson attaches to his exceptions a purported email from an individual
associated with Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company. In this email, dated March
12, 2018, the individual represents to Mr. Sanderson that the insurance company should
have recovered $1,437.10 from “[his] client[,]” but the organization allowed the client to
retain the funds. However, there are several problems associated with this exhibit.
First, the email does not indicate that the communication is in reference to Mr.
Sanderson’s representation of Ms. Ozel. In all actuality, the email does not identify Ms.
Ozel by name. The only potentially identifying information contained within the
correspondence are usage of female pronouns in reference to the client and reference to
one of Mr. Sanderson’s clients receiving a third-party settlement in the amount of
$6,900.00. The link between this email and Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Ms. Ozel
without more identifying information is tenuous. Nevertheless, other circumstances
23
surrounding this email and Mr. Sanderson’s eventual payment to Ms. Ozel render
unnecessary any further inquiry into this issue.
Although Mr. Sanderson submits that his payment to Ms. Ozel was significantly
delayed due to the potential worker’s compensation lien, the exhibit he provided and the
associated timelines clearly demonstration that his contention is without merit. Particularly
troubling, the email from Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company is dated March 12,
2018. However, Mr. Sanderson did not disburse the remaining $2,900 to Ms. Ozel until
December 12, 2018. In the email, an employee of the insurance company informed Mr.
Sanderson that Ms. Ozel will be able to retain the funds which, prior to this point, a question
remained as to whether they would be subject to Injured Worker’s Insurance Fund
(“IWIF”) withholding. Therefore, based on Mr. Sanderson’s own exhibit, he received
notice that there would be no withholding associated with Ms. Ozel’s claim nine months
before eventually releasing the funds to his client. Despite Mr. Sanderson’s insistence that
he had “a legitimate reason for not promptly dispersing [sic] the $2,900 in settlement funds
to Ms. Ozel[,]” whatever legitimacy can be attributed to that reason ceased at some point
after March 12, 2018. Mr. Sanderson offers no explanation for the nine-month delay in
providing the funds to Ms. Ozel. Therefore, on this basis, we cannot conclude that the
hearing judge clearly erred with respect to this finding. Accordingly, we overrule this
exception.
B. Review of the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law
In addition to Mr. Sanderson’s exception to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, he
also takes exception to several of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. Specifically, Mr.
24
Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions that he violated: (i) MLRPC
1.1 in BC Docket No. 2012-297-04-14 by failing to provide competent representation to
Mr. Odubanjo; (ii) MLRPC 1.1 in BC Docket No. 2017-0152 by failing to provide Ms.
Ozel with competent representation; and (iii) MLRPC 1.2 by failing to recognize the scope
of representation and the allocation of decision-making authority between attorneys and
their clients.
In terms of exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, Mr. Sanderson first
takes exception to several of the hearing judge’s evidentiary rulings. Mr. Sanderson argues
that the hearing judge erred when he permitted several pieces of evidence to be admitted,
because the exhibits lacked appropriate evidentiary foundations. The records Mr.
Sanderson contends were erroneously admitted by the hearing judge include: (i) bank
records; (ii) communications from the Attorney Grievance Commission to Mr. Sanderson;
and (iii) complaints from the Attorney Grievance Commission. In addition, Mr. Sanderson
argues that the hearing judge erred in admitting records and testimony provided by Mr.
Miller, because he was not properly qualified as an expert witness.
Mr. Sanderson first takes issue with the hearing judge’s admittance of bank records
that the Attorney Grievance Commission acquired from Wells Fargo through subpoena. In
his exceptions filed with this Court, Mr. Sanderson fails to identify any specific basis upon
which he takes exception to this evidentiary ruling. However, at the hearing, Mr.
Sanderson objected to the introduction of the Wells Fargo Bank records on grounds that he
was not informed of Bar Counsel’s intent to introduce the bank records prior to the start of
his hearing as required by the associated Rules.
25
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) provides the following limitations on the admission of
business records:
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A)
it was made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the
diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of
a regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular practice of that business
was to make and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A
record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or the method or
circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in the
record lacks trustworthiness. In this paragraph, “business” includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether
or not conducted for profit.
In close connection with this Rule, Maryland Rule 5-902(b)(1) establishes certain
procedural steps that a party seeking to introduce business records under Rule 5-803(b)(6)
must follow:
(1) Procedure. Testimony of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required as to the original or a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted
business activity, within the scope of Rule 5-803 (b)(6) that has been certified
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, provided that at least ten days prior to
the commencement of the proceeding in which the record will be offered into
evidence, (A) the proponent (i) notifies the adverse party of the proponent’s
intention to authenticate the record under this subsection and (ii) makes a copy
of the certificate and record available to the adverse party and (B) the adverse
party has not filed within five days after service of the proponent’s notice
written objection on the ground that the sources of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Md. Rule 5-902(b)(1) (emphasis added). The bank records in this case were accompanied
by a form titled “Business Records Declaration” in which an employee of Wells Fargo
Bank certified the authenticity of the records and indicated under the penalty of perjury
that they were, in fact, business records.
26
Mr. Sanderson objected to the introduction and admission of bank records, obtained
by Bar Counsel from Wells Fargo through subpoena, on the basis that he was not properly
afforded notice of Bar Counsel’s intent to introduce the documents under Rule 5-902(b)(1).
Also at the hearing, Mr. Sanderson conceded that he received a copy of the bank records
from Bar Counsel at his deposition which occurred on August 14, 2017.10 In fact, as noted
by Bar Counsel, Mr. Sanderson authenticated the records concerning both his attorney trust
account and his operating account. Accordingly, because the records were certified by an
employee of Wells Fargo, presented to Mr. Sanderson over a year before his hearing, and
authenticated by Mr. Sanderson during his deposition, we overrule Mr. Sanderson’s first
exception to the hearing judge’s evidentiary rulings.
Mr. Sanderson next takes exception to the hearing judge’s admission of
communications, i.e. letters, sent by Bar Counsel to Mr. Sanderson. Again, in his
exceptions he does not specifically identify the grounds upon which he takes exception to
the admission of these letters. However, at the hearing, Mr. Sanderson objected to
admission of the documents on hearsay grounds.
Hearsay is defined as a statement made by an out of court declarant offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. Md. Rule 5-801(c). As evident from the definition, the
letters Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Sanderson are not hearsay. Although the individual that
drafted the letters by Bar Counsel to Mr. Sanderson, his attorney, and monitor did not
10
Rule 5-902(b)(1) requires that the notification be performed at least ten days prior to the
start of any proceedings. Mr. Sanderson’s deposition occurred on August 14, 2017. His
hearing occurred on November 27, 2018, over a year after his deposition.
27
testify in court, the record makes clear that these letters were not offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. Although some of the later letters indicate that Mr. Sanderson had
failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s earlier communications, Bar Counsel clearly did not
intend to introduce these exhibits to prove that Mr. Sanderson had failed to respond to their
earlier communications or any violation of the MLRPC. Rather, these exhibits were
intended to establish notice – that Mr. Sanderson was aware of the proceedings against him
and was offered opportunity to respond.
Mr. Sanderson also takes exception to the introduction of testimony and records
compiled by Mr. Miller, Bar Counsel’s investigator, tasked with reviewing the records
obtained from Wells Fargo. Mr. Sanderson argues that Mr. Miller acted as an expert
witness in this capacity and the court erred by not requiring his qualification as an expert.
However, we have held that individuals testify as expert witnesses where they opine in a
particular matter on subjects which laypersons would typically be unable to grasp. See
Dorsey v. Nold, 362 Md. 241, 257 (2001) (holding that a doctor was an expert witness
rather than a fact witness where, in his testimony, he gave an opinion on the medical cause
of a death).
The activities which Mr. Miller engaged in do not require any particular expertise
in a subject-matter. Mr. Miller, in his role as investigator, reviewed the bank records
obtained from Wells Fargo and placed some of this information, concerning Mr.
Sanderson’s trust account, in tables detailing the transactions. In this regard, Mr. Miller
acted as a fact witness and merely noted data from the financial records and recorded this
information in tables for greater ease of access. In his review, Mr. Miller offered no
28
expertise, merely reiterated numbers from the records, and the subject-matter did not
require a particular level of expertise. Accordingly, Mr. Miller testified as a fact witness
instead of an expert witness, as Mr. Sanderson contends. Therefore, we overrule Mr.
Sanderson’s exception on this point.
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
MLRPC 1.1 provides that, “[a]n attorney shall provide competent representation to
a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” We have previously held that an
attorney may violate this Rule in multiple ways. First, “the failure to pursue a claim after
filing a complaint demonstrates not only incompetence, but also insufficient diligence.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 44 (2018) (quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 371 (2015)). In addition, “[a]n attorney [ ] violates
MLRPC 1.1 by failing to attend a court appearance absent sufficient explanation. Id.
(citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Storch, 445 Md. 82, 87 (2015). See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 180 (2015) (“[f]ailure to appear in court
when expected to do so is a particularly egregious violation of MLRPC 1.1.”); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 226-27 (2012); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 551 (2014) (commenting that “[c]ompetency includes,
“at a minimum, the attorney’s presence at any court proceeding for which he or she was
retained, absent an acceptable explanation for that attorney’s absence.”).
Mr. Sanderson first argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that he failed to
provide Mr. Odubanjo with competent representation. Specifically, he contends that the
29
hearing judge’s finding is unsubstantiated because the record does not adequately reflect
that his representation of Mr. Odubanjo failed to meet the requisite level of competence.
In the instant grievance proceedings, the record clearly reflects that Mr. Sanderson
filed a motion for continuance and an entry of appearance on January 23, 2013, the day
before Mr. Odubanjo’s trial was scheduled to begin. Mr. Sanderson conceded that he
would be unable to attend trial the following day. This demonstrates that Mr. Sanderson
entered his appearance in the matter, on the day before trial, knowing full well that he
would be unable to attend if his motion for continuance was not granted. Apparently, Mr.
Sanderson expected the court would grant his motion for a continuance, which would
enable him not to attend the hearing. Unfortunately for Mr. Sanderson, the court denied
the postponement request and he failed to appear on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo despite filing
his entry of appearance. Although Mr. Sanderson argues that his absence should be
excused, because he was required to attend court in another part of the State
contemporaneously with Mr. Odubanjo’s hearing, he was fully aware of this at the time he
entered his appearance. Therefore, based on our independent review of the record, we
agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in the course of his
representation of Mr. Odubanjo.
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Next, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s finding that, throughout
his representation of Ms. Ozel, he violated MLRPC 1.1. Primarily, Mr. Sanderson
contends that the record fails to sufficiently demonstrate that he did not provide competent
representation to Ms. Ozel. He points out that Ms. Ozel obtained a reasonable settlement
30
and contends that he has offered a reasonable explanation as to why the $2,900 was not
promptly paid to Ms. Ozel.11
However, Mr. Sanderson’s exhibit does not provide a satisfactory explanation for
the delay in providing Ms. Ozel with the funds. Although the exhibit provides an
explanation for a portion of delay, as discussed above, the email from the IWIF clearing
any worker’s compensation lien and eliminating the possibility of any withholding against
Ms. Ozel’s recovery occurred in March. Mr. Sanderson did not provide her with the funds
until December.
Overall, Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in several ways with respect to Ms.
Ozel. He violated this rule by unreasonably and without justification failing to promptly
deliver the remaining settlement funds to Ms. Ozel. An attorney’s failure to provide his or
her clients with funds due implicates MLRPC 1.1. In prior cases, we have recognized that
“failure to promptly deliver money to a client and to pay third parties demonstrates
incompetence.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 369 (2015). See also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 357 (2005). We have also
determined that MLRPC 1.1 is violated in situations where an attorney fails to inform a
client that settlement funds have been received. Id. at 369.
Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in his representation of Ms. Ozel by
11
Mr. Sanderson’s explanation for the delay is discussed at length in our review of his
exceptions to the hearing judge’s legal conclusions. See supra at 23-24.
31
failing to initially inform her of receipt of the settlement funds and by unreasonably
delaying full payment of the settlement funds to Ms. Ozel. Although Mr. Sanderson may
have held a portion of the funds because of a potential workman’s compensation offset, it
was incumbent upon him to communicate this fact to Ms. Ozel. In addition, the six-month
delay that elapsed between the date any potential workman’s compensation issue was
cleared and the date Mr. Sanderson eventually disbursed the remaining settlement funds to
Ms. Ozel demonstrates Mr. Sanderson’s incompetence. Accordingly, we agree with the
hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in his representation
of Ms. Ozel and overrule Mr. Sanderson’s exception.
MLRPC 1.1 Competency (BC Docket No. 2016-1374)
The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.1 in his
representation of Mr. Sangare. Specifically, the hearing judge found that Mr. Sanderson
violated the rule by failing to appear at Mr. Sangare’s removal hearing on July 6, 2011 and
a voluntary departure hearing on November 14, 2012. In addition, the hearing judge
determined that Mr. Sanderson violated the rule by failing to demonstrate adequate legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. The hearing judge found that this failure
was evident through several of Mr. Sanderson’s actions including: (i) his failure to timely
review the order denying Mr. Sangare’s I-130 Petition; (ii) Mr. Sanderson’s failure to
include evidence of exceptional circumstances when he filed a motion to re-open Mr.
Sangare’s case; and (iii) arguing under the incorrect standard in his motion to re-open.
This Court has previously indicated that an “[a]ttorney’s failure to appear at clients’
hearings, or to perform agreed-upon services on clients’ behalf violated [MLRPC 1.1 and
32
1.3.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shakir, 427 Md. 197, 205 (2012). See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 403 (2011) (determining that competence
under MLRPC 1.1 “necessarily includes, at a minimum, the attorney’s presence at any
court proceeding for which he or she was retained, absent an acceptable explanation for
that attorney’s absence[.]”). Mr. Sanderson failed to appear before the U.S. Immigration
Court several times in his representation of Mr. Sangare which ultimately led to the court
entering an order of removal against Mr. Sangare.
Despite his failure to appear before the court, Mr. Sanderson filed a motion to re-
open Mr. Sangare’s case. However, in his motion, Mr. Sanderson neglected to attach the
necessary affidavits and incorrectly identified the applicable standard for such proceedings.
Previously, we have held that “[e]vidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness
and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of
[MLRPC] 1.1.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Conwell, 462 Md. 437, 462 (2019)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McCulloch, 404 Md. 388, 398 (2008)). Therefore,
we determine that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion
that Mr. Sanderson’s conduct, in his representation of Mr. Sangare, violated MLRPC 1.1.
MLRPC 1.2 (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
Mr. Sanderson next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he violated MLRPC
1.2(c).12 The hearing judge found that Mr. Sanderson acted in violation of MLRPC 1.2 by
12
Mistakenly, Mr. Sanderson takes exception to “[the hearing judge’s] Conclusion of Law
regarding Respondent’s Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority between
Client and Lawyer” asserting that the hearing judge clearly erred. He asserts that “the
record is devoid of any evidence by a clear and convincing standard that after consultation
33
limiting and conditioning his representation of Mr. Odubanjo. Particularly, Mr. Sanderson
conditioned his representation of Mr. Odubanjo on his ability to obtain a postponement in
the matter. Specifically, the hearing judge found that such action violated MLRPC 1.2(c).
The rule, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(c) An attorney may limit the scope of the representation in accordance with
applicable Maryland Rules if (1) the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances, (2) the client gives informed consent, and (3) the scope and
limitations of any representation, beyond an initial consultation or brief advice
provided without a fee, are clearly set forth in a writing, including any duty on the
part of the attorney under Rule 1-324 to forward notices to the client.
MLRPC 1.2(c).
As evident, an attorney may make reasonable limitations to the scope of
representation if they are communicated to the client in writing. The record contains no
evidence that Mr. Sanderson provided Mr. Odubanjo with a written agreement indicating
that his representation of Mr. Odubanjo would be conditioned on his ability to obtain the
initial postponement. Therefore, at the outset, we determine that Mr. Sanderson failed to
comply with MLRPC 1.2(c)(2) and (3). In addition to his failure to provide his Mr.
Odubanjo with written notice of any limitations, Mr. Sanderson also violated MLRPC
1.2(c)(1). As the hearing judge noted, Mr. Sanderson attempted to condition his
representation of Mr. Odubanjo on his ability to obtain a postponement in the matter.
with the client that [Mr. Sanderson] failed to abide by the client’s decision.” However, Mr.
Sanderson’s arguments overlook an important distinction. The hearing judge found that
Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.2(c) which, as noted above, concerns limitations to the
scope of representation. The hearing judge did not make a finding with regard to MLRPC
1.2(a), which would implicate the allocation of authority between client and attorney.
34
Considering that Mr. Sanderson entered his appearance and filed the postponement the day
before Mr. Odubanjo’s trial was scheduled to begin, we agree with the hearing judge that
Mr. Sanderson unreasonably attempted to limit his representation of Mr. Odubanjo, in
violation of MLRPC 1.2(c). Although Mr. Sanderson, in his exception, acknowledges that
Mr. Odubanjo knew he would not appear court, this fact does not affect the unreasonable
nature of Mr. Sanderson’s decision to limit his representation of Mr. Odubanjo. As a result,
Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.2 in his representation of Mr. Odubanjo.
MLRPC 1.2 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Next, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.2(a) in
his representation of Ms. Ozel, by failing to consult with her regarding the status and
eventual disbursement of settlement funds Mr. Sanderson received on her behalf. At the
hearing, Ms. Ozel testified that she had never seen the settlement check, Mr. Sanderson
had not provided her with a settlement disbursement sheet, and Mr. Sanderson failed to
provide her with any document that identified the total settlement amount or the fee Mr.
Sanderson would receive. 13 Ms. Ozel also testified that, in addition to this confusion, Mr.
Sanderson neglected to inform her how much she would receive from the settlement.
Based on Ms. Ozel’s testimony, it is apparent that Mr. Sanderson failed to consult with her
regarding the potential settlement. Such conduct constitutes a violation of MLRPC 1.2(a).
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 443 Md. 351, 370 (2015). Therefore, we
13
Although Ms. Ozel testified that there was some ambiguity as to the amount of Mr.
Sanderson’s fee, she testified that she believed he would receive $2,000.
35
determine that the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.2(a)
in his representation of Ms. Ozel is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
MLRPC 1.3 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 1.3 establishes standards concerning the necessary diligence that must exist
within the attorney client relationship and provides that, “[a]n attorney shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” This rule may be implicated
by an attorney’s failure to appear before a court absent sufficient reason. Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Butler, 426 Md. 522, 534 (2012); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Byrd, 408 Md. 449, 459, 484 (2009) (holding that an attorney’s failure to attend court
proceedings constitutes a violation of both MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3). Undoubtedly, Mr.
Sanderson’s failure to appear for Mr. Odubanjo’s hearing constitutes a violation of MLRPC
1.3. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 229 (2012) (“Even a
single, inadvertent failure to appear at a hearing may constitute actionable neglect of a legal
matter.”)
As indicated above, Mr. Sanderson filed his entry of appearance and a motion for
continuance the day before Mr. Odubanjo’s trial was scheduled to begin. Despite having
a potential reason for his absence, Mr. Sanderson’s conduct demonstrates an underlying
lack of diligence especially considering the temporal proximity of his motion and entry of
appearance in relation to the start of Mr. Odubanjo’s trial. As a result, the hearing judge’s
determination that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Mr.
Odubanjo is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
36
MLRPC 1.3 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
The hearing judge also found that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his
representation of Ms. Ozel by failing to disburse settlement proceeds in a timely fashion.
Our review of the record indicates that Mr. Sanderson fails to offer sufficient evidence to
justify the delay in disbursement of the settlement proceeds. Even assuming he withheld
these funds due to a potential worker’s compensation lien, Mr. Sanderson failed to provide
Ms. Ozel with information concerning the status of this work and nine months ultimately
elapsed between any potential worker’s compensation offset being cleared and Mr.
Sanderson eventually distributing the settlement proceeds to Ms. Ozel. An attorney runs
afoul of MLRPC 1.3 where he or she fails “to keep a client informed about the client’s
case, to promptly disburse settlement funds, or to respond to reasonable requests for
information[.]” Smith, 443 Md. at 371. Here, Mr. Sanderson failed to keep Ms. Ozel
informed and failed to promptly disburse settlement funds owed to her. As a result, we
conclude that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3.
MLRPC 1.3 (BC Docket No. 2016-1374)
In addition to the two prior violations of MLRPC 1.3, the hearing judge also found
that Mr. Sanderson violated the Rule in his representation of Mr. Sangare by failing to
appear at two immigration hearings held on July 6, 2011 and November 14, 2013.14 As
14
The record reflects that Mr. Sanderson failed to appear before the immigration courts on
multiple occasions: (i) July 6, 2011; (ii) August 24, 2011; (iii) and November 14, 2013.
With respect to the hearing on August 24, 2011, Mr. Sanderson failed to appear at the time
the case was called. In response, the Court moved the case to the end of its docket and he
appeared by the time the case was recalled.
37
established in our discussions of MLRPC 1.3 violations Mr. Sanderson committed with
respect to his other clients, an attorney’s failure to appear for a scheduled court date, absent
excuse, generally constitutes a violation of MLRPC 1.3. See Byrd, 408 Md. at 459, 484.
By failing to appear on behalf of Mr. Sangare, Mr. Sanderson violated this provision.
Mr. Sanderson also failed to act with diligence in his representation of Mr. Sangare
by failing to keep Mr. Sangare informed regarding the status of his case and by failing to
respond to Mr. Sangare’s reasonable requests for information. See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. 180, 188 (2012) (determining that failure to keep a
client informed as to the status of a case and failure to respond to a client’s inquiries
regarding a case constitute violations of MLRPC 1.3). For example, Mr. Sanderson failed
to advise Mr. Sangare that his second I-130 was denied and failed to advise Mr. Sangare
of the consequences emanating from its denial.
In addition, Mr. Sanderson called Mr. Sangare to inquire about the time of the
hearing on November 14, 2013. First, this was information Mr. Sanderson should have
been aware of. Mr. Sanderson, and not Mr. Sangare, received the notice of the hearing
date from the court. Although atypical that an attorney would contact his or her client
requesting scheduling information, nevertheless, at the end of the discussion Mr. Sangare
asked Mr. Sanderson to confirm the time of the hearing and then relay this information
back to him. Ultimately however, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Mr. Sangare’s
request, which eventually led to both Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Sangare appearing late for
the hearing and the court entering an order of removal against Mr. Sangare. Accordingly,
38
clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s determination that Mr.
Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Mr. Sangare.
Regarding his representation of Ms. Brown and Mr. Wilkinson, the hearing judge
determined that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 by “failing to timely or ever disburse
settlement proceeds to Ms. Brown or Mr. Wilkinson.” However, Bar Counsel failed to
allege any violations against Mr. Sanderson that contemplated his representation of Ms.
Brown. Because a hearing judge’s findings must be appropriately limited to charges filed
by Bar Counsel through the Petition, we determine that the hearing judge erred in finding
that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 through his representation of Ms. Brown. Seiden,
373 Md. at 418-19; Monfried, 368 Md. at 378-79 n. 7 (citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at
551).
Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Mr. Wilkinson by
failing to promptly deliver settlement proceeds to him. As discussed above, Mr. Sanderson
received a substantial settlement on behalf of Mr. Wilkinson in November of 2016. The
record indicates that part of this amount was used by Mr. Sanderson as attorney’s fees,
while another portion of the funds was to be paid to Mr. Wilkinson. The record does not
indicate that the remaining funds were ever disbursed to Mr. Wilkinson. Such an
unreasonable delay in disbursing settlement funds to a client indicates an attorney’s lack
of diligence. Smith, 443 Md. at 371. Therefore, the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr.
Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.3 in his representation of Mr. Wilkinson is supported by
clear and convincing evidence.
39
MLRPC 1.4 (B.C. Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
MLRPC 1.4 provides the following:
(a) An attorney shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect
to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-301.0 (f)
(1.0), is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s
conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not
permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
In his representation of Mr. Odubanjo, Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to
adequately communicate information to Mr. Odubanjo. As the hearing judge correctly
noted, after Mr. Sanderson filed an entry of appearance and a motion for continuance in
Mr. Odubanjo’s traffic matter, Mr. Sanderson failed to adequately explain to Mr. Odubanjo
that, upon entering his appearance in the matter, he was obligated to appear on Mr.
Odubanjo’s behalf. In fact, Mr. Sanderson’s failure to communicate this circumstance
contributed to Mr. Odubanjo eventually terminating his representation. As mentioned
above, Mr. Sanderson also failed to communicate to Mr. Odubanjo other things including
the denial of his second I-130 petition, its significance, and the time of Mr. Odubanjo’s
hearing scheduled for November 14, 2013. Consequently, clear and convincing evidence
supports the hearing judge’s conclusion on this point.
40
MLRPC 1.4 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
In his representation of Ms. Ozel, Mr. Sanderson committed numerous violations of
MLRPC 1.4. An attorney’s failure to inform a client that he or she received a settlement
check or failure to communicate the terms of a settlement constitutes a violation of MLRPC
1.4. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 531-32 (2006). Ms. Ozel
testified that, as to the $6,900 settlement check Mr. Sanderson received from MAIF, that
he never informed her of the full settlement amount, never provided her with a settlement
disbursement sheet, and failed to explain to her the amount she would receive after his fee
had been accounted for. As a result, Mr. Sanderson’s conduct in his representation of Ms.
Ozel violated MLRPC 1.4. and the record is replete with evidence in support of hearing
judge’s conclusion.
MLRPC 1.5 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 1.5(c) places certain limitations on an attorney’s ability to set and collect
fees. The rule, in pertinent part, provides the following:
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by section
(d) of this Rule or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing
signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be
determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
attorney in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses
to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly
notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be responsible whether
or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee
matter, the attorney shall provide the client with a written statement stating the
outcome of the matter, and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the
client and the method of its determination.
41
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.5 in his
representation of Ms. Ozel by failing to memorialize a contingency fee agreement. Further,
the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated the provision through his failure
to provide Ms. Ozel with adequate information regarding the expenses associated with the
representation, whether such expenses would be deducted before or after the contingent fee
is calculated, and by failing to provide her with a written settlement statement.
The record contains a form entitled “attorney-client agreement” which summarizes
certain aspects of Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Ms. Ozel. However, the agreement
is unsigned, does not contain an area for signatures, and does not contain Ms. Ozel’s
signature.15 MLRPC 1.5 requires that any agreement regarding contingency fees must be
reduced to writing and signed by the client.
There are several other shortcomings associated with Mr. Sanderson’s
representation of Ms. Ozel. As mentioned above, Mr. Sanderson did not provide Ms. Ozel
15
Interestingly, the record contains a very similar attorney-client agreement between Mr.
Sanderson and Mr. Wilkinson. However, the two differ in some slight respects. First, the
attorney-client agreement for Mr. Wilkinson relates to a representation that occurred prior
to Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Ms. Ozel. Second, the agreement with Mr. Wilkinson
contains an area for the party’s signatures with instructions. The instructions indicate that
“I/We have read this agreement and have been given a copy” followed by lines for the
client’s signature and the accompanying date. The form also contains a signature and date
line intended for Mr. Sanderson’s signature which is preceded by a line that indicates
“[t]his agreement is valid when countersigned by the Attorney.”
Moreover, it is quite curious that the agreement for Mr. Wilkinson would contain signature
lines and instructions, whereas the agreement concerning Mr. Sanderson’s representation
of Ms. Ozel did not, especially considering that the parties entered into it prior to the
corresponding agreement for Ms. Ozel.
42
with a settlement disbursement sheet – as contemplated by the final sentence of MLRPC
1.5. In fact, Ms. Ozel openly testified that she was unaware of the total amount of her
settlement and never received such a document. Furthermore, no such document exists
within the record, which adds additional weight to Ms. Ozel’s testimony. For these
reasons, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC
1.5 and determine that the conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
MLRPC 1.15 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 1.15 requires that attorneys safekeep the property of clients or third persons
in some instances and provides the following limitations:
(a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an
attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be
created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other
property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded,
and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained.
Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by
the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the
date the record was created.
(b) An attorney may deposit the attorney’s own funds in a client trust account only
as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b).
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different
arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been
paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for
the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, an attorney shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, an attorney shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
43
request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full accounting
regarding such property.
(e) When an attorney in the course of representing a client is in possession of
property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the attorney)
claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the attorney until the
dispute is resolved. The attorney shall distribute promptly all portions of the
property as to which the interests are not in dispute.
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(a), (b), (c), and
(d) by transferring funds from his attorney escrow account to his operating account on
several occasions, by failing to maintain records concerning the funds held for Ms. Ozel,
and by failing to maintain her funds in trust account until earned.
As detailed above, Mr. Sanderson received a check from USAA in the amount of
$6,900 on July 18, 2016. Within the two days, Mr. Sanderson transferred $2,000 of this
amount to his operating account and withdrew $2,000 in cash at a Wells Fargo branch.
According to the evidence and testimony adduced at the disciplinary hearing, after the
initial payment to Ms. Ozel, Mr. Sanderson still owed her $2,900. Assuming arguendo the
legitimacy of Mr. Sanderson’s representation concerning the potential worker’s
compensation lien on the funds, the exhibit he provided indicates that the funds were
cleared on March 12, 2018. However, Mr. Sanderson failed to disburse the remaining
$2,900 to Ms. Ozel until December 12, 2018 – nine months later. During this period, the
available balance within the trust account fell below $2,900 on several occasions. To
interrupt the deficient trust balance, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from his firm’s
operating account into the attorney trust account numerous times. In addition, the financial
44
records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account indicate that he deposited
cash into the account on several instances in amounts as large as $2,000.
Mr. Sanderson’s failure to adequately maintain records concerning his attorney trust
account add a certain degree of opaqueness to our review of the associated financial
records. Within the proceedings below, Mr. Sanderson offered no documentary evidence
which could have explained some of the deficiencies associated with his attorney trust
account and specifically those concerning his representation of Ms. Ozel. Mr. Sanderson
violated MLRPC 1.15(a) and (b) by failing to maintain adequate records of his attorney
trust account and by depositing funds from his firm’s operating account into his attorney
trust account. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross, 428 Md. 50, 78-79 (2012) (holding
that an attorney violated MLRPC 1.15 by failing to maintain adequate trust account
records).
Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(b) by depositing funds from his operating
account into his attorney trust account on several occasions. Maryland Rule 19-408 sets
forth the limited situations in which an attorney may deposit funds into an attorney trust
account which includes paying fees, service charges, minimum balance requirements, and
funds that potentially belong to the attorney. The transfers here, however, fit none of these
limited exceptions. Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(b).
Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(c) in his representation of Ms. Ozel by failing
to maintain her funds in trust until they were earned. As detailed above, throughout his
representation of Ms. Ozel, the level of funds within Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust account
fell below the amount he owed to her, i.e. $2,900, her on several occasions. The Rule
45
provides that an attorney “may withdraw those funds for the attorney’s own benefit only
as fees are earned or expenses incurred.” MLRPC 1.15(c). The deficient balance compared
to the amount Mr. Sanderson still owed Ms. Ozel, demonstrates that Mr. Sanderson
violated MLRPC 1.15(c).
In addition to these violations, Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(d) by failing
to promptly deliver Ms. Ozel her settlement funds. Assuming arguendo the legitimacy of
Mr. Sanderson’s allegations concerning the potential worker’s compensation lien on the
funds, the exhibit he provided indicates that the funds were cleared on March 12, 2018.
However, Mr. Sanderson failed to disburse the remaining $2,900 to Ms. Ozel until
December 12, 2018 – nine months later. Mr. Sanderson offers no explanation aside from
the worker’s compensation issue to rectify this delay. Furthermore, Mr. Sanderson failed
to inform Ms. Ozel of the settlement and its amount, as evidenced by her testimony.
Therefore, Mr. Sanderson violated the provisions of MLRPC 1.15(d) in his representation
of Ms. Ozel by failing to promptly deliver the settlement funds to her and by failing to
promptly notify her of the terms of the settlement agreement.
The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated this Rule in his
representations of Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Parham. Specifically, the hearing judge
determined that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15(c) and (d) by failing to maintain their
funds in trust until earned and by failing to promptly deliver settlement funds owed to them.
The record reflects that Mr. Sanderson continued in his habit of transferring funds
from his operating account into his attorney trust account throughout his representation of
Mr. Parham. Between March 27, 2017 and April 4, 2017, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds
46
from his operating account to his attorney trust on six different occasions. In total, the
transfers amounted to $1,400. More troubling however, is the payment made on March
31, 2017, in which Mr. Sanderson impermissibly paid a portion Mr. Parham’s client funds
to Ms. Hines.
With respect to Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Sanderson
received a settlement check in the amount of $40,000 from the Cincinnati Insurance
Company and deposited it into his attorney trust account on November 28, 2016. On
December 3, 2016, Mr. Sanderson issued a check to Mr. Wilkinson for $22,933.28. Two
days later, Mr. Sanderson transferred $9,967, accounting for his fee in the matter, from his
attorney trust account to his operating account. Thereafter, $7,099.72 remained in the trust
account stemming from Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Mr. Wilkinson. The totality of
evidence adduced throughout the course of these disciplinary proceedings does not indicate
that Mr. Sanderson ever paid these remaining funds to Mr. Wilkinson. Therefore, clear
and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson
violated MLRPC 1.15(c) and (d) throughout his representations of Mr. Wilkinson and Mr.
Parham.
In addition to the violations of the MLRPC that originated from Mr. Sanderson’s
representation of Ms. Ozel, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated
MLRPC 1.15(c) and (d) throughout his representation of Ms. Brown. The hearing judge
determined that Mr. Sanderson violated this rule by failing to promptly deliver settlement
funds owed to these clients. However, as mentioned above, Bar Counsel failed to allege
47
any violations with respect to Mr. Sanderson’s representation of Ms. Brown.16 As noted
above, the record contains scant evidence concerning Mr. Sanderson’s representation of
Ms. Brown. Further, the record fails to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 1.15 in his representation of Ms. Brown.
Accordingly, the hearing judge’s contrary conclusion was premised upon error.
Md. Rule 19-410 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Maryland Rule 19-410, establishes numerous restrictions on an attorney’s ability to
perform certain actions with funds held in an attorney trust account:
(b) No Cash Disbursements. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account
may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash withdrawal may be
made from an automated teller machine or by any other method. All
disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by check or electronic
transfer.
(c) Negative Balance Prohibited. No funds from an attorney trust account shall be
disbursed if the disbursement would create a negative balance with regard to an
individual client matter or all client matters in the aggregate.
Md. Rule 19-410(b), (c). The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated
subsection (b) of this provision in his representation of Ms. Ozel by making several cash
withdrawals from his attorney trust account. However, the hearing judge failed to conclude
that Mr. Sanderson violated subsection (c).17
16
Out of due process constraints, our review focuses on the allegations established by the
hearing judge that were raised in Bar Counsel’s Petition. Specifically, the only overlapping
allegations between the hearing judge’s conclusions of law and Bar Counsel’s petition,
with reference to MLRPC 1.15, are those concerning Mr. Sanderson’s representation of
Ms. Ozel. See supra at 22-23.
17
The hearing judge’s failure to conclude that Mr. Sanderson violated subsection (c) is
puzzling, because the initial complaint in this matter was based on Mr. Sanderson’s failure
48
Nonetheless, the financial records associated with Mr. Sanderson’s attorney trust
account demonstrate that he made seven cash disbursements from his attorney trust account
between June 30, 2016 and April 4, 2017.18 In total, these cash disbursements amounted
to $15,201.88. For that reason, we hold that the hearing judge’s conclusion with respect
to Maryland Rule 19-410(b) is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Md. Rule 19-407 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
Maryland Rule 19-407 strengthens the trust afforded to the legal profession by
mandating a lengthy list of records that an attorney must maintain with respect to his or her
attorney client trust account:
(a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and maintained for
the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons:
(1) Attorney Trust Account Identification. An identification of all attorney trust
accounts maintained, including the name of the financial institution, account
number, account name, date the account was opened, date the account was
closed, and an agreement with the financial institution establishing each account
and its interest-bearing nature.
(2) Deposits and Disbursements. A record for each account that chronologically
shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows:
(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the deposit that shows (i)
the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the client or third
person for whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit;
to maintain a positive balance in his attorney trust account which the associated bank
records definitively establish. However, Bar Counsel did not except to the hearing judge’s
failure to make a conclusion as to whether Mr. Sanderson violated Maryland Rule 19-
410(c); as such, we do not address the matter further.
18
In addition to the cash disbursements, Mr. Sanderson cashed a $1,000 check made to the
account on November 9, 2016. This amount is not included in the total number of cash
disbursements or the accompanying total of funds withdrew from the account as cash.
49
(B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by electronic transfer, a
record made at or near the time of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the
disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the identity of the client or
third person for whom the disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v)
the purpose of the disbursement;
(C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written memorandum
authorizing the transaction and identifying the attorney responsible for the
transaction.
(3) Client Matter Records. A record for each client matter in which the attorney
receives funds in trust, as follows:
(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) the date of
the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii)
the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a disbursement, the payee
and the check number or other payment identification; and (v) the balance of
funds remaining in the account in connection with the matter; and
(B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion of a fee or expense
deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be returned to a person other than the
client.
(4) Record of Funds of the Attorney. A record that identifies the funds of the
attorney held in each attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 19-408 (b).
(b) Monthly Reconciliation. An attorney shall cause to be created a monthly
reconciliation of all attorney trust account records, client matter records, records
of funds of the attorney held in an attorney trust account as permitted by Rule
19-408 (b), and the adjusted month-end financial institution statement balance.
The adjusted month-end financial institution statement balance is computed by
adding subsequent deposits to and subtracting subsequent disbursements from
the financial institution’s month-end statement balance.
(c) Electronic Records. Whenever the records required by this Rule are created or
maintained using electronic means, there must be an ability to print a paper copy
of the records upon a reasonable request to do so.
(d) Records to be Maintained. Financial institution month-end statements, any
canceled checks or copies of canceled checks provided with a financial
institution month-end statement, duplicate deposit slips or deposit receipts
generated by the financial institution, and records created in accordance with
50
section (a) of this Rule shall be maintained for a period of at least five years after
the date the record was created.
In several correspondences to Mr. Sanderson throughout these disciplinary proceedings,
Bar Counsel requested that he provide copies of ledgers, records, and client files. In
response to these requests, Mr. Sanderson provided only purported retainer agreements for
several clients and two “waiver of conflict” agreements. However, he failed to provide
any records concerning his attorney trust account, and, therefore, the record is entirely
devoid of any indication that Mr. Sanderson complied with Maryland Rule 19-407. Under
these circumstances, we determine that the hearing judge’s conclusion with respect to this
issue is supported by clear and convincing evidence; Mr. Sanderson failed to adequately
maintain records associated with his attorney trust account as required under Maryland
Rule 19-407.
Md. Rule 19-408 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
(a) General Prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney trust
account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by Rule
19-404 or permitted to be so deposited by section (b) of this Rule.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an attorney trust account
funds to pay any fees, service charges, or minimum balance required by the
financial institution to open or maintain the account, including those fees that
cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland Legal Services
Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 19-411 (b)(1)(D), or (B) enter into an
agreement with the financial institution to have any fees or charges deducted
from an operating account maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney
or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds expected to be
advanced on behalf of a client and expected to be reimbursed to the attorney by
the client.
51
(2) An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account funds
belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the attorney
or law firm. The portion belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn
promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the funds, but any
portion disputed by the client shall remain in the account until the dispute is
resolved.
(3) Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and commingled in an
attorney trust account with the funds held for other clients or beneficial owners.
Md. Rule 19-408 (emphasis added). The rule references Maryland Rule 19-404 for the
types of items that must be deposited in an attorney trust account, which include the
following:
Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash,
received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third
person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received
as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expenses
properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust
account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an
instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client
or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person.
Further, the restrictive language of Maryland Rule 19-408(a) limits the type of items an
attorney may deposit into an attorney trust account to those specifically provided in
Maryland Rule 14-404. In the present disciplinary proceedings, the hearing judge
determined that Mr. Sanderson violated Maryland Rule 19-408 by depositing funds from
his business operating account into his attorney trust account on several occasions.
The record is replete with instances in which Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from
his operating account to his attorney trust account. In fact, between March 15, 2016 and
April 4, 2017, Mr. Sanderson transferred funds from his operating account to his attorney
trust account more than nineteen times. These transactions totaled an amount of
52
$15,149.72. With the record containing such undisputed evidence, the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated Maryland Rule 19-408 is supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
BOP § 10-306 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
In his conclusions of law, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson violated
BOP § 10-306 throughout his representation of several clients.19 The provision provides
that “[a] lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which
the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” BOP § 10-306. We have held that an attorney
violated this provision where he “used trust account funds for an unauthorized purpose,
withdrew cash from the account, and created negative balances within multiple client
accounts[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 43 (2016).
First, Mr. Sanderson engaged in a practice of making numerous impermissible cash
disbursements from his attorney trust account as discussed above in reference to his
violation of Maryland Rule 19-410. Second, this practice resulted in the trust account
becoming underfunded on several occasions with its balance falling into the negative and
causing the overdraft in January of 2017. Third, Mr. Sanderson consistently transferred
funds from his operating account to his trust account which is discussed at length in our
19
In his opinion, the hearing judge indicated he was discussing BOP § 10-306 but quoted
the text of BOP § 10-305 instead, which permits attorneys to withdraw funds from an
attorney trust and to invest them in certain instances. Bar Counsel’s Petition averred a
violation of BOP § 10-306 and we note that this discrepancy appears to be a typographical
issue and proceed in our analysis under the impression that the hearing judge intended to
conclude Mr. Sanderson violated BOP § 10-306.
53
analysis of MLRPC 1.15. Therefore, the record clearly reflects that the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated BOP § 10-306 is supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
MLRPC 3.4 (BC Docket No. 2017-0152)
MLRPC 3.4 concerns fairness to opposing parties and, in pertinent part, provides
that an attorney may not “falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law[.]” MLRPC 3.4(b).
The hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 3.4(b) when he
instructed Ms. Ozel to provide Bar Counsel with false information upon any subsequent
inquiry into his representation. According to Ms. Ozel’s testimony, Mr. Sanderson called
her at some point after the meeting in Owings Mills and inquired as to whether she had
been contacted or asked any questions regarding his representation of her. She testified
that after the phone call she and Mr. Sanderson encountered one another at the Baltimore
City Juvenile Court, where she worked. There, Mr. Sanderson again asked whether Ms.
Ozel had been contacted by anyone in reference to his representation. In addition, he
informed her that if anyone should contact her and ask questions regarding his
representation of her, she should inform them that she “hired him for something else beside
a car accident, and then [she] changed my mind and asked for the $2,900 back.” She then
testified that she did not retain Mr. Sanderson in another matter and the representation he
urged her to make was in fact false.
Our review of the record clearly indicates that Mr. Sanderson contacted Ms. Ozel
regarding the pending disciplinary proceedings. He was aware that she would likely be
54
called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings and attempted to have her provide
misinformation to Bar Counsel to mitigate any disciplinary action taken. Therefore, Mr.
Sanderson attempted to persuade Ms. Ozel into providing false testimony to Bar Counsel
which directly contravened MLRPC 3.4(b). Accordingly, the hearing judge’s conclusion
that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 3.4(b) is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
MLRPC 8.1 (BC Docket No. 2013-297-04-14)
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary
matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that
this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
19-301.6 (1.6).
MLRPC 8.1. See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Oswinkle, 364 Md. 182, 188 (2001).
The hearing judge found that Mr. Sanderson engaged in multiple violations of MLRPC 8.1.
Primarily, the violations stem from Mr. Sanderson’s failure to adequately respond to Bar
Counsel throughout the investigation.
Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s communication, dated December
15, 2016, which expressed Bar Counsel’s intention to declare him in default of the CDA
and requested a written response. Second, Mr. Sanderson failed to respond to several
requests by Bar Counsel concerning the overdraft on his attorney trust account. Third, Mr.
Sanderson failed to respond to multiple written correspondences from Bar Counsel
55
regarding his representation of Ms. Isom-Cyrus.20 This Court has previously held that,
where letters from Bar Counsel cite MLRPC 8.1 and put an attorney on notice that failure
to respond would result in a violation, such letters constitute a “lawful demand” as
envisioned by MLRPC 8.1. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 252-
53 (2000). See also Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. at 190. As the letters sent to Mr. Sanderson
contained this reference, and the record is devoid of evidence indicating that Mr. Sanderson
timely responded to the majority of these communications, clear and convincing evidence
exists supporting that hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated MLRPC 8.1.
MLRPC 8.4
In addition to the above findings, the hearing judge also found that Mr. Sanderson
violated subsections (a), (c), and (e) of MLRPC 8.4 which, in pertinent part, provides the
following:
It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts
of another;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) knowingly manifest by words or conduct when acting in a professional capacity
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status when such action is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, provided, however, that legitimate advocacy is not a
violation of this section;
The hearing judge’s conclusions of law concerning Mr. Sanderson’s representation of
20
Ms. Isom-Cyrus will be analyzed in detail shortly hereafter.
56
However, Bar Counsel takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions based on
MLRPC 8.4. Specifically, Bar Counsel contends that the hearing judge erred in neglecting
to find Mr. Sanderson in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d), where his conduct in the aggregate
brings the profession into disrepute. We next determine the applicable provisions of
MLRPC 8.4 that Mr. Sanderson violated.
First, Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 8.4(a) by violating several provisions of the
MLRPC discussed at length above. Mr. Sanderson also engaged in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) by
misrepresenting to Ms. Ozel that she would receive $2,900 from a worker’s compensation
action and urging her to provide Bar Counsel with misinformation upon request. Mr.
Sanderson’s continued pattern of making cash withdrawals from his attorney trust account
and reimbursing the account with funds transferred from his operating account are
troubling and evince dishonesty. Moreover, Mr. Sanderson’s conduct in paying Mr.
Wilkinson’s funds held in trust to Ms. Hines constitutes misappropriation. Such conduct
directly violates MLRPC 8.4(c). Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gage-Cohen, 440 Md.
191, 201 (2014). Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s
conclusions that Mr. Sanderson violated MLRPC 8.4(a) and (c).
In addition, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Sanderson ran afoul of MLRPC
8.4(e) by making disparaging remarks towards Ms. Isom-Cyrus in his interaction with her
at the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Several witnesses testified that Mr. Sanderson
called Ms. Isom-Cyrus a “bitch[,]” while she testified that Mr. Sanderson referred to her as
57
a “baby-snatching bitch[.]” At oral argument, Mr. Sanderson argued that the use of the
term alone does constitute conduct sufficient to support a violation of the Rule. He alluded
to the casual usage of racial epithets in hip-hop music and argued that, in some usages,
derogative terms can imply some level of respect rather than disdain. However, Mr.
Sanderson’s comparison is inapt as his exchange with Ms. Isom-Cyrus in no way
demonstrated any such level of respect.
When Mr. Sanderson made the disparaging remarks shortly after a CINA hearing in
which Ms. Isom-Cyrus represented the BCDSS, he was acting within his professional
capacity at the time. Clearly, based on the verbiage alone, Mr. Sanderson in his exchange
with Ms. Isom-Cyrus, knowingly manifested bias or prejudice based upon sex, through his
words, while acting in a professional capacity in violation of MLRPC 8.4(e). Accordingly,
our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that the hearing judge’s
conclusion is supported by clear and convincing as to this violation.
Additionally, Bar Counsel takes exception to the hearing judge’s legal conclusions
premised upon MLRPC 8.4. Specifically, Bar Counsel alleges that Mr. Sanderson’s
conduct, viewed in the aggregate, brings the legal profession into disrepute in
contravention of MLRPC 8.4(d). We agree with Bar Counsel and sustain the exception to
the hearing judge’s findings, because the record clearly reflects that Mr. Sanderson
engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
MLRPC 8.4(d) prohibits an attorney from acting in a manner “that negatively
impacts the public’s perception of the legal profession.” Ghatt, 461 Md. at 273-74 (citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Marcalus, 442 Md. 197, 205, 112 A.3d 375 (2015)). See
58
also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22 (2007) (commenting that MLRPC
8.4(d) is violated where attorney conduct “reflects negatively on the legal profession and
sets a bad example for the public at large.”). First, we have commented that “[a] failure by
an attorney to appear in court at a hearing on behalf of his or her client constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” Thomas, 440 Md. at 556. Here, Mr.
Sanderson failed to appear at several proceedings throughout his representations of Mr.
Odubanjo and Mr. Sangare. Second, an attorney violates MLRPC 8.4(d) by mismanaging
client funds, making cash withdrawals from an attorney trust account, failing to maintain
records associated with an attorney trust account, creating a negative trust balance, and
commingling personal funds with that of a client. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 43 (2016). As detailed above, Mr. Sanderson engaged in all these
violative practices. Accordingly, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exception and find that Mr.
Sanderson violated MLRPC 8.4(d).
SANCTION
Next, we must determine the sanction to impose where an attorney commits a
myriad of rule violations as found by the hearing judge in this case. The primary aim of
sanctions is to protect the public and not to punish an attorney. Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 (2005). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Shyrock, 408 Md. 105, 126 (2009) (commenting that sanctions are intended to “protect the
public, deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.”)
59
In terms of a sanction, Bar Counsel urged this Court to disbar Mr. Sanderson due to
the numerous violations of the MLRPC he committed. Whereas, Mr. Sanderson disagreed
and contended that an appropriate sanction would entail a six-month suspension with an
ability to reapply once he satisfied the conditions originally set forth in the CDA.
In fashioning an appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary proceedings, “[w]e
determine the appropriate sanction by considering the facts of the case, as well as balancing
any aggravating or mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md.
325, 337 (2013) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 262
(2008)). We often refer to Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Associations Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provides the following aggravating factors:
prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of
misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge
wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in
the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; (k) illegal conduct,
including that involving the use of controlled substances.
We have previously explained that “[a]ggravating factors militate in favor of a more severe
sanction[.]” Kremer, 432 Md. at 337.
Before the hearing judge, Bar Counsel argued that existence of ten aggravating
factors compelled disbarment: (1) prior disciplinary offense; (2) a dishonest or selfish
motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple offenses; (5) bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (7) refusal to acknowledge wrongful
60
nature of conduct; (8) vulnerability of victim; (9) substantial experience in the practice of
law; and (10) indifference to making restitution. For the most part, the hearing judge
agreed, finding that Bar Counsel had demonstrated the existence of nine of the aggravating
factors. However, the hearing judge determined that Bar Counsel had failed to meet the
burden of establishing the aggravating factor of substantial experience in the practice of
law. Moreover, the hearing judge determined that Mr. Sanderson failed to present any
mitigating evidence and, accordingly, found that Mr. Sanderson failed to establish any
mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See Md. Rule 19-727(c). Based on
our review of the record, we note the existence of several aggravating factors.
First, Mr. Sanderson was previously disciplined and received a reprimand on
February 25, 2014, for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 3.2, and 3.4(c). Second, Mr.
Sanderson demonstrated a dishonest or selfish motive throughout his representation of
clients and his interactions with Bar Counsel. Mr. Sanderson failed to disclose to Ms. Ozel
the amount or timing of her settlement and knowingly urged her to make false statements
to Bar Counsel in an apparent effort to obfuscate his improper handling of settlement and
client funds from Bar Counsel’s view.
Third, Mr. Sanderson clearly engaged in an overarching pattern of misconduct.
Throughout Bar Counsel’s investigation, Mr. Sanderson consistently failed to respond to
Bar Counsel’s inquiries. Moreover, Mr. Sanderson engaged in the questionable practice
of making impermissible cash withdrawals from his attorney trust account then
supplementing the trust account’s by transferring funds to it from his operating account.
Additionally, Mr. Sanderson demonstrated a pattern of misconduct by failing to appear at
61
several court proceedings despite entering his appearance on behalf of Mr. Odubanjo and
Mr. Sangare.
Fourth, as evident from our analysis above, Mr. Sanderson committed multiple
violations of the MLRPC. Fifth, Mr. Sanderson demonstrated bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding in several respects. Mr. Sanderson failed to comply with the terms
of the CDA, failed to comply with Bar Counsel’s requests for information regarding his
representation of several clients, and instructed Ms. Ozel to lie to Bar Counsel concerning
the investigation. Sixth, Mr. Sanderson made false statements to Bar Counsel regarding
his interactions with Ms. Ozel. He also engaged in deceptive practices by instructing Ms.
Ozel to make misrepresentations to Bar Counsel. Seventh, Mr. Sanderson refused to
acknowledge his behavior and the wrongful nature of his conduct.
Mr. Sanderson takes exception to the hearing judge’s determination that Mr.
Sangare was a vulnerable person, which undergirded his finding that factor (h) – the
vulnerability of victim.21 American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, § 9.22, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards
(2012). However, contrary to Mr. Sanderson’s position, “[w]e have recognized previously
the special vulnerability of immigrants as clients[.]” Thomas, 440 Md. at 558 (citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011)). Therefore, considering
21
In his exceptions, Mr. Sanderson stylizes this argument as an exception to the hearing
judge’s finding of fact that Mr. Sangare was a vulnerable client. However, this argument
is more appropriately viewed as an argument concerning aggravating and mitigating factors
rather than an exception to factual findings.
62
Mr. Sangare’s immigration status, Mr. Sanderson’s exception on this point is without merit.
We therefore overrule this objection.22
In contrast to aggravating factors, the existence of mitigating factors tends to lessen
or reduce the sanction an attorney may face. Kremer, 432 Md. at 338. Standard 9.22 of
the American Bar Associations Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions also provides a
non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors that we regularly consider within the context of
attorney sanctions. The standard provides the following potential mitigating factors:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution
or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary
board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice
of law; (g)character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or
chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when: (1) there is medical
evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability;
(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) The
respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and (4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely. (j) Delay in disciplinary proceedings; (k) Imposition of other penalties or
sanctions; (l) remorse; (m) remoteness of prior offenses
Id. See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63 (2010) (providing a
non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors).
In attorney discipline cases, the burden of proving allegations raised in the Petition,
by clear and convincing evidence, falls upon Bar Counsel. Md. Rule 19-727(c). However,
where an attorney asserts the existence of a mitigating factors, the burden rests with that
22
Lastly, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson’s experience in
the practice of law does not constitute an aggravating factor.
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attorney to prove them by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Mr. Sanderson makes
several arguments in favor of mitigation which he must have proven before the hearing
judge by a preponderance of the evidence. We find Mr. Sanderson’s arguments regarding
mitigation unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, he contends that, in his representation of Ms. Ozel, he provided her with
additional legal services, i.e., obtaining a release of funds from the worker’s compensation
carrier, without additional attorney fees. Mr. Sanderson’s exception regarding the
additional work he performed for Ms. Ozel neither fits easily into any of the above
categories of mitigating factors nor within any recognized mitigating factor discussed
within our case law. However, when viewed in terms of its substance, Mr. Sanderson’s
argument on this point is most likely subsumed under the mitigating factor concerning the
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. However, Mr. Sanderson failed to establish this
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of his explanation that he
performed additional work for Ms. Ozel, staving off a potential worker’s compensation
lien, Mr. Sanderson provides an email from a subrogation adjuster with the IWIF that
cleared Ms. Ozel’s settlement funds from any IWIF withholding. Mr. Sanderson failed to
provide any documentation which would show the amount of work he performed in
releasing these funds or any expenditures throughout this period.
Second, Mr. Sanderson argues that, although he failed to comply with the CDA in
its entirety, he worked with his CDA monitor for an additional eight months past its
expiration. Mr. Sanderson’s contentions on this point are largely misguided. Although he
may have met with his monitor beyond the time-period required by the CDA, he failed to
64
comply with several other conditions of the CDA. Specifically, Mr. Sanderson failed to
attend the required professional development courses concerning office and escrow
management. Mr. Sanderson argues that the courses were offered at times inconvenient
for him, which explains why he was unable to complete them within the two-year term of
the CDA. However, he did indicate that he participated in continuing legal education
courses from external jurisdictions that are similar to those required under the CDA.
Nonetheless, Mr. Sanderson’s actions of working with his monitor beyond the expiration
of the CDA are insufficient to constitute mitigating circumstances. A holding in Mr.
Sanderson’s favor would likely encourage other attorneys, within disciplinary proceedings,
to pick and choose which terms of their CDAs to follow and for what duration. Such a
result would likely frustrate attorney disciplinary proceedings and the purpose of CDAs
overall.
Third, Mr. Sanderson argues that he was depressed and abusing alcohol throughout
the time period in which these events occurred. Regarding mental disability or substance
dependence, we have indicated,
in cases of intentional dishonesty misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious
criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating
circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental
or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the
misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her
conduct in accordance with the law and with the [MLRPC]. Only if the
circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the
most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent
conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct,
whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise.
65
Ghatt, 461 Md. at 275-76 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md.
376, 413-14 (2001)). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 591
(1995) (holding that “absent truly compelling circumstances, alcoholism will not be
permitted to mitigate where an attorney commits a violation of ethical or legal rules which
would ordinarily warrant disbarment.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Williams, 335 Md.
458, 474 (1994) (“[w]e have said that a sanction less severe than disbarment is not
warranted absent evidence that the addiction, to a substantial extent, was the responsible,
precipitating and root cause of the misappropriation.”).
As demonstrated above, Mr. Sanderson misappropriated client funds throughout his
practice of repeatedly withdrawing cash from his attorney trust account, then reimbursing
the underfunded trust account by transferring funds from his operating account on several
occasions. Mr. Sanderson provides us with no evidence confirming his struggles with
alcoholism and depression or demonstrating that his struggles in managing his attorney
trust and operating accounts were substantially attributable to them. We determine that he
failed to adduce sufficient evidence linking any alcohol abuse or depressive disorders to
his deficient performance and grievous professional failings as an attorney.
Fourth, after reiterating that he had worked with his monitor under the CDA past its
expiration, Mr. Sanderson contends that the public has not been demonstrably harmed by
his conduct, the financial allegations raised in the Petition do not stem from a complaint
originating from the public, and that none of his clients are owed any reimbursement.
However, our precedent reveals no distinction between situations where financial
complaints originate from Bar Counsel, judges, or an attorney’s clients. In fact, in this
66
case, Mr. Sanderson had three complaints filed against him by Judge Mitchell, Mr.
Sangare, and Ms. Isom-Cyrus. Moreover, the allegations of Mr. Sanderson’s financial
misdoings stem from Bar Counsel’s investigation into his attorney trust account following
its overdraft. With Mr. Sanderson’s misrepresentations to his clients, including Ms. Ozel,
he obfuscated any financial concerns and reduced the likelihood that a client would have
the necessary knowledge of Mr. Sanderson’s violations concerning attorney trust accounts
and client funds.
Lastly, Mr. Sanderson argues that he acted as an attorney without any additional
allegations of misconduct between the time of the complained activity and Bar Counsel’s
filing of the Petition. As mentioned above, Bar Counsel filed the Petition on March 26,
2018. Although a lack of prior disciplinary record is a potential mitigating factor, Mr.
Sanderson attempts to establish this mitigatory effect by arguing that he practiced law for
a little over a year, after receiving Bar Counsel’s complaint, without incident. However,
twelve months of good behavior is insufficient to mitigate or overcome the litany of
sanctionable conduct Mr. Sanderson committed. Therefore, Mr. Sanderson’s brief period
of not committing sanctionable conduct is insufficient to operate as a mitigating factor.
Disbarment is often warranted in situations where an attorney neglects or abandons
clients, makes misrepresentations to clients and Bar Counsel, and knowingly
misappropriates funds. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 712 (2019).
We have previously held, that “[w]hen a pattern of intentional misrepresentations is
involved, particularly those misrepresentations that attempt to conceal other misconduct
by the attorney, disbarment will ordinarily be the appropriate sanction.” Attorney
67
Grievance Comm’n v. Framm, 449 Md. 620, 667 (2016). In addition, “[c]onduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, carries the risk of the ultimate sanction by this Court.”
Maldonado, 463 Md. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 523 (2011). In his communications with Ms. Ozel, Mr.
Sanderson engaged in such a pattern of intentional misrepresentations, which were made
in attempt to cover up his prior transgressions and to interfere in Bar Counsel’s
investigation. Mr. Sanderson clearly demonstrated conduct characterized by dishonesty or
deceit through his impermissible handling of client funds on numerous occasions.
In this case, we sustain the hearing judge’s findings that Mr. Sanderson violated
MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 3.4, 8.1, and 8.4. In addition, we sustain the hearing
judge’s conclusion that Mr. Sanderson violated Maryland Rules §§ 19-410, 19-407, 19-
408, and BOP § 10-306. Furthermore, Mr. Sanderson, as an attorney, failed to demonstrate
the requisite competence, diligence, and communicative abilities required of the
profession. Additionally, he engaged in a widespread pattern of misusing client funds,
failing to properly maintain records associated with his attorney trust account, and engaged
in conduct which has the potentiality to bring the profession into disrepute.
Based on our assessment of Mr. Sanderson’s misconduct, the existence of
aggravating factors, and the absence of any mitigating factors, we agree with Bar Counsel
and hold that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction. For the above reasons, we
disbarred Mr. Sanderson and awarded costs against him by per curiam order dated April 5,
2019.
68