State v. Wilson , 471 Md. 136 ( 2020 )

State of Maryland v. Darrayl John Wilson, No. 64, September Term, 2019
WITNESS TAMPERING – OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE – SPOUSAL
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE – MERGER – Court of Appeals held that, where person
married potential witness for State with intent to have witness invoke spousal testimonial
privilege to prevent witness from testifying at criminal proceeding, evidence was sufficient
to support convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Consistent with
holding in Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695(1941), and in accord with determinations of federal appellate courts, Court of Appeals
concluded that conduct constituting corrupt means under obstruction of justice and witness
tampering statutes may include conduct that is in and of itself legal. Court of Appeals
determined that use of corrupt means involves acting with corrupt intent, i.e., person uses
corrupt means by marrying with intent to preclude another person from testifying at
criminal proceeding, even though conduct involved (entering into marriage) is otherwise
lawful. Applying holding to circumstances of case, Court of Appeals concluded that
evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for witness tampering and
obstruction of justice given ample evidence that defendant married witness for State with
corrupt intent of having her invoke spousal testimonial privilege at defendant’s upcoming
murder trial and therefore not be able to testify at trial.
Court of Appeals held that defendant’s conviction for witness tampering did not merge for
sentencing purposes with conviction for obstruction of justice due to anti-merger provision
in witness tampering statute, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019
Supp.) (“CR”) § 9-305. In light of plain language of CR § 9-305(d), it was not necessary
to determine whether required evidence test mandated merger of defendant’s convictions
for witness tampering and obstruction of justice, and neither rule of lenity nor principle of
fundamental fairness required merger.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No. C-08-CR-17-000048
Argued: September 14, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 64
September Term, 2019
______________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
DARRAYL JOHN WILSON
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Getty
Booth
Biran,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 26, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2020-10-26 11:28-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
This case requires us to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
defendant’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice where the
evidence indicated that the defendant married a potential witness for the State to have the
witness invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his murder trial. We are also asked to
decide whether the defendant’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice
merge for sentencing purposes.
The witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes preclude the use of
“corrupt means” to impede, among others, a witness in the performance of the witness’s
duties or to impede the administration of justice. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012
Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) (“CR”) §§ 9-305(a), 9-306(a). In Maryland, the spouse of a person
on trial for a crime may invoke the spousal testimonial privilege codified at Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) (“CJ”) § 9-106(a), and, unless
certain exceptions specified in the statute are satisfied, may not be compelled to testify as
an adverse witness.
In this case, Kearra Bannister informed a law enforcement officer that her boyfriend,
Darrayl John Wilson, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, told her that he and Raymond Posey
were involved in the murder of Crystal Anderson. In the Circuit Court for Charles County,
the State, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, separately charged Wilson and Posey with first-
degree murder of Anderson and other crimes, initiating the cases of State v. Darrayl John
Wilson, No. 08-K-15-000551 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) (“Wilson I”) and State v. Raymond
Daniel Posey III, No. 08-K-15-000121 (Cir. Ct. Charles Cty.) (“Posey”).
While incarcerated and awaiting the trial in Wilson I, Wilson engaged in multiple
telephone and video conversations with Bannister and others in which he indicated that he
wanted to marry Bannister so that she could refuse to testify at his and Posey’s trials. One
day before the State was scheduled to call Bannister as a witness in Posey’s trial, and
eighteen days before the trial in Wilson I was scheduled to begin, Wilson and Bannister
married via a telephone conversation with a pastor. While testifying at Posey’s trial,
Bannister attempted to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. The circuit court ruled
that she could not do so and required her to answer the prosecutor’s questions. In Wilson
I, before trial, the State filed a motion to preclude Bannister from invoking the spousal
testimonial privilege, which the circuit court granted. Wilson later pled guilty to offenses
in the case.
Subsequently, the State charged Wilson with witness tampering and obstruction of
justice as to Wilson I and Posey on the ground that Wilson married Bannister to try to have
her invoke the spousal privilege and thus preclude her from testifying in both cases. A jury
found Wilson guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Wilson I, but not
guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Posey. Wilson appealed. The
Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions for insufficient evidence, reasoning that
the State failed to prove the “corrupt means” element of witness tampering and obstruction
of justice. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and Wilson filed a conditional
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the petition and granted the
conditional cross-petition as to one issue.
Before us, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support Wilson’s
convictions because, although marrying someone is a lawful act, Wilson married Bannister
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with the corrupt intent of trying to make it possible for her to invoke the spousal testimonial
privilege at trial in Wilson I. The State also argues that, because of an “anti-merger”
provision in CR § 9-305, a conviction for witness tampering does not merge for sentencing
purposes with a conviction for obstruction of justice. Wilson responds that he did not
commit a crime by marrying Bannister and therefore his conduct does not satisfy the
corrupt means element of the statutes. Wilson also contends that, if the evidence is
sufficient to sustain his convictions, his conviction for witness tampering should merge for
sentencing with his conviction for obstruction of justice under the required evidence test,
the rule of lenity, and the principle of fundamental fairness.
Below, in Part I, we conclude that, where a person marries a potential witness for
the State with the intent to enable the witness to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at
a criminal proceeding, the evidence is sufficient to support convictions for witness
tampering and obstruction of justice. Consistent with our holding in Romans v. State, 178
Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941), and in accord with the
determinations of federal appellate courts, we conclude that conduct constituting corrupt
means under the witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes may include conduct
that is in and of itself legal. We conclude that use of corrupt means involves acting with
corrupt intent, i.e., a person uses corrupt means by marrying with the intent to preclude
another person from testifying at a criminal proceeding, even though the conduct
involved—entering into a marriage—is otherwise lawful. Applying the holding to the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wilson’s
convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice given the ample evidence that
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Wilson married Bannister with the corrupt intent of having her invoke the spousal
testimonial privilege at his upcoming murder trial to prevent the State from compelling her
testimony.
In Part II, we conclude that Wilson’s conviction for witness tampering does not
merge for sentencing purposes with his conviction for obstruction of justice in light of the
anti-merger provision, CR § 9-305(d), which states: “A sentence imposed under this
section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any
crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section.” Given the plain language
of CR § 9-305(d), it is not necessary to determine whether the required evidence test
mandates merger of Wilson’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice,
and neither the rule of lenity nor the principle of fundamental fairness requires merger.
BACKGROUND
Trial and Sentencing
At trial, as a witness for the State, Detective John Elliott of the Charles County
Sheriff’s Office testified that, in August 2011, Anderson’s mother reported her missing.
Detective Elliott and another detective determined that Anderson was last seen alive at a
party in Nanjemoy, Maryland, which occurred on July 26, 2011. In January 2012, the
remains of a human body were found in a creek bed in Nanjemoy. In February 2012, a
medical examiner identified the remains as Anderson’s. The investigation of Anderson’s
murder went on for years. In August 2014, as part of the investigation, Detective Brian
Buchanan of the Charles County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Wilson’s girlfriend,
Bannister.
-4-
As a witness for the State, Detective Buchanan testified that, in August 2014, his
supervisor informed him that an officer had responded to a domestic call in Nanjemoy, and
that Bannister, who had been at the scene of the call, told the officer that she had
information regarding Anderson’s murder. Detective Buchanan’s supervisor asked him to
interview Bannister. He did so, and made a recording of the interview, which was admitted
into evidence and played for the jury. During the interview, Bannister stated that, on July
25, 2011, Wilson told her that he and Raymond Posey intended to rob Anderson and take
drugs and cash from her. Bannister indicated that, on July 26, 2011 (the date of Anderson’s
death, according to the indictments), on multiple occasions, she telephoned Wilson, who
did not answer. Bannister stated that, days later, Wilson and Posey had drugs and cash,
and were burning clothes and selling guns and other items. According to Bannister, Wilson
told her that he and Posey were involved in Anderson’s murder.
The circuit court admitted into evidence indictments showing that grand juries
separately indicted Posey and Wilson for first-degree murder and other crimes.
Specifically, on June 19, 2015, in the circuit court, the State filed an indictment against
Wilson, initiating Wilson I. Detective Elliott testified that, from July 2015 through at least
February 2017, Wilson was incarcerated at the Charles County Detention Center, awaiting
the trial.
The circuit court admitted into evidence notices of when the circuit court scheduled
the trials in Posey and Wilson I to begin. On October 6, 2016, the circuit court scheduled
the trial in Posey to begin on February 6, 2017. On October 27, 2016, the circuit court
scheduled the trial in Wilson I to begin on February 27, 2017.
-5-
The circuit court admitted into evidence recordings of multiple telephone
conversations and video visits in which Wilson participated with Bannister and others
while he was incarcerated and awaiting trial. The recordings were played for the jury. On
December 5, 2016, Wilson telephoned his cousin, Takiya Washington, who said that she
had “asked the big question” of Wilson’s “baby mama.” Wilson responded: “What?”
Washington responded: “Uuuuuh, jump the broom.”1 Shortly afterward, Washington said:
“I said[: ‘W]ell you gonna have to, you know, you gonna have to get married.[’] She said[:
‘]I know.[’]”
On December 7, 2016, Wilson and Bannister engaged in a video visit. Wilson said
that Washington had told him that she had asked Bannister whether she would marry him.
Wilson said: “[Y]ou gotta[] do it. I’m in here.” Bannister laughed and responded: “Ok.
I’ll do it.”
On December 19, 2016, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who said: “That thing we
w[ere] talking about costs six hundred fifty dollars[.]” Bannister indicated that “for the
person to come, well I guess I could, I don’t know anybody out here to do it.” Shortly
afterward, Wilson said: “They can’t come here to do it.” Bannister responded: “They can’t
visit with you on my visit.”
On December 22, 2016, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who said that she had only
$200. Wilson asked how Bannister would do “[w]hat [she] said [she] was gonna do.”
Bannister responded: “You say what?” Wilson responded: “Get them papers and stuff.”
“‘[J]umping the broom’ [is] a folk rite of marriage[.]” Alexander v. Haley, 460 F.
1
Supp. 40, 45 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citation omitted).
-6-
Bannister responded: “I already got the papers.” Wilson asked whether Bannister had
“fill[ed th]em out[.]” Shortly afterward, Bannister asked: “You talking about the license?”
Wilson responded: “Yeah.”
On December 30, 2016, Wilson and Bannister obtained a marriage license even
though evidence at trial indicated that Bannister had a boyfriend at the time.
On the same day, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who said: “[W]e just gotta keep
money on the phone. And do it like that . . . [a]s soon as possible.” Wilson responded:
“Yeah.” Bannister said: “Before, uh, your case again.” Wilson responded: “Yeah, yeah,
yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah[.]”
On January 2, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who asked what Washington had
“to do with the thing[.]” Wilson responded: “She do[es]n’t, but you really can’t talk to me
about it.” Bannister said: “I know.” Wilson responded: “And I really can’t talk to her
about it.” Later on the same day, Wilson telephoned Washington. Wilson said that
Bannister was “supposed to be tryin to get [Washington] to see” whether Wilson’s aunt
could “do the thing.” Washington responded: “Oh, um, the license?” Wilson responded:
“She already got that.”
On January 9, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister and said that his trial would begin
on February 27, 2017 and was “supposed to last a week.” Later on during the call,
Bannister asked: “[W]hat about that, though?” Wilson responded: “What?” Bannister
responded: “Never mind[.]” Wilson responded: “Oh[.]” Bannister said: “I’m just
(inaudible)[.]” Wilson responded: “Um, the phones are recorded[.]” Bannister responded:
“I know[.]” Wilson said: “I’m just waiting on y’all.”
-7-
On January 14, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother, Dawn Wilson. Wilson said:
“[Y]’all gotta hurry up and set the thing up before I end up down the hole[,2] and then it
do[es]n’t get done.” Wilson’s mother responded: “I just have one question, though.”
Wilson said: “You can ask the question after March.” Wilson’s mother asked why. Wilson
responded: “Because my trial will be over in March.”
At trial, the circuit court admitted into evidence a line that was filed in Wilson I,
requesting entry of the appearance of Antoini M. Jones as Wilson’s attorney. On January
19, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother, who said that Jones said that Wilson did not “need
to follow through with that, now.” (Emphasis omitted). Wilson responded: “What?”
Shortly afterward, Wilson’s mother said: “The license[.]” (Emphasis omitted). Wilson
asked: “What happened?” Wilson’s mother responded: “(unintelligible) He said it can just
be on stand-by, but there’s no need for it right now. They’re not, um, you know[—]wasn’t
subpoenaed. You hear me?” (Emphasis omitted). Wilson responded: “Remember the last
time we went to court[? H]e said they could do that at any time.”
On January 20, 2017, Wilson telephoned an unidentified woman,3 who said that she
would ask Wilson’s mother to “call the lawyer and ask the lawyer why he sa[id that] he
told [Wilson’s mother] (inaudible) that y’all didn’t have to do that.” Wilson responded:
“[H]e told me that we w[ere] supposed to been doin[g] it when he came down here and
2
Detective Elliott testified that, at the Charles County Detention Center, if an inmate
violates a rule, the inmate is sent to “the hole,” where there are fewer privileges. For
example, an inmate who is in “the hole” cannot make telephone calls or have video visits.
3
In multiple instances, the transcripts of recordings of telephone conversations
indicate that Wilson spoke with an unidentified woman.
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talk[ed] to me.” Wilson also said: “He told [Bannister] that we w[ere] supposed to been
doin[g] it.” Shortly afterward, the woman said: “[H]e says he know[s] somebody that will
do it. We w[ere] gonna say it wasn’t no problem. All you have to do is tell him when.”
Wilson responded: “They need to hurry up and tell him when because the trial is right next
month.” (Emphasis omitted). Shortly afterward, Wilson said: “[T]he State like[s] to play
tricks on people, like[s] to play games[,] act[s] like they not gonna do something and then
do it at the last minute . . . , so we should do it and be prepared anyway.” (Emphasis
omitted).
On January 21, 2017, Wilson telephoned an unidentified woman, who said that
Wilson’s mother said that a lawyer “said they’re not gonna call that girl. She’s on the other
boy’s side.” Wilson responded: “That’s a lie because, [] the first time I went to court, they
said, they said they w[ere] gonna call her, so why would they just change all the sudden?
That do[es]n’t even make sense.” The woman responded:
She was a key witness the first time. She [is] not gonna be the key witness
this time. That’s what he said. I don’t know. [Your mother] said she’s gonna
call back up there. So, I don’t know. But he told [your mother], he said don’t
worry about it. If push comes to shove, if he has to do it, he got somebody
to do it for him.
Shortly afterward, the following exchange occurred:
[Woman]: I’ll tell [your mother] that you want to talk to the lawyer and you
can talk to him and tell him what you think or whatever. Uh, see what he
say[s], but he just called [your mother] yesterday, the day before yesterday
and t[old] her don’t worry about nothin[g]. Don’t worry about getting
nobody to watchucall. [Your mother] said somethin[g] about that. Bill
Cosby’s wife, uh, they made her testify, but he said, this[—]
[Wilson]: Yeah, she’s looking for ways to avoid it, having it, that’s probably
why he’s telling her not to worry about it because she’s f[***]ing stupid.
-9-
She’s needs to not worry about other dumb stuff and focus on the goal. What
is wrong with her?
[Woman]: Naw, she’s, [Bannister]’s gonna be the key witness.
[Wilson]: Hey, don’t, man, you cannot say stuff like that on the phone.
[Woman]: He said she’s gonna be the key witness for the other boy. And
they not gonna put her on the stand. That’s what he said.
[Wilson]: (inaudible) get on the stand. You can’t say dumb s[***] like that
on the phone.
[Woman]: How am I gonna tell you what he said? I’m gonna tell you
something other else that he said, (inaudible) get whatchucall to call him and
ask him to come down there and talk to you again. You can tell him what
you think. After all we done paid him. He can’t refuse to talk to you.
[Wilson]: She’s not even gonna tell him nothing because she’s against what
is supposed to be happening.
(Paragraph break added).
On January 25, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother and said: “I think you guys
should hurry up and get together and do it because I can go down the hole any day and I
won’t be able to do it because I won’t be able to get on the phone[.]” (Emphasis omitted).
On February 1, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother again and said: “[T]ell [Jones] to get
the person that he said that he could get to do it.” (Emphasis omitted).
On February 3, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother, who said: “I know[] what you
want, but they said everything was going gravy, you know. And it was. They had
everything there, but then w[ere] sayin[g] something about charges [or] whatever.” Shortly
afterward, Wilson said: “Time is ticking away.” (Emphasis omitted). Later, Wilson said:
“For real[,] man, time, time’s getting away[.]” (Emphasis omitted). Shortly afterward,
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Wilson said: “I could be sent down the hole any day. I could get in a fight any day and be
sittin[g] in the hole and it won’t happen.” (Emphasis omitted).
On February 4, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister. Wilson said: “I was under the
impression that whoever was going to go ahead and set it up or whatever, but clearly it’s
not like that. You gotta call and do it yourself.” (Emphasis omitted). Later on the same
date, Wilson telephoned an unidentified woman. Wilson indicated that Bannister had met
with Jones the previous day. The woman asked: “What [did] he say, go right ahead?”
(Emphasis omitted). Wilson responded: “Yeah.” (Emphasis omitted).
On February 5, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who said: “I’m gonna have to
make that phone call myself[.]” On February 6, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who
said: “I talked to somebody (inaudible), so, I need you to think about when you gonna call
me and lock down[.]” Wilson asked: “What day?” Shortly afterward, Bannister said:
“Today or tomorrow.”
On February 7, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister and said: “[Y]our mother gotta
go, but you don’t gotta go to court.” Bannister responded: “I do. But, I didn’t get [a]
thing.” Shortly afterward, Bannister said: “I have to go on Friday.” Friday was February
10, 2017.
On February 8, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister, who said: “She said we gotta
do it tomorrow between 10 and 1.” Wilson indicated that he would be available the
following day at 10 a.m. or 12 p.m. Later on the same date, Wilson telephoned his mother,
who asked: “[D]id y’all get everything done today?” Wilson responded: “No.” Wilson’s
mother asked: “What happened?” Wilson responded: “I don’t know. She said she gotta
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do it tomorrow or something.” Wilson’s mother asked: “Who, um, Aunt Violet?” Wilson
responded: “Yeah.” Shortly afterward, Wilson said: “So much like (inaudible) waiting for
the last minute.”
On February 9, 2017, at 10:16 a.m., Wilson telephoned Bannister. Shortly after the
call began, Pastor Roy Brown of Manna From On High Ministries in New Jersey and his
wife, Violet Brown, began participating in the telephone conversation from an unknown
location. Pastor Brown said: “What we’re going to do is just a simple wedding ceremony
that you -- you need to know that you [are] going to have to do this again in about two or
three months when you’re out.” Violet Brown said that there had to be “two witnesses.”
Bannister indicated that someone named Jamie was on the phone with her. Pastor Brown
conducted a brief marriage ceremony during the telephone call. At the end of the call,
Pastor Brown said: “And that concludes the wedding ceremony. And like I said before,
we still need to do it again when you [are] able to.” The circuit court admitted into evidence
a “Marriage Certificate[,]” which Pastor Brown signed, indicating that, on February 9,
2017, at 10:30 a.m., he presided over Wilson’s and Bannister’s marriage in La Plata,
Maryland. Detective Elliott testified that the Charles County Detention Center is in La
Plata.
On February 10, 2017, Wilson telephoned Bannister and the following exchange
occurred:
[Bannister]: So, I didn’t get a subpoena in my hand and I didn’t get [any]thing
at my house and I changed my address. And they called me to come to court
today and I didn’t get a subpoena (inaudible) but I don’t want [any]body
coming and looking for me.
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[Wilson]: You said [that you] did what?
[Bannister]: I said, I don’t want [any]body coming and looking for me.
[Wilson]: And you said you did what to say they didn’t need you [any]more?
[Bannister]: I didn’t get [a] subpoena this time. I haven’t been to my mom’s
house because I don’t live there. I changed my address and all that back in
January. But they called me like they needed me, like [they] wanted me to
come in. But, she said she was gonna mail me a subpoena, but she never did,
so I assumed that they don’t need me anymore. But, I don’t want [any]body
coming looking for me.
[Wilson]: I don’t think that you can testify anyway because we married and
you’ll be, I don’t know, I don’t think[—]
[Bannister]: I’m talking about for today for [Posey.]
[Wilson]: I know, but still, even though it’s for his, I don’t think you can
because it’s involving me.
[Bannister]: I gotta send the, uh, a copy of the certificate to somebody real
quick.
[Wilson]: Alright, and call up there and see if they know [whether] they can
still make you do that on either one of us. You know what I’m talking about?
[Bannister]: Yeah. They said I should be good, though.
[Wilson]: For both of them, right?
[Bannister]: No.
[Wilson]: Oh, well, I don’t know.
(Emphasis omitted).
On February 11, 2017, Wilson telephoned his mother and the following exchange
occurred:
[Wilson’s Mother]: [Your aunt] called me last night. She didn’t know what
address to put on there, because it asks for where it took place at[.]
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[Wilson]: Yeah.
[Wilson’s Mother]: She didn’t know, she wasn’t sure about the address and
stuff. [Bannister] called Jones, and he said, um, Charles County, put, um, La
Plata.
[Wilson]: So, Ma, since, since, . . . I’m not sure about this, right. So, so, so,
so since that happened, do[es]n’t that mean she can’t say anything in either,
in either case?
[Wilson’s Mother]: What?
[Wilson]: Doesn’t that mean that she can’t say anything at either court date?
[Wilson’s Mother]: That’s what I’m saying. That’s what I’m thinking,
Darrayl. [Bec]ause she said, she told me yesterday that the people called her
and said she had to, uh, said she had to go that she had to come in Monday
or she said there would be a bench warrant for her arrest. But, [by] the same
token, [your aunt] took a picture of the license and sent it to Jones. Then
Jones just told them, like this is, you know, she can’t, you know[.]
(Ellipsis in original) (emphasis omitted).
The circuit court admitted into evidence a redacted transcript of testimony in
Posey’s trial that took place on Monday, February 13, 2017, when the State called
Bannister as a witness. During direct examination by the prosecutor, Bannister testified
that she and Wilson had gotten married the previous Thursday and attempted to invoke the
spousal privilege. The circuit court indicated that Bannister did not have such a privilege
as to Posey and directed her to respond to the prosecutor’s questions.4
4
Before trial in Wilson I, the State filed a “Motion to Preclude Assertion of Spousal
Privilege” as to Bannister. Darrayl John Wilson v. State, No. 1122, Sept. Term, 2017, 2018
WL 3025896, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 18, 2018). The circuit court conducted a
hearing and granted the motion, determining that Wilson’s and Bannister’s marriage was
invalid and that she could not invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. See id. Wilson
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In this case, after the State rested its case, Wilson’s counsel moved for judgment of
acquittal. Wilson’s counsel acknowledged that Wilson and Bannister wanted to marry
before her testimony at the trials in Posey and Wilson I, and that neither Wilson nor
Bannister wanted her to testify in either case. Wilson’s counsel asserted that Wilson and
Bannister believed that attempting to use the spousal privilege was lawful, based on the
advice of Jones (Wilson’s counsel in Wilson I) and that Wilson did not pressure Bannister
to marry him against her will. The prosecutor responded that it is obstruction of justice to
engage in an otherwise lawful act with the intent to prevent a witness from testifying. After
hearing argument, the circuit court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal, stating:
“[T]he evidence clearly indicates that the purpose of the proposal and the marriage between
[] Wilson and [Bannister] was so that she wouldn’t testify. . . . [I]t becomes a jury question
as to whether or not that is [] corruption within the definition of [CR §§] 9[-]305 and 9[-
]306.”
The only exhibit that Wilson offered into evidence was a copy of a “Marriage
Certificate” that had been previously issued to Wilson and Bannister on February 12, 2015.
After Wilson rested, his counsel renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal and the
circuit court denied the motion for the reasons previously stated.
appealed the circuit court’s determination while awaiting trial in Wilson I. See id. In the
Court of Special Appeals, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds of lack
of standing and lack of a final judgment or other appealable order. See id. The Court of
Special Appeals granted the motion to dismiss. See id. Wilson filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari, which this Court denied. See Wilson v. State, 461 Md. 508, 194 A.3d 949(2018). Wilson later pled guilty.
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When instructing the jury, the circuit court stated that, to obtain a conviction for
witness tampering, “the State must prove that the defendant used corrupt means, that the
defendant acted to influence or impede [] Bannister, a witness, in the performance of her
official duties, and the action . . . was in connection with a proceeding involving a crime
of violence.” The circuit court did not define the term “corrupt means.” After deliberations
began, the jury submitted a question regarding the definition of the term “corrupt means.”
The circuit court responded by providing the jury with copies of, and reading aloud, the
following supplemental jury instruction:
“Corruption” is defined as a vicious and fraudulent intention to evade the
prohibitions of the law. The phrase “corrupt means” refers to an act or
actions done with an intent to give the actor some advantage inconsistent
with the official dut[ies] and rights of others. To do an act corruptly is to
commit it with the unlawful purpose of impeding the administration of justice
or of influencing or impeding a witness in the performance of his [or her]
official duties. “Corrupt means” may include otherwise lawful acts (such as
sending a witness out of State during the time of trial) as well as otherwise
unlawful acts (such as pointing a gun at a witness) if the acts were committed
with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the administration of justice, or
with the specific intent to influence, intimidate, or impede a witness from
testifying.
The jury found Wilson guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to
Wilson I, but not guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as to Posey. The
circuit court sentenced Wilson to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but three and a
half years suspended, for witness tampering, and three and a half years of imprisonment
concurrent for obstruction of justice, followed by five years of supervised probation.
Wilson appealed.
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Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
On July 30, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals reversed Wilson’s convictions for
lack of sufficient evidence. See Wilson v. State, 241 Md. App. 683, 684-85, 213 A.3d 655,
656 (2019). The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the State failed to prove the
“corrupt means” element of witness tampering and obstruction of justice as there is no
sham marriage exception to the invocation of the spousal privilege in Maryland. See id. at
687, 213 A.3d at 658. The Court of Special Appeals stated “that, even assuming [that
Wilson] entered into a sham marriage for the purpose of allowing [] Bannister to invoke
[the] spousal privilege, his actions and intentions do not satisfy the ‘corrupt means’ element
of ‘witness tampering’ or ‘obstruction of justice.’” Id. at 687, 213 A.3d at 658 (footnote
omitted). The Court of Special Appeals explained that it would “follow the out-of-state
courts that have declined to create a judicial exception to the spousal privilege and hold
that a spouse may invoke the privilege even in the context of a sham marriage.” Id. at 687,
213 A.3d at 658. The Court of Special Appeals indicated that, “in Maryland, if the parties
are validly married, a spouse may invoke the spousal privilege codified at CJ[] § 9-106,
subject to the exceptions expressly provided in [CJ] § 9-106(a)(1) and (2).” Id. at 702, 213
A.3d at 667.
The Court of Special Appeals stated:
[I]n many states, engaging in a fraudulent marriage for the sole purpose of
shutting up a witness is a statutorily sanctioned means to prevent a witness
from testifying. Those states simply require a valid marriage in order to
invoke the privilege—it is irrelevant for purposes of the privilege whether
the marriage serves a fraudulent purpose. In light of our adoption of the
prevailing rule, we fail to see how the act of marrying for the express purpose
of invoking the privilege can constitute “corrupt means” witness tampering
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or obstruction of justice. In short, a person cannot be guilty of “corrupt
means” witness tampering or obstruction of justice where the allegedly
criminal act—marrying with the express purpose of invoking the spousal
privilege—is recognized as a lawful and permissible means for the new
spouse to avoid being compelled to testify.
We recognize that this rule creates an obvious potential for mischief.
Nevertheless, there is currently no “sham marriage” exception to the spousal
privilege set forth in CJ[] § 9-106, and we decline to create a judicial
exception. Any amendment to CJ[] § 9-106 must come from the General
Assembly.
Wilson, 241 Md. App. at 703-04, 213 A.3d at 667-68 (cleaned up).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Conditional Cross-Petition
On September 17, 2019, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the
following two issues:
1. Regardless [of] whether a collusive marriage confers spousal
testimonial privilege, is evidence that the defendant-spouse arranged to
marry in order to suppress the witness-spouse’s testimony under the cloak of
privilege sufficient to satisfy the “corrupt means” element of the obstruction
of justice and witness tampering statutes?
2. As a matter of first impression in Maryland, is a party to a collusive
marriage precluded from invoking the spousal testimonial privilege?
Wilson conditionally cross-petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising multiple questions.
This Court granted the petition in its entirety and granted the conditional cross-petition,
limited to the following question:
If Wilson’s convictions are affirmed, does his conviction and sentence for
witness tampering merge into his conviction and sentence for obstruction of
justice, where both convictions are predicated upon one act – marrying []
Bannister, his longtime girlfriend and the mother of his two children?
See State v. Wilson, 466 Md. 546, 222 A.3d 1071 (2020).
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DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Parties’ Contentions
The State contends that, as used in the statutes that govern witness tampering and
obstruction of justice, the term “corrupt means” includes otherwise lawful conduct that a
defendant undertakes with corrupt intent, i.e., the intent to impede the administration of
justice or a witness. The State maintains that, even if Wilson’s and Bannister’s marriage
entitled her to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege, the evidence showed that Wilson
acted with corrupt intent when he persuaded Bannister to marry him so that she could
attempt to invoke the privilege, and that this Court need not reach the question of the
validity of the marriage.
Wilson responds that it is not fraudulent or corrupt for two people to marry for the
purpose of enabling one of them to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. Wilson points
out that CJ § 9-106(a), which sets forth the spousal privilege, does not include an exception
for sham marriages. Wilson contends that most of the courts in other jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue have held that, where two people would not have married but for
criminal charges against one of them, the other person may still invoke the spousal
testimonial privilege. In sum, Wilson asserts that he entered into a valid marriage with
Bannister and that his conduct does not satisfy the corrupt means element of witness
tampering and obstruction of justice.
Standard of Review
In Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 307, 164 A.3d 265, 272 (2017), this Court
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described the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient, we examine
the record solely to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
examining the record, we view the State’s evidence, including all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State.
(Cleaned up).
Witness Tampering and Obstruction of Justice under Maryland Law
The witness tampering and obstruction of justice statutes proscribe, among other
things, impeding a witness or the administration of justice, and any attempt to do so, using
corrupt means. CR § 9-305(a) states: “A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means,
try to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State
or of the United States in the performance of the person’s official duties.” CR § 9-306(a)
states: “A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, obstruct, impede, or try to
obstruct or impede the administration of justice in a court of the State.” No Maryland
statute defines the term “corrupt means.” And, no Maryland case law expressly defines the
term. Nor does Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 4:25 (Obstruction of Justice --
Jurors, Witnesses, or Officials), the Comment to which states in pertinent part:
The Committee has not defined or explained the word “corrupt,”
believing that it, by itself, connotes its meaning better than a definition
would. See United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985)
(defining ““corruptly” as an act “done with an intent to give some advantage
inconsistent with the official duty and rights of others” (emphasis in original)
(quoting United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979))); United
States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1971) (defining “corrupt” as with
[]“evil or wicked purpose” and stating that “[s]pecific intent to impede the
administration of justice is an essential element”).
(Last alteration in original).
- 20 -
Although no Maryland statute defines the term “corrupt means,” where a term is not
defined by statute, we may refer to the dictionary and give the words their ordinary
meaning. See Baltimore City Det. Ctr. v. Foy, 461 Md. 627, 645, 197 A.3d 1, 11 (2018).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “corrupt,” as, in pertinent part, “[h]aving
unlawful or depraved motives; given to dishonest practices, such as bribery.” Corrupt,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines the word
“corrupt,” as “morally degenerate and perverted : DEPRAVED” or “characterized by
improper conduct (such as bribery or the selling of favors)[.]” Corrupt, Merriam-Webster
(2020), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corrupt [https://perma.cc/8TQS-
KW89]. Another definition of the word “corrupt” is “[h]aving or showing a willingness to
act dishonestly in return for money or personal gain.” Corrupt, Lexico/Oxford English and
Spanish Dictionary, Thesaurus, and Spanish to English Translator (2020), https://
www.lexico.com/en/definition/corrupt [https://perma.cc/J957-P36E]. These dictionary
definitions of the word “corrupt” support the State’s position that obstruction of justice
may involve a wide range of conduct, including conduct that alone may not be illegal but
is undertaken with the intent or purpose to impede a witness or obstruct justice.
In accord with the dictionary definitions of the word “corrupt,” the case of Romans,
178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642, demonstrates that conduct constituting witness tampering and
obstruction of justice may include conduct that is in and of itself legal but is undertaken
with the intent to obstruct justice. In Romans, id. at 591, 600, 16 A.2d at 644, 648, this
Court affirmed the convictions of two co-defendants for obstruction of justice under a
statute that was a predecessor of CR §§ 9-305 and 9-306. At that time, the same statute
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prohibited both witness tampering and obstruction of justice, stating in pertinent part:
If any person shall corruptly or by threats or force endeavor to influence,
intimidate or impede any juror, witness or officer in any court of this State in
the discharge of his [or her] duty, or shall corruptly or by threats or force
obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration
of justice therein, he [or she] shall be liable to be prosecuted[.]
Id. at 591, 16 A.2d at 644 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 (1939) (“Art. 27 (1939)”), §
30).
In Romans, 178 Md. at 595, 16 A.2d at 645, in a separate criminal case in Baltimore
City, the State charged two men with performing an abortion, which was a crime at the
time. The co-defendants in Romans, a man and a woman, allegedly tried to influence the
woman who had the abortion to leave the city and stay away until after the trial of the two
men. See id. at 598, 593, 16 A.2d at 647, 644. The male co-defendant engaged in
negotiations with the woman’s grandmother to arrange for the woman to go away until
after the trial. See id. at 598, 16 A.2d at 647. The woman’s brother acted as the
intermediary between the grandmother and the male co-defendant. See id. at 598, 16 A.2d
at 647.
The woman informed law enforcement officers of the negotiations between her
grandmother and the male co-defendant. See id. at 598-99, 16 A.2d at 647. The officers
and the woman’s brother planned a sting in which the brother would arrange to meet with
the male co-defendant and inform the lead investigator of the time and place of the meeting
so that officers could arrest the male co-defendant. See id. at 599, 16 A.2d at 647. The
sting was carried out, and officers arrested the male co-defendant and found incriminating
documents on him. See id. at 599, 16 A.2d at 647.
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The State charged both co-defendants with violating Art. 27 (1939), § 30. See id.
at 591, 16 A.2d at 644. In the trial court, one of the co-defendants filed a demurrer,
contending that the indictment was duplicitous in that it charged multiple offenses in the
same count.5 See Romans, 178 Md. at 591, 16 A.2d at 644. The trial court overruled the
demurrer, conducted a bench trial, and found both co-defendants guilty. See id. at 591, 16
A.2d at 644.
The co-defendants appealed, and this Court affirmed. See id. at 600, 16 A.2d at
648. This Court held that the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer and
emphasized that obstruction of justice may include a wide variety of conduct. See id. at
592, 594, 16 A.2d at 644, 645. This Court explained:
[Art. 27 (1939), § 30] is in aid and definition of a class of those
criminal acts which are known to the common law as obstructions of justice.
The words of the statute are general and embrace in comprehensive terms
various forms of obstruction. Thus the particular acts are not specified but,
whatever they may be, if the acts be corrupt, or be threats or force, used in
an attempt to influence, intimidate or impede any juror, witness or officer in
any court of the State in the discharge of his [or her] duty, there is an
obstruction of justice. Likewise, if by acts of similar quality and nature the
due administration of justice in any court shall either be impeded or
obstructed or be so attempted, there is an obstruction of justice. Furthermore,
it is quite clear that the corrupt act, or one of threat or force, employed to
influence or intimidate or impede any such juror, witness or officer in the
discharge of his [or her] duty in a court, must necessarily be, also, an
endeavor to obstruct or impede in such court the due administration of
justice.
Id. at 592, 16 A.2d at 644.
A demurrer is “a motion to dismiss[.]” Demurrer, Black’s Law Dictionary (italics
5
omitted). “Duplicitous” means “alleging two or more matters in one plea; characterized
by double pleading[.]” Duplicitous, Black’s Law Dictionary.
- 23 -
This Court’s holding in Hitzelbeger v. State, 173 Md. 435, 196 A. 288 (1938), a
case involving corrupt intent, also indicates that the conduct involved need not be criminal.
In Hitzelberger, id. at 443, 196 A. at 292, this Court held that the evidence was sufficient
to support a defendant’s conviction for constructive contempt of court. After a grand jury
began investigating vice in Baltimore City, the defendant, an officer of the Baltimore
Police Department, met with one of the grand jurors, advised the grand juror that he was
being framed, and gave the grand juror a list of witnesses who could testify on his behalf.
See id. at 436-37, 443, 196 A. at 289, 292. This Court rejected the defendant’s contention
that he had no corrupt intent to influence the grand juror’s actions. See id. at 443, 196 A.
at 292. This Court explained that, if the charges were accurate, the defendant “attempt[ed]
to get into the grand jury room witnesses favorable to him, in answer to the charges he had
heard were being made against him[.]” Id. at 443, 196 A. at 292.
Obstruction of Justice under Federal Law
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) prohibits obstruction of justice, stating in pertinent part:
“Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be
punished[.]” In State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 137, 669 A.2d 1339, 1343 (1996), this Court
stated that cases in which federal courts interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1503 were “of particular
relevance” to interpreting the version of CR § 9-306 that was effective at the time, given
that CR § 9-306’s original version “was identical to” 18 U.S.C. § 1503’s original version,
and that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and CR § 9-306 were “still very similar.” (Citation omitted).
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and CR § 9-306(a) remain very similar, in that the statutes
- 24 -
prohibit “corruptly” or by “corrupt means” obstructing or impeding the administration of
justice, respectively. Accordingly, as we did in Pagano, id. at 138-39, 669 A.2d at 1343,
we look to federal case law in interpreting the obstruction of justice statute.
In United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917(1974), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the evidence
was sufficient to support a defendant’s convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy
to obstruct justice. A grand jury was investigating a loan with a usurious rate of interest.
See id. at 1114-15. The lender expected the government to subpoena one of the borrowers
to testify before the grand jury. See id. at 1115. The defendant—who was ostensibly an
associate of the lender—met with the borrower and told him to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. See id. at 1116. The government subpoenaed the borrower, who
testified before the grand jury. See id. at 1113, 1115. The Second Circuit’s opinion does
not expressly indicate whether the borrower invoked or attempted to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. In any event, the grand jury indicted the lender for making an
“extortionate loan[.]” Id. at 1117. The defendant met with the borrower’s uncle and
wanted him to get the borrower to write a statement indicating that he had never been
threatened or intimidated. See id. The government charged the defendant with obstruction
of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice, identifying the lender as a co-conspirator. See
id. at 1113, 1115. A jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. See id. at 1113.
The defendant appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed. See id. The Second
Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that it is not obstruction of justice for a
defendant to advise a witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at
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1119. The Second Circuit explained: “The focus is on the intent or motive of the party
charge[d] as an inducer. The lawful behavior of the person invoking the [Fifth]
Amendment [privilege against self-incrimination] cannot be used to protect the criminal
behavior of the inducer.” Id. The Second Circuit approvingly quoted jury instructions,
which borrowed most of the following language from Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437,
443 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964): “[W]hile a witness violates no law by
claiming the . . . privilege against self-incrimination [before] a grand jury, one who bribes,
threatens, [or] coerces a witness to claim it or advises with corrupt motive a witness to take
it, can and does obstruct or influence the administration of justice.” Cioffi, 493 F.2d at
1119. In Cioffi, id., the Second Circuit concluded that there was “ample evidence that the
[defendant] endeavored to influence the” borrower.
In United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1004, 983 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 913 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to obstruct
justice. A grand jury began investigating a gang’s criminal activities. See id. at 984. The
defendant in Cintolo was a lawyer who represented a witness who was to testify before the
grand jury. See id. The defendant helped the gang leader and his associates pressure the
witness not to testify. See id. at 989. The First Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention
that he could not be found guilty of conspiracy to obstruct justice because he had simply
been obtaining information from the gang leader that he could use to represent the
witness. See id. The First Circuit explained: “[A]ny act by any party—whether lawful or
unlawful on its face—may [constitute obstruction of justice] if performed with a corrupt
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motive.” Id. at 991. The First Circuit determined that, although the defendant’s “acts in
fostering the intimidation of [the witness] were not in themselves overtly unlawful, they”
could still be found by the jury to constitute conspiracy to obstruct justice. Id. at 993
(emphasis omitted).
Spousal Testimonial Privilege
CJ § 9-106(a) governs the spousal testimonial privilege and states:
The spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify
as an adverse witness unless the charge involves:
(1) The abuse of a child under 18; or
(2) Assault in any degree in which the spouse is a victim if:
(i) The person on trial was previously charged with assault in
any degree or assault and battery of the spouse;
(ii) The spouse was sworn to testify at the previous trial; and
(iii) The spouse refused to testify at the previous trial on the
basis of the provisions of this section.
Before this case, neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals had, in a
reported opinion, endeavored to resolve the question of whether a party to a sham marriage
may invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. A “sham marriage” is “[a] purported
marriage in which all the formal requirements are met or seemingly met, but in which the
parties go through the ceremony with no intent of living together as spouses.” Sham
Marriage, Black’s Law Dictionary.
Although the issue of whether a party to a sham marriage may invoke the spousal
testimonial privilege is a matter of first impression, both this Court and the Court of Special
- 27 -
Appeals have commented on the issue in dicta. In Hagez v. State, 110 Md. App. 194, 211,
676 A.2d 992, 1000-01 (1996), the Court of Special Appeals observed that, because it
“reverse[d] on other grounds[,]” it did not need to “resolve the thorny issue concerning”
“whether the statutory testimonial privilege is available to a witness who has married solely
to assert the spousal testimonial privilege or to obstruct justice.” (Footnote omitted). That
said, in a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “We note that the spousal privilege,
codified in [CJ] § 9-106, does not seem to include any exceptions concerning an improper
motive or purpose in marrying.” Id. at 211 n.7, 676 A.2d at 1001 n.7.
In State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 295-96, 329-30, 691 A.2d 1341, 1342, 1358-59
(1997), this Court held that a trial court erred in admitting evidence of an out-of-court
statement by the defendant’s wife under the residual hearsay exception because we
concluded that the spousal testimonial privilege was not an exceptional circumstance
justifying admission of the hearsay statement. We explained:
The [spousal testimonial] privilege itself does not preclude the
admission of out-of-court statements made by the spouse prior to the
marriage. . . . Lurking here, perhaps, is some discomfort with the fact that
[the defendant] and [his wife] married after she made her statement but
before trial. There have, to be sure, been cases in which the defendant and
the witness have entered into a marriage immediately prior to trial, the
inference being that the marriage was a sham, arranged solely to preclude the
witness from testifying or having to testify. Most of those cases seem to have
arisen under the common law rule that either made the spouse incompetent
as a witness or allowed the defendant to preclude the testimony. See Michael
G. Walsh, Existence of Spousal Privilege Where Marriage Was Entered Into
For Purpose of Barring Testimony, 13 A.L.R.4th 1305 (1982). Some courts,
in that circumstance, have refused to apply the privilege, although the
prevailing rule seems to be, even in that circumstance, that the privilege
applies. Id. at 1308.
That problem is not before us in this case, however. The State has not
contended that the marriage between [the defendant] and [his wife] was a
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sham.
Walker, 345 Md. at 329-30, 691 A.2d at 1358-59.
Analysis
Here, we conclude that, where a person marries a potential witness for the State with
the intent to have the witness invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at a criminal
proceeding in order to prevent the witness from testifying at the proceeding, the evidence
is sufficient to support convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. This
Court’s holding in Romans, 178 Md. at 593, 598, 600, 16 A.2d at 644, 647, 648, and federal
appellate case law support the conclusion that engaging in otherwise lawful conduct with
the intent of trying to preclude a witness for the State from testifying at an upcoming
criminal trial may constitute corrupt means under the witness tampering and obstruction of
justice statutes. We conclude that the use of corrupt means involves acting with corrupt
intent, i.e., a person uses corrupt means by marrying with the intent to preclude another
person from testifying at a criminal proceeding, even though the conduct involved—
entering into a marriage—is otherwise lawful.
In Romans, 178 Md. at 600, 598, 593, 16 A.2d at 648, 647, 644, this Court affirmed
co-defendants’ convictions for obstruction of justice where the co-defendants attempted to
arrange for a witness for the State in a criminal case in Baltimore City to leave town and
stay away until after the conclusion of a trial in that criminal case. Obviously, arranging
for another person to voluntarily take a trip is not, in and of itself, a crime. Yet, in Romans,
that otherwise lawful act constituted obstruction of justice because the co-defendants had
the corrupt purpose of trying to preclude the witness for the State from testifying at the
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upcoming trial. Just as in Romans, where arranging for a witness for the State to take a
trip for the purpose of precluding the witness from testifying satisfied the statutory
requirement that the co-defendants behaved “corruptly,” marrying a witness for the State
for the purpose of trying to enable the witness to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege
satisfies the “corrupt means” element of the witness tampering and obstruction of justice
statutes.6 The focus is on the intent underlying the conduct, and in keeping with our holding
in Romans, we conclude that otherwise lawful conduct done with the intent to preclude a
witness from testifying at a criminal proceeding satisfies the corrupt means element of the
statutes.
We are aware that, when this Court decided Romans, 178 Md. at 591, 16 A.2d at
644, the statute that prohibited witness tampering and obstruction of justice used the word
“corruptly” rather than the term “corrupt means,” which CR §§ 9-305(a) and 9-306(a)
use. This circumstance, however, does not affect our analysis because the word
“corruptly” and the term “corrupt means” are essentially synonymous. Indeed, both are
derived from the root word “corrupt.” And, even after the General Assembly amended the
statute to replace the word “corruptly” with the term “corrupt means,” this Court and the
Court of Special Appeals continued to rely upon Romans when discussing the range of
6
At oral argument, Wilson’s counsel contended that Romans, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d
642, is inapplicable because one of the co-defendants offered a bribe, in the form of a free
vacation for the key witness for the State. Nowhere in Romans, however, did this Court
state or imply that either co-defendant’s conduct constituted bribery. And, in addition to
our holding in Romans, this Court’s holding in Hitzelberger, 173 Md. at 443, 196 A. at
292, demonstrates that otherwise lawful conduct—such as speaking to a grand juror—may
constitute conduct done with corrupt intent.
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conduct that may constitute obstruction of justice. See Pagano, 341 Md. at 136, 669 A.2d
at 1342; Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 734-35, 521 A.2d 1216, 1219-20 (1987); Lee
v. State, 65 Md. App. 587, 591-92, 501 A.2d 495, 497-98 (1985).
Our conclusion is compelled not only by this Court’s holding in Romans but is also
supported by opinions from federal appellate courts that have interpreted the federal
obstruction of justice statute, which is very similar to its Maryland counterpart. See
Pagano, 341 Md. at 137, 669 A.2d at 1343. In Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119, the Second Circuit
held that, although it is lawful for a government witness to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, it is obstruction of justice for a defendant, with a corrupt motive, to
advise a government witness to invoke the privilege. The focus is on the intent or motive
of the defendant who is charged as an inducer.7 See Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119. Plainly, the
7
Wilson argues that it cannot be corrupt means for a defendant to exercise a right,
such as the right to marry. In support of his argument, Wilson relies on Arthur Andersen
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005), in which the Supreme Court stated:
[P]ersuading a person with intent to cause that person to withhold testimony
or documents from a Government proceeding or Government official is not
inherently malign. Consider, for instance, a mother who suggests to her son
that he invoke [the privilege] against [] self-incrimination, or a wife who
persuades her husband not to disclose marital confidences[.]
(Cleaned up). Wilson’s reliance on Arthur Andersen, id., is misplaced. In that case, the
Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), which prohibit, in pertinent
part, “‘knowingly ... corruptly persuad[ing]’ another person ‘with intent to ... cause’ that
person to ‘withhold’ documents from, or ‘alter’ documents for use in, an ‘official
proceeding.’” Id. at 703 (ellipses in original). 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) includes the word
“knowingly,” whereas 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)’s plain
language, a violation of that subsection contains a unique mens rea element that a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not. Indeed, in Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705 n.9, the
Supreme Court pointed out that, because 18 U.S.C. § 1503 “lack[s] the modifier
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inducer’s behavior is corrupt—i.e., a defendant’s motive is corrupt—where he or she tries
to preclude a witness from testifying for “self-serving” reasons. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at
989. For example, in Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119, the Second Circuit stated that “an endeavor
to induce [a witness] . . . to plead the Fifth Amendment for the purpose of protecting [a
defendant] was obviously corrupt.” Similarly, in Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 989, the First Circuit
rejected the defendant’s factual argument that he had an “authentic motive” and “did not
intend to obstruct justice,” explaining “that the self-serving gloss which [the defendant]
place[d] on the evidence manifestly misapprehend[ed] both the jury’s factfinding function
and our role in the review of the verdict.”
Here, viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that there is ample evidence that Wilson
married Bannister for the purpose of trying to have her invoke the spousal testimonial
privilege in Wilson I, i.e., that Wilson married Bannister with the corrupt intent of
preventing her from giving incriminating testimony against him at his upcoming murder
trial.
Wilson was aware that Bannister was expected to be the key witness for the State at
‘knowingly,’ [] any analogy [is] inexact” with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Thus,
although, in Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court indicated that the scenarios that it
described would not constitute “knowingly” corruptly persuading someone to withhold
testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the hypotheticals do not furnish us with
guidance in interpreting CR §§ 9-305 and 9-306, which, like 18 U.S.C. § 1503, lack the
word “knowingly.”
- 32 -
his trial. The State did not initiate Wilson I and Posey8 until Detective Buchanan
interviewed Bannister more than three years after Anderson’s murder. Bannister indicated
to Detective Buchanan that Wilson confessed to being involved in Anderson’s murder and
made other inculpatory statements. During a telephone conversation with an unidentified
woman, while Wilson was incarcerated and awaiting trial, the unidentified woman said to
Wilson that Bannister was “gonna be the key witness” at the trial in Posey. Wilson
responded: “Hey, don’t, man, you cannot say stuff like that on the phone.” The
circumstances set forth above and Wilson’s response to the woman’s statement give rise to
the reasonable inference that he believed Bannister would be the key witness for the State
at Posey’s murder trial, and, by extension, at his trial.
In addition to the evidence that Wilson was aware of Bannister’s status as the key
witness for the State, the telephone conversations contain abundant evidence that Wilson
wanted to marry Bannister to try to have her invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at the
trial in his case. Tellingly, when referring to his and Bannister’s marriage plans, Wilson
almost always avoided referring to the upcoming marriage as a “marriage,” and instead
used euphemisms or code language such as “[g]et them papers[,]” “set the thing up[,]” “do
it[,]” and “what is supposed to be happening.” Wilson’s oblique way of referring to his
and Bannister’s upcoming marriage gives rise to the inference that he was attempting to
conceal that he wanted to marry Bannister from anyone who may have been listening to
8
Although the jury found Wilson guilty of obstruction of justice and witness
tampering only as to Wilson I, some of the circumstances of Posey are relevant because
the State charged both Wilson and Posey with Anderson’s murder and Bannister was
expected to be a witness for the State in both cases.
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the calls.
Telephone conversations after Wilson and Bannister married, but before the State
called Bannister as a witness in Posey, strongly support the determination that Wilson
married Bannister with the intent to enable Bannister to invoke the spousal testimonial
privilege. During a telephone conversation after Wilson and Bannister married, he said to
her: “I don’t think that you can testify anyway because we married[.]” Bannister
responded: “I’m talking about for today for [Posey.]” Wilson responded: “I know, but still,
even though it’s for his, I don’t think you can because it’s involving me.” Wilson also told
Bannister to “see if they know [whether] they can still make you do that on either one of
us.” It is reasonable to infer that Wilson was asking Bannister to seek information as to
whether she could invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his and Posey’s trials.
During another telephone conversation after Wilson and Bannister married, his
mother referred to the Marriage Certificate. Wilson asked his mother: “Doesn’t that mean
that she can’t say anything at either court date?” It is reasonable to infer that Wilson was
attempting to confirm with his mother whether, in light of their marriage, Bannister could
invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his or Posey’s trial.
Last but not least, the timing of Wilson’s and Bannister’s marriage and the number
of telephone calls leading up to the marriage support the determination that Wilson married
Bannister with the intent of having her invoke the spousal testimonial privilege. During a
telephone conversation before Wilson and Bannister married, she said: “[W]e just gotta
keep money on the phone. And do it like that. . . . [a]s soon as possible. . . . Before, uh,
your case again.” Wilson responded: “Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah[.]” Wilson’s
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response gives rise to the reasonable inference that he interpreted Bannister’s statements
to mean that they needed to get married by telephone before his upcoming trial, and that
he agreed with her.
During another telephone conversation, Wilson said: “They need to hurry up and
tell him when because the trial is right next month.” (Emphasis omitted). Shortly
afterward, Wilson said: “[T]he State like[s] to play tricks on people, like[s] to play games;
act[s] like they not gonna do something and then do it at the last minute . . . , so we should
do it and be prepared anyway.” (Emphasis omitted). Wilson’s statements give rise to the
reasonable inference that he expected the State to call Bannister as a witness at Posey’s
trial as well as his, and that he wanted to marry her before then.
On February 6, 2017, the trial in Posey began. On February 7, 2017, during a
telephone conversation, Bannister indicated to Wilson that the State would call her as a
witness at the Posey trial on Friday, which was February 10, 2017. On February 8, 2017,
during a telephone conversation, Wilson said something to his mother about “waiting for
the last minute.” On February 9, 2017, Wilson and Bannister married. On February 13,
2017, the State called Bannister as a witness in the Posey trial, and she attempted to invoke
the spousal testimonial privilege. At the time that Wilson and Bannister married, the trial
in Wilson I was scheduled to begin February 27, 2017, which was just eighteen days away.
A total of twenty-eight telephone calls and video visits, in which Wilson discussed or
alluded to the potential marriage and whether Bannister would be able to testify against
him and Posey, took place between Wilson and Bannister and others between December
2016 and the February 9, 2017 marriage.
- 35 -
Together, all of these circumstances—Bannister’s status as the key witness for the
State and Wilson’s knowledge of her status, Wilson’s use of euphemisms or code language
for his and Bannister’s upcoming marriage, the content of telephone and video
conversations before and after the marriage, the timing of the marriage, and the number of
conversations that Wilson engaged in about the upcoming marriage—provided the jury
with more than enough evidence to find that Wilson’s intent was to enable Bannister to
invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his trial. Just as the defendants in Romans, 178
Md. at 600, 598, 593, 16 A.2d at 648, 647, 644, Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119, and Cintolo, 818
F.2d at 983, 993, obstructed justice by performing an otherwise lawful act (such as
arranging for a witness to take a trip or advising a government witness to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination or not to testify) for the corrupt purpose of trying to
preclude the witness from testifying at an upcoming criminal proceeding, here, there was
more than enough evidence for the jury to find that Wilson performed an otherwise lawful
act (marrying Bannister, a witness for the State) for the corrupt purpose of trying to
preclude Bannister from testifying against him at the trial in Wilson I.
It is not dispositive that, ultimately, Bannister was unable to invoke the spousal
testimonial privilege at Wilson’s trial. CR § 9-305(a) prohibits using “corrupt means[ to]
try to influence, intimidate, or impede . . . a witness[.]” Similarly, CR § 9-306(a) prohibits
using “corrupt means[ to] try to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in a court
of the State.” The inclusion of the word “try” in the plain language of CR §§ 9-305(a) and
9-306(a) demonstrates the General Assembly’s intent that an attempt—whether successful
or not—to engage in witness tampering or obstruction of justice would constitute a
- 36 -
violation of the statutes.
The federal statute that prohibits obstruction of justice, and the case law regarding
its interpretation, are instructive in this regard. Similar to CR §§ 9-305(a) and 9-306(a), 18
U.S.C. § 1503(a) proscribes “corruptly . . . endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede[]
the due administration of justice[.]” As the Fourth Circuit has pointed out, “the success or
lack of success in endeavoring to influence such a witness is not in itself the determining
factor in deciding whether [18 U.S.C. § 1503] has been violated.” United States v. Baker,
611 F.2d 964, 967 (4th Cir. 1979). 18 U.S.C. § 1503 “requires only proof of an endeavor,
irrespective of its success, and makes that act a crime if the endeavor is a corrupt one.”
Baker, 611 F.2d at 967. As such, in Baker, id., the Fourth Circuit noted that it was not
dispositive that a government witness did not comply with the defendant’s advice to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, here, there is ample evidence that
Wilson’s purpose in marrying Bannister was to attempt to preclude her from testifying at
his trial, and that evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for witness tampering
and obstruction of justice, even though Bannister did not assert the privilege at trial.
Just as it is immaterial that the circuit court ruled that Bannister could not invoke
the spousal privilege at the trial in Wilson I, it is not dispositive whether a party to a sham
marriage is precluded from invoking the spousal testimonial privilege. In other words, we
need not answer the second question presented in the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
This question need not be answered because it does not matter whether Wilson’s attempt
to have Bannister invoke the privilege was successful or would have been successful. What
matters is that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Wilson married Bannister
- 37 -
with the intent to preclude Bannister from testifying. It is of no consequence to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence whether Wilson’s attempt to have
Bannister use the privilege was founded on a correct or incorrect interpretation of the law
as to whether Bannister could, in fact, invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his trial.
Indeed, although the State raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari the question of
whether a party to a sham marriage may invoke the spousal testimonial privilege, at oral
argument, the Assistant Attorney General acknowledged that this Court need not answer
the question. We agree. Resolution of the question concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence for Wilson’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice does
not require us to determine the legality of Wilson’s marriage or whether Bannister was
entitled to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege at his murder trial. Instead, the question
of the validity of Wilson’s convictions requires us to determine whether Wilson acted with
“corrupt means” as required by both statutes, i.e., whether the evidence was sufficient to
support Wilson’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cole, 329
F.2d at 443, illustrates our point. There, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence was
sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice where the defendant
instructed a government witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination before a
grand jury that was investigating the defendant. See id. at 443-45. The Ninth Circuit noted
that it did not need to decide whether “the policy of the law would uphold the privilege”
against self-incrimination where a lawyer, doctor, or priest corruptly advised a witness to
invoke the privilege. Id. at 440. Just as, in Cole, id., where it was not determinative
- 38 -
whether a witness could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, here, it is not
dispositive whether Bannister could invoke the spousal testimonial privilege in Wilson I.
Given that we need not answer the question of whether a party to a sham marriage may
invoke the spousal testimonial privilege, we refrain from doing so.
In this case, irrespective of whether a party to a sham marriage may invoke the
spousal testimonial privilege, it was up to the jury to determine whether Wilson’s intent in
marrying Bannister was to attempt to preclude her from testifying at his trial by trying to
have her invoke the privilege, i.e., whether Wilson acted with corrupt means. By finding
Wilson guilty of witness tampering and obstruction of justice, the jury answered the
question in the affirmative.9 For a myriad of reasons, the evidence was sufficient to support
Wilson’s convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice.10
9
Although, in this instance, the evidence was sufficient to support Wilson’s
convictions for both witness tampering and obstruction of justice, we note that this may
not always be the case. With this opinion, we define the element of “corrupt means.” The
determination as to whether the evidence satisfies the elements of witness tampering—
which are using “threat, force, or corrupt means” to “try to influence, intimidate, or impede
. . . a witness . . . in the performance of the person’s official duties[,]” CR § 9-305(a)—will
necessarily be a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis. Under some circumstances, a
defendant’s conduct of marrying with the corrupt intent to “obstruct, impede, or try to
obstruct or impede the administration of justice in a court of the State[,]” CR § 9-306(a),
may not necessarily satisfy the elements of witness tampering.
10
On a final note, to the extent that Wilson alleges that his conduct fails to satisfy
the corrupt means element of the statutes because he married Bannister at least partly based
on the advice of Jones, his counsel in Wilson I, the record belies this claim. At trial, the
only indication that Jones may have advised Wilson concerning the marriage was a series
of vague references to Jones during telephone conversations between Wilson and
individuals other than Jones. And, while arguing in favor of the motion for judgment of
acquittal, Wilson’s counsel alleged only that Wilson had been following the advice of Jones
“to some degree.” In short, Wilson’s contention regarding his alleged reliance on the
advice of counsel is not supported by the record. Moreover, generally, the advice of
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II. Merger
The Parties’ Contentions
Wilson contends that the circuit court erred in not merging his conviction for witness
tampering with his conviction for obstruction of justice for sentencing purposes, and that
merger is warranted under the required evidence test, the rule of lenity, and the principle
of fundamental fairness. Wilson argues that the legislative history of CR §§ 9-305(a) and
9-306(a) demonstrates that obstruction of justice can be committed in multiple ways, such
as by impeding a juror, a witness, or an officer of the court, and as such, he committed only
one crime. Wilson points out that, before 2002, a single statute prohibited the acts that CR
§§ 9-305(a) and 9-306(a) now separately prohibit. Wilson indicates that the Revisor’s
Notes to the 2002 recodification, dividing the criminal acts into two new statutes, state that
the General Assembly did not intend any substantive amendments at the time. Wilson also
argues that the General Assembly intended CR § 9-305(d) to apply only where a defendant
obstructed justice by committing a distinct crime, such as assault. In sum, Wilson contends
that every violation of CR § 9-305(a) is necessarily a violation of CR § 9-306(a) as well
because CR § 9-305(a) prohibits the same acts as CR § 9-306(a), only with greater detail.
The State responds that CR § 9-305(d) constitutes an anti-merger provision that
counsel is not recognized as a defense in criminal cases in Maryland. See Hopkins v. State,
193 Md. 489, 498, 69 A.2d 456, 460 (1949); Herd v. State, 125 Md. App. 77, 119 n.12,
724 A.2d 693, 714 n.12 (1999). Although not recognized as a defense, under certain
circumstances, information concerning the advice of counsel may be admissible as
evidence of a defendant’s lack of criminal intent. See Hopkins, 193 Md. at 498, 69 A.2d
at 460. But, in this case, the record failed to establish such lack of criminal intent.
- 40 -
permits separate sentences without the need to determine whether witness tampering is a
lesser-included offense of obstruction of justice under the required evidence test. The State
argues that, if the General Assembly had intended CR § 9-305(d) not to apply where a
defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice and witness tampering, the General
Assembly would have stated as much. The State asserts that, by dividing the relevant
criminal acts between two new statutes in 2002, and by increasing the maximum sentence
for witness tampering in 2005, the General Assembly demonstrated an intent to create two
distinct crimes. The State maintains that witness tampering involves a harm that is distinct
from the harm that results from obstruction of justice. The State contends that neither the
rule of lenity nor the principle of fundamental fairness applies because the language of CR
§ 9-305(d) is unambiguous.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews without deference the question of whether a sentence is
legal. See Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 389, 225 A.3d 44, 60 (2020).
Merger
In State v. Stewart, 464 Md. 296, 318, 211 A.3d 371, 384 (2019), this Court
explained the required evidence test as follows:
Under the required evidence test—also known as the same evidence test,
Blockburger test, or elements test—Crime A is a lesser-included offense of
Crime B where all of the elements of Crime A are included in Crime B, so
that only Crime B contains a distinct element. In other words, neither Crime
A nor Crime B is a lesser-included offense of the other where each crime
contains an element that the other does not.
(Cleaned up).
- 41 -
In Johnson, 467 Md. at 390, 225 A.3d at 60-61, this Court explained the rule of
lenity as follows:
The rule of lenity is not a rule in the usual sense, but an aid for dealing with
ambiguity in a criminal statute. Under the rule of lenity, a court that is
confronted with an otherwise unresolvable ambiguity in a criminal statute
that allows for two possible interpretations of the statute will opt for the
construction that favors the defendant. For a court that is construing a statute,
the rule of lenity is not a means for determining—or defeating—legislative
intent. Rather, it is a tie-goes-to-the-runner device that the court may turn to
when it despairs of fathoming how the General Assembly intended that the
statute be applied in the particular circumstances. It is a tool of last resort, to
be rarely deployed and applied only when all other tools of statutory
construction fail to resolve an ambiguity. This follows from the fact that our
goal in construing statutes is always to ascertain and carry out the legislative
purpose of the statute and not to seek out an interpretation that necessarily
favors one party or the other.
(Cleaned up).
In Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 694-95, 697, 53 A.3d 1159, 1168, 1169 (2012),
this Court explained the principle of fundamental fairness as follows:
Fundamental fairness is one of the most basic considerations in all [of]
our decisions in meting out punishment for a crime. In deciding whether
fundamental fairness requires merger, we have looked to whether the two
crimes are part and parcel of one another, such that one crime is an integral
component of the other. This inquiry is fact-driven because it depends on
considering the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s convictions, not
solely the mere elements of the crimes.
Rare are the circumstances in which fundamental fairness requires
merger of separate convictions or sentences. . . . One of the principal reasons
for rejecting a claim that fundamental fairness requires merger in a given case
is that the crimes punish separate wrongdoing.
(Cleaned up).
Legislative History of CR §§ 9-305 and 9-306
Before 2002, one statute, Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001
- 42 -
Supp.) (“Art. 27 (2001)”), § 26 governed both witness tampering and obstruction of justice,
stating:
If any person by corrupt means or by threats or force endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or court officer of any court of this
State in the discharge of his [or her] duty, or by corrupt means or by threats
or force obstructs, impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede the due
administration of justice therein, he [or she] is liable to be prosecuted, and
on conviction to be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, or both, according to the nature and
aggravation of the offense.
1993 Md. Laws 1566 (Vol. III, Ch. 223, S.B. 261); see also Pagano, 341 Md. at 131, 669
A.2d at 1339-40.
In 2002, as part of the Code recodification process, the General Assembly created
the Criminal Law Article. See 2002 Md. Laws 197 (Vol. I, Ch. 26, H.B. 11). At that time,
the General Assembly recodified Art. 27 (2001), § 26 as Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002)
(“CR (2002)”) §§ 9-305 (Intimidating or Corrupting Juror) and 9-306 (Obstruction of
Justice). See id. at 666-67. CR (2002) § 9-305 stated:
(a) Prohibited.
A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to influence,
intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State
in the performance of the person’s official duties.
(b) Penalty.
A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on
conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not
exceeding $10,000 or both.
Id. at 666 (some capitalization omitted). The Revisor’s Note for CR (2002) § 9-305 stated,
in pertinent part:
- 43 -
This section is new language derived without substantive change from
former Art. 27, § 26, as it referred to intimidating or corrupting a juror.
...
Also in subsection (b) of this section, the reference to a person who violates
this section being “guilty of a misdemeanor” is added to state expressly that
which was only implied in the former law. In this State, any crime that was
not a felony at common law and has not been declared a felony by statute is
considered a misdemeanor. See State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 490 (1976);
Bowser v. State, 136 Md. 342, 345 (1920); Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 378
(1914); and Williams v. State, 4 Md. App. 342, 347 (1968).
For provisions on bribing a juror, see [CR (2002)] § 9-202[].
2002 Md. Laws 667. CR (2002) § 9-306 stated:
(a) Prohibited.
A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, obstruct, impede, or try
to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in a court of the State.
(b) Penalty.
A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on
conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not
exceeding $10,000 or both.
Id. The General Assembly has never amended this language—i.e., CR (2002) § 9-306 is
identical to the current version, CR § 9-306. The Revisor’s Note for CR (2002) § 9-306
stated in pertinent part: “This section is new language derived without substantive change
from former Art. 27, § 26, as it related to obstructing justice. In subsection (a) of this
section, the former reference to ‘due’ administration is deleted as surplusage.” Id.
(paragraph break omitted).
In 2005, the General Assembly amended CR (2002) § 9-305, in pertinent part, to
add the following language:
- 44 -
[(c)](2) If an act described in subsection (a) of this section is taken in
connection with a proceeding involving a felonious violation of Title 5 of
this article or the commission of a crime of violence as defined in § 14-101
of this article, or a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such a crime, a person
who violates this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.
(d) A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and
consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act
establishing the violation of this section.
2005 Md. Laws 2571 (Vol. IV, Ch. 461, S.B. 122) (some capitalization omitted).11
Analysis
Here, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in not merging, for sentencing
purposes, Wilson’s conviction for witness tampering with his conviction for obstruction of
justice. The plain language of CR § 9-305(d) provides that a sentence for witness
tampering “may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any
crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section[,] ” i.e., CR § 9-305(a), the
subsection prohibiting witness tampering. The State refers to this subsection as an anti-
merger provision that permits separate punishment for the two offenses. And, that is
correct. CR § 9-305(d)’s plain language unequivocally demonstrates that the General
Assembly intended to allow separate sentences, either consecutively or concurrently, for
11
At the same time, the General Assembly amended CR (2002) § 9-305 such that
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2005 Supp.) (“CR (2005)”) § 9-305(c)(1) provided:
“Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person who violates this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5
years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.” 2005 Md. Laws 2571 (some capitalization
omitted).
In 2018, after the State initiated this case, the General Assembly amended CR
(2005) § 9-305(c)(1), increasing the maximum sentence of imprisonment from five years
to ten. See 2018 Md. Laws 831 (Vol. I., Ch. 145, S.B. 1137).
- 45 -
witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The language of CR § 9-305(d) does not
contain an exception for obstruction of justice or for crimes that are allegedly the result of
one act—or for any crime, for that matter. Irrespective of whether the offenses merge
under the required evidence test, the language of CR § 9-305(d) is clear—a sentence for
witness tampering is not required to merge with a sentence imposed for any other offense.
In light of the plain language of CR § 9-305(d), we agree with the State that it is not
necessary to determine whether the required evidence test mandates merger of Wilson’s
convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice.12
We perceive no merit in Wilson’s contention that CR § 9-305(d) does not apply
because it was not a crime for him to marry Bannister or because he did not commit a
crime, such as assault, in addition to witness tampering. Along with there being no
exceptions in the language of the subsection, this assertion is in essence a repetition of
Wilson’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The
inquiry regarding merger does not turn on the sufficiency of the evidence, and there was
more than sufficient evidence to support Wilson’s convictions.
To the extent that Wilson argues that merger is appropriate because both convictions
12
Because CR § 9-305(d)’s plain language is unambiguous, the rule of lenity also
does not apply. See Johnson, 467 Md. at 390, 225 A.3d at 60-61. The rule of lenity assists
in breaking a tie when there is unresolvable ambiguity in a criminal statute. See id. at 390,
225 A.3d at 61. Despite the implications of its name, the rule of lenity is not a mechanism
that permits a court to dispense leniency because a party seeks it. The rule of lenity applies
when the meaning of a criminal statute cannot be ascertained after all of the tools of
statutory construction have been exhausted. See id. at 390, 225 A.3d at 61. In this case,
we are far from that point. Both the plain language and legislative history of the statute
clearly reflect the General Assembly’s intent that merger is not required.
- 46 -
were the result of the same act, to determine whether the General Assembly intended
separate sentences for the same act, the Court employs a three-step analysis:
To evaluate the legality of the imposition of separate sentences for the same
act, we look first to whether the charges arose out of the same act or
transaction, then to whether the crimes charged are the same offense, and
then, if the offenses are separate, to whether the [General Assembly] intended
multiple punishment for conduct arising out of a single act or transaction
violates two or more statutes[.]
Alexis v. State, 437 Md. 457, 485-86, 87 A.3d 1243, 1259 (2014).
Regardless of whether the convictions arose out of the same act, here, it is clear that
the crimes charged do not constitute the same offense. The elements of witness tampering
at issue here are using “corrupt means [to] try to . . . impede . . . a witness . . . in the
performance of the [witness]’s official duties[.]” CR § 9-305(a). The elements of
obstruction of justice are using “corrupt means [to] try to obstruct . . . the administration of
justice in a court of the State[.]” CR § 9-306(a). Aside from being prohibited by separate
statutes, witness tampering includes an element that obstruction of justice does not:
influencing, intimidating, or impeding a witness.13 See CR § 9-305(a). The legislative
history of the offenses shows that the General Assembly split what had been one statute,
Article 27, § 26, into two statutes, CR § 9-305 and CR § 9-306, and subsequently increased
13
Even if the General Assembly had not amended the witness tampering statute to
add CR § 9-305(d), and the convictions were potentially to merge for sentencing (and it is
not clear that they would), under no circumstances would the convictions merge as Wilson
contends—with witness tampering merging into obstruction of justice. If the convictions
were to merge at all, obstruction of justice would merge into the offense of witness
tampering because witness tampering is the offense with the obviously distinct element of
trying to “influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness . . . .” CR § 9-305(a). Thus,
the twenty-year maximum sentence for witness tampering would remain available.
- 47 -
the maximum penalty for witness tampering to ten or twenty years of imprisonment,
depending on the circumstances, while the penalty for obstruction of justice is a maximum
sentence of five years of imprisonment. The statutes also act as safeguards against separate
and distinct harms. The witness tampering statute furthers the goal of protecting the safety
and well-being of witnesses and ensures their ability to appear at trial and give testimony,
whereas the obstruction of justice statute, as the term implies, seeks to protect the overall
administration of justice. In an ultimate indication of legislative intent, in 2005, the
General Assembly amended the witness tampering statute to add CR § 9-305(d)—the anti-
merger provision. There can be no greater demonstration that the General Assembly
intended to permit separate sentences for the two offenses than the enactment of this
subsection.
Wilson also contends that the holding in Romans 178 Md. at 594, 16 A.2d at 645,
stands for the proposition that obstruction of justice and witness tampering are one
offense—the offense of obstruction of justice. In Romans, id. at 594, 16 A.2d at 645, in
rejecting a contention that the indictment was duplicitous, we stated: “Every one of the
several counts is a statement of the offence followed by the particulars of the offence in
plain and unambiguous language so as to give, without repugnancy, the [co-defendant]
reasonable information of the nature of a single charge. More than this is not here
necessary.” We added: “The circumstance that the offence stated may come within either
the particular and general terms of the denunciation of a criminal statute does not split the
offence into separate offences.” Id. at 594, 16 A.2d at 645. Contrary to Wilson’s position,
this Court’s holding in Romans, id. at 594, 16 A.2d at 645, does not signify that witness
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tampering constitutes a means of obstructing justice and that the offenses are one. In
Romans, id. at 594, 16 A.2d at 645, this Court simply concluded that the indictment was
not duplicitous—not because witness tampering is a means of obstructing justice, but
instead because it was permissible for each count of the indictment to quote the entire
statute, which prohibited both witness tampering and obstruction of justice at the time.
Finally, merger of the offenses in this case under the principle of fundamental
fairness would negate both the plain language of CR § 9-305(d) and the legislative intent
revealed by the history of the statute. Moreover, the principle of fundamental fairness is
of no avail to Wilson because the principle turns on a consideration of the circumstances
of the case. See Carroll, 428 Md. at 695, 53 A.3d at 1168. It cannot be said that it is
fundamentally unfair for the circuit court to have imposed concurrent sentences for witness
tampering and obstruction of justice, where the evidence demonstrated that Wilson
engaged in multiple communications with multiple people over a course of months to
orchestrate his marriage to Bannister with the intent of trying to preclude her from
testifying as a witness for the State in an attempt to thwart conviction at his upcoming
murder trial. Under any of the theories advanced, Wilson’s convictions do not merge for
sentencing purposes.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTION TO
AFFIRM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY.
RESPONDENT/CROSS-PETITIONER TO PAY
COSTS.
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