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, we explained that a consent judgment
embodies the parties’ agreement and, therefore, is “in some respects [] contractual in
nature[, b]ut it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and
be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other
judgments and decrees.” (Cleaned up). As to the contractual nature of a consent judgment,
we observed that a “consent judgment memorializes the agreement of the parties, pursuant
to which they have relinquished the right to litigate the controversy in exchange for a
certain outcome and/or, perhaps, expedience.”

Id. at 83

. Indeed, a consent
judgment is “entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced
agreement on the[] precise terms.”

Id. at 83

 (citation omitted). Because a
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consent judgment embodies the parties’ agreement, it is that “agreement that defines the
scope of the decree[,]” meaning that, where an issue as to the scope of the judgment arises,
a court looks to the parties’ agreement and applies the rules of contract interpretation.

Id. at 83-84

807 A.2d at 7-8

. Moreover, for a contract to be binding on the parties, “it must
be supported by consideration[,]” which “necessitates that a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for.” Chernick,

327 Md. at 479

 (cleaned up).
“A performance is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his [or her]
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”

Id. at 480

 (cleaned up).
“[O]rdinarily, a party may not appeal from a judgment to which [the party]
consented[.]” Bryant v. Howard Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Costley,

387 Md. 30

, 42,

874 A.2d 457

, 463 (2005) (citations omitted); see also Chernick,

327 Md. at

477 n.1,

610 A.2d at

773 n.1 (“[G]enerally[,] no appeal will lie from a consent judgment.” (Citation
omitted)). “This is so because entry of a judgment by consent implies that the terms and
conditions have been agreed upon and that the parties have consented to its entry.” Long,

371 Md. at 86

807 A.2d at 9

 (cleaned up). Nevertheless,
[a]n appeal will lie from a court’s decision to grant or refuse to vacate a
“consent judgment” where it was contended below that the “consent
judgment” was not, in fact, a consent judgment because the consent was
coerced, the judgment exceeded the scope of consent, or for other reasons
there was never any valid consent.
Chernick,

327 Md. at

477 n.1,

610 A.2d at

773 n.1 (citations omitted).
In Dorsey v. Wroten,

35 Md. App. 359

, 359-60,

370 A.2d 577

, 578 (1977), the Court
of Special Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a petition to set
- 19 -
aside a purported consent decree. The parties entered into a contract for the sale of land,
with the appellant, the seller of the land, agreeing to construct a house. See

. Issues arose concerning the completion and possession of the house, and the
appellees filed a complaint for specific performance. See

. The
case was set for trial, and, when the case was called that day, the parties’ attorneys
requested a settlement-type conference in the judge’s chambers. See

. The attorneys conferred with their respective clients, and the appellant expressed
reservations about the settlement. See

. The appellant and his
attorney met with the appellees’ attorney before the attorneys met with the trial court to
advise that a settlement had been reached. See

370 A.2d at 578-79

. The trial
court requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to the court. See

. A few hours later, the appellant told his attorney that he would not
agree to a consent decree, and the appellant’s attorney met with the trial court to advise as
much. See

id. at 360-61

. The trial court stated that the matter was settled
and that it would sign the consent decree when it was presented. See

id. at 361

. A few days later, the trial court signed the purported consent decree. See

id. at 361

. The appellant filed a motion to set aside the purported consent
decree, which the trial court denied, and the trial court granted a petition to enforce the
purported consent decree. See

id. at 359-60

.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to set aside the purported consent decree because the trial court knew
“at the time of the entry of the decree [] that the appellant did not so consent.”

Id. at 362

,
- 20 -

 (footnote omitted). The Court of Special Appeals explained:
[Al]though the appellant orally agreed to a settlement agreement, it is
obvious that he withdrew that consent before the final meeting with the trial
[court]. It is also apparent that both the trial [court] and the appellees had
full knowledge that the appellant was not consenting to the decree [three]
days before it was signed.

Id. at 362

. The Court of Special Appeals also held that “entry of a
judgment by consent implies that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and
consent thereto given in open court or by filed stipulation.”

Id. at 363

370 A.2d at 580

.
In that case, although the trial court determined that both parties had agreed to the terms of
the settlement, “it [wa]s obvious there was no consent thereto in open court[,] nor was there
a written stipulation filed in court.”

Id. at 363

370 A.2d at 580

.
In Long,

371 Md. at 77

807 A.2d at 3-4

, this Court held that the Court of Special
Appeals erred in entering a modified consent order instead of a consent order submitted by
the parties. In the Court of Special Appeals, the parties filed a joint motion to vacate
sentence and proposed consent order, embodying their resolution of a civil contempt
matter, whereby the petitioner’s sentence would have been vacated and his immediate
release from incarceration ordered. See

id. at 88

807 A.2d at 10

. Rather than entering the
proposed order, though, the Court of Special Appeals modified it by vacating the
petitioner’s sentence and, instead of ordering the petitioner’s immediate release, remanding
the case for further civil contempt proceedings and a pretrial determination of the
petitioner’s eligibility for release. See

id. at 88-89

807 A.2d at 10

.
In our view, the motion to vacate sentence and proposed order “constituted [a]
consent judgment which the[ parties] requested the Court of Special Appeals to enter.”

Id.

- 21 -
at 88,

807 A.2d at 10

. We determined that the Court of Special Appeals erred in entering
the modified consent order instead of “the proposed consent order jointly submitted by the
parties.”

Id. at 89

807 A.2d at 11

. We explained:
The modified order materially altered the agreement reached by the parties:
by ordering a remand for further proceedings and a pretrial release
determination, it is totally inconsistent with their agreement that the
petitioner be released immediately from incarceration. Thus, as the parties
correctly point out, by entering the modified consent order[,] the intermediate
appellate court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the
parties, and, in the process, undermined the settlement agreement at issue,
and consent judgments in general, contrary to the State’s longstanding policy
of encouraging settlements. . . . That action also deprived both of them of the
benefit of their bargain and the petitioner of the alternative right to litigate
the dispute.

Id. at 89

807 A.2d at 11

 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Smith v. Luber,

165 Md. App. 458

, 479,

885 A.2d 894

, 906 (2005),
the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion in entering a
purported consent order that modified the agreement reached by the parties in open court.
At trial, the parties reached agreements as to various issues in the case that would end the
litigation, and those agreements were placed on the record in open court. See

id. at 465

885 A.2d at 898

. “Both parties were asked qualifying questions by their attorneys about
their acceptance of the agreement on the record[,] and both acknowledged their
acceptance.”

Id. at 465

885 A.2d at 898

. The trial court requested that the parties reduce
their agreement to writing, and the parties engaged in some back and forth about a draft
consent agreement. See

id. at 465-66

885 A.2d at 898-99

. After many months, the
appellant’s attorney advised the trial court that it objected to the proposed consent order
submitted by the appellee because it failed to accurately reflect the parties’ agreement. See
- 22 -

id. at 466

885 A.2d at 899

. The trial court ultimately executed a purported consent order.
See

id. at 466

885 A.2d at 899

. The appellant filed a motion to vacate or to alter, amend,
or revise the order, which the trial court denied, ruling that the executed order accurately
reflected the parties’ agreement. See

id. at 466

885 A.2d at 899

.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in
entering the order, explaining:
The parties entered into a valid consent settlement agreement on the record
in open court, but refused to consent to the agreement as written. The [trial]
court, after months of wrangling between the parties, entered an Order that
modified the agreement of the parties as entered on the record. Upon our
examination of the Order and the record, we have concluded that several
provisions of the [trial] court’s Order fail[] to accurately reflect the
agreement of the parties entered on the record. Thus, the [trial] court’s Order,
as entered, modified the parties’ agreement and altered the rights of the
parties under the agreement.
A consent decree implies that the parties have consented to the
agreement. In this case, it was clear to both the parties and the [trial] court
that there was no consent to the terms of the written agreement. Therefore,
we hold it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter the Order . .
. , and we remand this case to the trial court to revise the agreement of the
parties, tracking the terms and language of the agreement as it appears in the
record of the proceedings [that occurred in the trial court].

Id. at 479

885 A.2d at 906

.
Analysis
Here, we hold that the judgment entered by the District Court was not a consent
judgment, and, as such, Pettiford was not required to object to its entry to preserve for
appellate review issues concerning the judgment and merits of the case, but rather could
just appeal, as she did. Instead of a consent judgment, the judgment entered in this case
was a run-of-the mill judgment determined by a trial court. It is clear that, although the
- 23 -
District Court stated “we’ll do a consent judg[]ment” and marked the box next to the word
“[c]onsent” on the “DISPOSITION” portion of the form complaint, the judgment was not
a consent judgment at all because there had been no agreement between the parties as to
resolution of the issues in the case, no agreement had been presented by the parties to the
District Court, there was no consideration, and neither Pettiford nor her counsel consented
to the so-called consent judgment.
Significantly, the record is devoid of any agreement between the parties with respect
to the resolution of the issues in the case. Thus, the judgment entered by the District Court,
by definition, was not “an agreement of the parties with respect to the resolution of the
issues in the case or in settlement of the case, that has been embodied in a court order and
entered by the court, thus evidencing its acceptance by the court.” Long,

371 Md. at 82

807 A.2d at 6

(cleaned up). The record demonstrates that the parties appeared before the
District Court prepared to proceed with trial; in other words, there was no agreement
reached between the parties pretrial. At the start of the proceeding, Pettiford’s counsel
moved to dismiss the complaint based on the lack of a use and occupancy permit, and,
when the District Court denied the motion, Pettiford’s counsel attempted to assert defenses.
The parties discussed the amended amount of rent owed, with Pettiford’s counsel
requesting to see a ledger. At that point, the District Court sent the parties into the hallway
to take a look at the ledger. At that time, there was still no agreement between the parties.
The parties returned to the courtroom, and the District Court asked whether they had
reached “some type of resolution,” and Pettiford’s counsel unequivocally responded: “No.”
The District Court stated it would proceed with trial. Next Generation’s agent reiterated
- 24 -
that the parties could not reach an agreement due to the issue that Pettiford raised as to the
lack of heat. Pettiford’s counsel confirmed, stating that Pettiford was raising a rent escrow
defense due to the heat issue. Pettiford addressed the District Court and advised that,
although she had hot water, she did not have heat, and she had notified Next Generation
about the issue. At that point, clearly there was still no agreement between the parties.
Nonetheless, after Pettiford acknowledged owing rent for four months, the District
Court stated: “[T]hen we’ll do a consent judg[]ment[.]” It is hard to fathom how any
judgment by the District Court at that time could be a consent judgment, where there was
no agreement whatsoever entered into between the parties to resolve or settle the case.
Indeed, just a short time before the District Court’s statement, Next Generation’s agent and
Pettiford’s counsel plainly stated that no resolution of the case had been reached because
of the issue as to lack of heat. In other words, there was no agreement or resolution of the
issue as to lack of heat. Clearly, Pettiford’s position was that the lack of heat excused her
from being liable for the rent. Nothing in the record or the transcript leads to the conclusion
that the parties reached an agreement, “pursuant to which they have relinquished the right
to litigate the controversy in exchange for a certain outcome and/or, perhaps, expedience.”
Long,

371 Md. at 83

. In short, there was no agreement between the parties,
and, hence, no consent judgment embodying such an agreement.3
3
This is not a case where an agreement was reached between the parties and later
materially modified by the court, thus depriving the parties “of the benefit of their bargain
and [their] alternative right to litigate the dispute[,]” as in Long,

371 Md. at 89

807 A.2d at 11

 (footnote omitted). Rather, there was no agreement between Pettiford and Next
Generation in the first instance, and thus nothing that could be, or was, modified by the
District Court.
- 25 -
Because there was no agreement of the parties with respect to the resolution of the
issues in the case, there obviously was no agreement presented to the District Court. As
such, the judgment entered by the District Court was not “a judgment . . . enter[ed] at the
request of the parties.” Jones,

356 Md. at 528

740 A.2d at 1013

. There was no written
agreement between the parties presented to the District Court. Nor was there an oral
agreement between the parties on the record. Glaringly, Next Generation’s agent and
Pettiford’s counsel expressly advised the District Court that there was no resolution
reached between the parties. The District Court’s determination of an amount of rent and
late fees due and owing, and imposition of judgment in that amount, did not constitute an
agreement of the parties or an agreement that was presented to the District Court.
The record fails to demonstrate that there was any consideration given for settlement
of the case, i.e., “a performance or a return promise [that was] bargained for.” Chernick,

327 Md. at 479

 (cleaned up). As we explained in Chernick,

id. at 480

, “[a] performance is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his [or her] promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise.” (Cleaned up). Here, it does not appear that any performance or return promise
was bargained for, given that no agreement existed between the parties. In other words,
there was no consideration exchanged between the parties to support an agreement.
Finally, there was no valid consent by Pettiford to the judgment proposed by the
District Court. The record reveals that, once the District Court inquired about the amount
of rent and late fees owed, Pettiford stated that she had made a payment and that she owed
rent for July, August, September, and October. The District Court asked: “So, she agrees
- 26 -
to [$1,200] times [4,] which is [$4,800,] and then[,] what is your late fee?” Next
Generation’s agent stated that the late fee was $60. Neither Pettiford nor her counsel stated
that she agreed that she owed $4,800, or much less that she would pay that amount. The
District Court stated that the total late fee would be $240, for a total amount owed of $5,040
“and we’ll cross June off, do you consent to that?” Next Generation’s agent replied
affirmatively. Notably, neither Pettiford nor her counsel responded to the District Court’s
question stating that Pettiford consented to that amount. The District Court next asked:
“She just said she owes July, August, September[,] and October that she didn’t pay it,
correct?” Pettiford responded: “Mmm-hmm.” Pettiford’s response was not a clear or
definitive affirmative statement of agreement. Immediately thereafter, the District Court
said that they would “do a consent judg[]ment” for $5,040, and Next Generation’s agent
thanked the District Court. Again, neither Pettiford nor her counsel expressed agreement
with the District Court’s determination. The District Court thanked the parties for
“working it out” and wished them luck, and, at that point, when it seemed as though the
proceeding was concluded, Pettiford’s counsel thanked the District Court. The District
Court realized, however, that $5,040 was more than what Next Generation had sought in
the complaint, so it reduced the amount of the judgment to $4,799.64. Next Generation’s
agent replied “[r]ight[,]” both Pettiford’s counsel and Next Generation’s agent thanked the
District Court, and the proceeding concluded.
From our perspective, a murmured “[m]mm-hmm” from Pettiford and a “thank you”
or two from Pettiford’s counsel fall far short of constituting valid consent to a consent
judgment. We decline to construe a murmur and two expressions of thanks as consent to
- 27 -
the judgment proposed by the District Court. Pettiford’s murmured “[m]mm-hmm” could
have meant anything, but, in any event, it is clearly not an affirmative or definitive response
indicating agreement to the terms of the judgment proposed by the District Court. And,
certainly, Pettiford’s counsel’s expression of thanks was simply an extension of courtesy
to the District Court and not consent to the judgment. It is customary for counsel at the
end of any proceeding to thank the court for its time and consideration. Pettiford’s counsel
and Next Generation’s agent did the same at the end of the November 19, 2018 proceeding.
At bottom, Pettiford simply acknowledged that she had not paid rent for certain months,
but at no point did either she or her counsel agree to the amount of rent and late fees owed
or to the entry of judgment against her as proposed and ultimately entered by the District
Court.
The Court of Special Appeals has stated that “entry of a judgment by consent implies
that the terms and conditions have been agreed upon and consent thereto given in open
court or by filed stipulation.” Dorsey,

35 Md. App. at 363

370 A.2d at 580

. In this case,
nothing in the way that the judgment was determined or entered by the District Court leads
to the conclusion, or otherwise implies, that the terms and conditions of the judgment were
agreed upon by the parties, or that Pettiford consented to them. Because there was no
consent judgment, despite the circumstance that the District Court labeled the judgment as
such, the general rule that, “ordinarily, a party may not appeal from a judgment to which
[the party] consented[,]” Bryant,

387 Md. at 42

874 A.2d at 463

 (citation omitted), does
not apply. Pettiford’s appeal is properly before this Court.
- 28 -
III.
The Parties’ Contentions
Pettiford contends that the District Court erred in precluding her from asserting
defenses under the implied warranty of habitability and under Maryland and Baltimore
City rent escrow statutes. Pettiford argues that she was entitled to assert an affirmative
defense of breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and that the District Court
improperly “threaten[ed] her with imminent eviction[.]” Pettiford asserts that the District
Court’s refusal to hear any information related to the defense, such as the conditions of
disrepair forming the basis of the defense, denied her the statutory right to seek a setoff
from the rent and late fees claimed by Next Generation. Pettiford maintains that the District
Court erred in refusing to consider her rent escrow arguments, and ruling that she would
not have needed heat for the months at issue. Pettiford contends that the rent escrow
statutes entitle her to raise a defense to remedy defects that constitute, or will constitute, a
fire hazard or substantial threat to life, health, or safety, and argues that lack of heat from
February to November qualified as such a defect.
Next Generation responds that the District Court properly rejected the claims for
rent escrow pursuant to the warranty of habitability based on the lack of heat because
Pettiford failed to establish the defect and because the defense did not apply for the months
at issue. Next Generation contends that the District Court did not refuse to hear the defense
raised pursuant to the implied warranty of habitability, and instead sought to protect
Pettiford from the danger that she alleged was imminent. Next Generation argues that the
District Court heard arguments from the parties on the rent escrow issue and determined
- 29 -
that the issue being raised did not constitute a serious threat to life, health, or safety,
especially during the months for which rent was claimed.
Summary Ejectment
RP § 8-401(a) provides that, “[w]henever the tenant [] fail[s] to pay the rent when
due and payable, it shall be lawful for the landlord to have again and repossess the
premises.” An action under RP § 8-401 is known as a summary ejectment action, and such
“proceedings empower the court to enter a money judgment for the amount of rent
determined to be owing[,] and also to issue an order for the tenant to yield possession of
the premises when the jurisdiction over the tenant has been obtained.” Cane v. EZ Rentals,

450 Md. 597

, 602,

149 A.3d 649

, 652 (2016) (cleaned up). An “aggrieved landlord need
only file a verified complaint for repossession in the District Court, alleging title to the
premises, the name of each tenant, and the amount of rent due and owing” to initiate
summary ejectment proceedings. McDaniel,

419 Md. at 575

19 A.3d at 936

. In Cane,

450 Md. at 602-03

, we explained summary ejectment proceedings under
RP § 8-401:
Summary ejectment proceedings are expedited. A trial is ordinarily
to be held on the fifth day following the filing of the complaint. RP § 8-
401(b)(3)(i). The statute allows a court to adjourn the trial for one day to
permit a party to procure necessary witnesses if it is in “the interests of
justice,” but requires the consent of both the landlord and the tenant for a
longer postponement. RP § 8-401(c)(1). If the tenant was personally served
with the complaint[,] and if the trial does not take place within five days of
the filing of the complaint, the trial court may include in the judgment any
unpaid rent and late fees accruing since the filing of the complaint, as well
as court costs. RP § 8-401(c)(2)(iii)-(iv). If judgment is for the landlord, the
tenant ordinarily must vacate the premises within four days. RP § 8-
401(c)(3).
If the judgment is in favor of the landlord, including restitution of the
- 30 -
premises, the tenant has a “right to redemption of the leased premises” if the
tenant tenders to the landlord the amount of the judgment, as well as any
court-awarded costs and fees, before the execution of the judgment. RP § 8-
401(e)(1). However, a tenant who has had three judgments of possession for
unpaid rent within the previous 12 months does not have a right of
redemption. RP § 8-401(e)(2). When a court holds that a tenant no longer
may redeem the tenancy for that reason, it is said to foreclose the right of
redemption.
Summary ejectment cases originate in the District Court. RP § 8-
401(b). Either party may appeal to the [c]ircuit [c]ourt within four days of
the District Court’s judgment. RP § 8-401(f)(1). If the tenant appeals, the
tenant must furnish an appeal bond to stay execution of the judgment. RP §
8-401(f)(2)-(3).
In McDaniel,

419 Md. at 578

19 A.3d at 937

, we remarked that “[it] is obvious that, in this
truncated process, the landlord’s entitlement to enforcement of his [or her] superior interest
in the premises is a given, once the failure to pay rent is proven and appropriate notice is
provided.”
Rent Escrow
RP § 8-211, the rent escrow statute, “is designed to provide an incentive for a
landlord to repair ‘serious and dangerous defects’ in a residential rental unit by creating
‘meaningful sanctions’ for a landlord who allows such conditions to exist.” Cane,

450 Md. at 603

 (quoting RP § 8-211(a)-(b)). The rent escrow statute is remedial
legislation that should not be narrowly construed. See Cane,

450 Md. at 603

 (citation omitted). In Neal v. Fisher,

312 Md. 685

, 693-94,

541 A.2d 1314

, 1318-19
(1988), this Court discussed the remedial nature of the rent escrow statute, stating:
[The rent escrow statute is] remedial legislation. When the [General
Assembly] enacts a statute designed, as the [rent escrow statute] is, to provide
remedies not available at common law, it is not desirable that construction
should be mindlessly guided by a slogan, such as statutes in derogation of
the common law must be narrowly construed. Statutes of this nature are
- 31 -
remedial and designed to close a gap in the preexisting law[.] A court should
not permit a narrow or grudging process of construction to exemplify and
perpetuate the very evils to be remedied[.] . . . We look at the words of the
statute in the context of their adoption[,] and[,] from that perspective[,]
determine the meaning of the language in a manner consistent with the goal
[that] the [General Assembly] was trying to achieve.
(Cleaned up).
RP § 8-211(e) states that it “provides a remedy and imposes an obligation upon
landlords to repair and eliminate conditions and defects which constitute, or[,] if not
promptly corrected[,] will constitute, a fire hazard or a serious and substantial threat to the
life, health[,] or safety of occupants[.]” RP § 8-211(e) “provides a non-exhaustive list of
examples of conditions for which a tenant may seek relief under [the] statute.” Cane,

450 Md. at 604

. Those conditions include, among other things, a lack of heat
or hot or cold running water, “except where the tenant is responsible for the payment of
the utilities and the lack thereof is the direct result of the tenant’s failure to pay the
charges[,]” RP § 8-211(e)(1), or “[t]he existence of any structural defect which presents a
serious and substantial threat to the physical safety of the occupants[,]” RP § 8-211(e)(4).
“There is a rebuttable presumption that [certain] conditions, when they do not present a
serious and substantial threat to the life, health[,] and safety of the occupants, are not
covered by” the section, such as “[s]mall cracks in the walls, floors[,] or ceilings” or “[t]he
absence of air conditioning.” RP § 8-211(f)(2), (4).
In Cane,

450 Md. at 604-05

149 A.3d at 653

, as to the process under the rent escrow
statute, we summarized:
The rent escrow statute creates both an affirmative cause of action for
a tenant and a defense to certain actions brought by a landlord. If the tenant
- 32 -
notifies the landlord of serious conditions or defects, and “if the landlord
refuses to make the repairs or correct the conditions, or if[,] after a reasonable
time[,] the landlord has failed to do so, the tenant may bring an action of rent
escrow to pay rent into court because of the asserted defects or conditions.”
RP § 8-211(i). The tenant also “may refuse to pay rent and raise the existence
of the asserted defects or conditions as an affirmative defense” to an action
brought by the landlord to obtain the rent or recover possession of the
premises. Id. As a condition for relief under the statute, the tenant must
notify the landlord of the defect[,] and may be required to pay the rent to the
court. RP § 8-211(g) and (k). Tenants who have a certain number of
judgments for unpaid rent within the [twelve] months prior to initiation of
the action may not obtain relief under the statute. Id.
In adjudicating issues under the rent escrow statute, the trial court is
to make “appropriate findings of fact” and order relief either for the
landlord—e.g., termination of the lease and restitution of the premises—or
the tenant—e.g., abatement of the rent and an order that the landlord make
necessary repairs. RP § 8-211(m).
(Brackets omitted).
In Cane,

450 Md. at 601-02

, this Court held that a tenant was not
required to present her rent escrow claims in a separate action, but instead could present
the claims in defense of a summary ejectment action brought by a landlord, and we
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration as to whether the tenant’s proffered
evidence was a valid defense to the summary ejectment action. The landlord filed a
summary ejectment action against the tenant for one month of unpaid rent and to regain
possession of the apartment. See

id. at 601

. During a bench trial, the
tenant “attempted to submit evidence of what she asserted were serious defects in the rental
property, including a leak that resulted in a threat to shut off water service to the property.”

Id. at 601

. The trial court declined to accept the proffered evidence, ruling
that such evidence would be relevant only in a rent escrow action, which the trial court
believed needed to be filed as a separate action. See

id. at 601

. The trial
- 33 -
court ultimately entered a money judgment in the landlord’s favor and awarded possession
of the property to the landlord. See

id. at 601

.
We held that a tenant may raise issues under the rent escrow statute as an affirmative
defense in a summary ejectment action. See

id. at 613

. We observed that
RP § 8-211(i) provides that “a tenant ‘may refuse to pay rent and raise the existence of the
asserted defects or conditions as an affirmative defense . . . to any complaint proceeding
brought by the landlord to recover rent or the possession of the leased premises.’” Cane,

450 Md. at 613

 (quoting RP § 8-211(i)) (cleaned up). And, because RP
§ 8-401, the summary ejectment statute, authorizes a court to enter a money judgment for
the amount of unpaid rent and to issue an order for the tenant to relinquish possession of
the premises to the landlord, we concluded that a summary ejectment action constitutes a
proceeding brought by a landlord to recover rent or the possession of the leased premises
under RP § 8-211(i). See Cane,

450 Md. at 613

. We explained that, if a
tenant successfully “establish[es] a defense under the rent escrow statute, the tenant is
entitled to various forms of relief [under] the statute ‘whether the issue of rent escrow is
raised affirmatively or defensively.’”

Id. at 614

 (quoting RP § 8-211(j))
(cleaned up). One such type of relief is that the trial court may allow a setoff of the rent
owed by the tenant to the extent equitable in light of the conditions or defects the trial court
finds. See Cane,

450 Md. at 614

.
We rejected the landlord’s contention that the trial court considered the tenant’s rent
escrow defense, but determined that the conditions or defects alleged were not serious
enough to support a rent escrow claim. See

id. at 614

. In our view, the
- 34 -
trial court “consistently declined to accept evidence or hear argument from [the tenant]
concerning what she contended were serious defects in the property that the landlord had
failed to correct.”

Id. at 614

. Rather, the record revealed that, at one
point, the trial court had cut the tenant off, stating that it would not hear anything other
than arguments related to the alleged failure to pay rent. See

id. at 614

.
And, we concluded that the trial court made no factual findings with respect to the tenant’s
assertions, which the trial court would have made had it addressed the merits. See

id. at 615

149 A.3d at 659

. We vacated the trial court’s judgment and “remand[ed] the case for
reconsideration in light of [the tenant]’s proffered rent escrow defense.”

Id. at 617

149 A.3d at 660

 (citation omitted). We stated that, on remand, the tenant could submit evidence
of the alleged defects and conditions that existed in the property, and that the trial court
would determine whether those defects and conditions “were sufficient to trigger the
remedies available under the rent escrow statute.”

Id. at 617

149 A.3d at 660

.
Baltimore City Public Local Laws
RP § 8-208, concerning written lease requirements for residential dwelling units,
provides:
No provision of this section shall be deemed to be a bar to the applicability
of supplementary rights afforded by any public local law enacted by the
General Assembly or any ordinance or local law enacted by any municipality
or political subdivision of this State; provided, however, that no such law can
diminish or limit any right or remedy granted under the provisions of this
section.
RP § 8-208(f). To that end, the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (2016)
(“PLL”) § 9-9, Baltimore City’s rent escrow law, mirrors RP § 8-211 and provides that
- 35 -
there are “structures used for human habitation which are, or may become in the future,
substandard with respect to structure, equipment[,] or maintenance[,] and [] such
conditions constitute a menace to the health, safety, welfare[,] and reasonable comfort of
[] citizens.” PLL § 9-9(a)(1). “[P]ublic policy require[s] that meaningful sanctions be
imposed upon those who would perpetrate or perpetuate [] such conditions[.]” PLL § 9-
9(a)(4). Such “sanctions are intended to protect the life, health[,] and safety of tenants and
are not to be used to have premises redecorated or to have minor code violations corrected.”
Id.
PLL § 9-9(b) authorizes a Baltimore City tenant to assert conditions that constitute,
or will constitute if not promptly corrected, “a fire hazard or serious threat to the life, health,
or safety of occupants[], including[,] but not limited to, a lack of heat[.]” A Baltimore City
tenant may make such an assertion either on his or her own initiative through a filing in the
District Court, see PLL § 9-9(c)(1), or by raising “as a defense in answer to an action of
distress for rent or in any complaint proceeding brought by a landlord to recover rent or the
possession of leased premises for nonpayment of rent[,]” PLL § 9-9(c)(2). To make such
an assertion, there must be prior notice to the landlord of the condition by, for example,
notice in writing by certified mail from the tenant or “actual notice of the defects or
conditions, but that the landlord has refused, or having a reasonable opportunity to do so,
has failed to remedy the same.” PLL § 9-9(d)(1). Also, to make the assertion, there must
be “[p]ayment by the tenant into court of the amount of rent called for under the lease at
the time of any assertion of rent escrow, unless or until such amount is modified by
subsequent order of the court[.]” PLL § 9-9(d)(2). The District Court is required to make
- 36 -
factual findings on such issues and “make any order that the justice of the case may
require.” PLL § 9-9(f).
PLL § 9-14.1, concerning the implied warranty of fitness, also known as the implied
warranty of habitability, provides that, “[i]n any written or oral lease or agreement for rental
of a dwelling intended for human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and
warrant that the dwelling is fit for human habitation.” PLL § 9-14.1(a). PLL § 9-14.1(b)(3)
defines “fit for human habitation” as meaning that “the premises shall not have any
conditions which endanger the life, health[,] and safety of the tenants, including, but not
limited to[,] . . . lack of heat[.]”
PLL § 9-14.2, entitled “Implied warranty of fitness – continuation during tenancy,”
similarly defines “fit for human habitation” as meaning that “the premises shall not have
any conditions which endanger the life, health[,] and safety of the tenants involving . . .
lack of heat[.]” PLL § 9-14.2(a)(4). PLL § 9-14.2(b) provides:
The warranty of habitability provided in [PLL §] 9-14.1 is a continuing
warranty, and the tenant may maintain an action for breach of this warranty,
at any time during the tenancy, if the dwelling becomes unfit for human
habitation. An action for breach of this warranty may also be maintained as
a defense in an action of summary ejectment or distress for rent.
Nonetheless, “[n]o action for breach of warranty may be maintained unless the
landlord has notice or knowledge of the conditions which constitute the alleged breach of
the warranty of habitability.” PLL § 9-14.2(c). “‘Notice’ means a violation notice from
the Department of Housing and Community Development or any other municipal or
governmental agency, or a letter sent by the tenant or his [or her] agent to the landlord by
certified mail, or actual notice of the defects or conditions.” PLL § 9-14.2(a)(3). After
- 37 -
notice, “[t]he landlord has a reasonable time . . . to repair the defect or damage alleged by
the tenant except that there should be a rebuttable presumption that a period in excess of
[thirty] days by the landlord would be unreasonable.” PLL § 9-14.2(c). Significantly, PLL
§ 9-14.2(d) provides that a “tenant may maintain a defense based on [PLL § 9-14.2] to the
landlord’s action in summary ejectment” and that damages are to “be computed
retroactively to the date of the landlord’s actual knowledge of the breach of warranty[,] and
shall be the amount of rent paid or owed by the tenant during the time of the breach[,] less
the reasonable rental value of the dwelling in its deteriorated condition.”
In Benik v. Hatcher,

358 Md. 507

, 530-31,

750 A.2d 10

, 23 (2000), a lead-based
paint case, this Court discussed the significance of PLL § 9-14.1 and the implied warranty
of habitability, observing:
The implied warranty provisions establish a threshold for the lease of
premises[,] and that threshold is based on the purpose of the Baltimore City
Housing Code[] to make dwellings safe, sanitary[,] and fit for human
habitation, for the benefit of the health and safety of the people. These
provisions, like the Code of which it is a part, are applications of the police
power of [] Baltimore[ City]. They are examples of public health and safety
regulations. [Baltimore] City has a vital interest and public purpose in
ensuring the habitability of its housing stock[,] and in the health and safety
of its people.
(Cleaned up).
Analysis
In this case, we hold that the District Court improperly precluded Pettiford from
asserting and litigating defenses under the implied warranty of habitability and the rent
escrow statutes, and that Pettiford was statutorily entitled to raise such defenses during the
summary ejectment proceeding and to have them fully considered. The implied warranty
- 38 -
of habitability, PLL § 9-14.1(a) provides that, in any rental lease, “the landlord shall be
deemed to covenant and warrant that the dwelling is fit for human habitation.” That
implied warranty of habitability continues during the tenancy and requires that premises
remain fit for human habitation, see PLL § 9-14.2(b), meaning that “the premises shall not
have any conditions which endanger the life, health[,] and safety of the tenants involving .
. . lack of heat,” PLL § 9-14.2(a)(4). Pursuant to PLL § 9-14.2(b), a “tenant may maintain
an action for breach of th[e] warranty, at any time during the tenancy, if the dwelling
becomes unfit for human habitation[,]” and “[a]n action for breach [] may also be
maintained as a defense in an action of summary ejectment[.]” And, PLL § 9-14.2(d) states
that a “tenant may maintain a defense based on [PLL § 9-14.2] to the landlord’s action in
summary ejectment[.]” Of course, to raise an issue as to breach of the warranty of
habitability, the landlord must have notice of the alleged breach, in one of the manners
prescribed, and the landlord must be given reasonable time to repair the defect. See PLL
§ 9-14.2(c).
Just a few years ago, in Cane,

450 Md. at 601-02, 613

149 A.3d at 651, 658

, this
Court held that a tenant may raise issues under RP § 8-211, the rent escrow statute, as an
affirmative defense in a summary ejectment proceeding, and is not required to raise such
issues in a separate action. RP § 8-211(i) provides that a tenant “may refuse to pay rent
and raise the existence of the asserted defects or conditions as an affirmative defense . . .
to any complaint proceeding brought by the landlord to recover rent or the possession of
the leased premises.” And, because RP § 8-401, the summary ejectment statute, authorizes
a court to enter a money judgment for the amount of unpaid rent and to issue an order for
- 39 -
the tenant to relinquish possession of the premises to the landlord, in Cane,

450 Md. at 613

, we concluded that a summary ejectment action constitutes a proceeding
brought by a landlord to recover rent or the possession of the leased premises under RP §
8-211(i). Plainly, a rent escrow issue may be raised as a defense in a summary ejectment
proceeding.
PLL § 9-9, Baltimore City’s rent escrow law, mirrors RP § 8-211 and expressly
provides that an assertion of a condition that constitutes, or if not promptly corrected will
constitute, a fire hazard or serious threat to the life, health, or safety of occupants, see PLL
§ 9-9(b), may be made by the filing of the tenant, i.e., institution of a rent escrow action,
see PLL § 9-9(c)(1), or “by the tenant as a defense in answer to an action of distress for
rent or in any complaint proceeding brought by a landlord to recover rent or the possession
of leased premises for nonpayment of rent[,]” PLL § 9-9(b)(2). In other words, a claim for
rent escrow under both RP § 8-211 and PLL § 9-9 may be raised as a defense in a summary
ejectment proceeding, and need not be raised in a separate rent escrow action.
Put simply, a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability or under the rent
escrow statutes may be raised as a defense in a summary ejectment proceeding. This is
exactly what Pettiford attempted to do in this case. Once they were raised, the District
Court was required to consider the defenses. Instead, the District Court cut off Pettiford’s
defenses at the knees, effectively denying her the right to seek relief and defend against the
summary ejectment proceeding. Indeed, when Pettiford’s counsel attempted to raise
breach of the warranty of habitability as a defense, rather than accepting evidence or
hearing argument from Pettiford’s counsel on the issue, the District Court stated: “[I]f you
- 40 -
don’t think [that] it’s habitable[,] I’m not going [to] let her stay in the property.” Pettiford’s
counsel attempted to assert a claim for rent escrow, and the District Court stated: “Well[,]
if it’s uninhabitable[,] I’m not going to let her stay in it. . . . [Bec]ause[,] if something
happens to her[,] and you’ve told me [that] it’s uninhabitable[,] it’s on me. So, she’ll be
out by midnight tonight if she wants to claim [that] it’s uninhabitable.” Faced with the
District Court’s implacability, Pettiford’s counsel responded that, in “that case[,] we
cannot[,]” and did not pursue the breach of the warranty of habitability issue further.
Essentially, the District Court’s statements served as a threat of immediate eviction if
Pettiford were to pursue the defense of breach of the warranty of habitability. She was
faced with the choice of asserting the defense and possibly prevailing on the merits and
staving off the summary ejectment proceeding, yet nonetheless being ordered by the
District Court to leave the premises by midnight, or abandoning the defense to ensure that
she could remain in her home at least another night and have the opportunity to redeem the
property if Next Generation were awarded judgment. The options offered by the District
Court unmistakably deprived Pettiford of her statutory right to pursue breach of the
warranty of habitability related to the lack of heat for approximately nine months. It is no
wonder that her counsel stated that, under those circumstances, she could not proceed with
the defense. Additionally, the District Court made no factual findings with respect to
Pettiford’s assertion about the breach of the warranty of habitability, because it had not
bothered to address the merits of the defense raised. Cf. Cane,

450 Md. at 614-15

149 A.3d at 658-59

(This Court concluded that the trial court had not addressed the merits of a
tenant’s rent escrow issue because the trial court made no factual findings with respect to
- 41 -
the tenant’s assertions and otherwise cut the tenant off, stating that it would not hear
arguments other than those related to the alleged failure to pay rent.).
The District Court’s handling of the rent escrow defense was little better. After the
failed settlement talk in the hallway, the parties returned to the courtroom, and Next
Generation’s agent advised that the parties could not reach an agreement due to the issue
of the lack of heat raised by Pettiford. The District Court asked: “Well[,] this isn’t an
escrow case, right?” Pettiford’s counsel responded that Pettiford was raising a rent escrow
defense based on the lack of heat in the property since February 2018, approximately nine
months earlier. The District Court asked whether Pettiford provided notice of the issue to
Next Generation, and Pettiford stated that she had been in contact with an individual at
Next Generation to advise that the furnace was not working. According to Pettiford, a
maintenance person was supposed to come to the property on multiple occasions to light
the furnace, but that did not happen, and she still did not have heat as of that day. The
District Court asked: “[S]o this is only for June, July, August, September[,] and October?
. . . When you wouldn’t have needed heat. . . . So, you can open your escrow for November[,
b]ut they’re not asking for November.” The District Court reiterated that Pettiford could
“go to the [C]lerk’s [O]ffice and open that for November.”
These exchanges and the District Court’s remarks tend to show that the District
Court did not understand that a rent escrow issue could be raised as a defense in the
summary ejectment proceeding, and that the issue did not need to be raised in a separate
action. For example, after being advised that the parties had not reached a resolution due
to the issue as to lack of heat, the District Court’s response was to inquire about the nature
- 42 -
of the case and confirm that the case was not “an escrow case[.]” And, a short while
thereafter, the District Court told Pettiford that she could “open” an escrow claim for
November of 2018, and that she could go to the Clerk’s Office to do so. The District
Court’s remarks and advice lead to the conclusion that the District Court believed that a
rent escrow issue had to be opened as a new case through the Clerk’s Office, and could not
be considered as a defense in the summary ejectment proceeding.
Moreover, the District Court improperly concluded that, because the complaint
sought rent only for June through October, and because Pettiford would not “have needed
heat” for those months, a rent escrow issue could not be raised in the summary ejectment
action. It is certainly not clear that Pettiford would not have needed heat for the months
for which Next Generation sought rent, and the District Court did not entertain arguments
from the parties or hear any testimony about that matter. Nothing in the rent escrow statutes
sets forth a temporal limitation, providing that a rent escrow claim may only be made for
certain times of the year or under certain conditions. RP § 8-211(i) provides that, if a
landlord refuses to make repairs or correct the hazardous condition, “the tenant may refuse
to pay rent and raise the existence of the asserted defects or conditions as an affirmative
defense . . . to any complaint proceeding brought by the landlord to recover rent or the
possession of the leased premises.” PLL § 9-9(c)(2) provides similarly.
RP § 8-211(i) and PLL § 9-9(c)(2) do not state that a rent escrow defense may be
raised only where the hazardous condition complained of occurred or impacted the tenant
during the months for which rent is sought to be recovered by the landlord. In Cane,

450 Md. at 603