Code Home Rule Counties – Taxes and Fees – WhetherCharles County May Impose a Host Fee on WasteTransfer Stations ( 2020 )


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  • 94                                                   [105 Op. Att’y
    COUNTIES
    CODE HOME RULE COUNTIES – TAXES AND FEES – WHETHER
    CHARLES COUNTY MAY IMPOSE A HOST FEE ON WASTE
    TRANSFER STATIONS
    December 22, 2020
    Reuben B. Collins, II, Esq., President
    Board of County Commissioners, Charles County
    You have asked for an opinion of the Attorney General on
    whether Charles County (the “County”), as a code home rule
    jurisdiction, possesses the authority, absent enabling legislation
    enacted by the General Assembly, to levy a “host fee” on private
    waste transfer facilities (also known as “transfer stations”) that
    wish to operate in the County. In your request, you have indicated
    that, as you understand it, a “host fee” is a fee that an operating
    company pays to a local government to locate, construct, operate,
    and/or expand waste or recycling facilities and that, here, the
    contemplated host fee would be charged as a condition of allowing
    a private transfer facility to collect waste at the facility and then
    transfer that waste to another facility outside the County, rather
    than to dispose of waste at the County landfill.
    Your request indicates that the fees would “be used to mitigate
    against roadway usage, litter generation, traffic congestion, and
    loss in revenue from waste that would otherwise be subject to fees
    for disposal at the County-operated landfill.” The opinion of the
    County Attorney that was included with your request further
    explains that “[o]perators of such facilities may be met with local
    opposition to the construction of waste facilities, and to ease such
    opposition, a local authority may impose some form of host
    compensation to be paid to the local government, in exchange for
    their permission to proceed with developing the facility.”
    Memorandum of E. Wesley Adams III, Charles County Attorney,
    to the Charles County Commissioners, at 1 (June 8, 2020) (“Adams
    Memorandum”).
    For the reasons explained below, it is our opinion that, under
    Article XI-F, § 9 of the Maryland Constitution, Charles County
    does not possess the requisite authority to levy the proposed “host
    fee,” as described in your request, without express authority from
    the General Assembly, and that the General Assembly has not yet
    granted that authority. We do not offer an opinion about a “host
    Gen. 94]                                                               95
    fee” that might be different in nature from the one described in your
    request, about a “host fee” imposed on a different type of facility
    than a waste transfer station, or about the authority of a jurisdiction
    other than Charles County to impose a “host fee.” 1
    I
    Background
    A.       Charles County and Code Home Rule
    Charles County is a code home rule jurisdiction governed by
    Article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution. “Code home rule
    counties derive their powers from two main sources—the
    Constitution itself and legislation enacted by the General
    Assembly.” 96 Opinions of the Attorney General 36, 37 (2011)
    (citing Kent Island Def. League, LLC v. Queen Anne’s County Bd.
    of Elections, 
    145 Md. App. 684
    , 688 (2002)); see also 98 Opinions
    of the Attorney General 60 (2013) (discussing some of the powers
    of code counties); 62 Opinions of the Attorney General 275 (1977)
    (describing the historical background of Article XI-F).
    Article XI-F, § 9 of the Maryland Constitution provides that
    “[a] code county shall not levy any type of tax, license fee,
    franchise tax, or fee which was not in effect or authorized in the
    code county at the time it came under the provisions of this Article,
    until an express authorization of the General Assembly has been
    enacted for this purpose by a general law which in its terms and
    effect applies alike to all code counties in one or more of the classes
    provided for in Section 5 of this Article.” 2 The Court of Appeals
    has interpreted the largely identical provision governing
    municipalities—Article XI-E, § 5—to apply “not only to revenue-
    1
    We understand your question to be whether Charles County may
    unilaterally impose the contemplated host fee on private transfer
    stations. We thus have not analyzed, for example—and do not offer an
    opinion on—whether the County or any other local jurisdiction may
    enter into a contract, with a private operator of a waste facility, under
    which the operator agrees to pay a “host fee.”
    2
    By statute, there are four classes of code counties: those in Central
    Maryland, on the Eastern Shore, in Southern Maryland, and in Western
    Maryland. See Md. Code Ann., Local Gov’t (“LG”) § 9-302(a). Charles
    County is currently the only code county in the Southern Maryland class,
    as defined by that provision.
    96                                                       [105 Op. Att’y
    raising levies but to regulatory levies as well.” 77 Opinions of the
    Attorney General 37, 39 (1992) (citing Campbell v. Mayor &
    Aldermen of the City of Annapolis, 
    289 Md. 300
    , 308 (1981)). As
    we have previously noted, “[s]uch a broad interpretation of this
    limitation suggests that the entire subject of the levying of taxes
    and fees by code counties has been reserved to the General
    Assembly.” 77 Opinions of the Attorney General at 39; see also 64
    Opinions of the Attorney General 296 (1979) (discussing Article
    XI-F, § 9). In short, as a code home rule county, Charles County
    must have “express authorization” from the General Assembly
    before it levies “any type” of tax, license fee, franchise tax, or fee
    not already in effect or authorized in the County at the time it
    became a code home rule jurisdiction, which—for Charles
    County—was on December 5, 2002. 3
    B.       Waste Transfer Stations
    The operation of waste transfer stations is governed by Title
    9 of the Environment Article, as implemented by regulations
    promulgated by the Maryland Department of the Environment
    (“MDE”). See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Envir. (“EN”) § 9-210;
    COMAR 26.04.07.24; COMAR 26.03.03.05. At the most general
    level, a waste “transfer station” is a type of “[s]olid waste acceptance
    facility.” EN § 9-501(n) (defining “[s]olid waste acceptance
    facility” to mean “any sanitary landfill, incinerator, transfer station,
    or plant whose primary purpose is to dispose of, treat, or process
    solid waste”). More specifically, a “transfer station” is defined
    under MDE’s regulations as:
    a place or facility where waste materials are
    taken from one collection vehicle (for
    example, compactor trucks) and placed in
    another transportation unit (for example, over-
    the-road tractor-trailers, railroad gondola cars,
    barges or ships) for movement to other solid
    waste acceptance facilities. For the purposes
    of these regulations, collection points serving
    rural residential areas are not considered to be
    transfer stations, provided that solid waste is
    not transferred from a collection vehicle to
    3
    The voters of Charles County approved the resolution adopting
    home rule jurisdiction on November 5, 2002, and Article XI-F of the
    Maryland Constitution provides that a “county shall become a code
    county under the provisions of this Article, on the thirtieth day after the
    election” at which the resolution is approved. Md. Const., Art. XI-F, § 2.
    Gen. 94]                                                              97
    another transportation unit. The movement or
    consolidation of a single generator’s solid
    waste at the site of generation may not be
    considered to be a transfer station.
    COMAR 26.04.07.02B(32).
    It is important to note that these regulations establish a clear
    distinction between transfer stations and other types of waste
    acceptance facilities. Most relevant to this analysis, while MDE’s
    regulations define a “transfer station” as “a place or facility where
    waste materials are taken from one collection vehicle . . . and
    placed in another transportation unit . . . for movement to other
    solid waste acceptance facilities,” id., the regulations define a
    “sanitary landfill” as “an engineered method of disposing of solid
    wastes on land in a manner that: (a) [m]inimizes public health and
    environmental hazards[,] and (b) [i]s designed, installed, and
    operated according to the provisions of these regulations,”
    COMAR 26.04.07.02B(27) (emphasis added). Thus, the primary
    difference between a sanitary landfill and a waste transfer station
    seems to be that a transfer station is a place where waste is
    temporarily collected to be transferred somewhere else for
    permanent disposal, whereas a sanitary landfill is a place where
    waste is disposed of permanently.
    C.       Host Fees
    The term “host fee” is not defined by any Maryland statute or
    regulation. Nor have such fees been the subject of review by the
    Maryland courts or any opinions of our Office. However, such fees
    have apparently been implemented in jurisdictions throughout the
    country. See Neil R. Shortlidge & S. Mark White, The Use of
    Zoning and Other Local Controls for Siting Solid and Other
    Hazardous Waste Facilities, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Winter 1993
    at 3. 4
    While the exact nature of these fees varies depending on the
    jurisdiction, it is our understanding that “host fees” are typically
    understood to be “charges applied as a condition of permitting or
    other regulatory approvals that are designed to mitigate the impacts
    4
    It is our understanding that some local jurisdictions in Maryland
    charge fees that they may have termed “host fees” to private waste
    facilities, but the nature and permissibility of those fees is beyond the
    scope of your specific opinion request.
    98                                                   [105 Op. Att’y
    created by the proposed [waste] facility on the community, public
    facilities and services, and natural resources.” Id. at 5. These fees
    also ordinarily “compensate the community for the risks created by
    the waste facility,” id., and “allow the developer to proceed with
    construction while providing an important revenue source to the
    community,” id. at 44. This economic benefit can “make its
    construction more politically palatable to citizens in the
    community.” Id.
    Consistent with that understanding, you explain in your
    request that the host fee would “be used to mitigate against
    roadway usage, litter generation, traffic congestion, and loss in
    revenue from waste that would otherwise be subject to fees for
    disposal at the County-operated landfill.” The County Attorney
    also noted that the fee may be justified in part by “the transfer
    stations’ impact on County roadways that may require more
    frequent maintenance and improvement of public road facilities
    designed to serve the needs of the public and the transfer station, as
    well to mitigate against other nuisances from the collection of
    waste at the station.” Adams Memorandum at 2. It thus appears
    from the County Attorney’s opinion that Charles County would
    impose the fee at least in part for purposes of raising revenue for
    the County and thereby making the transfer facilities more
    palatable to the public.
    D.   Fees Versus Taxes
    It is sometimes relevant under Maryland law to determine
    whether a particular “fee” is a “regulatory fee,” a “user fee,” or a
    fee in the nature of a tax. See, e.g., 96 Opinions of the Attorney
    General 61, 67 (2011); 91 Opinions of the Attorney General 14,
    17-19 (2006). In distinguishing among these types of charges, “the
    purpose of the enactment governs rather than the legislative label.”
    Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 
    319 Md. 45
    , 53 (1990) (quoting Campbell, 
    289 Md. at 305
    ).
    “Generally, a tax is designed primarily to raise revenue, a
    regulatory fee funds a regulatory measure, and a user fee pays for
    a commodity consumed or a service rendered.” 96 Opinions of the
    Attorney General at 67. In particular, as between regulatory fees
    and taxes, the Court of Appeals has articulated the following
    distinction:
    There is no set rule by which it can be
    determined in which category a particular Act
    primarily belongs. In general, it may be said
    that when it appears from the Act itself that
    revenue is its main objective, and the amount
    Gen. 94]                                                           99
    of the tax supports that theory, the enactment
    is a revenue measure. . . . [W]here the fee is
    imposed for the purpose of regulation, and the
    statute requires compliance with certain
    conditions in addition to the payment of the
    prescribed sum, such sum is a license proper,
    imposed by virtue of the police power; but
    where it is exacted solely for revenue
    purposes and its payment give[s] the right to
    carry on the business without any further
    conditions, it is a tax.
    Eastern Diversified Properties, 
    319 Md. at 53
     (internal citation and
    quotation omitted). For a fee to qualify as regulatory, therefore, the
    fee generally must “require[] compliance with certain conditions
    beyond mere payment of a prescribed sum,” and “[t]he amount of
    revenue generated by [the] . . . fee must be ‘reasonable’ and bear
    ‘some definite relation to the purpose of the regulation.’” 91
    Opinions of the Attorney General 152, 156 (2006) (quoting Mayor
    & City Council of Ocean City v. Purnell-Jarvis, 
    86 Md. App. 390
    ,
    405 (1991)). In other words, to be a regulatory fee, there must be
    a sufficient “nexus between the charges and the stated regulatory
    purpose.” 
    Id.
     (citing Eastern Diversified Properties, 
    319 Md. at 55
    ).
    As noted above, however, the limitation on the authority of
    code counties in Article XI-F, § 9 “applies not only to revenue-
    raising levies but to regulatory levies as well.” 77 Opinions of the
    Attorney General at 39. That means a code county must have
    “express authorization” from the General Assembly to charge a fee
    that was not in effect or authorized before the county became a code
    home rule jurisdiction regardless of whether that fee is properly
    characterized as a regulatory measure or as a revenue-raising tax.
    Still, whether a fee has been expressly authorized by a particular
    statute may “depend on whether [the fee] is more aptly
    characterized as a regulatory measure or a tax,” 89 Opinions of the
    Attorney General 212, 214 (2004), because some statutes might
    authorize only regulatory fees, rather than fees in the nature of a
    tax, or vice versa.
    II
    Analysis
    You have asked whether Charles County may impose a “host
    fee” on waste transfer stations that might wish to operate in the
    100                                                       [105 Op. Att’y
    County. As explained above, a code county “shall not levy any
    type of tax, license fee, franchise tax, or fee which was not in effect
    or authorized in the code county at the time it came under the
    provisions of this Article [i.e., Article XI-F], until an express
    authorization of the General Assembly has been enacted for this
    purpose by a general law which in its terms and effect applies alike
    to all code counties in one or more of the classes provided for in
    Section 5 of this Article.” Md. Const., Art. XI-F, § 9. To answer
    your question, therefore, we must consider: (1) whether, at the time
    Charles County became a code home rule jurisdiction, a “host fee”
    for waste transfer facilities was in effect in Charles County or there
    was an existing provision of law that would have authorized such
    a “host fee” in the County; and (2) if not, whether the County now
    has express authorization from the General Assembly to levy the
    “host fee” in question.
    A.       Was a Host Fee in Effect or Authorized When Charles
    County Became a Code Home Rule Jurisdiction?
    Turning to the first prong, it does not appear that “host fees”
    for waste transfer facilities were in effect or authorized in Charles
    County before the County became a code home rule jurisdiction.
    Preliminarily, as the County Attorney noted in his opinion, “[t]here
    is no question that an explicit host fee imposed upon a transfer
    station did not exist in 2002[,] as a private waste acceptance facility
    has not existed previously in the County.” Adams Memorandum
    at 1. But Article XI-F does not require a tax or fee to have been “in
    effect” at the time a county adopted code home rule, so long as the
    tax or fee was “authorized” at that time. Md. Const., Art. XI-F, § 9.
    We thus must determine whether the “host fee” about which you
    ask might have been “authorized” in the County by a provision of
    the Charles County Code of Ordinances, the Public Local Laws of
    Charles County, or the Maryland Code that existed before
    December 5, 2002.
    As far as we have been able to tell, there were no such
    provisions authorizing the hypothetical “host fee” on waste transfer
    facilities that is the subject of your request. 5 Although § 254-7 of
    5
    To be clear, we have not scoured every provision of the relevant
    codes that existed in 2002, but the County Attorney did not identify any
    relevant provisions, and we are also not aware of any. If another
    provision can be identified that we did not consider, that could, of course,
    affect the analysis.
    Gen. 94]                                                          101
    the Charles County Code of Ordinances and Resolutions—which
    took effect in 1982, before Charles County adopted home rule—
    refers to a fee that is charged for the “use of” the County’s “sanitary
    landfills,” 6 that fee appears to be distinguishable from the proposed
    “host fee” for waste transfer facilities. One important difference is
    that, as the County Attorney explained in his opinion, the proposed
    “host fee” would not be for disposal of waste in the County landfill
    but instead would be a fee charged to a private entity in exchange
    for affording that entity the privilege to operate the transfer station
    and, in doing so, to transfer the waste in question to some location
    outside the County. Adams Memorandum at 1-2.
    Because § 254-7 contemplates a service charge for “use of”
    the landfill, the County Attorney concluded that it could not cover
    the host fee, which would not be for “the service of disposing of
    the waste . . . at the County landfill.” Adams Memorandum at 1.
    In fact, according to the County Attorney, the waste to be processed
    through the transfer station in the County “is not intended for
    disposal at the landfill whatsoever, not even on a temporary basis.”
    Id. That distinction is reinforced by the fact that landfills are
    treated differently than transfer stations under MDE’s regulations,
    as explained above. See Part I.B, supra. We ordinarily defer to a
    County Attorney’s interpretation of county laws, see, e.g., 88
    Opinions of the Attorney General 145, 150 (2003), and do so here.
    More fundamentally, though, § 254-7 of the County Code
    could not have served as an authorization for the contemplated
    “host fee” here because the provision of State law that authorized
    that ordinance did not provide for the power to impose such a “host
    fee.” See Md. Code, Art. 25, § 14A (2001 Repl. Vol.) (now
    codified at LG § 13-403). That State law, both at the time the
    ordinance was enacted and when Charles County later adopted
    code home rule, provided that “[t]he county commissioners of
    every county in the State may acquire, maintain, and operate a tract
    of land or tracts or parcels of land within the limits of the county
    for the disposal of refuse, garbage, rubbish, or any other matter as
    in their judgment may promote the public health of the inhabitants
    of the county.” Id. In the “exercise of that power,” the counties
    could “[m]ake agreements . . . for cooperation in, and financial
    6
    According to the County Attorney’s opinion, although the fee is
    mentioned in this provision, the fee is actually imposed each year
    through the County’s annual budget ordinance, and such fees for the use
    of the County’s landfills have been imposed—apparently through the
    budget—since at least 1974.
    102                                                     [105 Op. Att’y
    support by way of service charges and fees, in the acquisition,
    construction, operation and maintenance of th[ose] disposal areas
    or facilities,” as well as “[f]ix and collect reasonable service
    charges or fees . . . for the use of the disposal areas or facilities.”
    Id.; see also 86 Opinions of the Attorney General 153 (2001)
    (discussing some of the other powers granted to counties under
    what was then Article 25, § 14A). As that language makes clear,
    the provision could not have extended to the contemplated “host
    fee” imposed on a private transfer facility that will not be disposing
    of refuse, garbage, or rubbish in the County’s landfill. 7
    We recognize that, under the former Article 25, § 3(v)(1), 8 a
    number of counties, including Charles County, had been granted
    powers as of December 2002 that might have been read to include
    the power to regulate transfer facilities. Under that section as it
    existed at the relevant time, counties could “require, regulate, or
    provide for the collection, removal, and disposal of refuse, garbage,
    rubbish, filth, or any other matter or thing that is or may become
    injurious to the health or comfort of the inhabitants of the county”
    and “provide whether the expense, if any, shall be borne by
    individual owners or tenants or shall be paid for in whole or in part
    by the county.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 25, § 3(v)(1) (2001 Repl.
    Vol.).
    That language, however, speaks to the regulation of certain
    garbage-related activities themselves, not to funding the
    maintenance of county infrastructure or to raising revenue to make
    a facility palatable to the County’s residents, as seems to be
    contemplated by the host fee in question. 9 Although the power to
    7
    Similarly, § 133-1 of the Public Local Laws of Charles County,
    which might also have been a partial source of authority for § 254-7 of
    the County Code, applies only to the County’s “disposal areas” and
    would not seem to extend to a private transfer station.
    8
    Article 25, § 3(v)(1) was recodified in 2013 and now appears as LG
    § 13-402(c). See 2013 Md. Laws, ch. 119.
    9
    The extent to which a county may regulate transfer stations and other
    waste acceptance facilities under current law may also be limited to some
    degree by State statute, which reserves to the State the regulation of
    many environmental-protection matters related to solid waste. See Days
    Cove Reclamation Co. v. Queen Anne’s County, 
    146 Md. App. 469
    , 501-
    02 (2002) (“[T]he traditional zoning and land use decisions which . . .
    are to be made by the local government do not include determining what
    is necessary in order to protect the environment from the pollutants that
    are generated specifically by a rubble landfill.”). We need not decide the
    extent of those limits here, however.
    Gen. 94]                                                               103
    regulate an activity can often include the power to impose
    regulatory fees in connection with the activity being regulated, so
    long as there is a sufficient “nexus between the charges and the
    stated regulatory purpose,” 91 Opinions of the Attorney General at
    156 (citing Eastern Diversified Properties, 
    319 Md. at 55
    ), the
    regulatory authority granted by Article 25, § 3(v)(1) does not seem
    to have a nexus to—and thus did not authorize—the County to
    charge the host fees you describe. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council
    of Baltimore v. Canton Co. of Baltimore, 
    186 Md. 618
    , 631-32
    (1946) (“Power delegated to a [local jurisdiction] to ‘regulate’ or
    to ‘license and regulate’ does not include power to impose a license
    tax or fee to raise revenue that bears no reasonable relation to the
    expense of regulation”). 10 Therefore, regardless of the extent to
    which former Article 25, § 3(v)(1) might have authorized Charles
    County to regulate transfer stations before December 5, 2002—
    which we need not decide here—the provision would not have
    authorized the “host fee” contemplated by your request.
    In sum, it does not appear that there was any provision in
    effect in December of 2002, when Charles County became a code
    home rule jurisdiction, that would have authorized the County to
    impose the “host fee” that is the subject of your request.
    B.        Has the General Assembly Expressly Authorized Host Fees
    for Waste Transfer Facilities in Charles County?
    Because it does not appear that a “host fee” of the type
    mentioned in your request was either in effect or authorized in
    Charles County at the time the County became a code home rule
    jurisdiction, in order to be valid, such a fee must be expressly
    authorized by the General Assembly. See Md. Const., Art. XI-F,
    § 9. Thus, we turn to the second prong of our analysis, i.e., whether
    Charles County has express authority from the General Assembly
    to levy the proposed “host fee.”
    The statutory powers of code counties are generally (though
    not exclusively) codified in one of three locations: Title 10,
    Subtitle 3 of the Local Government Article, which lists the powers
    10
    Similarly, although the part of that same statute that gave counties
    the power to “provide whether the expense, if any, [for the collection,
    removal, and disposal of refuse] shall be borne by individual owners or
    tenants or shall be paid for in whole or in part by the county” might have
    authorized a user fee or service charge of some sort, Art. 25, § 3(v)(1), it
    would not have authorized a host fee as you have described it.
    104                                                   [105 Op. Att’y
    that are shared by both charter counties and code counties; Title 11
    of the Local Government Article, which lists powers that are
    particular to code counties; and Title 13 of the Local Government
    Article, which lists certain other powers given to all counties or to
    a subset of particular counties. However, none of the provisions in
    those parts of the Maryland Code (or anywhere else in the Code,
    for that matter) appears to authorize the proposed “host fee.”
    For example, Title 10 of the Local Government Article (also
    known as the Express Powers Act) provides for a grant of certain
    express powers to code counties, see LG § 10-102(b) (stating that
    “[i]n addition to other powers granted to code counties, each code
    county may exercise by legislative enactment the express powers
    provided in Subtitle 3 of this title”), but none of those powers
    includes the authority to impose the “host fee” as described in your
    request. While the powers do include the specific authority for
    code counties to impose certain fees, a “host fee” is not among
    them. See, e.g., LG § 10-312 (permitting code counties to impose
    franchise fees and establish rates); LG § 10-315 (permitting code
    counties to charge fees to businesses subject to a commercial
    district management authority).
    And although Title 10 grants code counties the broad
    authority to “enact local laws to protect and promote public safety,
    health, morals, comfort, and welfare, relating to . . . the disposal of
    wastes,” LG § 10-317(a)(2), that power does not constitute an
    “express authorization” under Article XI-F, § 9 to charge the
    contemplated host fee. As the Court of Appeals explained in
    interpreting the largely identical constitutional provision that
    governs municipalities, a similarly broad grant of police powers—
    including, among other things, the power “to protect the health,
    comfort and convenience of the citizens of the municipality”—was
    too general to qualify as an “express authorization” to impose a
    regulatory fee. Campbell, 
    289 Md. at 308-09
     (emphasis added). In
    other words, although a broad police power granted to a home rule
    jurisdiction might sometimes encompass the authority to charge
    regulatory fees if those fees have a sufficient nexus to the purpose
    of a regulation imposed under that police power, cf. Eastern
    Diversified Properties, 
    319 Md. at 51, 53
     (implying that was the
    case for charter counties), that was not the rule under the stricter
    Gen. 94]                                                              105
    requirements in Article XI-E, § 5. Express authorization for the fee
    was instead required. 11
    Given the similarity between Article XI-F, § 9 and the
    constitutional provision at issue in Campbell, we have previously
    suggested that Article XI-F, § 9 would also be interpreted to require
    “express authorization” for both “revenue-raising” and “regulatory
    levies.” 77 Opinions of the Attorney General at 39. Indeed, in that
    opinion, we explained that “the provisions of the Code Home Rule
    Article are generally modeled on the Municipal Home Rule
    Article,” that “[t]his parallelism is especially true of the tax levy
    limitation in § 9 of the Code Home Rule Article,” and that § 9, like
    the analogous provision in the Municipal Home Rule Article,
    “applies not only to revenue-raising levies but to regulatory levies
    as well.” Id. Applying the same principles from that opinion here,
    the general authorization in LG § 10-317 regarding the disposal of
    wastes, despite its breadth, is not an “express authorization” to
    charge the host fee in question. Regardless of whether the host fee
    is viewed as revenue-raising measure or a regulatory levy,
    therefore, LG § 10-317 does not authorize it.
    Similarly, under Title 11 of the Local Government Article, as
    with Title 10, there do not appear to be any provisions that would
    authorize a “host fee” for waste transfer facilities along the lines
    you describe in your request. See, e.g., LG § 11-401(f)(2)
    (allowing code counties to “set rates, fees, and assessments for
    water and sewerage services and benefits”); LG § 11-504 (allowing
    code counties to charge “a reasonable fee” for towing company
    licenses).
    11
    In reaction to Campbell, the General Assembly later expressly
    authorized municipalities to, with certain exceptions, “establish and
    collect reasonable fees and charges: (i) [f]or the franchises, licenses, or
    permits authorized by law to be granted by a municipal corporation; or
    (ii) [a]ssociated with the exercise of any governmental or proprietary
    function authorized by law to be exercised by a municipal corporation.”
    89 Opinions of the Attorney General at 217 n.3 (citing 67 Opinions of
    the Attorney General 307, 310 (1982)); see also LG § 5-205(d)
    (providing for the current version of that authorization). It does not
    appear, however, that any similar authorization has been enacted for all
    code counties. We thus do not need to decide whether the contemplated
    host fee would qualify as a regulatory levy.
    106                                                    [105 Op. Att’y
    The same is again true for Title 13 of the Local Government
    Article. Although the General Assembly has, under that Title,
    authorized all counties to require licensing fees for the operation of
    junkyards, and to impose a reasonable fee for those licenses, LG
    § 13-504, that does not give Charles County the requisite authority
    to charge a “host fee” for waste transfer stations. 12 Rather,
    “junkyard” is defined under that statute as “a public or private
    dump, automobile junkyard, automotive dismantler or recycler
    facility, scrap metal processing facility, outdoor place where old
    motor vehicles are stored in quantity or dismantled, or lot on which
    refuse, trash, or junk is deposited.” LG § 13-501. Like sanitary
    landfills, then, junkyards are distinguishable from transfer stations
    in that junkyards accept trash for “deposit[]” onto the lot, not
    temporarily collected for transfer to transport to another location.
    What is more, in authorizing a county to impose a “reasonable
    fee” for junkyard licenses, the language of LG § 13-504 implies
    that it was intended to grant the power to impose regulatory fees—
    which are generally assessed for “reasonableness,” 91 Opinions of
    the Attorney General at 156 n.3—not fees in the nature of a tax.
    See 89 Opinions of the Attorney General at 217 (explaining under
    a different statute that an “authorization to impose ‘reasonable’ fees
    and charges indicates that . . . the Legislature was conferring
    authority to impose regulatory charges rather than taxes”). Thus,
    to the extent that the proposed host fee would be a revenue-raising
    tax, rather than a regulatory fee, that would be yet another reason
    why LG § 13-504 could not provide a basis for charging the host
    fee in question for waste transfer facilities.
    Finally, we recognize that, under Title 20 of the Local
    Government Article, the General Assembly has authorized the
    imposition of development impact fees by certain counties,
    including Charles County. See LG § 20-701 (authorizing code
    counties to impose “development impact fees to finance any of the
    capital costs of additional or expanded public works,
    improvements, and facilities required to accommodate new
    construction or development”). As we have explained in prior
    opinions, development impact fees are typically “imposed to offset
    the cost of [the] infrastructure or public facilities necessary to
    support new development.” 89 Opinions of the Attorney General
    12
    This provision applied to Charles County before December of 2002,
    see Md. Ann. Code, Art. 25, § 122A (2001 Repl. Vol.), so it need only
    have “authorized” Charles County to impose a host fee for transfer
    stations, not “express[ly]” so. Either way, it cannot be read to provide
    the necessary authorization for such a host fee.
    Gen. 94]                                                          107
    at 213; see also 91 Opinions of the Attorney General at 155-57;
    Paul A. Tiburzi, Impact Fees in Maryland, 
    17 U. Balt. L. Rev. 502
    (1988).
    Here, however, neither your request nor the County
    Attorney’s opinion suggests that the proposed fee would be
    structured as an impact fee under LG § 20-701. That is, the
    proposed fee, as described to us, would not be limited solely to the
    financing of “capital costs of additional or expanded public works,
    improvements, and facilities required to accommodate new
    construction.” LG § 20-701. Although the County Attorney’s
    opinion notes that the fee might be justified in part by the need for
    “improvement of public road facilities designed to serve the needs of
    the public and the transfer station,” that would apparently comprise
    only one component of the overall fee. Adams Memorandum at 2.
    The fee, according to your request, would also be designed to
    mitigate for nuisances caused by the transfer station, such as litter
    generation and traffic congestion, and for the loss in revenue from
    the transfer of waste to other jurisdictions that would otherwise be
    subject to fees for disposal at the County-operated landfill, as well
    as to “ease” local opposition to the construction of the transfer
    station. Those other justifications for the fee do not appear to be
    tied to the “capital costs” of any public works, improvements, or
    facilities needed to accommodate new construction, as would be
    required in order for a fee to be legally imposed under LG § 20-
    701. See also Shortlidge & White, supra, at 5 (distinguishing “host
    fees” for waste facilities, at least as generally understood, from
    “impact fees” and noting that impact fees are generally tied to the
    costs of “identified impacts” on public resources, while host fees
    generally “compensate the community for the risks created by the
    waste facility”).
    Thus, while it is at least possible that a “host fee” for a waste
    transfer station might qualify as a development impact fee under
    LG § 20-701 if it were actually tied to the “capital costs of
    additional or expanded public works, improvements, and facilities
    required to accommodate new construction” of the transfer station,
    the host fee that Charles County is contemplating, as described to
    us, likely would not qualify as a development impact fee under that
    statute. In our view, therefore, the General Assembly has not yet
    expressly authorized the fee as proposed in your letter, and, under
    Article XI-F, § 9, Charles County may not impose it.
    108                                                  [105 Op. Att’y
    III
    Conclusion
    In sum, as a code home rule county, Charles County is
    prohibited from imposing the “host fee” that you have described
    without express authority from the General Assembly, unless such
    a fee was in effect or authorized at the time the County became a
    code home rule jurisdiction. As best as we can tell, the contemplated
    “host fee” was neither in effect nor authorized at the time the
    County became a code home rule county, and the General
    Assembly has not expressly authorized such a fee. Therefore,
    based on the information provided, it is our opinion that the County
    currently lacks the authority to impose it.
    Brian E. Frosh
    Attorney General of Maryland
    Christopher Franzoni
    Assistant Attorney General
    Patrick B. Hughes
    Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice
    *Ann MacNeille, Assistant Attorney General, contributed significantly
    to the preparation of this Opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 105 OAG 094

Filed Date: 12/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2020