Peete v. Peete ( 2023 )

Bessie Jean Peete v. Maryland Elizabeth Peete, No. 2098, September Term 2021.
Opinion by Wells, C. J.
FAMILY LAW — BIGAMY— STANDING TO ANNUL
Vacating a judgment of divorce leaves the parties to the divorce action still married. If one
of the parties remarries, the second marriage is void, because it is bigamous. Further, in
this unique circumstance, the aggrieved spouse has standing to seek to annul the second
marriage because it is a bigamous union.
FAMILY LAW — BIGAMY— STANDING TO ANNUL — LACHES
Even though a party may have standing to annul a bigamous union, the equitable doctrine
of laches may apply, particularly when, as here, the allegedly aggrieved party waited at
least 13, and plausibly, almost 20 years to challenge her husband’s remarriage and did so
admittedly not to vindicate her marital rights, but solely for financial gain.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CAD2019363
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*
No. 2098
September Term, 2021
______________________________________
BESSIE JEAN PEETE
v.
MARYLAND ELIZABETH PEETE
______________________________________
Wells, C.J.,
Arthur,
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wells, C.J.
______________________________________
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic. Filed: March 1, 2023
2023-03-01 14:52-05:00
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
* At the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
Bessie and Author Peete were married in 1971. They later divorced, at which time
Author married Maryland.1 After Author’s death many years later, Bessie had the divorce
judgment declared void, and then filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County to annul Author’s second marriage. The circuit court dismissed Bessie’s complaint
on grounds that she lacked standing. Bessie timely appealed, raising the following two
issues, which we have rephrased for clarity2:
I. Did the circuit court err in holding that Bessie lacked standing to bring
a complaint to annul Author’s second marriage to Maryland?
II. Does laches bar Bessie’s complaint for an annulment?
We hold that Bessie had standing to bring a complaint for annulment, but we conclude,
under the unique circumstances of this case, that laches bars her complaint. Accordingly,
we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court on alternative grounds, consistent with
this opinion.
1
Because the three people involved here, Author, Bessie, and Maryland, have the
same last name, for ease of understanding we shall refer to them by their first names. We
mean no disrespect by using the parties’ first names.
2
Bessie had stated her appellate issues as follows:
1. Did the Circuit Court err in deciding that improper notice of divorce
proceedings, and subsequent revocation of the DC Superior Court
divorce decree was insufficient to create a bigamous relationship
which would require the Circuit Court to overturn (find void) the
marriage between A[u]th[o]r Peete and Maryland Peete?
2. Is 21 years too late to correct an error regarding bigamous marriage?
BACKGROUND
On January 18, 1971, Bessie and Author were married in Washington, D.C. but
separated in the spring of 1975. Roughly 15 years after they separated, on April 9, 1991,
Author filed a complaint for absolute divorce in the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia. Bessie did not file an answer, nor did she appear at the subsequent divorce
hearing, during which the court took testimony from Author and the parties’ son. Finding
that the parties had lived apart since the spring of 1975 without cohabitation, the court
granted Author a default judgment of absolute divorce from Bessie.
On June 13, 1992, several months after Author obtained the judgment for divorce,
he married Maryland in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The two remained married
until Author’s death about 15 years later, on September 9, 2007. Upon his death, the
Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County appointed Maryland executor of Author’s
estate.
On November 18, 2011, roughly twenty years after the 1991 judgment for divorce
and four years after Author’s death, Bessie filed a motion in the Superior Court for the
District of Columbia to vacate the judgment of divorce based on improper and ineffective
service of process. Author was designated the plaintiff; Bessie the defendant; Maryland, as
executor of Author’s estate, was served with a copy of the motion. Bessie alleged she had
not received the complaint for absolute divorce. She believed she was still married to
Author and claimed to have had marital relations with him up to the time of his death.
Bessie argued that service was ineffective because the person who signed the certificate of
2
service, Cynthia Williams, was a minor in 1975 and did not reside in her home, as required
by the D.C. Superior Court Rules governing service.
A hearing followed on July 19, 2012. The court admitted into evidence an affidavit
of proof of service that was filed on April 12, 1991, attesting that Bessie had been served
with the divorce complaint by certified mail on April 10, 1991. The affidavit was
accompanied by a “green card” signed by Williams, attesting that she was Bessie’s
roommate and she had accepted the certified mail containing the complaint and summons.
Williams testified that when she accepted the certified mail and signed the accompanying
affidavit, she was 16 years old, dating Bessie’s son, and living in New Jersey. Williams
testified that she lived with Bessie two or three years later when she married Bessie’s son.
Williams further testified that it was possible she gave the certified mail to Bessie after
signing for it, but she did not remember doing so. Bessie testified that Williams never lived
with her.
Because the D.C. Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule governing service
requires a third person signatory to reside with the recipient and finding that Williams did
not reside with Bessie at the time of the service, the court ruled that service was defective
and the divorce judgment void. On July 30, 2013, the D.C. Superior Court issued a written
order vacating the judgment for divorce.3
3
In its written order, the D.C. Superior Court stated that it was making no findings
or conclusions regarding the validity of Author’s subsequent marriage to Maryland because
that question was not before the court. Although the court noted that “a void judgment
cannot acquire validity because of laches[,]” the court stated that if laches were to apply it
would “almost certainly provide a valid defense to this Judgment.” The court believed that
(Continued)
3
Roughly nine years later, on December 7, 2020, Bessie filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking to annul the marriage between Author
and Maryland on grounds of bigamy, in other words, that Author was still legally married
to Bessie when he married Maryland. Bessie admitted that the purpose of her action was
to obtain a share of Author’s pension. Following a hearing, a magistrate issued a report and
recommendation, concluding that Bessie did not have standing to annul the marriage
between Author and Maryland. On August 9, 2021, Bessie filed exceptions. Following two
exceptions hearings, the circuit court issued a memorandum and order holding that the
magistrate’s findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous. The court then overruled
Bessie’s exceptions and entered judgment for Maryland. Bessie has filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal Bessie advances two arguments.4 First, she argues that contrary to the
circuit court’s holding, she has standing to annul the marriage between Author and
Maryland because a bigamous marriage is void, not voidable. Next, she argues that,
because Author’s bigamous marriage to Maryland was void, not voidable, the circuit court
Bessie’s claim that she was not aware of the divorce was “wholly” not credible based on
the credible testimony of Author’s children; the listing of Maryland as the surviving spouse
in the probate proceedings by Author’s children; Bessie’s actions following the divorce;
and evidence that Bessie and Maryland had interactions related to Author’s children from
his first marriage during his second marriage. The court also did not find credible Bessie’s
uncorroborated claim that she and Author continued to have sexual relations after the date
of their divorce.
4
Maryland has not filed an appellate brief.
4
erred in suggesting that the almost 21-year delay between the 1991 judgment for divorce
and her 2011 filing to vacate that judgment would bar her annulment action.
I. Standing to Annul
Standard of Review
A court of equity has jurisdiction in an action for annulment of a marriage or
divorce. Md. Code Ann., Family Law Art (“FL”) § 1-201(b)(3), (4). “We review a circuit
court’s determination of standing for clear error.” Moulden v. State, 212 Md. App. 331,
344 (2013) (citing Joyner v. State, 87 Md. App. 444, 451 (1991) (“The circuit court’s ruling
on the standing issue is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.”)).
The Circuit Court’s Ruling
The circuit court’s memorandum and order began with citation to three Maryland
statutes regarding marriage. FL § 2-201(b), provides that “[o]nly a marriage between two
individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying is valid in this State.”
Criminal Law § 10-502(b) provides that a person may not marry another while lawfully
married to a living person. FL § 2-202 provides that certain types of marriages are void in
Maryland and then lists various prohibited degrees of affinity and consanguinity. Bigamy
is not mentioned.
Given this statutory law, the circuit court reasoned that at the time Author married
Maryland there was no legal prohibition to the marriage. Author and Maryland were not
within any degree of lineal or collateral consanguinity; they both consented to the marriage;
there was no evidence of fraud; and Author possessed a valid divorce decree. Placing great
weight on the cited Maryland statutes and finding that at the time Author married Maryland
5
he possessed a valid divorce decree, the circuit court reasoned that the marriage between
Author and Maryland was voidable.
The court then analyzed Maryland case law. The court noted that Maryland courts
recognize a distinction between “voidable” and “void” marriages, and notwithstanding the
court’s conclusion to the contrary, noted that Maryland courts hold that “bigamous and
incestuous marriages are void marriages[] because they are invalid regardless of the
parties’ consent.” Morris v. Goodwin, 230 Md. App. 395, 404 (2016), cert. dismissed, 451
Md. 587 (2017) (citations omitted). See Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. 420, 434
(2003) (a party is not competent to enter into a new marriage when already married to
someone else and that marriage is not terminated by annulment, death, or absolute divorce.
“It is the lack of capacity to enter into the new marriage that renders the [new] marriage
void ab initio.”) (Citation omitted)). The court then described the resulting effect of a
voidable and void marriage. When a marriage is voidable, only a party to the marriage may
seek an annulment of the marriage and may only do so during the life of the parties. See
Morris, 230 Md. App. at 406-409. When a marriage is void, a third party may seek an
annulment to the marriage at any time. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. at 434. Because the court
found the marriage voidable and not void, the court reasoned that Bessie had no standing
to invalidate Author’s and Maryland’s marriage as Bessie was not a party to the marriage
and Author was dead.
6
Analysis
Our concern with the circuit court’s opinion is that the court looked only to
Maryland statutory law in its determination that a bigamous marriage is voidable instead
of void. While we agree that Maryland statutory law is perhaps unclear on this point,
Maryland’s appellate authority (as well as case law from our sister jurisdictions) is clear
that a bigamous marriage is void, not voidable.5 See Morris, 230 Md. App. at 404
(“[B]igamous and incestuous marriages are void marriages, because they are invalid
regardless of the parties’ consent.”); Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 173 (1949) (“A
second marriage contracted while a first marriage exists undissolved is a nullity without
the passage of any judicial decree declaring it void.”).
Morris is instructive. In Morris, the personal representative (and mother) of the
deceased filed a complaint to annul her daughter’s marriage based on fraud. The circuit
court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. On appeal, we affirmed.
5
Gibbons v. Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1985) is representative of the rulings
in our sister jurisdictions.
The majority rule is soundly based on the public policy that regards
the marriage contract as so uniquely personal that any action to annul or
dissolve it cannot be commenced after the death of either of the parties to the
marriage unless the validity of the marriage is challenged on a ground that
made the marriage absolutely void rather than voidable. Applying the
majority rule and rationale to the facts of this case, we hold that an action to
annul a marriage on the ground of fraud can only be brought by the defrauded
spouse while both parties to the marriage are living.
Gibbons, 376 N.W.2d at 25.
7
Although Morris concerned an action for annulment based on a fraudulent marriage,
not a bigamous marriage, the framework we used in Morris guides us in this case. In
Morris, we recognized that in determining whether a marriage is void or voidable, we look
to “‘whether, with proper consent, the parties could have established a valid marriage. If
not, the marriage is considered void.’” Morris, 230 Md. App. at 404 (quoting Cecily Fuhr,
Cause of Action to Annul Marriage, in 65 CAUSES OF ACTION (“COA”) 2d 617 § 3, p.
638). We stated that “‘[i]f, on the other hand, the parties could have lawfully married had
one or the other party’s consent to the marriage not been legally ineffective, the marriage
is voidable rather than void.’” Id. (quoting Fuhr, 65 COA 2d 617 § 3, p. 638). We then
reasoned that “bigamous and incestuous marriages are void marriages, because they are
invalid regardless of the parties’ consent.” Id. (citation omitted). In contrast, “a marriage
procured by duress or exertion of undue influence is voidable, because the defect in the
marriage goes to a party’s consent.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We noted
the distinct effect of void and voidable marriages, stating that “voidable marriages may be
annulled only during the joint lives of the parties to the marriage.” Id. at 408. In an
accompanying footnote, we stated:
Conversely, courts have ruled that void marriages may be challenged by third
parties after the death of one of the married parties. See In re Estate of Davis,
55 Or. App. 982, 640 P.2d 692, 693 (1982) (“A void marriage, on the other
hand, is invalid from the outset and may be challenged by third parties.”);
Abel v. Waters, 373 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (“Clearly, the
contention is that this was an invalid marriage, void ab initio. It is therefore
clear to this court that in this instance, on the grounds alleged by the personal
representative, an annulment action can be maintained after the death of one
of the parties.”).
Id. at 408 n.4.
8
Here, in 2012, the D.C. Superior Court ruled that Author’s 1991 judgment of divorce
was void and as a result the court vacated the divorce decree. The effect was to create a
bigamous marriage between Author and Maryland. A bigamous marriage is void because
there is no way to “fix it.” See Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. at 436. Therefore, contrary to the
court’s ruling, Bessie has standing in this unique situation to annul the bigamous marriage
because that marriage directly affected her marriage to Author.
II. Laches
Bessie next argues that the circuit court erred in considering the effect the nearly
21-year delay had on her motion to annul Author’s second marriage. She cites no case law
to support her argument, nor does she set forth any further reasoning or argument to explain
it. Essentially, she flatly states that the doctrines of laches or equitable estoppel do not
apply in this case. Although we agree that generally the application of laches will not bar
a suit to set aside a bigamous marriage, under the unique circumstances presented here,
laches or equitable estoppel is applicable.
We have found only one Maryland case, Townsend, previously cited, that discusses
application of equity in the context of a bigamous marriage. In Townsend, a husband
brought suit to annul his marriage to his second wife and to sell their jointly owned
property. Id. at 172. He alleged that he married his first wife in 1930, and within a few
months, they separated, and she left the State of Maryland. Id. Ten years later, he married
his second wife. Id. Because he had not heard from his first wife since she left Maryland,
the husband believed that he was free to marry again. Id. Several years after his second
9
marriage, he obtained a divorce from his first wife, after which he and his second wife
separated and he filed for an annulment. Id. at 173. His second wife answered by asserting
that the complaint was barred in equity by the doctrine of “unclean hands.” The Court of
Appeals, now called the Supreme Court of Maryland,6 began its analysis by stating:
Common-law marriages are not valid in Maryland, and therefore when a
party who has a spouse living marries another, cohabitation under the second
marriage after the death or divorce of the first spouse does not give validity
to the second marriage. Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 46 [(1934)]. A
second marriage contracted while a first marriage exists undissolved is a
nullity without the passage of any judicial decree declaring it void.
* * *
It is generally accepted that the equitable maxim that he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands cannot be applied in any case where
the result of the application sustains a relation which is denounced by statute
or is contrary to public policy. Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E.
316 [(1923)]; Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App.D.C. 216, 19 F.2d 690 [(1927)].
In proceedings to annul a bigamous marriage, the interest of the State is
paramount to the grievances of the parties directly interested. The State
sponsors the sanctity of the marriage relation and the welfare of society. In
some cases the interests of unborn children may be affected. There is a
difference between the ordinary case where the court refuses to aid the
complainant in securing benefits from his own wrongdoing and the case
where the complainant desires to have a judicial declaration that a marriage
is null and void. When a party files a suit for annulment of his marriage, he
is deemed as coming into court repenting of his wrongdoing and asking the
court to correct his wrongful act as far as possible, in order to prevent any
injurious consequences which might be cast thereby in the future upon
innocent persons and upon the State. For these reasons the clean hands
6
At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the
Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. See,
also, Md. Rule 1-101.1(a) (“From and after December 14, 2022, any reference in these
Rules or, in any proceedings before any court of the Maryland Judiciary, any reference in
any statute, ordinance, or regulation applicable in Maryland to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland shall be deemed to refer to the Supreme Court of Maryland….”). The Judges of
the Court are now called “Justices.”
10
doctrine is not applicable in a suit to annul a bigamous marriage. The
marriage status being on a different footing from contracts generally, a party
may be relieved from a void marriage, although fully aware of its invalidity
when contracted. Phelps, Juridical Equity, sec. 259; 1 Bishop, Marriage,
Divorce and Separation, sec. 722; Davis v. Green, 91 N.J.Eq. 17, 108 A. 772[(1919)]; Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N.E. 816 [(1917)]; Kiessenbeck
v. Kiessenbeck, 145 Or. 82, 26 P.2d 58, 60 [(1933)].
It is an unquestioned principle that a court of equity will refuse aid to
a complainant who has acted fraudulently or gained an advantage by deceit
or unfair means. But general iniquitous conduct, unconnected with the
transaction alleged as the cause of action, does not deprive him of his right
to relief in a court of equity. Equity does not demand that suitors shall have
led blameless lives. The maxim requiring clean hands does not disqualify one
who has not dealt unjustly in the particular matter in which judicial protection
or redress is sought. The courts apply the maxim only where some unjust act
of the complainant affects the equitable relations of the parties with respect
to the matter presented for adjudication. Thus the maxim is applied, not by
way of punishment for past violations of the law, but upon considerations
that make for justice. Trice v. Comstock, 8 Cir., 121 F. 620 [(1903)];
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54 S.Ct. 146,
148 [(1933)].
Townsend, 192 Md. at 173, 175-76 (emphasis added). Because the Court believed that
considerations of justice did not warrant application of the doctrine of unclean hands to bar
husband from obtaining a decree for the sale of the parties’ jointly owned property, the
Court reversed the chancellor’s decree dismissing the complaint, and remanded the case to
the circuit court for further proceedings. Id. at 178. We observe that the Court’s holding
was based on principles of equity in the context of “general iniquitous conduct” and would
not necessarily apply where the unjust act “affects the equitable relations” between the
parties.
Very helpful to us are cases from other jurisdictions where courts have applied
estoppel or laches to bar the suit when presented with a similar (and rare) fact pattern as
11
the one presented here – where a first wife sought to invalidate a second marriage several
years after the death of the husband in order to reap a financial windfall. See Self v. Self,
893 S.W.2d 775 (Ark. 1995) (in a suit over entitlement to widow’s benefits from the
Veterans Administration – first wife’s motion to set aside allegedly invalid divorce decree
24 years after it was entered was barred by laches)7; Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 451 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1984) (first wife estopped from
claiming benefits of that marriage when she married a second man five years after she
married her first husband; her first husband died 25-years later; and she waited six years
after her first husband’s death to assert any rights to his estate); and Morehouse v.
Morehouse, 111 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App. 1937) (in first wife’s suit against administrator of
deceased husband, her motion to set aside allegedly invalid divorce decree is barred by
equitable estoppel where she waited 13 years after it was entered). See also Annotation,
Estoppel or Laches Precluding Lawful Spouse From Asserting Rights in Decedent’s
Estates as Against Putative Spouse, 81 A.L.R. 3d 110, §§10A-16A (1977, 2022 Supp.)
(listing cases that have applied laches or estoppel to bar suit under similar fact patterns).
In making a laches determination, a court shall look to the reasonableness of the
delay and whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party. Jones v. State, 445 Md. 324,
349-50 (2015) (citations omitted). Here, the record is unclear when Bessie learned that
7
But see Raymond v. Raymond, 36 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Ark. 2001) where the
Supreme Court of Arkansas distinguished Self by reasoning that the divorce decree there
was merely voidable, but in Raymond, the decree was void from inception where wife was
not properly served. The Court determined that laches did not apply to bar former wife
from petitioning to set aside divorce decree that was void.
12
Author had remarried - whether it was around the time he obtained the 1991 divorce
judgment, when he remarried in 1992, or, as she claimed, when he died in 2007. In any
event, by her own account, she waited at least 13 years after Author’s death before asserting
any interest in his estate in 2020.
We conclude that the unusual set of facts before us necessitates the application of
laches. This is particularly so where Bessie’s annulment suit was admittedly motivated
only to gain financial rights, not to vindicate the status of the marriage. Additionally,
because we have applied laches under similar circumstances, specifically where the
petitioning party alleged fraud instead of bigamy, we conclude that to not apply laches in
this case would work a grave injustice. Cf. Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230-32 (1965)
(Supreme Court of Maryland upheld a circuit court’s application of laches to bar first wife’s
petition to vacate divorce decree on grounds of fraud, because she was not served with the
divorce petition and neither she nor her husband resided in Maryland, when first wife
waited 13 years before filing petition to vacate, husband remarried immediately upon filing
of the divorce decree, and he died prior to first wife filing her petition to vacate.).
An appellate court may issue a remand for further proceedings instead of entering a
final order affirming, reversing, or modifying a judgment when the interests of justice and
judicial expediency require. Md. Rule 8–604(d). See also Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93,
103 (2002). But we exercise our discretion and decline to do so in this instance when the
record before us is clear and undisputed. The record demonstrates that Bessie waited a
minimum of 13 years after Author’s death before filing the annulment action. She states in
her appellate brief that eight of those 13 years, between 2012 (when the court vacated the
13
divorce decree) and 2020 (when she filed her annulment action), were due to her “health,
and COVID[.]” She does not elaborate beyond that statement. Although she offers no
further elaboration, we conclude that Bessie’s 13-year delay in asserting her marital rights
was unreasonable and unfairly prejudices Maryland (and Author). Accordingly, under the
circumstances before us, we conclude that Bessie’s action to annul the marriage between
Author and Maryland is barred by laches.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED ON
GROUNDS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION. APPELLANT TO PAY THE
COSTS.
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