Grandison v. State ( 2017 )

HEADNOTE: Anthony Grandison v. State and Anthony Grandison v. State, Nos. 2039
and 2822, September Term 2014 and 2015
CRIMINAL LAW – ILLEGAL SETENCE – MARYLAND CONSTITUTION –
POWERS OF GOVERNOR TO COMMUTE SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW – ILLEGAL SETENCE – MARYLAND CONSTITUTION – EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE – POWERS OF GOVERNOR TO COMMUTE SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW – ILLEGAL SETENCE – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION –
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE – POWERS OF GOVERNOR TO COMMUTE
SENTENCE
In 1983, Anthony Grandison, appellant, hired Vernon Lee Evans, to murder Scott
Piechowicz and his wife, Cheryl Piechowicz, to prevent them from testifying against him
in a then-pending criminal trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. Evans succeeded in murdering Mr. Piechowicz, but in a case of mistaken
identity, Evans murdered Susan Kennedy instead of Ms. Piechowicz.
After being convicted in federal court for conspiracy to violate civil rights resulting
in death and witness tampering, Grandison was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a
consecutive ten-year sentence. In 1984, Grandison was also convicted by a jury sitting in
the Circuit Court for Somerset County of two counts of first degree murder, conspiracy to
commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. These
convictions resulted in two death sentences along with a sentence of life for the conspiracy
conviction plus twenty years for the handgun conviction to run consecutive to the life
sentence.
In 2013, the General Assembly repealed the death penalty in Maryland, and that
same year, Grandison filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court denied
all relief, except pursuant to the State’s concession, vacated Grandison’s twenty-year
sentence for the handgun violation. The Court then resentenced Grandison to fifteen years
for the handgun violation to run consecutive to the life sentence for conspiracy. Grandison
filed an appeal from this order.
In 2015, Governor Martin O’Malley signed Executive Order 01.01.2015.05
commuting Grandison’s death sentences to life without the possibility of parole sentences.
Thereafter, Grandison filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence attacking his new
sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The circuit court denied all requested
relief under this second motion to correct an illegal sentence. Grandison filed an appeal
from this order and the appeals were consolidated.
Held: Affirmed.
After the Court found many of Grandison’s claims not cognizable under Maryland
Rule 4-345(a) and Colvin v. State, 450 Md. 718 (2016), the Court considered appellant’s
challenges to Governor O’Malley commuting his death sentences to life without the
possibility of parole. The Court first determined that the Governor of Maryland has the
power to grant reprieves or pardons under Article II, Section 20 of the Maryland
Constitution. The Court held that except for a limitation of this power in cases of
impeachment under Article II, Section 20, and perhaps, bribery of public officials under
Article III, Section 50, the Governor of Maryland’s pardon power is plenary.
The Court next turned to Grandison’s contention that Governor O’Malley did not
have the authority under Article II, Section 20, to sua sponte commute his death sentences
to life in prison without parole sentences, because he did not apply for a commutation. The
Court held that the provision on which Grandison relied, namely that “before granting a
nolle prosequi, or pardon, [the Governor] shall give notice, in one or more newspapers, of
the application made for it, and of the day on, or after which, his decision will be given[,]”
was merely a notice requirement and not a condition precedent. Because Governor
O’Malley gave notice of his commuting Grandison’s sentence on the day of his decision,
such action by the Governor was lawful.
In considering Grandison’s contention that Governor O’Malley’s commutation of
his death sentences also violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article 17 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, the Court held that, even if the Ex Post Facto Clause was applicable
to the Maryland Constitution, the Governor’s actions did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because such action did not increase Grandison’s sentences. See Woods v. State,
315 Md. 591, 606-07 (1989) (rejecting “the notion that a life sentence without the
possibility of parole is, even relatively, the equivalent of death itself”). Moreover, the
Court rejected Grandison’s alternative argument that, if the Governor derived his authority
under Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 41, §§ 118 and 119, and their modern-day
counterparts, Md. Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.), Correctional Services Article
(“CS”) §§ 7-601 and 7-602, this exercise violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court
held that, because the Governor was authorized to commute a sentence of death to a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole under the language of Article 41, §§ 118
and 119, which were in effect at the time of Grandison’s sentencing, and there was no
retroactive change in CS §§ 7-601 and 7-602, no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
occurred.
Circuit Court for Somerset County
Case No. 19-K-83-004010 REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
CONSOLIDATED CASES
No. 2039
September Term, 2014
ANTHONY GRANDISON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
No. 2822
September Term, 2015
ANTHONY GRANDISON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Woodward, C.J.,
Leahy,
Moylan, Charles E., Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Woodward, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed: November 29, 2017
*Judge Kathryn Grill Graeff, Judge Dan
Friedman, Judge Matthew J. Fader did not
participate in the Court’s decision to designate
this opinion for publication pursuant to Md. Rule
8-605.1.
In 1983, Anthony Grandison, appellant, for a fee of $9,000, hired his friend, Vernon
Lee Evans, to murder Scott Piechowicz and his wife, Cheryl Piechowicz, to prevent them
from testifying against him in a then-pending criminal trial in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 697, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 873, and reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1001 (1986). Pursuant to their unlawful
agreement, Evans succeeded in murdering Scott Piechowicz but failed in killing Cheryl
Piechowicz, instead murdering her sister, Susan Kennedy, by mistake.1 Id.Later that year, Grandison, Evans, and two others2 were tried in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland on charges of conspiracy to violate civil rights
resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, and witness tampering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512. United States v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425, 428 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated
sub nom. Kelly v. United States, 479 U.S. 1076 (1987), aff’d on remand, 885 F.2d 143 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990). All four defendants were convicted of both
charges, id., and Grandison, in particular, was sentenced to life imprisonment and a
consecutive term of ten years’ imprisonment. Grandison, 305 Md. at 698.
1
On the day Evans was to commit the killings, at the Piechowicz’s place of
employment (the Warren House Motel in Pikesville, Baltimore County), Susan Kennedy
was working in her stead, and Evans, apparently, mistook Ms. Kennedy for Ms.
Piechowicz. Grandison, 305 Md. at 697.
2
The other co-defendants in Grandison’s federal trial were Janet Patricia Moore and
Rodney Kelly. United States v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425, 428 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated sub
nom. Kelly v. United States, 479 U.S. 1076 (1987), aff’d on remand, 885 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990).
The following year, after removal of the Maryland case to Somerset County at
Grandison’s request,3 he was convicted, by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Somerset
County, of conspiracy to murder, two counts of first-degree murder, and use of a handgun
in the commission of a crime of violence. Id. He was thereafter sentenced, by the jury, to
death sentences for both first-degree murders, and the court imposed a sentence of “life
imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction and twenty years for the handgun violation
consecutive to the life sentence.” Id. Both of the latter sentences “were imposed to run
consecutively to the life plus ten years sentence previously imposed in the federal case.”
Id.Grandison subsequently filed a post-conviction petition, in the Circuit Court for
Somerset County, and, in 1992, that court, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988),4 vacated his death sentences but otherwise denied
his claims. Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 194 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 10273
A defendant in a capital case had an absolute right to have his case removed to
another county. Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 305-06 (citing Md. Const., Art. IV, § 8),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 860 (2001), and reh’g denied, 535 U.S. 966 (2002).
4
As the Court of Appeals explained:
In Mills, the Supreme Court held that the Maryland capital
sentencing form, and the jury instructions pertaining thereto,
were unconstitutional because the Mills jury could have
believed that it was precluded from giving any weight to
mitigating factors found by some, but not all, jurors. Mills, 486
U.S. at 373-84, 108 S. Ct. at 1865-70, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 393-400.
Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 194 n.2 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1027 (1996), and
reh’g denied, 519 U.S. 1143 (1997).
2
(1996), and reh’g denied, 519 U.S. 1143 (1997). At resentencing, a jury in Somerset
County reimposed the two death sentences for the murders of Scott Piechowicz and Susan
Kennedy. Id.Grandison thereafter lodged repeated challenges, in both state and federal court, to
those sentences, finally gaining a temporary reprieve when, in 2006, the Court of Appeals
enjoined the State from carrying out the death penalty against his co-defendant, Evans,
because the protocols governing the method of administering that penalty, lethal injection,
had been adopted, held the Court, in a manner that violated the Maryland Administrative
Procedure Act. Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 344-46, 350 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
835 (2007).5
That injunction was to remain in effect until new protocols were promulgated in
accordance with the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 350, but such new
protocols were never promulgated. See Fiscal and Policy Note (Revised), S.B. 276, at 3-5
(2013). Instead, the General Assembly repealed the death penalty in 2013. 2013 Md.
Laws, ch. 156, § 3. Meanwhile, on June 6, 2013, Grandison filed, in the Circuit Court for
Somerset County, the first of two motions to correct an illegal sentence (which he
supplemented several times) that are the subject of the present appeals. Following two
hearings, the circuit court, on November 13, 2014, issued a memorandum opinion and order
granting relief, at the State’s own concession, on a single claim—that the twenty-year
sentence imposed for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence was illegal,
5
Not only Evans, but all Maryland prisoners then awaiting the death penalty,
including Grandison, obtained the benefit of that injunction. See Evans, 396 Md. at 350.
3
because, at the time Grandison committed that offense, its maximum penalty was fifteen
years’ imprisonment.6 Accordingly, the circuit court vacated Grandison’s twenty-year
sentence for that crime and imposed a fifteen-year term of imprisonment, consecutive to
his life sentence for conspiracy as well as to Grandison’s federal sentences. But it denied
all of his other claims. Grandison noted a timely appeal from that order, raising the
following questions:
6
There was some ambiguity as to whether, at the time of the offense, the maximum
penalty for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence was
fifteen or twenty years’ imprisonment. The offense was committed on April 28, 1983.
Grandison, 305 Md. at 697. At that time, Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., Supp. 1982),
Art. 27, § 36B(d) read as follows:
(d) Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of
any felony or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this
article, shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on
conviction thereof shall, in addition to any other sentence
imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or
misdemeanor:
(1) For a first offense, be sentenced to the Maryland
Division of Correction for a term of not less than 5 nor more
than 20 years, and it is mandatory upon the court to impose no
less than the minimum sentence of 5 years.
(2) For a second or subsequent offense, be sentenced to
the Maryland Division of Correction for a term of not less than
5 nor more than 15 years, and it is mandatory upon the court to
impose no less than a minimum consecutive sentence of 5
years which shall be served consecutively and not concurrently
to any other sentence imposed by virtue of the commission of
said felony or misdemeanor.
The record does not indicate whether Grandison was charged and convicted under Art. 27,
§ 36B(d)(1) or (d)(2). Because the State conceded below that Grandison was subject to a
maximum penalty of fifteen years, we need not resolve whether he was sentenced under
Art. 27, § 36B(d)(1) or (d)(2). Instead, we accept the State’s concession and proceed by
resolving the ambiguity in favor of Grandison.
4
I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in ruling appellant’s
convictions for first degree murder did not merge with his
conviction for use of a handgun in the commission of [ ] a
felony or crime of violence under the required evidence test?
II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in holding a motion
to correct illegal sentence is not the appropriate forum to
consider appellant’s allegations his sentences are illegal under
the Bartkus exception to dual sovereignty?
III. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in holding the jury
was properly hearkened since a mere hearkening of counts of
an indictment without specifying the offense does not
constitute a hearkening of the verdict as to first degree murder
or any other offense?
IV. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in ruling after
vacating sentence under Mills the court had the authority to
resentence and there was no legal requirement the resentencing
jury announce their findings in open court or requirement to
poll or hearken their findings?
V. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in imposing the
fifteen year sentence for use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony or crime of violence consecutive to Grandison’s
federal sentences of life plus ten years after the federal
authorities made those sentences run concurrent with the State
sentences?
Then, in 2015, Governor Martin O’Malley, exercising his pardon power, commuted
Grandison’s death sentences to sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Executive Order 01.01.2015.05 (Jan. 20, 2015). Thereafter, Grandison filed, in the
Circuit Court for Somerset County, a second motion to correct an illegal sentence. The
circuit court subsequently issued a written memorandum opinion and order denying that
motion. Grandison noted a timely appeal from that order, raising two question for review,
which we have slightly rephrased as follows:
5
I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s motion to correct illegal sentence in holding that
the former Governor had authority under Maryland
Constitution, Art. II, § 20 to sua sponte exercise executive
powers to commute Grandison’s death sentences to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole without an
application having been made seeking commutation?
II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in holding that the
former Governor’s commutation of his sentences of death to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not
violate Art. 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which
prohibits ex post facto laws in criminal cases?
On this Court’s own motion, we consolidated these appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Appeal No. 2039
A.
Grandison claims that the circuit abused its discretion in ruling that his convictions
for first-degree murder did not merge with his conviction for use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony or crime of violence under the required evidence test. This claim
is without merit.
Although the Court of Appeals held, in State v. Ferrell, 313 Md. 291, 297 (1988),
that use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence and the predicate
felony or crime of violence are the same offense under the required evidence test, that
holding addressed a different circumstance—whether the predicate offense and the
handgun offense could be tried in successive prosecutions. Ferrell held that they could not
be tried in successive prosecutions. Id. Ferrell said nothing about whether separate
sentences may be imposed for those crimes if they are brought in the same trial.
6
The question before us was squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in Missouri
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). There, the Court held:
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes
cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of
whether those two statutes proscribe the “same” conduct under
Blockburger,[7] a court’s task of statutory construction is at an
end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may
impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single
trial.
Id. at 368-39.
At the time the offenses at issue were committed, the statute proscribing unlawful
use of a handgun stated as follows:
Unlawful use of handgun in commission of crime. – Any person
who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony or
any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this article, shall
be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on conviction thereof
shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of
commission of said felony or misdemeanor . . . be sentenced to
the Maryland Division of Correction[.]
Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., Supp. 1982), Art. 27, § 36B(d).8
It is manifest that the General Assembly intended that a separate sentence be
imposed upon any person convicted of a violation of Section 36B(d), “in addition to any
7
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (setting forth the required
evidence test).
8
A similar provision is now codified at Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.),
Criminal Law Article (“CL”), § 4-204. The most noteworthy changes in the new statute
are that the penalty provision now contains an enhancement for repeat offenders in CL §
4-204(c)(2) and that, since 2011, its proscription extends to the use of firearms rather than
just handguns. 2011 Md. Laws, chs. 164, 165.
7
other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or misdemeanor.” Id.; see,
e.g., Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 145-49 (1980) (holding that separate sentences may be
imposed for a violation of Section 36B(d) and the predicate offense, where both
convictions were the result of the same act, so long as the charges are brought in a single
trial), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990 (1981). Given that unambiguous expression of legislative
intent, and the Supreme Court’s instruction in Missouri v. Hunter, it is clear that
Grandison’s claim fails.9
B.
As noted earlier, Grandison was prosecuted in both federal and Maryland courts, in
the former for conspiracy to murder the witnesses in a prior federal narcotics trial and in
the latter for, among other things, first-degree murder of those same witnesses. He now
complains that the Maryland prosecution was a “sham,” essentially indistinguishable from
the federal prosecution, and that, therefore, his Maryland sentences are illegal, under the
purported Bartkus10 exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine. From that premise,
Grandison concludes that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that this claim was
9
Grandison also invokes the rule of lenity. That argument also fails, as the rule of
lenity is applicable only where the legislative intent to impose separate penalties is unclear.
Latray v. State, 221 Md. App. 544, 555 (2015) (observing that the rule of lenity “is purely
a question of reading legislative intent” and that if the legislature “intended two crimes
arising out of a single act to be punished separately, we defer to that legislated choice”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Here, there is no ambiguity as to the
legislative intent to permit the imposition of separate penalties for both the illegal use of a
firearm and the predicate offense.
10
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh’g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959).
8
not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. To understand this claim requires
a brief digression into the Supreme Court decision upon which Grandison relies, Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh’g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959).
In Bartkus, the defendant had been acquitted, in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, of robbery of a federally insured savings and loan
association. Id. at 121-22. Bartkus was thereafter charged, in the Criminal Court of Cook
County, Illinois, with violation of a state robbery statute. Id. at 122. “The facts recited in
the Illinois indictment were substantially identical to those contained in the prior federal
indictment.” Id. Bartkus moved to dismiss based upon double jeopardy, but the Illinois
court rejected that claim. Id. He was thereafter convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment as a repeat offender. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, as did the
United States Supreme Court, the latter holding that a defendant may be prosecuted in both
federal and state courts for the same act without violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because, under the “dual sovereignty” doctrine, 11 an act may be
an offense against both the state where it was committed as well as against the federal
government.12 Id. at 122, 136-39.
11
The Court of Appeals has explained the “dual sovereignty” doctrine as follows:
“Under the ‘dual sovereignty’ doctrine, separate sovereigns deriving their power from
different sources are each entitled to punish an individual for the same conduct if that
conduct violates each sovereignty’s laws.” Gillis v. State, 333 Md. 69, 73 (1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1039 (1994).
12
In so holding, the Bartkus Court expressly rejected the “incorporation doctrine,”
according to which the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution should be deemed
(continued . . . )
9
In dictum, the Court observed that the record did not “sustain a conclusion that the
state prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential
fact another federal prosecution[,]” id. at 124, which would have been barred under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 123. Thereafter, some courts
interpreted that statement as expressing a narrow so-called “Bartkus exception” to the dual
sovereignty doctrine, which bars a successive “sham prosecution.” See, e.g., United States
v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir.) (observing that “under very limited circumstances[,]
successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns might transgress the Double Jeopardy
Clause”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1020 (1996); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 517 (4th Cir.
1990) (noting that “a ‘tool of the same authorities’ exception is possible in some
circumstances,” which “may only be established by proof that State officials had little or
no independent volition in their proceedings”), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969 (1991); United
States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that “a narrow
exception to the ‘dual sovereignty’ doctrine, carved out in Bartkus v. Illinois, bars a second
prosecution where one prosecuting sovereign can be said to be acting as a ‘tool’ of the
(. . . continued)
applicable to the states, as having been “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment,
which binds the states. 359 U.S. at 126. During the ensuing decade, the Supreme Court
“selectively” incorporated most, but not all, of the first eight amendments, holding that
their specific provisions applied not only to the federal government but to the states as well.
See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (prohibition against double jeopardy);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh’g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968) (right to jury trial);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right
against compulsory self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh’g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961) (right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures).
10
other, or where the second prosecution amounts to a ‘sham and a cover’ for the first”
(internal citations omitted)).
Other courts, however, have questioned whether there even is such an exception.
See, e.g., United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994)
(declining to decide whether the “sham prosecution” exception exists); United States v.
Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir.) (stating that “[w]e have questioned whether
Bartkus truly meant to create such an exception, and we have uniformly rejected such
claims”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 999 (1993), and reh’g denied, 510 U.S. 1159 (1994);
United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 1991) (observing that “[a] possible
exception might exist”); United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that, although “Bartkus does suggest that a state prosecution may not be used as a
cover and a tool for a federal prosecution[,]” the Court “did not define a clear exception in
that case”).
In any event, even if we assume, arguendo, that the Bartkus exception to the dual
sovereignty doctrine exists, the circuit court correctly concluded that such a claim may not
be raised in a Rule 4-345(a) motion. In United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed
that the defendant’s burden “of establishing that federal officials are controlling or
manipulating the state processes is substantial[,]” namely, that he “must demonstrate that
the state officials had little or no independent volition in the state proceedings.” To prevail
on such a claim would likely require far more than Grandison’s bald allegation and, in the
absence of an affidavit from the prosecution admitting to such a scheme (a most unlikely
11
occurrence), would require an evidentiary hearing. But that would be entirely contrary to
the nature of a Rule 4-345(a) motion, which is focused on the “narrow” category of
sentences that are “intrinsically and substantively unlawful,” not those that may be beset
by “some arguable procedural flaw.” Colvin v. State, 450 Md. 718, 725 (2016) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, “a motion to correct an illegal sentence is
not[,]” as Grandison would have it, “an alternative method of obtaining belated appellate
review of the proceedings that led to the imposition of judgment and sentence in a criminal
case.” State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273 (2006).
Even if such a claim were cognizable in a Rule 4-345(a) motion, we would conclude
that it is barred by the law of the case doctrine. Prior to Evans’s and Grandison’s separate
1984 trials, both defendants filed motions to dismiss, contending that Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
was applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, had effectively
abrogated the dual sovereignty doctrine, as articulated in Bartkus. Evans v. State, 301 Md.
45, 49-50 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Court of Appeals rejected that
assertion and remanded for trials, which resulted in convictions and sentences, which
Grandison now challenges. See id. at 51, 58. Here, however, instead of disparaging
Bartkus, Grandison relies upon it as the basis for his claim.
Under the law of the case doctrine, “once an appellate court rules upon a question
presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is
considered to be the law of the case.” Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 183 (2004). Moreover,
“‘[d]ecisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal’
12
at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is
out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the
decision would result in manifest injustice.” Id. at 184 (quoting Hawes v. Liberty Homes,
100 Md. App. 222, 231 (1994)). And, more recently, in Holloway v. State, 232 Md. App.
272, 282 (2017), we observed that the law of the case doctrine applies, not only to a claim
that was actually decided in a prior appeal, but also to any claim “that could have been
raised and decided.” Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has expressly rejected the notion
that “the doctrine of law of the case [is] inapplicable to motions to correct an illegal
sentence.” Scott, 379 Md. at 183.
Nothing prevented Grandison, in his 1984 double jeopardy challenge, from raising
the same claim that he raises before us now. Were this issue properly before us, we would
hold that, as it “could have been raised and decided,” it is barred by the law of the case
doctrine. See Holloway, 232 Md. App. at 282.
C.
Grandison contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in holding that the
jury was properly hearkened. Not only is this claim utterly without merit, it is foreclosed
by Colvin v. State, 450 Md. 718, 727 (2016). There, the Court of Appeals held that a claim,
alleging that the jury had not been properly polled, thereby rendering the sentences
imposed on its verdict illegal, was not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a). Id. The Court
stated:
Under Maryland law, procedural challenges to a verdict
ought be done by contemporaneous objection and, if not
13
corrected, presented through the direct appeal process. Such
claims do not come within the purview of Rule 4-345(a).
Id. at 728. Likewise, Grandison’s claim of an improperly hearkened jury is a procedural
challenge to his verdict and is therefore not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal
sentence.
We note that Grandison does not claim that the jury was not polled or hearkened at
all, a defect that, if proven, would fall outside of the holding of Colvin. See id at 727-28.
In any event, the circuit court, as it did not have the benefit of Colvin at the time it rendered
its decision, painstakingly examined the record and, at pages 16-19 of its memorandum
opinion, demonstrated the falsity of Grandison’s claim as to whether the jury had been
properly hearkened. We need not repeat here what the circuit court wrote, except to point
out that it was correct. Thus, even if Grandison’s claim were cognizable in a Rule 4-345(a)
motion, it would fail nonetheless.
D.
Grandison maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his claims
that the resentencing court lacked the authority to impose sentence and that the
resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, because both the original
sentencing jury and the resentencing jury failed to announce their findings in open court,
nor were they polled or hearkened to their findings. These claims are utterly without merit.
When the post-conviction court vacated Grandison’s original death sentences, under
Mills v. Maryland, it is obvious that resentencing, with the possibility of new death
sentences, was permitted and did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. See
14
Twigg v. State, 447 Md. 1, 21 (2016) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that
resentencing does not offend double jeopardy principles”). As for Grandison’s complaints
regarding the procedures followed during the resentencing, those matters are not
cognizable in a Rule 4-345(a) motion. See Colvin, 450 Md. at 728. But, in any event, as
the circuit court explained in its memorandum opinion, the procedures followed fully
comported with the then-extant applicable Maryland rule.
E.
Finally, Grandison complains that the circuit court abused its discretion in imposing
the (new) fifteen-year sentence for use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime
of violence consecutive to his federal sentences. He does not (and cannot) complain that
the newly imposed sentence constituted an illegal increase in his sentence, as it merely
replaced a former twenty-year sentence that had also been made consecutive to his state
and federal sentences.
The short answer to this complaint is that it is not cognizable in a motion to correct
an illegal sentence, which encompasses only claims of substantively illegal sentences.
Colvin, 450 Md. at 728. “An illegal sentence, for purposes of Rule 4-345(a), is one in
which the illegality ‘inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no conviction
warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a permitted one for
the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically and
substantively unlawful.’” Id. at 725 (quoting Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 (2007)).
Here, the fifteen-year sentence was provided by statute, see Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl.
Vol., 1982 Supp.), Art. 27, § 36B(d), and is not “intrinsically and substantively
15
unlawful[,]” whether imposed concurrently with or consecutively to any other sentence
Grandison may be serving, so long as the resulting sentence does not constitute an increase
of his previous sentence (which it does not). See id.
II. Appeal No. 2822
In Appeal No. 2822, Grandison, apparently ungrateful that he has been spared from
the death penalty, challenges the legality of former Governor O’Malley’s commutation of
his death sentences to sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We
shall first address the constitutional basis for a governor’s pardon power and then address
Grandison’s claims, concluding that none of them has any merit.
A.
The Governor of Maryland has had the power to grant reprieves and pardons under
every version of the Maryland Constitution, dating back to 1776. See Md. Const., Art.
XXXIII (1776) (providing that the Governor “may alone exercise all other [of] the
executive powers of government,” including the power to “grant reprieves or pardons for
any crime, except in such cases where the law shall otherwise direct”). Under the present
1867 Maryland Constitution, the Governor possesses the power to “grant reprieves and
pardons,” as provided under Article II, § 20:
He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons, except in
cases of impeachment, and in cases, in which he is prohibited
by other Articles of this Constitution; and to remit fines and
forfeitures for offences against the State; but shall not remit the
principal or interest of any debt due the State, except, in cases
of fines and forfeitures; and before granting a nolle prosequi,
or pardon, he shall give notice, in one or more newspapers, of
the application made for it, and of the day on, or after which,
his decision will be given; and in every case, in which he
16
exercises this power, he shall report to either Branch of the
Legislature, whenever required, the petitions,
recommendations and reasons, which influenced his decision.
Alfred S. Niles, the author of a treatise on Maryland constitutional law, stated that
“there is practically no restriction upon” a Governor’s “pardoning any offence against the
state, except in the case of an impeachment.” Alfred S. Niles, Maryland Constitutional
Law 122 (1915). More recently, Judge Dan Friedman, a member of this Court and the
author of another treatise on the subject, wrote that “the pardon power is broad” and that,
except in cases of impeachment and, perhaps, bribery of public officials, see Md. Const.,
Art. III, § 50,13 there is “no other provision that limits the Governor’s pardon power[.]”
Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 119 (2011). Moreover, the Court of
Appeals has recognized that the gubernatorial pardon power encompasses the power to
commute a sentence, Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 534 (1967), reh’g denied, 259 Md. 146(1970),14 that is, to “substitute[] a lesser penalty for the grantee’s offense for the penalty
13
Article III, § 50 provides in part that “any person,” convicted of bribery of a public
official “shall, as part of the punishment thereof, be forever disfranchised and disqualified
from holding any office of trust, or profit, in this State.” According to Judge Friedman’s
treatise, such punishment “may not be subject to pardon[,]” although “[t]here are no
appellate opinions to suggest whether [that] interpretation is correct.” Dan Friedman, The
Maryland State Constitution 119 (2011).
14
When Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 532 (1967), was decided, capital punishment
was still a legal sentence upon a conviction for rape. Although that is obviously no longer
true, as a matter of federal constitutional law, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419
(2008) (holding that a death sentence for a conviction “for the rape of a child where the
crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim[,]” was barred
by the Eighth Amendment), the Court of Appeals’ statements, in Jones, concerning the
scope of the gubernatorial pardon power, are still binding.
17
imposed by the court in which the grantee was convicted.” Md. Code (1999, 2008 Repl.
Vol., 2017 Supp.), Correctional Services Article (“CS”), § 7-101(d).
Indeed, the gubernatorial pardon power is derived from the Maryland Constitution
itself, not from any legislative enactment, and it therefore may be exercised independently
of legislative control, so long as the Governor, in exercising that power, does not violate
federal constitutional provisions or their Maryland cognates. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S.
256, 266 (1974) (concluding that the analogous presidential pardon power 15 “flows from
the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Congress”). That is especially true in Maryland, in light of
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,16 which provides for the separation of
powers. We conclude that the gubernatorial pardon power is plenary, although,
undoubtedly, in commuting a prisoner’s sentence, the Governor may not impose a reduced
sentence that, itself, constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.”17 See Schick, 419 U.S. at
15
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing, among other things, that the President
“shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment”).
16
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from
each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of
said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other.
17
For examples of non-capital sentences that have been deemed to be “cruel and
unusual punishment,” see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion),
which concluded that the “use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth
(continued . . .)
18
266 (stating that the presidential pardon provision allows “plenary authority in the
President to ‘forgive’ the convicted person in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms
of a specified number of years, or to alter it with conditions which are in themselves
constitutionally unobjectionable”).
Having set forth the Governor’s broad pardon power, we turn next to address
Grandison’s claims that former Governor O’Malley exceeded that power in commuting his
death sentences to sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
B.
Grandison claims that the former Governor had no authority under Maryland
Constitution, Article II, § 20, to sua sponte exercise his executive power to commute his
death sentences to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because he did not
apply for commutation. We disagree.
The passage on which Grandison relies provides:
and before granting a nolle prosequi, or pardon, he shall give
notice, in one or more newspapers, of the application made
for it, and of the day on, or after which, his decision will be
given;
(. . . continued)
Amendment[;]” and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363-64, (1910), which held that
a fifteen-year sentence “at hard and painful labor,” along with “accessory penalties” of
“civil interdiction[,]” “perpetual absolute disqualification[,]” and “subjection to
surveillance during life[,]” upon conviction for falsifying a public record, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.
19
Md. Const., Art. II, § 20 (emphasis added). Grandison maintains that the bolded language
must be interpreted as imposing a condition precedent upon the grant of a gubernatorial
pardon, namely, that the grantee must first have applied for a pardon.
As we have just explained, the gubernatorial pardon power is plenary. Specifically,
it does not depend upon a request by the grantee. The only substantive limitations on that
power are that it may not be exercised “in cases of impeachment, and in cases, in which
[the Governor] is prohibited by other Articles of this Constitution.” Md. Const., Art. II, §
20. We interpret the procedural limitation, on which Grandison relies, that “before granting
a nolle prosequi, or pardon, [the Governor] shall give notice, in one or more newspapers,
of the application made for it, and of the day on, or after which, his decision will be
given[,]” as merely a notice requirement and not a condition precedent. Md. Const., Art.
II, § 20. As the State aptly puts it in its brief, “the most logical interpretation of the
‘application’ language is that the Governor will be required to give notice of any
application received, but only in the event that one was actually received.” In any event,
Grandison acknowledges that former Governor O’Malley gave the required notice of “the
day on, or after which, his decision [would] be given.” Accordingly, we conclude that the
fact that Grandison did not apply for a commutation of sentence does not render the actions
of the former Governor illegal.
C.
1.
Finally, we turn to Grandison’s assertion that the former Governor, in commuting
his death sentences to sentences of life without the possibility of parole, imposed illegal
20
sentences, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Article 17 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. That Article provides:
That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the
existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal
are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty;
wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any
retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.
Md. Const. Declaration of Rights, art. 17.
This provision is generally construed in pari materia with its federal counterpart,
Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution.18 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety &
Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 548 (2013) (plurality opinion); id. at 577 n.1 (McDonald, J.,
concurring); id. at 578-79 (Barbera, J., dissenting). On its face, the Ex Post Facto Clause
arguably applies only to the retroactive application of a statute, not to the purportedly
retroactive application of an executive action, as took place here. But even if we were to
assume that executive actions are included within the strictures of Article 17, Grandison’s
claim must fail, as we next explain.
In light of recent decisional law, the test to be applied, in determining whether there
has been a violation of Article 17, is unclear, as the Court of Appeals has been sharply
divided over that question. But, under either of the tests applied in the most recent
18
Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
21
decisions by our State’s highest Court, there was no ex post facto violation in the instant
case.
The Doe plurality opinion applied the following test, derived from Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1883), and Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 33-34 (1981),
and previously adopted by the Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 310 Md. 217, 224, 226-27 (1987): “[T]wo critical elements must be present for
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by
it.” Doe, 430 Md. at 551, 556 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). Under that test, it is clear that Grandison cannot
demonstrate that Governor O’Malley’s commutation of his death sentences to sentences of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole resulted in an ex post facto violation,
because he obviously did not suffer a disadvantage as a consequence of that commutation
of sentence. See id. at 556; Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 606-07 (1989) (rejecting “the
notion that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is, even relatively, the equivalent
of death itself”).
The Doe dissent would have applied a different test, derived from Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1990) (overruling Kring), and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798): The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits “[e]very law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.” Doe, 430 Md. at 582 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
22
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390).19 Under that alternative test, Grandison’s claim would
still fail, as it is clear that Governor O’Malley’s commutation of his sentences obviously
did not result in a “greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.” See id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the result of Governor O’Malley’s action
was to reduce Grandison’s sentences. See Woods, 315 Md. at 606-07.20
2.
19
According to Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798), there are four
categories of laws, which violate the Ex Post Facto Clause:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.
(Emphasis in original).
Only the third category, enumerated in Calder, has any relevance to this case.
20
Because, under either test for determining whether Grandison’s rights under the
Ex Post Facto Clause have been violated, he cannot demonstrate that the former
Governor’s commutation of his death sentences, to sentences of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, resulted in either a disadvantage or a greater punishment, it is
immaterial that, at the time of the murders, there was no provision under Maryland law for
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Md. Code (1957,
1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 412(b) (providing that the only possible sentences, following
a conviction for murder in the first degree, were death or life imprisonment). It was not
until 1987 that the General Assembly amended § 412(b) to permit a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 237 at 1049-50,
codified at Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 412(b).
23
Grandison also contends that the former Governor’s commutation of his death
sentences was an illegal retroactive application of a statute, CS § 7-601. That contention,
like all of the others in these appeals, is without merit.
Notwithstanding the independent constitutional basis for the gubernatorial pardon
power, Md. Const., Art II, § 20, that power is also set forth in statutes. The pertinent
statutes, for our purposes, are Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 41, §§ 118 and
119, and their modern-day counterparts, CS §§ 7-601 and 7-602. Article 41, § 118, the
statute in effect at the time Grandison committed the murders at issue, provided:
The Governor upon giving the notice required by the
Constitution may commute or change any sentence of death
into penal confinement for such period as he shall think
expedient. And, on giving such a notice, he may pardon any
person, convicted of crime, on such conditions as he may
prescribe, or he may upon like notice remit any part of the time
for which any person may be sentenced to imprisonment on
such like conditions without such remission operating as a full
pardon to any such person.
Article 41, § 119, also in effect at the time Grandison committed the murders at
issue, further emphasized the plenary nature of the gubernatorial pardon power. It
provided:
In any case in which the Governor may issue a conditional
pardon to any person, the Governor, in the absence of any
provision to the contrary expressed therein, shall be the sole
judge of whether or not the conditions of said pardon have been
breached, and the determination by the Governor, that the
conditions of such pardon have been violated by the person
receiving the same, shall be final and not subject to review by
any court of this State.[21]
21
The Court of Appeals, however, interpreted an identical provision, then codified
(continued . . .)
24
Plainly, under Section 118, the Governor was authorized to “commute or change
any sentence of death into penal confinement for such period as he shall think expedient.”
(Emphasis added.) Such a period would obviously include life without the possibility of
parole. That point is further confirmed by the provision that the Governor could “remit
any part of the time for which any person may be sentenced to imprisonment on such like
conditions,” that is, “such conditions as he may prescribe,” “without such remission
operating as a full pardon to any such person.” Art. 41, § 118 (emphasis added). Clearly,
among “such conditions” as the Governor “may prescribe” would have included the
condition that a prisoner, like Grandison, being granted commutation of his death
sentences, would not be eligible for parole.
Further underscoring the Governor’s plenary authority to impose conditions on any
pardon he may grant was Section 119. That section, consistent with the Governor’s plenary
pardon power under Article II, § 20, made clear that the Governor alone is the judge of
whether a condition of a pardon has been breached and that such a determination, by the
Governor, “shall be final and not subject to review by any court of this State.” Art. 41, §
119. In this respect, the instant case is indistinguishable from Schick, supra, which is
highly persuasive authority in interpreting the scope of the Maryland counterpart to the
federal constitutional provision interpreted in that case. The Schick Court observed that
“the pardoning power was intended to include the power to commute sentences on
(. . . continued)
at Article 41, § 80, as requiring, under due process, that the Governor, prior to revocation
of a conditional pardon, provide the grantee “an opportunity to be heard.” Murray v.
Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 231 (1950).
25
conditions which do not in themselves offend the Constitution, but which are not
specifically provided for by statute[,]” 419 U.S. at 264, and it held that the President was
authorized to commute a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment, on condition
that the grantee not be eligible to seek parole, although, at the time that pardon was granted,
no such condition was expressly authorized by law. Id. at 260, 267-68.
The modern-day counterpart to Article 41, § 118, is CS § 7-601, which, effective
October 1, 2013, provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general. – On giving the notice required by the
Maryland Constitution, the Governor may:
(1) change a sentence of death into a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole;
(2) pardon an individual convicted of a crime
subject to any conditions the Governor requires;
or
(3) remit any part of a sentence of imprisonment
subject to any conditions the Governor requires,
without the remission operating as a full pardon.
The modern-day counterpart to Article 41, § 119, is CS § 7-602, which provides:
(a) Governor as sole judge. – Unless the order granting a
pardon provides otherwise, the Governor is the sole judge of
whether a condition of a conditional pardon has been violated.
(b) Determination not subject to judicial review. – A
determination by the Governor that a condition of a conditional
pardon has been violated by the grantee is final and not subject
to review by any court of the State.
Plainly, it is substantially the same as its 1983 counterpart, Article 41, § 119.
Under the plain language of the statutes, the Governor, both under the current
statutes and their 1983 versions, was authorized to commute a sentence of death to a
26
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, although the current versions state this
proposition more plainly. It follows, then, that the statutory changes have not resulted in a
violation of Article 17, because they have not effected a retroactive change in the law.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR SOMERSET COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS ASSESSED TO
APPELLANT.
27