Md Prop. Management v. Peters-Hawkins ( 2021 )


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  • Maryland Property Management, LLC, et al. v. Helena Peters-Hawkins, et vir., No.
    0278, September Term 2019. Opinion by Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially
    Assigned)
    Landlord and Tenant – the word “landlord,” as used in Md. Code (2015 Repl. Vol.), Real
    Property Article § 8-216(a), means owner of the property leased or rented to another.
    Appeal and Error – A trial judge has the discretion to grant a new trial on the ground that
    the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict even though at trial movant failed to
    raise that issue. But, in determining whether to grant a new trial on that basis, a trial judge
    has almost boundless discretion not to grant a new trial based on insufficiency of the
    evidence, even though the result may have been different if a more timely objection had
    been raised.
    Landlord and Tenant – Under Real Property Article § 8-216, a landlord may be held
    liable by changing the lock on the rental property prior to eviction or by entering the rental
    property prior to eviction and removing the tenant’s personal property.
    Trial – A party is not precluded from raising for the first time the issue of irreconcilably
    inconsistent verdicts in a post-trial motion.
    Circuit Court for Baltimore City
    Case No. 24-C-18-001445
    REPORTED
    IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
    OF MARYLAND
    No. 0278
    September Term, 2019
    _____________________________________
    MARYLAND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
    LLC, ET AL.,
    v.
    HELENA PETERS-HAWKINS, ET VIR.
    ______________________________________
    Reed,
    Shaw Geter,
    Salmon, James, P.
    (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
    JJ.
    ______________________________________
    Opinion by Salmon, J.
    ______________________________________
    Filed: January 28, 2021
    Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
    (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
    is authentic.
    Suzanne Johnson
    2021-01-28 13:17-05:00
    Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
    This case has its origin in a Baltimore City Landlord/Tenant dispute. The tenants
    and appellees in this appeal are Helena Peters-Hawkins (“Mrs. Hawkins”) and her husband,
    Charles Hawkins (“Mr. Hawkins”). The appellants are Maryland Property Management,
    LLC (“Maryland Property Management”), ANT Properties, LLC (“ANT”), and Ted
    Thornton, the managing member of Maryland Property Management, and owner of ANT.
    On March 14, 2018, Mrs. Hawkins and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court
    for Baltimore City against the three appellants. The complaint contained eight counts, but
    the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellants as to six of those
    counts. One of the two surviving counts (Count I) alleged a violation by all three appellants
    of Md. Code, (2015 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article (“RP”), § 8-216(b), which reads, in
    material part, as follows:
    In general. – (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a
    landlord may not take possession or threaten to take possession of a dwelling
    unit from a tenant or tenant holding over by locking the tenant out or any
    other action, including willful diminution of services to the tenant.
    (2) A landlord may take possession of a dwelling unit from a tenant
    or tenant holding over only:
    (i) In accordance with a warrant of restitution issued by a court and
    executed by a sheriff or constable; or
    (ii) If the tenant has abandoned or surrendered possession of the
    dwelling unit.
    Section 8-216(a)(2) defines the words “threaten to take possession” as “using words
    or actions intended to convince a reasonable person that the landlord intends to take
    imminent possession of the property in violation of this section.”
    Another surviving count in the complaint alleged a cause of action for common law
    conversion against all three appellants.
    After extensive discovery was completed, the case was tried before a jury over a
    three-day period in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The jury set forth its verdicts as
    follows:
    COUNT I – Violation of Real Property Article Section § 8-216
    1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Theodore Thornton
    threatened to take possession of 4909 Morello Road, or took possession
    by locking the Plaintiffs out or by any other action, in violation of Real
    Property Article § 8-216?
    Yes    X               No ______
    2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Maryland Property
    Management, LLC or ANT Properties, LLC, is liable for violating Real
    Property Article § 8-216 based on either Mr. Thornton’s actions or by any
    other actions?
    As to Maryland Property Management, LLC:
    Yes    X               No ______
    As to ANT Properties, LLC:
    Yes    X               No ______
    3. If you answered yes to any of the above, what damages do you find for:
    Economic Damages $ 3,000.00
    Non-Economic Damages:
    Charles Hawkins: $ 5,000.00
    Helena Peters-Hawkins $ 10,000.00
    2
    COUNT II – Conversion
    4. Do you find that Plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that any of the Defendants converted any of Plaintiffs’
    property?
    As to Maryland Property Management, LLC:
    Yes    X                No ______
    As to ANT Properties, LLC:
    Yes   X                No ______
    As to Theodore Thornton:
    Yes   X                No ______
    5. If your answer is yes as to any of the Defendants mentioned in Question
    4 above, what do you find for damages?
    Damages: $ 10,000.00
    [Total]    $ 28,000.00
    All three appellants filed a motion for new trial and/or for judgment notwithstanding
    the verdict.
    Both the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion for a new
    trial were denied. Mr. Hawkins and his wife filed a “Petition for Statutory Attorneys’ Fees
    and Costs” pursuant to RP § 8-216(c)(1)(ii). As the title of their petition suggested,
    petitioners asked for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing Count I of the lawsuit,
    i.e., the suit brought to enforce rights under RP § 8-216(b). After the appellants filed an
    opposition, a hearing was held concerning the petition. The circuit court, on March 5,
    3
    2019, filed a memorandum and order awarding appellees $66,880.00 in attorneys’ fees and
    $1,713.39 in costs.
    The appellants then filed this timely appeal in which they raise five issues, which
    we have reordered:
    I.     Whether the trial court erred in denying the Rule 2-519 motion of
    appellant ANT Properties, LLC, at the close of plaintiffs’ case in
    chief, when plaintiffs presented no evidence that ANT was the
    landlord, or that ANT had engaged in any supposed acts of
    conversion.
    II.    Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant ANT’s motion for
    a new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, with
    respect [to] the supposed identity of ANT as a landlord under RP § 8-
    216, there being no law or evidence to support a holding that ANT
    had been the landlord.
    III.   Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellants’ motion
    for a new trial with respect to any liability under RP § 8-216, as there
    was no evidence from which a jury could have inferred the necessary
    elements of that cause of action, the Hawkins family having remained
    living at the house for two weeks after the cancellation of the eviction.
    IV.    Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial with
    respect to illogical and inconsistent jury awards of economic
    damages.
    V.     Whether the trial court erred in assessing attorney fees against
    defendants where the award of fees was a multiple of the underlying
    award of damages. 1
    1
    Appellees renewed a previously filed motion to dismiss this appeal. None of the
    reasons advanced by appellees for imposing the sanction of dismissal are persuasive and
    therefore the motion for dismissal shall be denied.
    4
    I.
    UNDISPUTED FACTS
    On November 12, 2016, Mr. Hawkins and his wife signed a one-year lease for a
    single family house located at 4909 Morello Road in Baltimore City (“the Property”). The
    term of the lease was from November 14, 2016 to November 30, 2017 and the rent was
    $1,550.00 per month. The first paragraph of the lease read:
    1) NAMES OF LANDLORD AND RESIDENT(S):
    a) Property Manager for Owner (Landlord): Maryland Property
    Management, LLC
    b) Address to send rent payments: 40 York Rd., Suite 301, Towson, MD
    21204
    c) Resident(s) Name: Helena Hawkins        SSN:__________
    Name: Charles Hawkins     SSN:__________
    Paragraph 9 of the lease provided:
    AGENCY – Landlord has authorized Maryland Property Management LLC
    to enter into this rental agreement on his/her behalf, to receive and receipt for
    rent, and to do any and all other things necessary or desirable to administer
    or effectuate this agreement during Resident’s occupancy. Rent shall be paid
    and all notices, requests or other communications shall be by or to Landlord
    through Maryland Property Management LLC at the address listed above.
    Maryland Property Management LLC has full authority from the owner to
    manage the rented premises.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The tenants did not pay the rent that was due on June 1, 2017. Maryland Property
    Management thereafter filed an eviction action in the District Court of Maryland for
    Baltimore City. Next, on August 8, 2017, Mrs. Hawkins filed a rent escrow action in the
    same court. She contended that there were serious health violations at the Property. A
    hearing was held on the rent escrow dispute in the district court on September 26, 2017.
    5
    By the time of that hearing, the appellees had not paid rent since June 2017. Nevertheless,
    the district court judge ruled that if the tenants would pay into escrow two month’s rent,
    the eviction that was then set for October 4, 2017 would be cancelled. The tenants,
    however, did not pay anything into escrow and as a result, the eviction remained scheduled
    for October 4, 2017.
    On the morning of October 4, 2017, Baltimore City Deputy Sheriff Trina Anderson
    went to the rental premises. Because of what she saw at the premises, she did not feel
    comfortable in going forward with the eviction, and, accordingly, she appeared in the
    district court that afternoon and reported to a judge why she had not gone forward with the
    eviction. Mrs. Hawkins and a representative of Maryland Property Management attended
    the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court judge cancelled the eviction.
    II.
    EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
    A. Testimony of Deputy Sheriff Trina Anderson
    Deputy Anderson went to the rental property on the morning of October 4, 2017, to
    evict the tenants. She explained that at an eviction, a representative of the landlord is
    usually present with his or her paperwork in hand. On the morning in question, she went
    to the front door of the Property and encountered a gentleman who she thought was acting
    suspiciously. That gentleman, it was later discovered, was Hassan Hamilton, who had been
    sent there by Maryland Property Management. According to Deputy Anderson, Mr.
    Hamilton was trying to get to the front door before her and was also trying to open a
    lockbox on the door before showing her the appropriate paperwork.
    6
    Mr. Hamilton told her that he was there to change the lock(s). While on the
    premises, Deputy Anderson saw trash bags in front of the house. She looked into one of
    the windows of the house and to her, it looked as though the premises had already been
    “cleaned out.” More specifically, it appeared to her that a maintenance person had cleaned
    out the premises, not a tenant. Deputy Anderson also testified that her overall impression
    was that the tenants had been evicted already.
    Although she could not recall exactly what she told the judge at the hearing on the
    afternoon of October 4, 2017, she believed that she told him that she didn’t feel
    “comfortable proceeding with this eviction because it looked like [the tenants] weren’t
    there, the house was empty, and I didn’t understand why the guy was trying to change locks
    on an empty house[,] because if it’s an empty house, why [are] you changing locks if they
    moved out?”
    B. Testimony of Helena Peters-Hawkins
    Mrs. Hawkins testified that the reason she did not pay the June rent was because a
    close relative of hers had unexpectedly died and she had to help pay funeral expenses. She
    called Maryland Property Management to talk to one of their agents that worked in the
    office and to explain the problem. When she called, she spoke to a woman whose first
    name was Rosemary. Rosemary told her that it would be “okay” if she did not pay the rent
    for June so long as it was paid by the time that the lease came up for renewal in November
    2017.
    7
    Despite what Rosemary had said, Maryland Property Management filed a failure to
    pay rent action against her and her husband seeking $1,550.00 for the rent due for June
    2017.
    In August 2017, Mrs. Hawkins filed a rent escrow action in which she complained
    about water leaks, mold and other serious deficiencies in the house she and her husband
    had rented. The rent escrow action was set for hearing in the Maryland District Court for
    Baltimore City on September 26, 2017.
    Sometime in September 2017, on a Sunday evening, Ted Thornton (one of the
    appellants in this case), personally paid a visit to her home. The visit lasted approximately
    three hours. During that visit, Mrs. Hawkins showed Mr. Thornton the water leak, mold
    and other problems with the house. Mr. Thornton inquired of Mrs. Hawkins as to why he
    had not been notified of these problems prior to her filing a rent escrow action. Mrs.
    Hawkins replied that she had reported the problems to someone in the Maryland Property
    Management’s rental office.
    During the visit, Mr. Thornton looked around the house and said “I cannot believe
    this. Oh, I am so sorry that you [are] living in these type[s] of conditions.” Toward the
    end of the three-hour meeting, Mr. Thornton expressed the view that Mrs. Hawkins
    shouldn’t have filed the rent escrow case without having first talked to him. He then said,
    “well, if you drop the rent escrow case, any money [or] whatever that you owe it’ll be gone.
    And we can start over.” He then inquired: “Do you have that $1,500 on you like right
    now[?]” She replied in the negative, but Mr. Thornton reiterated that if she paid him $1,500
    8
    immediately then everything would “go away. You don’t have [to go to] the court, why
    would you want to involve the courts.”
    Mrs. Hawkins turned down the offer and said that she would rather leave the
    situation the way it was. This caused Mr. Thornton to become very upset. He said, “I want
    you and your family the f⁕⁕⁕ out of my house, I want y’all out of here.”
    Mr. Thornton next said that when he got back to his office on Monday, he was going
    to talk to people there and was going to find out “what’s going on.” Mr. Thornton then
    said that he had “people watching” her and that if she “didn’t give him the money . . . he
    was going to come in the house, he was going to remove my stuff, he was going to take my
    stuff, it’s going to get ugly.” Mr. Thornton added that he had lawyers and money, unlike
    her. He also expressed the view that she couldn’t afford a lawyer and that she didn’t know
    who she was dealing with.
    The next day, after Mr. Thornton had a chance to go back to his office, he phoned
    Mrs. Hawkins and said “[y]ou’re a f⁕⁕⁕ing liar. You lied. You never called my office. . . .
    [N]o one []ever spoke to you, I want you and your family the f⁕⁕⁕ out of here, and I want
    y’all out of here today.” He then reiterated that she didn’t know who she was “messing
    with.” The phone call with Mr. Thornton scared Mrs. Hawkins. Because of these two
    encounters with Mr. Thornton, she called her son and her nephew and told them that she
    didn’t want them to come to her house to “chill out” because she didn’t know if Mr.
    Thornton was “going to pop up because he already told me that somebody [was] watching,
    he was going to come in and take my stuff . . . and I believed him.”
    9
    On a date between September 26, 2017 and October 4, 2017, a man showed up at
    her doorstep, identified himself as “Mr. Williams,” and said he was sent there by Mr.
    Thornton to fix “all the stuff that was wrong with the house.” Mr. Williams also told her
    that he had been instructed by Mr. Thornton “to retrieve the key to the house from [her],
    because [she] was getting evicted anyway because he [Mr. Thornton] wanted [her] out of
    his house.” She complied and gave a key to him.
    Mrs. Hawkins knew that the eviction was to take place between 9 and 10 a.m. on
    October 4, 2017. Prior to that date, she had moved some, but not all, of her furniture and
    personal belongings out of the Property. She had made arrangements with her son,
    Douglas, and a family friend named Thomas Holland, to remove the remaining property
    on October 4, 2017. The two were instructed to go to the premises at 8 a.m. on October 4,
    2017 and pick up all of the furniture and other belongings that she and her husband had left
    on the premises.
    Mrs. Hawkins and her husband left the Property between 6 and 6:15 a.m. on the
    morning of October 4, 2017.        She drove her husband to work and dropped her
    grandchildren off at someone else’s house.
    At approximately 8 a.m. that morning, she got a phone call from Thomas Holland
    who said that he was at the Property but could not get into the house because the door was
    locked. She said, in reply, that maybe the sheriff had already conducted the eviction and
    that there was nothing he could do about it.
    10
    Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Hawkins got a call from her son, Douglas, who was also at
    the Property. He notified her that a deputy sheriff was there and that he thought that she
    should immediately return to the Property.
    Mrs. Hawkins returned to the Property, but when she did so, the deputy sheriff was
    not there, and she was told by Douglas to call the sheriff’s office. When she did so, she
    was instructed to appear for a hearing in the district court at 1:00 o’clock that afternoon.
    When she appeared in court, she heard Deputy Sheriff Anderson testify that the first
    floor of the house was empty. Mrs. Hawkins immediately inquired as to the whereabouts
    of her “stuff.” The deputy sheriff could not answer that question.
    The judge called off the eviction and told Mrs. Hawkins that she could go back to
    the house. Although previously Mrs. Hawkins had intended to take her family and move
    in, temporarily, with her mother, or possibly an aunt, or go to a hotel, she decided to go
    back to the Property. When she returned to the house on the afternoon of October 4, 2017,
    after the eviction had been called off, there was a lockbox on the door (that had not been
    there previously) and the door lock itself had been changed. Despite the fact that the lock
    had been changed, she was able to regain entry because her daughter climbed through one
    of the windows and opened the door from the inside. Thereafter, Mrs. Hawkins and her
    family lived at the Property for two more weeks. For that two-week period, the appellees
    had to climb through a window to gain ingress or egress from the house.
    11
    In her testimony, Mrs. Hawkins described the household furnishings and other items
    that were missing from the house that had been left behind for Mr. Holland and her son to
    retrieve. She also gave an estimate of the value of the property that was missing and
    described the emotional toll that she experienced as a result of the alleged lock out and the
    threats made to her by Mr. Thornton.
    During her testimony, the following unobjected-to exchange occurred between Mrs.
    Hawkins and her counsel, viz.:
    Q. When you say you don’t know who, do you have an idea about what
    happened to your property?
    A. Yes, I have a[n] idea.
    Q. And what’s your idea about what happened to it?
    A. That Ted [Thornton] told the -- William and them to remove my stuff out
    of the house.
    Q. Okay. Did you tell all of your family about the lock out?
    A. Not all of them.
    Q. And why didn’t you tell all of them?
    A. Because I’m embarrassed. I’m embarrassed because this man told me
    that he was going to do these things and he actually did it. He actually did
    it.
    C. Testimony of Ted Thornton – As an Adverse Witness
    Mr. Thornton testified that ANT Properties, LLC was the owner of the Property.
    When Mr. Thornton was asked whether ANT was currently “in good standing,” he replied:
    “[t]here’s a partnership and the partner’s wife did something a little screwy by cancelling
    the LLC, and she shouldn’t have done that. And it created a big problem with the LLC
    12
    itself, and I have an attorney that’s working on it.” He also said he was not sure whether
    the “partnership” had been cancelled prior to when the appellees moved out of the Property.
    But when he was shown Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, he admitted that the “partnership” had been
    cancelled in 2015. Later in his testimony, on several occasions, Mr. Thornton said that he
    owned the subject property.
    Mr. Thornton also testified that he was the managing member of Maryland Property
    Management, LLC. That LLC manages “hundreds of properties.”
    On a Sunday evening in September 2017, Mr. Thornton went to the Hawkinses’
    home because he had been notified by a health inspector that there was water damage and
    mold problems at the house.
    Mr. Thornton further testified that Maryland Property Management retained an
    independent contractor named William Gaskins to perform the necessary repairs to fix the
    water damage and mold problems at the Property.
    The lockbox that was on the leased premises was put there by the leasing agent prior
    to the time the appellees rented the house. In Mr. Thornton’s words, the lockbox was
    “always on the door.” Nevertheless, during his direct testimony, he admitted that he signed
    an interrogatory answer, on behalf of Maryland Property Management, that said, in
    pertinent part: “No one changed the locks on October 4th, 2017. A key to the residence
    was in the lock[]box and accessible to Plaintiffs. The lock[]box was placed on the door for
    workmen to enter the residence.”
    13
    D. Testimony of Thomas Holland
    Mr. Holland testified that on the morning of October 4, 2017, he arrived at the
    Property between 8 and 8:30 a.m. He had a key to the premises that had been given to him
    by Mrs. Hawkins, but the key would not work. Because the key would not allow him to
    enter the Property, he called Mrs. Hawkins’s son, Douglas, who was on his way to the
    premises. Just as he was doing that, he saw a deputy sheriff and a gentleman at the front
    door to the house. He overheard the deputy sheriff saying that the lockbox should not be
    on the door.
    E. Testimony of Charles Hawkins
    Mr. Hawkins testified that on the morning of October 4, his wife drove him to work.
    When he left for work that morning, there were numerous articles of personal property still
    in the house. While at work that morning, his wife called and told him to return to the
    Property. After work, he returned and found that the house was empty except for one
    mattress.
    F. Testimony of William Gaskins – as a Defense Witness
    Mr. Gaskins testified that he was an independent contractor employed, from time-
    to-time, by Maryland Property Management. Prior to October 4, 2017, he had been to the
    Property approximately eight times to repair mold, water damage and other problems.
    He testified that when he visited the Property, he had seen a lockbox, but he never
    thought that there was anything in it, nor did he ever put a key in the lockbox.
    He emphatically denied that he had ever asked Mrs. Hawkins for her key, nor did
    she ever give him her key.
    14
    On October 5, 2017, he went to the Property, having been advised that the tenants
    had moved out the previous day. But when he arrived, he found that someone was living
    in the house. For that reason, he did not change the locks on the door as he had intended
    to do.
    G. Testimony of Ted Thornton – as a Defense Witness
    Mr. Thornton said on direct examination that he was the “managing member” of
    both Maryland Property Management, LLC and ANT Properties, LLC. He also said that
    ANT owned the Property and that Maryland Property Management managed it. He added,
    somewhat confusingly, that the premises that the appellees rented was “my house.”
    In regard to his meeting with Mrs. Hawkins in September 2017, he remembered
    visiting her house and telling her that she could stay at the premises if she could come up
    with $1,600.00. He denied that he ever directed anyone to change the lock on the house
    prior to the eviction. On the date of the scheduled eviction, October 4, 2017, he sent Hassan
    Hamilton to go to the Property and to change the locks after the sheriff had approved the
    paperwork and had gone through the house. He denied that anybody changed the lock
    prior to the deputy’s arrival on October 4, 2017. He also denied ever confiscating Mrs.
    Hawkins’s key or asking anybody else to confiscate it. He emphatically denied ever
    threatening to have someone come into the house and take Mrs. Hawkins’s belongings.
    According to Mr. Thornton’s testimony, the lockbox was on the house when the
    appellees moved in. He testified, however, on cross-examination, that he was not 100%
    sure that the lockbox was on the door when the lease with the appellees began.
    Other facts will be added, as needed, to answer the questions presented.
    15
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Question One
    At the conclusion of the appellees’ case in chief, defense counsel made a motion for
    judgment as to ANT only. The following exchange occurred:
    [Counsel for Appellants]: I don’t know that there’s been any evidence
    of any separate action by ANT Properties for the two counts. The only
    evidence has been that their theory is it’s Theodore Thornton and because
    he’s a member of both LLCs, that both are liable, but the only evidence is
    that there’s a lease with Maryland Property Management. So[,] I don’t know
    how they include ANT Properties just because they’re the owner of the
    property.
    There [h]as been no evidence that he had properties, did anything
    relating - -
    THE COURT: Didn’t - -
    [Counsel for Appellants]: - - to the two counts.
    THE COURT: Didn’t Mr. Thornton say that ANT Properties owned
    the house - -
    [Counsel for Appellants]: He did say that - -
    THE COURT: - - too?
    [Counsel for Appellants]: - - they’re the owner, but they haven’t done
    anything related to the two counts.
    THE COURT: Anything else?
    [Counsel for Appellants]: No.
    THE COURT: All right. That’s denied.
    After the motion for judgment was denied, the appellants proceeded to introduce
    evidence.
    16
    When the appellants rested their case, the following colloquy occurred at the bench:
    THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. Rebuttal witnesses?
    [Counsel for Appellees]: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. So we need to talk about jury instructions.
    And then we’re going to have a lunch break. And then I have a bench
    meeting. So we’re probably not going to resume until 2 o’clock at which
    time I’ll instruct them and let them deliberate.
    Anything else from them?
    THE CLERK: Oh, no.
    THE COURT: Oh, okay. So let me –
    [Counsel for Appellants]: And I’ll renew my motion.
    THE COURT: Okay. Let me release them.
    (Whereupon, counsel returned to trial tables and the following
    occurred in open court:)
    THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, at this time, we are
    going to take a break and we have some instructional issues to go over. And
    then I have a bench meeting. So we’re not going to resume until 2 o’clock.
    But when we do resume, I will then instruct you as to the law and you
    will be sent to deliberations today. So you do have kind of a long lunch.
    Please make sure that you’re back here and in the jury room before 2 o’clock.
    Thank you.
    And I’m going to just take a brief recess and I’ll come back.
    (Emphasis added.)
    After a short recess, the trial judge and counsel proceeded to have an on-the-record
    discussion of jury instructions. During that discussion, nothing was said about the motion
    for judgment and when the jury returned, no mention was made in regard to that subject.
    The trial judge next proceeded to instruct the jury.
    17
    The first argument presented by appellants in this appeal is worded as follows:
    The trial court erred in denying the Rule 2-519 motion of appellant ANT
    Properties, LLC, at the close of plaintiffs’ case in chief, when plaintiffs
    presented no evidence that ANT was the landlord[.]
    Maryland Rule 2-519 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
    Motion for judgment.
    (a) Generally. A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues
    in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party,
    and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence. The moving party
    shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be
    granted. No objection to the motion for judgment shall be necessary.
    A party does not waive the right to make the motion by introducing
    evidence during the presentation of an opposing party’s case.
    (b) Disposition. When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the
    evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court
    may proceed, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render
    judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until
    the close of all the evidence. When a motion for judgment is made
    under any other circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and
    inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    motion is made.
    (c) Effect of denial. A party who moves for judgment at the close of the
    evidence offered by an opposing party may offer evidence in the event
    the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and
    to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. In so doing, the
    party withdraws the motion.
    (Emphasis added.)
    As appellees point out in their brief, Issue I has not been preserved for review
    because, as stated in Md. Rule 2-519(c), when a party introduces evidence after a motion
    for judgment has been denied at the conclusion of the opponent’s case, that motion is
    withdrawn. In fact, later in appellants’ brief, when discussing Issue II, appellants explicitly
    18
    admit that “a Motion for judgment, made at the close of the opponent’s case and thereafter
    denied, is withdrawn when the party making the Motion offers evidence in its own case-
    in-chief.”
    For the above reasons, we hold that the first issue presented has not been preserved
    for appellate review.
    IV.
    ISSUE II
    Appellants next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new
    trial and ANT’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). The grounds
    for ANT’s motion for JNOV was that appellees had produced no law or evidence to support
    a holding that ANT had been the “landlord” as that term is used in RP § 8-216.
    ANT points out, correctly, citing Nelson v. Carroll, 
    350 Md. 247
    , 254 (1998), that
    if, at the end of all the evidence, the movant states that the motion is based upon the same
    reasons given at the time the original motion for judgment was made, or renews a motion
    for judgment, the party implicitly incorporates by reference the reasons previously given.
    The problem in this case, however, is twofold. First, on this record, it is unclear as to
    whether counsel for ANT did, in fact, “renew” his motion for judgment. The trial judge,
    in her memorandum and order denying ANT’s motion for a JNOV said:
    In the case under review, this [c]ourt, having reviewed its notes and
    the video recording of the trial, finds that [d]efendants did not move for
    judgment on December 13, 2018, at the close of the evidence. During a
    bench conference following [d]efendants’ case, defense counsel said he
    would like to renew his motion, but was then directed to wait so the [c]ourt
    could take a recess. Upon reconvening, defense counsel did not move for
    judgment or make any further argument in support of a motion for judgment.
    19
    Contrary to [d]efendants’ contention in their Reply, [d]efendants had ample
    opportunity to make a motion or to assert arguments in support of judgment
    in their favor. Principles of preservation require that a movant elicit a ruling
    on a motion prior to the conclusion of a trial.
    The [c]ourt finds that defense counsel’s remark during the bench
    conference was insufficient to satisfy the requirement that a party move for
    judgment, with particularity, at the close of the evidence. Thus, [d]efendants’
    Motion for JNOV must be denied on procedural grounds.
    (References to transcript omitted.)
    The issue addressed by the trial judge in her memorandum boils down to whether,
    in the context of the bench conference, defense counsel’s statement that “I’ll renew my
    motion for judgment” meant that he was renewing his motion for judgment or whether it
    meant, as the trial judge believed, that he would renew his motion for judgment at the end
    of the court recess. Weighing the scales in favor of the trial judge’s interpretation is the
    fact that the court never ruled on appellants’ (assumed) renewal of the motion for judgment.
    If there had been such a renewal, one would expect defense counsel to ask for a ruling,
    which he never did.
    A motion for JNOV is, in essence, a motion asking the trial court to reconsider the
    denial of a motion for judgment made at the conclusion of the entire case. As we said in
    Nu Car Carriers, Inc. v. Everett, 
    33 Md. App. 310
    , 312-13 (1976): a motion for JNOV
    “may be made only to bring up for reconsideration, a motion for directed verdict (now
    motion for judgment), made at the close of all of the evidence, and at that time either denied
    or reserved by the trial court.” (emphasis added). Here, it is undisputed that at the
    conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the case, the trial judge did not deny appellants’
    motion for judgment.
    20
    In regard to the motion for JNOV, a second preservation problem is presented. Md.
    Rule 2-532(a) provides that a motion for JNOV may be made “only on the grounds
    advanced in support of the [motion for judgment].” As the Court of Appeals said in Sage
    Title Group, LLC v. Roman, 
    455 Md. 188
    , 216 (2017): “Sage Title waived its unclean
    hands/in pari delicto argument because it failed to articulate this ground in its motion for
    judgment and could not ‘renew’ the argument for purposes of its JNOV motion.” 
    Id. at 216
    .
    In this case, the first time that counsel for ANT argued that ANT could not be held
    liable for violation of RP § 8-216(b) because there was no proof that ANT was the
    “landlord” (as that term was used in the statute), was in ANT’s post-trial motion for JNOV.
    At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, counsel only argued, in a very general fashion,
    that ANT hadn’t “done anything related to the two counts.” Md. Rule 2-519(a) provides
    that a party making a motion for judgment “shall state with particularity all reasons why
    the motion should be granted.” The reason for the particularity requirement is “to ensure
    that the opposing party is not ‘sandbagged.’”       Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac
    Telephone, 
    104 Md. App. 1
    , 27 (1995) (quoting Annapolis Mall Ltd. Partnership v. Yogurt
    Tree, Inc., 
    299 Md. 244
    , 256 (1984)).
    For the above reasons, we agree with the trial judge that ANT did not preserve, for
    post-trial review by the circuit court, the issue of whether appellees had proved that ANT
    was a landlord, within the meaning of RP § 8-216(b).
    But even if the issue had been preserved, we conclude that the appellees did present
    sufficient proof that ANT was the landlord. ANT disagrees and argues as follows:
    21
    It is a matter of judicial notice that owners of property retain third
    party entities for the purpose of managing the property and relationships with
    Tenants or with anyone else. As ANT argued in its Motion [for JNOV], the
    jury determination would require a finding that there were three Landlords.[2]
    ANT finds no authority for the proposition that the General Assembly has
    intended to hold that all owners of property, even when not named on the
    lease or not involved in management, are, inherently, Landlords.
    Where a statute is ambiguous, the [c]ourt also considers the
    consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another and adopt that
    construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which
    is inconsistent with the common sense. Smith v. State, 
    425 Md. 292
    , 300
    (2012). Here, in the absence of a Real Property definition of Landlord that
    provides that all owners are Landlords, the lower [c]ourt should have
    declined to have adopted that construction of RP § 8-216.
    The trial [c]ourt should have granted ANT’s Motions. ANT asks this
    Court to reverse the judgment against ANT, under the RP § 8-216 claim.
    At another point in its brief, ANT stresses that the name of ANT does not appear in
    the lease and that the lease was with “Maryland Property Management.”
    As mentioned earlier (see page 5, supra), the first paragraph in the lease identifies
    Maryland Property Management as the “property manager for owner (landlord).” And,
    paragraph 9 states that Maryland Property Management is the agent for the landlord, and
    as such, “has full authority from the owner to manage the rented premises.” In other words,
    the appellees proved that in the lease itself, the words “landlord” and “owner” were used
    synonymously. And, at trial, through the testimony of Mr. Thornton, the owner of the
    Property was identified as ANT.
    2
    We disagree with the “three landlords” argument. The jury could reasonably have
    determined that ANT was the landlord, and that Ted Thornton, at all times here relevant,
    was acting as an agent of ANT and Maryland Property Management.
    22
    The goal in statutory interpretation is to divine the intent of the
    Legislature. See Kortobi v. Kass, 
    410 Md. 168
    , 176-77 (2009). In this
    endeavor, we turn initially (and often only) to the plain language of the
    statute; if the Legislature resolved the present dispute through the plain words
    of the statute, we are not obliged to consult other sources of legislative
    history. See Price v. State, 
    378 Md. 378
    , 387 (2003) (“[A]ll statutory
    interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself . . ., for
    the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s
    very words . . . .” (citations omitted)) .
    Guttman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
    421 Md. 227
    , 234 (2011).
    Statutory construction:
    “begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular
    understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its
    terminology.” Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 
    402 Md. 587
    , 613 (2007) (quoting
    Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
    385 Md. 563
    , 576 (2005)).
    Kortobi v. Kass, 
    410 Md. 168
    , 177 (2009). See also, Baltimore City Detention Center v.
    Foy, 
    461 Md. 627
    , 645 (2018) (When interpreting a statute “we may consult a dictionary
    and give words their ordinary meaning.”).
    Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (2019) defines the word “landlord” as:
    1. the owner of property (such as land, houses, or apartments) that is leased
    or rented to another.
    https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/landlord.
    Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines “landlord” in the following manner:
    landlord (bef. 12c) 1. At common law, the feudal lord who retained the fee
    of the land. – Sometimes shortened to lord. 2. Someone who rents a room,
    building, or piece of land to someone else.
    Significantly, ANT, in its brief, does not propose any definition of the word
    “landlord” that it contends the court should have used in determining whether to grant its
    23
    motion for JNOV. And, in any event, it is clear the word landlord, as used in the statute,
    means owner of the property that is leased.
    It is true, as ANT argues, that a statute should not be construed to have a meaning
    that would produce an illogical or unreasonable result or one that is inconsistent with
    common sense. But we fail to see how such a result would occur if the statute were read
    to treat the word “landlord” and “owner” as synonymous.
    ANT also argues for the first time on appeal, that because ANT was not called a
    “landlord” in appellees’ complaint, the jury should not have been allowed to find that ANT
    was appellees’ landlord. 3 We reject that contention. Even if we assume that ANT renewed
    its motion for judgment at the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the trial, ANT never
    raised this pleading error as a ground for that motion. Due to the particularity requirement
    set forth in Md. Rule 2-519, such a belated contention could not be successfully raised as
    a ground for the grant of a JNOV.
    Appellant also argues:
    Jury inferences must be sound logically, and Maryland Courts will
    refuse to allow a jury of laymen to engage in guesswork, speculation and
    conjecture. Hamilton v. Kirson, 
    439 Md. 501
     (2014). ANT submits that it
    was impermissible to allow a jury to find that ANT was a Landlord, when
    such had not been . . . proven at trial. Moreover, as stated above, the lower
    [c]ourt’s authority upon a Motion for a new trial is broad enough that it may
    prevent miscarriages of justice.
    3
    The plaintiffs did allege in their complaint that appellant was the owner of the
    premises and that it had violated RP § 8-216.
    24
    Here, there was no “miscarriage of justice.” The appellees proved that ANT owned
    the leased premises and, using the common meaning of the word “landlord,” the jury could
    have rationally found that the meaning of the words “landlord” and “owner,” as used in the
    statute, were the same.
    For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial judge did not err when she denied
    ANT’s motion for JNOV.
    V.
    ISSUE III
    Appellants argue:
    The trial court erred in refusing to grant appellants’ motion for a new
    trial with respect to any liability under RP § 8-216, as there was no evidence
    from which a jury could have inferred the necessary elements of that cause
    of action, the Hawkins family having remained living at the house for two
    weeks after the cancellation of the eviction.
    At the conclusion of the trial, neither Maryland Property Management nor Mr.
    Thornton made a motion for judgment and ANT’s motion for judgment was not based on
    the grounds it now raises. Nevertheless, an appellant can raise the issue of insufficiency
    of the evidence for the first time in a motion for new trial. See Cam’s Broadloom Rugs,
    Inc. v. Buck, 
    87 Md. App. 561
    , 575-76 (1991) (“the trial court may grant a new trial for
    any reason that will support its determination that a party was denied a fair trial, and there
    is nothing in Md. Rule 2-533 which precludes a judge from granting a new trial on the basis
    of an issue that could have been, but was not, raised during trial.”).
    Whatever the ground for a motion for new trial, the standard for
    granting the motion differs from the one employed in granting a motion for
    judgment under Rule 2-519 or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
    25
    verdict under Rule 2-532. The requirement for granting those motions is the
    absence of substantial evidence to support a verdict. Determination of
    whether to grant a motion under this rule is made on the judge’s consideration
    of “the core question of whether justice has been done.” Butkiewicz v. State,
    
    127 Md. App. 412
    , 422, cert. denied, 
    356 Md. 495
     (1999).
    Maryland Rules Commentary, Rule 2-533 page 740 (5th ed. LexisNexis Matthew Bender)
    (emphasis added).
    A trial judge has very broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial. As
    we said in Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 
    144 Md. App. 463
    , 484 (2002):
    The trial judge has boundless discretion not to indulge this all-too-natural
    desire to raise issues after the fact that could have been raised earlier but were
    not or to make objections after the fact that could have been earlier but were
    not. Losers do not enjoy carte blanche, through post-trial motions, to replay
    the game as a matter of right.
    Even assuming, arguendo, the appealability of the denial of a post-
    trial motion, the appellant would carry a far heavier appellate burden on that
    issue than he would carry in challenging the denial of a more timely motion
    for relief made during the course of trial.
    * * *
    That a party, arguendo, should have prevailed on the merits at trial by
    no means implies that he should similarly prevail on a post-trial motion to
    reconsider the merits.
    Here, the trial judge, in her post-trial memorandum, thoroughly reviewed the
    evidence. After such a review, the trial judge’s discretion as to whether to grant, or deny,
    a new trial is “at its broadest.” Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 
    328 Md. 51
    , 59
    (1992):
    Appellants argue:
    The argument of Mr. Thornton, [Maryland Property Management],
    and ANT, as to liability under the lock[ ]out statute, is found at pages 5-7 of
    26
    their Motion [for New Trial]. Appellants argued that liability could have
    been asserted only if Mr. and M[r]s. Hawkins had been locked out. Further,
    that the jury must have been confused as to the difference between a lockbox
    and a lock[ ]out; that Mr. and M[r]s. Hawkins had never been locked out;
    that upon the cancellation of the eviction, within the district [c]ourt hearing,
    M[r]s. Hawkins called Mr. Hawkins to come back to the house for the night;
    and that the Hawkins family continued to occupy the house later than the
    evening of October 4-5.
    *    *   *
    [F]ocusing on the verbiage of subsection (b)(1) [for RP § 8-216], it is
    prefaced, “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2).” Underlining added.
    Appellants submit that the [c]ourt should have first directed [its] attention
    upon that paragraph (2). And, the first requirement of paragraph (2) would
    have been whether the Landlord (whichever of the Appellants that might
    have been) had taken possession of the dwelling unit from Mr. and M[r]s.
    Hawkins.
    None of the evidence suggested that [Maryland Property
    Management] or any other Appellant had taken possession. One can argue
    over whether a jury was entitled to find that the locks had been changed in
    the short time between the time M[r]s. Hawkins left the house at 6:15 a.m.
    on the morning of October 4, 2017; and the arrival of the sheriff at 9:00 or
    9:23 a.m. Implausible as that may have been, and in the absence of anyone
    testifying as to such conduct within a two or two and a half-hour window,
    even if the jury was entitled to so infer, the question is whether any Appellant
    took possession.
    The trial judge, in her written opinion, found that the appellees had presented
    sufficient evidence to prove that they had been “locked out” within the meaning of RP §
    8-216(b). The court’s opinion, however, did not discuss whether there was evidence that
    appellants had taken possession of the premises. The apparent reason that this was not
    discussed was that in appellants’ written motion for a new trial, appellants did not argue
    that the appellees had failed to prove that appellants had taken possession of the premises.
    Md. Rule 2-533(b) provides that: “[a]ll grounds advanced in support of the motion shall be
    27
    filed in writing within the time prescribed for the filing of the motion, and no other grounds
    shall thereafter be assigned without leave of court.” Here, appellants did not either ask for,
    or obtain, leave of court to list any additional grounds. Therefore, the argument that
    appellees failed to prove that appellants took possession of their Property appears to have
    been waived. But we will, nevertheless assume, arguendo, that it was not waived. As
    discussed, infra, there was sufficient evidence that defendants, and/or their agent, changed
    the lock on the front door of the Property, before the appellees were evicted. Changing the
    locks deprived appellees of possession of the premises, albeit only briefly (until a family
    member could gain entry by climbing through a window). There was also evidence from
    which the jury could rationally infer that agents of appellants had entered the Property and
    removed property of the appellees that was worth more than $2,000.00. The jury could
    also have found that such an unauthorized entry deprived the appellees of their right to sole
    possession of the rental premises.
    Appellants, both in this appeal and in the trial court, also contend that there was
    insufficient evidence presented to prove that appellees were locked out of the premises by
    appellants. Proof that the lock on the front door to the leased premises had been changed
    prior to the eviction, by appellants or their agent(s), would constitute a “lock out” under
    the statute. As mentioned, Mr. Holland testified that Mrs. Hawkins gave him a key to the
    front door of the premises. He arrived at the house between 8 and 8:30 a.m. on the morning
    of October 4, 2017 and the key to the front door would not open that door. From that
    testimony, the jury could infer that sometime between 6:15 and 8:30 a.m. someone had
    changed the lock. That inference was bolstered by Mrs. Hawkins’s testimony that when
    28
    she returned to the rental premises, after the court hearing on October 4, 2017, she found
    that the lock on the front door had been changed; she also found that afternoon that
    someone had installed a new lockbox that had not been there previously. That lockbox
    was also observed by Deputy Anderson when she arrived at the premises between 9 and
    9:30 a.m.
    There was no direct evidence as to who changed the lock to the front door or who
    installed the lockbox, but the jury could infer, legitimately, that it was either Ted Thornton,
    acting on behalf of the two companies he controlled (ANT and Maryland Property
    Management), or someone directed by Mr. Thornton to do the work. That would be a
    rational inference for at least two reasons. First, no one else would have had the incentive
    to install a new lockbox and to change the lock other than appellants or persons acting as
    their agent. Second, according to Mrs. Hawkins’s testimony, Mr. Thornton had threatened
    to take drastic action against her when he said to her prior to the date scheduled for eviction:
    “I want you and your family the f⁕⁕⁕ out of my house, I want y’all out of here.” He had
    also said that if she didn’t give him the rent money immediately, “he was going to come in
    the house, he was going to remove [her] stuff, . . . it’s going to get ugly.” Also, supporting
    the inference that Mr. Thornton, or someone acting at his direction, had changed the lock
    was the fact, according to Mrs. Hawkins’s testimony, that Mr. Thornton fulfilled his threat
    inasmuch as the proof showed: 1) that as of 6:15 a.m. on October 4, 2017, there were
    numerous items of personal property belonging to the appellees that were still on the
    premises but, when Deputy Anderson arrived at the premises, the house looked empty; and
    2) furthermore, when Mrs. Hawkins returned to the premises on the afternoon of October
    29
    4, she found that articles of personal property worth over $2,000.00 that had been left on
    the premises, were no longer there. Accordingly, if the witnesses called by appellees were
    believed, it was more probable than not that the appellees were locked out and deprived of
    their personal property by appellants. What we said in Bell v. Heitkamp, Inc., 
    126 Md. App. 211
    , 224-25 (1999) concerning the legitimacy of an inference, is here apposite:
    The “more probable than not” rule is implemented by the use of
    inferences. The test for the legitimacy of an inference was explained by the
    late Judge Charles Orth in [Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone] Co. v. Hicks,
    
    25 Md. App. 503
     (1975), as follows:
    The test for the legitimacy of an inference is often expressed in this
    way: “where from the facts most favorable to the plaintiff the
    nonexistence of the fact to be inferred is just as probable as its
    existence (or more probable than its existence), the conclusion that
    it exists is a matter of speculation, surmise, and conjecture, and a
    jury will not be permitted to draw it.” 
    Id.
     This test is directed to the
    court’s function and not to the jury’s. “The court must determine
    whether the existence of fact A (which has been testified to) is more
    probable than not, as a generalization, attended by the coexistence
    of fact B. If the court makes the initial determination in favor of the
    legitimacy of the inference, the issue goes to the jury to determine
    whether[,] upon the preponderance of the evidence in this case[,]
    they find[:] (a) that fact A probably did exist and, if so, whether fact
    B probably did exist (again, in this case).” [2 F. Harper & F. James,
    The Law of Torts § 19.4], pp. 1068-1069. This view was adopted by
    the Court of Appeals in Short v. Wells, 
    249 Md. 491
    , 495-496 (1968).
    
    Id. at 524-25
     (footnote omitted).
    For the above reasons, we agree with the trial judge that there was sufficient
    evidence for the jury to find that the appellants locked out the appellees and took their
    property.
    As mentioned, appellants also argued that “the jury must have been confused as to
    the difference between a lockbox and a lock out[.]” We reject that contention, as did the
    30
    trial judge. There was a video tape introduced showing the lockbox. Also, there was
    extensive testimony concerning when the lockbox was installed. There was no reason that
    the jury would have confused a lock out with a lockbox.
    The trial judge also found that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
    could find that Mr. Thornton had “threaten[ed] to take possession of a dwelling” as
    prohibited by RP § 8-216(b). That finding was supported by the statutory definition of the
    phrase “threaten to take possession” as meaning “using words . . . intended to convince a
    reasonable person that the landlord intends to take imminent possession of the property in
    violation of this section.” Real Property § 8-216(a)(2). If Mrs. Hawkins’s testimony was
    believed, Mr. Thornton, in September 2017, which was prior to the date that the landlord
    was legally entitled to take possession, threatened Mrs. Hawkins by saying that he was
    going to come into the house and take property belonging to the appellees and also saying
    he wanted her and her family out of the house “today.” Such an invasion and confiscation
    of property could reasonably be interpreted by a juror as a threat to take immediate
    possession of the property.
    In arguing that the appellees did not present sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
    consider whether RP § 8-216 had been violated, appellants stress the fact that Mrs.
    Hawkins testified at the court proceeding held on the afternoon of October 4, 2017, that
    she did not want to live at the house anymore and that on the morning of October 4, 2017,
    both Mr. and Mrs. Hawkins had intended to vacate the property. All of this is true. But
    after the judge cancelled the eviction, Mrs. Hawkins changed her mind and decided to stay.
    The appellants had no right to change the lock prior to the point that appellees were legally
    31
    evicted. Moreover, what Mrs. Hawkins and her husband intended to do on the morning of
    October 4, 2017, would not excuse the prior conduct of Mr. Thornton when he threatened
    to invade the rental premises and confiscate their property.
    For all of the above reasons, we hold that the trial judge did not err in denying the
    motion for new trial.
    VI.
    ISSUE IV
    When the appellants filed their motion for a new trial, they pointed out, accurately,
    that the jury verdicts were, in part, inconsistent. As mentioned earlier, the jury awarded
    $3,000.00 in economic damages to the appellees for a violation of RP § 8-216. The only
    evidence as to any economic damages as a result of the violation of that statute was the
    value of the personal property that was taken from the premises by agents of the appellants.
    Mrs. Hawkins testified as to the value of that property and the total value, according to
    appellees’ trial counsel, came to a total of $2,027.98. The jury was instructed that they
    could add an amount for interest at the “legal rate” for the loss of the property. On the
    verdict sheet, when the jurors came to the issue of what damages were caused by the
    conversion of the property belonging to the Hawkinses, the jury awarded $10,000.00.
    Because the conversion damages that were proven (which were all economic damages)
    were exactly the same as the economic damages that were proven by appellees to have
    been suffered by them due to the statutory violation, the two verdicts were irreconcilably
    inconsistent. In their motion for new trial, the appellants asked the court to take “corrective
    action” in regard to this inconsistency or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
    32
    In Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Cliser, 
    267 Md. 406
    , 424 (1972), the issue
    presented to the circuit court was whether the jury could make three separate awards of
    punitive damages “for the same wilful, wanton and malicious conduct.” The Court
    answered that question in the negative, saying:
    For reasons not relevant here, we were not required to reach the
    question [triple recovery for the same wrong] which confronts us in this case.
    In our view, this point is controlled by the following principles quoted in 25
    C.J.S. Damages, § 3:
    “It is generally recognized that there can be only one recovery of
    damages for one wrong or injury. Double recovery of damages is
    not permitted; the law does not permit a double satisfaction for a
    single injury. A plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the
    same injury simply because he has two legal theories . . . . The
    overlapping of damages is generally not permissible, and a person is
    not entitled to recover twice for the same elements of damage
    growing out of the same occurrence or event . . . .”
    We think that in view of the combination of events presented in this case,
    the trial court erred in not furnishing guidelines to the jury in its consideration
    of whether to award punitive damages for each of the three torts. The result,
    as we see it, was that the jury “pyramided” the claims into a triple recovery
    of punitive damages on the basis “of an episode that was one continuous
    occurrence.”
    Because we deal here with error uniquely convertible into monetary
    terms, we need only make an adjustment, without further proceedings below,
    which will correctly reflect the verdict of the jury. To that end, we shall
    modify the judgment so that there may be but one recovery of punitive
    damages.
    Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
    In opposition to the appellants’ request to modify the verdict, appellees argued that
    Mrs. Hawkins testified as to the value of lost property and that plaintiffs were entitled to
    “additional damages,” as explained in the jury instructions regarding conversion because
    33
    the appellees were still paying for some of the converted items that they had purchased on
    credit. 4
    The court instructed the jury as follows:
    The measure of damages for conversion of personal property is the
    market value at the time and place of the interference plus the legal rate of
    interest to the date of judgment. Additional damages may be awarded in
    conversion to the extent necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the actual
    losses sustained.
    In the trial judge’s written opinion, the court ruled that appellants had waived the
    issue of inconsistent verdicts. The court also said:
    [E]ven in the absence of a waiver of this argument, [d]efendants’ contention
    is baseless. It was well within the province of the jury to determine the
    amount of damages to which [p]laintiffs are entitled. The jury was presented
    with evidence from which, in an exercise of its discretion, it was permitted
    to award appropriate damages to [p]laintiffs. Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
    
    119 Md. App. 395
    , 408-09 (1998) (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
    v. Garrett, 
    343 Md. 500
    , 521 (1996). Notably, the jury award was less [than]
    the amount that [p]laintiffs requested. The jury’s award of damages will not
    be changed.
    The damages that appellees asked for in their complaint is irrelevant. The relevant
    inquiry is what damages, if any, were proven. And, it is undisputed that the economic
    damages for the statutory violation were the same as the conversion damages. In other
    words, there is no valid reason that the jury could have legitimately found $3,000.00 in
    economic damages as to Count I and $10,000.00 damages on the conversion count.
    4
    The court did instruct the jury that it could award additional damages on the
    conversion count but only “to the extent necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the actual
    losses sustained.” Mrs. Hawkins testified that she was “still paying for” one item: a
    $600.00 “living room set” that was taken. She didn’t say how much interest, if any, she
    was paying but under the jury instruction, she was only entitled to recover the legal rate of
    interest. There were no other “actual losses sustained.”
    34
    Counsel for appellees, in her closing argument, conceded that the damages for
    conversion were the same as the economic damages for the statutory violation. In regard
    to the damages for the statutory violation, counsel for the appellees stated:
    If you answered yes to any of the above, what damages do you find
    for x amount of damages? That means totaling the cost for the stuff that they
    lost as a result of being locked out. You heard testimony that the bunkbeds
    were $250, toddler beds were $59 and $79, the dishes were $19.99 and there
    were two sets of those. Clothes were $400 and $500. The sheets and blankets
    were $400. And the CD was $679.[5] You add that all up, it comes to
    $2,027.98. So that’s what we’re suggesting that you put there.
    Shortly thereafter, in arguing what the damages should be as to the conversion
    count, counsel for appellees argued:
    The second count has to do with the loss of their things. So conversion
    means that they lose – that someone else takes possession of their things and
    that they lose possession of those things. So we are asking that you check
    yes as to Maryland Property Management, LLC, yes as to ANT Properties,
    LLC, and yes as to Mr. Thornton.
    And then here, the damages, that would be the same amount for the
    economic damages which is $2,027.98 because that’s how much M[r]s.
    Hawkins testified to the amount of – that she paid for those items.
    Counsel for the appellees did not include in her calculation the value of a living
    room set that was taken, which Mrs. Hawkins said cost $600.00 and that she was “still
    paying for” it. 6
    5
    Counsel apparently intended to say “TV” rather than “CD.”
    6
    The total value of the property taken was $2,027.98 plus $600.00 or $2,627.98.
    The pre-judgment rate of interest was 6% per year. The cost of goods taken ($2,627.98)
    plus pre-judgment interest ($187.78) equals $2,815.78, which is fairly close to the $3,000
    awarded for economic damages.
    35
    Appellants’ argument that the verdicts were inconsistent was by no means baseless.
    There was no evidence of damages for loss of use. Under the jury instructions, the jury
    could have, and apparently did, allow some extra money in arriving at their $3,000.00
    verdict for prejudgment interest. But having awarded economic damages of $3,000.00 for
    the statutory violation, the jury reached an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict when it
    awarded $10,000.00 for the same damages under the conversion count.
    We also disagree with the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellees waived their
    argument as to inconsistent verdicts. In support of that waiver conclusion, the trial judge
    cited, inter alia, Givens v. State, 
    449 Md. 433
     (2016), which held that in a criminal case,
    to preserve an issue of legally inconsistent jury verdicts, a defendant must object before
    the jury is discharged. 
    Id. at 472-73
    . But the rule is different in a civil case as explained
    in Southern Management Corp. v. Taha, 
    378 Md. 461
    , 492 (2003). In Taha, Southern
    Management and two of its employees, were sued for malicious prosecution. 
    Id. at 467
    .
    The theory of the plaintiff, Mr. Taha, was that his former employer, Southern Management
    Corporation, was liable for damages incurred as a result of a malicious prosecution action
    brought against him by two of Southern Management’s employees. 
    Id.
     The jury returned
    a verdict in favor of the two employees but found against Southern Management
    Corporation. 
    Id.
     Counsel for Southern Management Corporation did not object to the jury
    instructions nor was any objection made to the inconsistent verdicts at trial. 
    Id. at 475
    . In
    Taha, as here, the first objection to the inconsistent verdict was in a post-trial motion. 
    Id.
    Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that such an inconsistent verdict could not be
    allowed to stand. The pertinent language in Taha was:
    36
    [T]here remains a distinction between inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases
    and irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts in civil matters. While a
    member of the Court of Special Appeals, Chief Judge Bell considered the
    effect of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts in a civil fraud case, holding that
    they cannot stand:
    It is well settled that irreconcilably defective verdicts cannot stand.
    Gaither v. Wilmer, 
    71 Md. 361
    , 364 (1889). Where the answer to
    one of the questions in a special verdict form would require a verdict
    in favor of the plaintiff and an answer to another would require a
    verdict in favor of the defendant, the verdict is irreconcilably
    defective. Ladnier v. Murray, 
    769 F.2d 195
    , 198 (4th Cir. 1985);
    Carter v. Rogers, 
    805 F.2d 1153
    , 1158-59 (4th Cir. 1986); Robertson
    Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 
    871 F.2d 1368
    , 1373
    (8th Cir. 1989); Hopkins v. Coen, 
    431 F.2d 1055
    , 1059 (6th Cir.
    1970); Lewis v. Yaggi, 
    584 S.W.2d 487
    , 497-98; Russell v. Pryor,
    
    264 Ark. 45
    , 
    568 S.W.2d 918
    , 922-23 (1978).
    S & R, Inc. v. Nails, 
    85 Md. App. 570
    , 590 (1991), rev'd on other grounds,
    
    334 Md. 398
     (1994) (involving an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict
    awarding punitive damages on a fraud claim where the jury had determined
    that the defendant had acted only with implied rather than actual malice).
    The verdict rendered by the jury in the case sub judice is irreconcilably
    inconsistent and, therefore, cannot be permitted to stand.
    378 Md. at 488 (footnote omitted).
    The trial court’s reliance on Givens, a criminal case, was misplaced. The trial court,
    in support of its waiver holding, also relied on a 2018 unreported decision by a panel of
    this Court, Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Coates, No. 2709, Sept. Term 2016 (Md. App. May 11,
    2018), that held that in a civil case, failure to object to an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict
    prior to the discharge of the jury, waived the objection. The panel cited Givens for that
    proposition and, in a footnote, attempted to distinguish Taha on the grounds that in the
    Taha case, the Court had observed that it was “procedurally fair” to correct the verdict
    post-trial because the appellants had only asked to correct the verdict and not for a new
    37
    trial. Id. at 19 n.10. In the view of the panel in Coates, the defendants’ belated objection
    in Taha did not materially impair judicial efficiency because the relief sought did not
    require a new trial, but in Coates, a new trial was the only remedy available to correct the
    problem. Although the matter need not be decided, because here the appellants did ask, in
    the alternative, that the inconsistency be corrected, it is doubtful that the Taha majority
    wanted to allow post-judgment corrections of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts to be
    available only when a new trial would not be necessary.
    The Court said in Taha:
    Based on the circumstances in this case, it is “procedurally fair” to address
    the merits of SMC’s contentions, especially given the absence of a guiding
    court rule. Most importantly, though, allowing Taha to prevail in this case
    based on the dissent’s waiver argument would produce a result that is directly
    contrary to the law—a judgment in favor of Taha based on woefully
    insufficient evidence and at odds with the jury’s other legal conclusions. See
    Los Angeles Nut House [v. Holiday Hardware Corp.], 825 F.2d [1351,] 1356
    [(9th Cir. 1987)] (disfavoring the “waiver” theory because it permits a result
    contrary to the law). We refuse to accept such an outcome under the present
    circumstances.
    378 Md. at 492.
    Here, the $10,000.00 verdict on the conversion count should not be allowed to stand
    because it is at odds with the jury’s economic damage finding as to Count I. Waiver is
    defined as giving up a known right. Based on Taha, a competent lawyer in a civil case
    would not have known that he or she was giving up the right to object to an irreconcilably
    inconsistent verdict by failing to object before the jury was discharged. Therefore, it cannot
    be said that the issue was waived.
    38
    In the subject case, the trial judge also ruled that the appellants had waived the
    inconsistent verdict argument by failing to object to the form of the verdict sheet. As far
    as we can see, there was nothing wrong with the verdict sheet. At the point where the case
    went to the jury, it was possible that the jury could find that there was a conversion but no
    violation of the statute. It was necessary for the verdict sheet to allow for such a
    contingency.
    For the above reasons, we hold that the verdicts were irreconcilably inconsistent and
    that counsel for appellants did not waive the issue of irreconcilable verdicts. We shall
    remand this case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with instructions to vacate the
    $10,000.00 judgment entered in favor of appellees as to the conversion count.
    VII.
    ISSUE V – ATTORNEYS’ FEES
    Appellants’ final argument is that the trial judge erred in assessing attorney’s fees
    against “defendants where the award of fees was a multiple of the underlying award of
    damages.” Appellants stress that appellees were only entitled to receive attorney’s fees for
    pursuing the statutory claim, i.e., RP § 8-216, and as to that claim were only awarded
    $18,000.00, yet the attorney’s fees awarded were almost four times that amount. In this
    appeal, and in the trial court, appellants contended that it was error for the trial judge to
    make an award of attorney’s fees that was in excess of the amount the Hawkinses recovered
    in damages. In support of that contention, appellant cites three cases: Johnson v. Georgia
    Highway Express, Inc., 
    488 F.2d 714
     (5th Cir. 1974); Ochse v. Henry, 
    216 Md. App. 439
    39
    (2014); and Frankel v. Friolo, 
    170 Md. App. 441
     (2006). None of the cases cited stand for
    the proposition advocated by appellants.
    In Johnson, the Court addressed the considerations that were proper for an award of
    attorney’s fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
    488 F.2d at 715
    . The Court
    set forth twelve guideline factors that the trial court should consider, on remand, in
    determining the issue of what attorney’s fees were reasonable. 
    Id. at 717-19
    . Those twelve
    guidelines, with some minor changes, now are set forth in Md. Rule 2-703(f)(3) and read:
    (A)    the time and labor required;
    (B)    the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
    (C)    the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
    (D) whether acceptance of the case precluded other employment by the
    attorney;
    (E)    the customary fee for similar legal services;
    (F)    whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
    (G)    any time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
    (H)    the amount involved and the results obtained;
    (I)    the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
    (J)    the undesirability of the case;
    (K)    the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
    and
    (L)    awards in similar cases.
    40
    The appellants quote Johnson as follows: “In no event, however, should the litigant
    be awarded a fee greater than he is contractually bound to pay, if indeed the attorneys have
    contracted as to amount.” The excerpt from Johnson does not support appellants’ argument
    because, here there was no evidence that the appellees entered into a contract with their
    attorneys as to the amount of fees that would be charged. In fact, it is likely that in a case
    of this nature, where the plaintiffs were of limited financial means, counsel for the
    appellees would have agreed that in the event the suit was successful, they would seek
    recompense from the appellants pursuant to RP § 8-216.
    Ochse, 216 Md. App. at 448, unlike the present case, did not deal with a fee-shifting
    statute; instead, it dealt with a contract containing a fee-shifting provision which provided
    that if a party breached his/her contractual obligation to convey marketable title to the
    purchasers (the Ochses), then the Ochses would be entitled to an attorney fee award.
    In Ochse, we said:
    The Court of Appeals has drawn a firm line between contractual fee-
    shifting cases, which arise out of a private agreement, and statutory fee-
    shifting cases, which involve some overriding public policy. Statutory fee
    awards generally make use of the lodestar approach, by which the court
    simply multiplies the time an attorney spent on a case by a reasonable hourly
    rate and then adjusts the result up or down to arrive at a reasonable award
    based on the circumstances of the case and after considering factors such as
    the twelve enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 
    488 F.2d 714
    , 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). See Friolo v. Frankel, 
    373 Md. 501
    , 528-
    30 (2003). Although statutory fee-shifting provisions “were not designed as
    a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were
    they intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a
    private fee arrangement with his client,” they are intended “to enable private
    parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the
    actual or threatened violation of specific . . . laws” by assuring an attorney
    “that he will be paid a ‘reasonable fee.’” Friolo, 
    373 Md. at 526
     (quoting
    Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 
    478 U.S. 41
    546, 565 (1986)). In other words, statutory fee-shifting provisions are
    designed to encourage attorneys to take on cases that might otherwise be
    financially undesirable but which serve some greater, legislatively-
    established, social purpose.
    In contractual fee-shifting cases, the Court of Appeals has rejected the
    lodestar approach in favor of an approach based on Maryland Lawyers’ Rule
    of Professional Conduct l.5 [now Rule 19-301.5], in part to discourage
    awards that bear no rational relationship to the work a case reasonably
    requires of an attorney or the amount at issue in the litigation.
    [U]nlike the lodestar method, Rule 1.5 does not carry with it the
    notion that the importance of the right vindicated will justify an
    expenditure of attorney time that is hugely disproportionate to the
    dollar amount at issue in the case. Indeed, when applying Rule 1.5,
    trial judges should consider the amount of the fee award in relation
    to the principal amount in litigation, and this may result in a
    downward adjustment. Although fee awards may approach or even
    exceed the amount at issue, the relative size of the award is
    something to be evaluated.
    Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Hamilton, 
    416 Md. 325
     (2010)
    (emphasis supplied).
    216 Md. App. at 456-57 (footnote omitted).
    Appellants cite the Ochse case for the proposition that it endorsed legal principles
    set forth in the Johnson v. Georgia Highway case. In Ochse, the only mention of the
    Johnson case is in the portion of the excerpt quoted above that we have emphasized.
    Nothing in the Ochse case suggests that in a statutory fee-shifting case, the ultimate
    attorney fee award cannot be a “multiple” of the actual damages recovered on behalf of the
    plaintiff.
    As indicated in the portion of Ochse just quoted, when dealing with the award of
    attorney fees based on a fee-shifting statute, the “lodestar approach” should be used. And
    in this case, the trial judge followed that approach.
    42
    Frankel v. Friolo, 
    170 Md. App. 441
    , (“Friolo I”), is one of several Maryland
    appellate decisions that arose out of a fee dispute between Douglas Frankel (defendant)
    and Joy Friolo (plaintiff). In Friolo I, we vacated the award of attorney’s fees and
    remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for further proceedings
    consistent with our opinion. 
    Id. at 457
    . In their brief filed in this Court, appellants rely on
    the following language used in the Friolo I decision:
    “[t]he suggestion that counsel is entitled to fees in excess of $125,000 in
    obtaining a judgment of less than $12,000, where the client has been made
    whole, and where the additional fees have been generated only by counsel’s
    continued litigation of its dissatisfaction with the fee awarded by the [c]ircuit
    [c]ourt, is untenable. It is, in a word, outrageous.”
    Friolo, 170 Md. App. at 456-57.
    The language just quoted has no application in this case because the attorney’s fees
    awarded were not, in any sense, “generated” by counsel’s continued litigation of their
    dissatisfaction with the fee awarded by the circuit court. In any event, the plaintiff in Friolo
    I filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review our decision on the issue of attorney fees.
    The Court of Appeals granted the petition and issued its decision in Friolo v. Frankel, 
    403 Md. 443
     (2008), (“Friolo II”). The Friolo II Court agreed with us that the trial court “failed
    to provide an explanation of how [the lodestar] factors affected the amount of the award,
    thereby erring as a matter of law.” 
    Id. at 454-55
    . The Court of Appeals went on to explain
    that attorney fee awards for appellate work are justified by the same logic justifying trial
    fee awards:
    It is as important to compensate counsel for ensuring that the trial court gets
    it right, even if to do so requires counsel to appeal, as it is to ensure that
    counsel is compensated for services rendered at trial. Indeed, it is a
    43
    disincentive to the retention of competent counsel in these kinds of cases to
    deny recovery for successful appellate advocacy, including advocacy that
    demonstrates trial error.
    
    Id. at 458
    . Nothing in either Friolo I or II supports appellant’s argument.
    In the trial court, appellants did not contend that the hourly rate charged by counsel
    for the appellees was unreasonable nor was there any challenge to the number of hours
    expended by appellees’ counsel in presenting their case. When the lodestar approach is
    used, it is not at all surprising, or even unusual, that the ultimate fee awarded would be
    more than the amount recovered by the client. That such an award may be tolerated is
    because the legislature, in enacting fee-shifting statutes, wanted to “encourage attorneys to
    take on cases that might otherwise be financially undesirable but which serve some greater,
    legislatively-established, social purpose.” Ochse, 216 Md. App. at 456. Here, the trial
    judge considered the twelve factors set forth in Md. Rule 2-703(f)(3) that the court was
    required to consider when deciding whether to award attorney fees, and the amount thereof.
    See Pinnacle Group LLC v. Kelly, 
    235 Md. App. 436
    , 477 (2018) and Lockett v. Blue Ocean
    Bristol, LLC, 
    446 Md. 397
    , 426 (2016) (when a request for attorney fees is made, the circuit
    court must follow the procedures set forth in Md. Rule 2-703 and state the basis for grant
    or denial of an attorney fees award).
    In the subject case, the trial judge wrote, in pertinent part:
    [T]his [c]ourt finds that the request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable in light
    of the factors set out in Maryland Rule 2-703. Several of the factors
    significantly weigh in favor of a grant of the requested attorneys’ fees. For
    example, Plaintiffs’ counsel spent substantial time and efforts on this case,
    as contemplated by subsection (A) [of Rule 2-703]. Plaintiffs’ counsel
    responded to numerous interrogatories and requests for production of
    documents. See Plaintiffs’ Petition, Exh. 2. Plaintiffs’ counsel also
    44
    interviewed witnesses in the investigation of Defendants’ claims. 
    Id.
    Plaintiffs’ counsel also had several meetings with Plaintiffs. 
    Id.
     Plaintiffs’
    counsel also drafted and filed several pre- and post-trial documents. 
    Id.
    Additionally, the novelty and difficulty of the Maryland Real Property
    § 8-216, relevant to subsection (B), is such that an award of the attorneys’
    fees requested is appropriate. The statute became effective on June 1, 2013,
    and there has since been little case law written on it. Indeed, Plaintiffs
    researched the legislative history to interpret the statute and to present
    arguments to the [c]ourt and the jury regarding its purpose.
    Subsection (D), examines whether handling this case precluded other
    paid work. Considering that counsel recorded 228.40 hours, they were
    naturally precluded from handling other matters. As to subsection (E), on
    the issue of whether counsel’s fee is customary, this [c]ourt finds, and
    Defendants do not dispute, that the requested fees are in line with the
    guidelines set forth by the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland. Additionally, the fees were judicially approved in Curtis v. Blue
    Ocean Realty, LLC, case no. 24-C-16-006490 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. 2018).
    Consideration of subsection (L), regarding the amount of attorneys’ fee
    awards in like cases, also leads this [c]ourt to find the attorneys’ fees
    warranted. For example, in Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC v. Felicia Lockett, case
    no. 24-C-14006572 (Balt. City. Cir. Ct. 2016), a tenant prevailed on
    retaliatory eviction claim and was awarded $2,511 in damages, and her
    attorneys were awarded $53,665 in attorneys’ fees and $145.00 in costs.
    Appellants complain that the trial judge gave “no concrete reason” why “an award
    in the amount of $68,000+” should be allowed, nor did the court:
    squarely address[] the issue of why such an award, a multiple of the $28,000
    underlying jury verdict (putting aside, for the moment as to whether that
    amount had been correct or justified), was consistent with the admonitions
    advanced within the Johnson, Ochse, or Friolo [I] opinions.
    It is all the worse when considering the fact that Mr. and Mrs.
    Hawkins were not the sort of litigants that the General Assembly, enacting
    RP § 8-216, could have sought to protect. This was an instance in which
    [Maryland Property Management] attempted to use the processes of the
    district [c]ourt; and in which M[r]s. Hawkins specifically said that she
    wanted to leave the house.
    45
    The trial judge, in her written opinion, expressly recognized that she was required
    to consider the degree of success by the plaintiffs but rejected appellants’ argument that “it
    is impermissible for an attorney’s stake in the litigation to exceed the client’s stake, and
    [therefore] . . . the [c]ourt should consider the amount of the fee in relation to the principal
    amount in litigation.” In this regard, the trial court said:
    The [c]ourt declines to use a contingency-fee or proportionality-based
    approach to calculating the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees sought.
    Stevenson v. Branch Banking and Trust Corp., 
    159 Md. App. 620
    , 666 (2004)
    (citing Blaylock v. Johns Hopkins Fed. Credit Union, 
    152 Md. App. 338
    ,
    355-56 (2004)).
    The trial court did not err in rejecting appellant’s “proportionality approach.” In
    Blaylock v. Johns Hopkins Fed. Credit Union, 
    152 Md. App. 338
    , 359 (2003), we said:
    It is, of course, true, as the trial judge pointed out, that in ordinary civil
    litigation, where no fee-shifting statute exists, a litigant “would not pay
    $50,000 to . . . [get back] $8,000.” But that appears to be the precise reason
    why the legislature included in the Consumer Protection Act a provision for
    fee shifting. If we were to approve the proportionality rule, consumers, such
    as Ms. Blaylock, who are engaged in civil litigation with a financially
    superior foe, would have no meaningful right to obtain legal recourse. Upon
    remand, the trial court can, of course, take into consideration the degree of
    Ms. Blaylock’s counsel’s success, but a strict rule of proportionality may not
    be applied.
    We turn next to appellants “intent of the General Assembly” argument. The jury
    had before it evidence from which it could legitimately conclude that the appellants tried
    to use self-help rather than the processes of the district court to achieve their goals of
    evicting tenants, under such circumstances it cannot be said that appellees were not the sort
    of tenants that RP § 8-216 was designed to protect.
    46
    Lastly, appellants complain that the attorneys’ fees were too high because the case
    could have been resolved in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City with much
    lower fees and more efficiency, yet counsel for appellees made the “calculated” decision
    to try the matter in the circuit court. A similar argument was made and rejected by us in
    Blaylock, 152 Md. App. at 359. Here, as in Blaylock, there was good reason for appellees
    to file suit in the circuit court. If the case had been filed in the district court, discovery
    would have been limited. Id. But here, as the trial judge pointed out in her opinion, the
    “discovery phase of the litigation was robust[.]” Under such circumstances, the fact that
    the appellees decided to ask for a jury trial and litigate this matter in the circuit court was
    not a legitimate reason to reduce the award of attorney’s fees.
    For the above reasons, we reject appellants’ argument that the trial court erred in its
    attorney fees award.
    Finally, in their brief, appellees request, pursuant to Friolo v. Frankel, 
    438 Md. 304
    (2014), (Friolo III), that this case be remanded to the circuit court so that the trial court can
    consider whether to award attorneys’ fees incurred in this appeal. Under Friolo III, a
    remand for that purpose is required. 
    Id. at 329
    .
    MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; CASE
    REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
    BALTIMORE CITY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO:
    1) VACATE THE $10,000.00 JUDGMENT
    ENTERED AS TO THE CONVERSION COUNT; 2)
    CONSIDER WHAT ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
    COSTS, IF ANY, APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO
    RECOVER FOR WORK PERFORMED AND
    EXPENSES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL;
    JUDGMENTS OTHERWISE AFFIRMED; COSTS
    47
    TO BE PAID ONE-THIRD BY APPELLEES AND
    TWO-THIRDS BY APPELLANTS.
    48