Wallace v. State ( 2014 )


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  •             REPORTED
    IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
    OF MARYLAND
    No. 2100
    September Term, 2012
    BRANDON WALLACE
    v.
    STATE OF MARYLAND
    Wright,
    Nazarian,
    Davis, Arrie. W.
    (Retired, Specially Assigned),
    JJ.
    Opinion by Nazarian, J.
    Filed: August 27, 2014
    Matthew Womack was beaten and robbed by two men in the early morning hours of
    November 4, 2011. Minutes before, he had engaged in a brief discussion with Brandon
    Bernard Wallace. Shortly after the robbery, Mr. Wallace was seen at two convenience stores
    where Mr. Womack’s stolen credit card was used. After Mr. Womack identified Mr.
    Wallace as one of his assailants from a photo array, Mr. Wallace was arrested, charged, and
    convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of robbery and related crimes, but
    was ultimately acquitted of second-degree assault. Mr. Wallace appeals his conviction,
    contending that insufficient evidence supported the robbery conviction and that the circuit
    court erred by failing to suppress an impermissibly suggestive extrajudicial identification, by
    allowing an improper prosecutorial comment, and by accepting inconsistent jury verdicts.
    We find no merit in his first three contentions and affirm his convictions for theft under
    $1,000 and credit card theft. Because we conclude that the circuit court erred by accepting
    legally inconsistent jury verdicts, however, we vacate Mr. Wallace’s robbery conviction and
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and in the process fill a gap in
    the evolving jurisprudence of legally inconsistent verdicts.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Mr. Womack caught a bus from work at 11:30 p.m. on November 3, 2011, and arrived
    at the Oxon Hill Road bus stop in Prince George’s County between midnight and 1:00 a.m.
    on November 4. Upon his arrival, he was approached by Mr. Wallace. This was not,
    however, their first meeting—they had met and spoken two weeks before at that same bus
    stop, after Mr. Wallace tried to sell Mr. Womack a head set for three dollars.
    Their discussion on November 4 lasted only a few minutes. While they spoke, two
    of Mr. Wallace’s friends approached, and Mr. Womack became uneasy when one friend
    “made a look towards” him. He decided it was best that he leave, and as he left, Mr. Wallace
    inquired about the direction he was headed. Mr. Womack told him he was going north on
    Livingston Road, but instead went south, toward his home.
    The lighting on Livingston Road dwindled as Mr. Womack traveled toward Stratwood
    Avenue, so he attempted to cross the street to a better-lit area. But as he looked for
    oncoming cars, two men came up behind him, each wearing dark hooded sweatshirts and ski
    masks that covered their mouths and noses but left their eyes exposed.1 The two assailants
    first hit Mr. Womack from behind, then punched him in the face and knocked him to the
    ground. Then they flashed what appeared to be a shotgun and demanded Mr. Womack’s
    money and possessions in urgently vulgar terms. In all, they took his cell phone and charger,
    security license, an ATM card, an ID holder, a pair of gloves, and a Baltimore Ravens jacket.
    Mr. Womack phoned the police and accompanied them to the police station to provide
    an initial statement. Upon returning home, he contacted his bank to cancel his card, but was
    told that somebody used it that morning at several locations.
    On November 22, 2011, Mr. Womack was contacted by Detective Jeffrey Konya, who
    requested a meeting to show Mr. Womack a photo array prepared by Detective Paul
    Schweinsburg. The two detectives visited Mr. Womack’s home later that day and, before
    1
    At trial, Mr. Womack described one of the assailants as six foot and approximately
    165 to 200 pounds, and the other as six feet two inches and between 175 and 200 pounds.
    2
    showing him the array, informed him that they had found the culprit. Mr. Womack covered
    the lower halves of the faces to see the men as if they were wearing the half-mask his
    assailants wore and selected picture number five—the photo of Mr. Wallace. When asked
    why he selected this photo, he explained:
    Because when I was getting off the Metro bus, I was stopped
    and . . . the guy starting talking to me for at least five minutes.
    Then I walked away. Dude asked me which way I was going to
    go home. So I remember that. I had some type of feeling that
    something was going to happen to me that night because why
    would somebody ask you which way you was going to go home.
    And I felt some type of way about it. Then five minutes later,
    bam, I get robbed. And I remember that conversation I had with
    him a couple weeks ago when he had said something to me prior
    to that.
    The State obtained Mr. Womack’s bank records, which showed that his stolen card
    was used multiple times shortly after the robbery. The bank records showed that the card was
    used first for a $30.98 purchase at 5:01 a.m. at an Exxon on Old Branch Avenue in Camp
    Springs, but a corresponding receipt indicated that his card had been used there to make a
    $30.98 purchase at 1:01 a.m. The records also showed that the card was used at 5:09 a.m.
    at the 7-Eleven adjacent to the Exxon, but no receipt was produced. Surveillance stills
    produced by the State showed Mr. Wallace at the 7-Eleven that morning from 1:07 through
    1:10 a.m., however. These stills, along with stills from the Exxon,2 showed Mr. Wallace
    2
    The timestamp on the Exxon surveillance stills showed the man inside the store from
    12:20 through 12:23 a.m.
    3
    wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt at each establishment in the early morning hours of
    November 4.3
    Before trial, Mr. Wallace moved to suppress the extrajudicial identification provided
    by Mr. Womack. The circuit court held a suppression hearing on April 13, 2012, and denied
    the motion. Following a jury trial on August 23 and 27, 2012, Mr. Wallace was convicted
    of robbery, theft under $1,000, and credit card theft. The jury acquitted him of robbery with
    a deadly weapon and second-degree assault. The trial court sentenced Mr. Wallace on the
    robbery charge to fifteen years, with all but eight years suspended, to be followed by five
    years of supervised probation. The remaining offenses were merged for sentencing purposes.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Mr. Wallace’s brief lists five questions that we have revised to four: 4
    1.    Did the suppression hearing court err by denying [Mr.
    Wallace’s] motion to suppress evidence of an out-of-
    court identification of him from a photo array?
    2.    Did the trial court err by denying a motion for mistrial
    made during the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument?
    3.    Did the trial court err by accepting an inconsistent jury
    verdict?
    3
    Detective Michael Arnett recognized the man in the surveillance stills as Mr.
    Wallace and informed Detective Schweinsburg of the man’s identity. Soon after, the police
    executed a search warrant on Mr. Wallace’s residence and recovered a black and gray zip-up
    hoodie, like the one worn by the man in the stills.
    4
    Mr. Wallace’s third and fourth questions both addressed whether the trial court erred
    by accepting an inconsistent verdict.
    4
    [4].      Is the evidence legally insufficient to sustain [Mr.
    Wallace’s] convictions?
    We hold that sufficient evidence supported Mr. Wallace’s convictions and that the circuit
    court properly denied his motion to suppress. We hold as well, though, that the circuit court
    erred in accepting inconsistent jury verdicts, and we vacate the robbery conviction and
    remand.5
    A.     The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Denying Mr. Wallace’s Motion
    To Suppress.
    Mr. Wallace argues first that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress
    Mr. Womack’s testimony identifying him from a photo array. Mr. Wallace argues that Mr.
    Womack’s extrajudicial identification was impermissibly suggested when Detective Konya,
    before displaying the photo array, informed Mr. Womack that the police had “found the
    person that did it,” and that this “made him believe that the photo array contained an image
    of the suspect.” The State counters that the extrajudicial identification procedure was not
    impermissibly suggestive because the detectives did not indicate who should be chosen. We
    agree with the State.
    In reviewing the circuit court’s disposition of Mr. Wallace’s motion to suppress, “‘we
    look only to the record of the suppression hearing and do not consider the evidence admitted
    5
    Because our inconsistent jury verdict determination is dispositive, we need not
    consider the propriety of the prosecutor’s comment in his closing argument that, “[t]he victim
    met with the defendant. The defense doesn’t deny that.” We do, however, caution the
    prosecution to avoid such references, particularly where the only defense witness who could
    deny that fact is Mr. Wallace himself.
    5
    at trial.’” James v. State, 
    191 Md. App. 233
    , 251 (2010) (quoting Massey v. State, 
    173 Md. App. 94
    , 100 (2007)). We accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
    circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous, and we examine the evidence and inferences
    reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before
    the circuit court, in this case the State. McFarlin v. State, 
    409 Md. 391
    , 403 (2009). We
    review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and make our own independent
    assessment by applying the law to the facts of the case. Id.; see also Gatewood v. State, 
    158 Md. App. 458
    , 475-76 (2004), aff’d, 
    388 Md. 526
     (2005).
    Extrajudicial identifications obtained through impermissibly suggestive procedures
    are not admissible. James, 191 Md. App. at 251-52. We look at the circumstances of Mr.
    Womack’s identification of Mr. Wallace through a two-step process:
    The first is whether the identification procedure was
    impermissibly suggestive. If the answer is “no,” the inquiry
    ends and both the extra-judicial identification and the in-court
    identification are admissible at trial. If, on the other hand, the
    procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the second step is
    triggered, and the court must determine whether, under the
    totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.
    Jones v. State, 
    395 Md. 97
    , 109 (2006) (citations omitted). “The defendant bears the burden
    of proof in the first stage of the inquiry, and, if the defendant meets this burden, then the
    prosecution has the burden in the second stage of the analysis.” Upshur v. State, 
    208 Md. App. 383
    , 400-01 (2012) (citing In re Matthew S., 
    199 Md. App. 436
    , 447-48 (2011)), cert.
    denied, 
    430 Md. 646
     (2013); see also James, 191 Md. App. at 252 (“Although the reliability
    6
    of the identification is the linchpin question, if the identification procedure is not unduly
    suggestive, then our inquiry is at an end.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.)).
    The circuit court decided that Mr. Wallace had failed to carry his burden of
    establishing that the identification process was impermissibly suggestive, so it never reached
    the second step of the analysis. In looking at whether the identification was tainted by
    suggestiveness, we look in essence at whether the officers prompted Mr. Womack to identify
    Mr. Wallace:
    “To do something impermissibly suggestive is not to pressure or
    browbeat a witness to make an identification but only to feed the
    witness clues as to which identification to make. THE SIN IS
    TO CONTAMINATE THE TEST BY SLIPPING THE
    ANSWER TO THE TESTEE. All other improprieties are
    beside the point.”
    Jenkins v. State, 
    146 Md. App. 83
    , 126 (2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Conyers v.
    State, 
    115 Md. App. 114
    , 121 (1997)) (observing that “the scope of identification procedures
    constituting ‘impermissible suggestiveness’ is extremely narrow”), rev’d on other grounds,
    
    375 Md. 284
     (2003); see also Matthew S., 199 Md. App. at 448.
    We agree with the circuit court that Mr. Wallace failed to meet his initial burden to
    prove impermissible suggestiveness.       At the motions hearing, the circuit court heard
    testimony from Mr. Womack and Detectives Schwiensburg and Konya. Mr. Womack
    testified that prior to being shown the photo array, the detectives informed him that “they had
    7
    the person.”6 He also testified, however, that the detectives “did not tell [him] how they
    found the person,” nor did they give any kind of hint as to which photo he should choose
    from among those in the array. Mr. Womack testified that he selected Mr. Wallace’s photo
    believing that the array contained the person who robbed him, but not that the detectives told
    him so:
    To my knowledge I would have figured that if they said they
    believed to have found the person for what I had provided to
    them, I was to believe that they had the person in the photo line
    up and that’s when I had made my decision this is the guy that
    did it.
    We were presented with a comparable circumstance in Gatewood, 
    158 Md. App. 458
    .
    In that case, an arresting officer was to serve as a witness in the prosecution of a defendant
    charged with various drug crimes. Id. at 471-72. But before being presented with a photo
    array, the detective who prepared the array indicated to the arresting officer that “[he] knew
    who [the suspect] was,” id. at 472, implicitly “suggesting that [the] person’s photograph was
    in the array.” Id. at 476. When presented with the array, the arresting officer ultimately
    selected the suspect referred to by the detective. In determining whether the detective’s
    statements were impermissibly suggestive, we recognized that although “‘[t]he chance of
    misidentification is . . . heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have other
    evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime,’” id. (quoting Simmons v.
    6
    Detective Schweinsburg denied ever making such a statement to Mr. Womack, and
    Detective Konya was never questioned on the subject. But because such a statement does
    not amount to impermissible suggestiveness anyway, we assume that it was made.
    8
    United States, 
    390 U.S. 377
    , 383 (1968)), each case must “nevertheless be judged on its own
    facts.” 
    Id.
     Considering that the detective “left it to [the witness] to select the photograph of
    the person who had [committed the crime at issue],” and that “the circuit court was entitled
    to consider that [the witness] could reasonably expect that the array shown to him would
    have contained a suspect,” we held that the extrajudicial identification procedure was not
    impermissibly suggestive. Id.7
    We reach the same conclusion here. The detectives did not “‘contaminate the test by
    slipping the answer to [Mr. Womack],’” Jenkins, 146 Md. App. at 126 (quoting Conyers,
    115 Md. App. at 121); they left it to him to select the photograph of the person who robbed
    him.   And because the detective “did not in any way suggest which photograph or
    photographs were of the suspect or give any indication why the person in the photograph was
    7
    We also cited United States v. Gambrill, 
    449 F.2d 1148
     (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which
    the court acknowledged the reality that witnesses likely assume that the suspect is among the
    people in a lineup:
    Law enforcement personnel should avoid telling a witness that
    a definite suspect is in a lineup but it is not absolutely
    impermissible. . . . It must be recognized, however, that any
    witness to a crime who is called upon to view a police lineup
    must realize that he would not be asked to view the lineup if
    there were not some person there whom the authorities
    suspected.
    Gatewood, 158 Md. App. at 476 n.6 (quoting Gambrill, 
    449 F.2d at
    1151 n.3). And although
    we recognized that “the lineup procedure is less likely than a photo array to suffer from this
    tactic,” we considered the court’s observation in Gambrill relevant to photo arrays as well.
    
    Id.
    9
    suspected of having committed the robbery,” State v. Bolden, 
    243 N.W.2d 162
    , 164 (Neb.
    1976) (cited by Gatewood, 158 Md. App. at 477 n.6), Mr. Wallace’s arguments do not
    support a finding of impermissible suggestiveness. The circuit court did not err in ruling that
    Mr. Wallace failed to sustain his burden of showing that the identification procedure used
    by the police was unduly suggestive, and on that basis denying his motion to suppress Mr.
    Womack’s extrajudicial identification. That ends the inquiry. See James, 191 Md. App. at
    252; Jones, 
    395 Md. at 109
    .
    B.     Sufficient Evidence Existed To Support The Jury’s Finding That
    Mr. Wallace Committed The Robbery.
    Mr. Wallace argues next that insufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding
    that he committed the offense of robbery.8 Mr. Wallace acknowledges that “there is [no]
    doubt that Matthew Womack was the victim of a robbery,” but he argues that the prosecution
    failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that he was one of the robbers. We disagree.
    In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we must “determine ‘whether, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Taylor v. State, 
    346 Md. 452
    , 457 (1997) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)). It is not our
    role to measure the weight of the evidence; instead, we consider “only whether the verdict
    8
    Robbery is “‘the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of
    another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear, or, more
    succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear.’” Ball
    v. State, 
    347 Md. 156
    , 184 (1997) (quoting West v. State, 
    312 Md. 197
    , 202 (1988)).
    10
    was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could fairly convince
    a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id.
     (citing State v. Albrecht, 
    336 Md. 475
    , 478-79 (1994)). “We defer to any possible
    reasonable inferences the jury could have drawn from the admitted evidence and need not
    decide whether the jury could have drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to
    draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the evidence.”
    State v. Mayers, 
    417 Md. 449
    , 466 (2010).
    Because Mr. Wallace concedes that a robbery did, in fact, occur, one fact inferred by
    the jury is of crucial importance here: that Mr. Wallace was, in fact, one of two men who
    robbed Mr. Womack. We focus, then, while reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable
    to the State, on whether any rational jury could have drawn this same inference.
    The jury’s inference relied primarily upon circumstantial evidence produced by the
    State regarding Mr. Wallace’s whereabouts between the time he spoke with Mr. Womack at
    the bus stop and when surveillance cameras captured him making purchases at the same time
    and at the same stores at which Mr. Womack’s stolen credit card was used. “A conviction
    can rest on circumstantial evidence alone,” but such a conviction “cannot be sustained on
    proof amounting only to strong suspicion or mere probability.” Taylor, 
    346 Md. at
    458
    (citing Wilson v. State, 
    319 Md. 530
    , 535-36 (1990)). The circumstantial evidence may “not
    require the trier of fact to resort to speculation or conjecture,” and if this is the case, and there
    is “no solid factual foundation, there can be no conviction.” 
    Id.
     Put differently, “when the
    11
    evidence equally supports two versions of events, and a finding of guilt requires speculation
    as to which of the two versions is correct, a conviction cannot be sustained.” 
    Id.
     (citing
    Hebron v. State, 
    331 Md. 219
    , 234 (1993)).
    Indeed, the parties propose two alternative versions of the events in the time between
    the meeting at the bus stop and Mr. Wallace’s visits to Exxon and 7-Eleven: the State argued
    that Mr. Wallace committed the robbery in that intervening time, while Mr. Wallace
    contended that the connection was mere coincidence. A review of the record in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution demonstrates a solid factual foundation upon which a
    rational factfinder could agree with the State:
    •      Mr. Wallace and Mr. Womack had met twice at the bus stop
    prior to the robbery: once two weeks prior and again shortly
    before the robbery. In total, the two spoke for between twelve
    and eighteen minutes.
    •      Shortly after the second meeting, during which Mr. Wallace
    asked Mr. Womack where he was going, and just down the road
    from their meeting point, Mr. Womack was robbed of his credit
    card, among other items, by two masked men.
    •      Shortly thereafter, Mr. Womack’s card was used at an Exxon
    and a 7-Eleven in the vicinity of the robbery, and Mr. Wallace
    was caught on surveillance purchasing items from those same
    stores in the hours following the robbery.
    •      The assailants wore dark hooded sweatshirts, Mr. Wallace was
    wearing a black and gray sweatshirt in the surveillance stills,
    and that same sweatshirt was found in his room months later.
    The connection between these pre- and post-robbery circumstances was strengthened further
    by Mr. Womack’s identification of Mr. Wallace at the scene of the crime as a result of his
    12
    prior interactions with him. Mr. Womack testified that from those prior interactions, he
    recognized the eyes and voice of one of his assailants as those of Mr. Wallace.
    The circumstantial evidence produced by the State, coupled with Mr. Womack’s
    identification, could readily have allowed the jury to infer that Mr. Wallace was one of the
    men who robbed Mr. Womack. The evidence on the record tying Mr. Wallace to the robbery
    (which he admits occurred) supports a finding that the jury’s inference was reasonable. And,
    as we noted above, “[w]e defer to any possible reasonable inferences the jury could have
    drawn from the admitted evidence.” Mayers, 
    417 Md. at 466
    . As such, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact
    could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wallace committed the crime for which
    he was charged.
    C.     The Circuit Court Erred By Accepting An Acquittal On A Lesser-
    Included Offense Of A Crime For Which Mr. Wallace Was
    Convicted When Those Crimes Arose During The Same Criminal
    Transaction.
    Finally, Mr. Wallace challenges the circuit court’s decision to accept what he
    characterizes as a legally inconsistent jury verdict. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
    found Mr. Wallace guilty of robbery, among other charges, but not guilty of second-degree
    assault. After the verdicts were read, Mr. Wallace’s counsel objected to the alleged verdicts,9
    9
    Mr. Wallace properly raised an inconsistent verdict challenge before the circuit
    court, and the State does not argue otherwise. See McNeal v. State, 
    426 Md. 455
    , 466 (2012)
    (quoting Price v. State, 
    405 Md. 10
    , 40-42 (2008) (Harrell, J., concurring)).
    13
    and counsel for both Mr. Wallace and the State initially requested that the case be sent back
    to the jury to resolve the inconsistency. But after a brief recess, the State changed course and
    opposed Mr. Wallace’s contention of legal inconsistency. The circuit court agreed and
    declined Mr. Wallace’s request.10
    Mr. Wallace argues here that second-degree assault is a lesser-included offense of
    robbery, and therefore that the acquittal for second-degree assault was legally inconsistent
    with the guilty verdict for robbery. The State counters that the verdicts were not legally
    inconsistent because the evidence produced at trial supported two separate and distinct
    instances of assault. “We review de novo the question of whether verdicts are legally
    inconsistent. This is so because we review the elements of the offense at issue in light of the
    jury instructions.” Teixeira v. State, 
    213 Md. App. 664
    , 668 (2013).
    1.      Legally inconsistent verdicts generally
    Legally inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases are no longer acceptable in
    Maryland.11 See McNeal v. State, 
    426 Md. 455
    , 458 (2012); Price v. State, 
    405 Md. 10
    , 35
    10
    Mr. Wallace also filed a post-judgment motion to strike the inconsistent verdicts,
    but this motion was also denied. But as we explain, the error was in declining to send the
    case back to the jury for further deliberations. See Price, 
    405 Md. at 41-42
    .
    11
    For an in-depth review of the jurisprudential evolution of inconsistent verdicts, see
    Travis v. State, __ Md. App. __, No. 1174, Sept. Term 2013, at 25-44 (filed August 26,
    2014). Travis sets a useful legal backdrop for our discussion of inconsistent jury verdicts,
    but doesn’t fully answer the question before us here. That case involved a challenge to the
    consistency of verdicts issued in a bench trial, whereas this case involves purportedly
    inconsistent verdicts issued by a jury, and Travis did not turn (as this case does) on the
    number of criminal transactions pled and proven. In Travis, we cautioned that “[b]etween
    (continued...)
    14
    (2008) (Harrell, J., concurring); Teixeira, 213 Md. App. at 678-79. “A legally inconsistent
    verdict is one where the jury acts contrary to the instructions of the trial judge with regard
    to the proper application of the law.”12 McNeal, 
    426 Md. at
    458 (citing Price, 
    405 Md. at 35
    ). More specifically, “[v]erdicts where a defendant is convicted of one charge, but
    acquitted of another charge that is an essential element of the first charge, are inconsistent
    as a matter of law.”13 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    The underlying purpose of this rule is to ensure that an
    individual is not convicted of a crime on which the jury has
    actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential
    element, whether it be one element or all. A person cannot be
    convicted of a crime if a jury has necessarily decided that one of
    the essential elements was not proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Teixeira, 213 Md. App. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v.
    Muhammad, 
    17 N.Y.3d 532
    , 539 (2011)).
    11
    (...continued)
    jury trials and bench trials, . . . there are more dissimilarities than similarities in handling
    their respective inconsistencies,” id. at 53, and advised that courts should “carefully
    differentiate between the different types of inconsistency and refrain from trying to squeeze
    dissimilar problems under a single umbrella.” Id.
    12
    A legally inconsistent verdict is different than a factually inconsistent verdict.
    “Factually inconsistent verdicts are those where the charges have common facts but distinct
    legal elements and a jury acquits a defendant of one charge, but convicts him or her on
    another charge.” McNeal, 
    426 Md. at 458
     (emphasis added). Factually inconsistent verdicts,
    while illogical, are permissible.
    13
    In other words, “legally inconsistent verdicts are those where a defendant is
    acquitted of a ‘lesser included’ crime embraced within a conviction for a greater offense.”
    McNeal, 
    426 Md. at
    458 n.1.
    15
    In Price, McNeal, and Teixeira, the touchstone for determining whether verdicts were
    legally inconsistent was whether “[t]he crime for which appellant was acquitted, and the
    crime for which he was convicted, each contained elements that the other did not.” 14 McNeal
    v. State, 
    200 Md. App. 510
    , 517 (2011) (citing Tate v. State, 
    182 Md. App. 114
    , 131-32
    (2008)), aff’d, 
    426 Md. 455
     (2012). But the parties agree here (as do we) that second-degree
    assault, the charge for which Mr. Wallace was acquitted, was a lesser-included offense of
    robbery, for which he was convicted,15 so the two crimes indisputably have common
    elements.
    Instead, the question here is more one of pleading than of law: whether the two
    charges arose from one criminal transaction (as Mr. Wallace argues)—i.e., that the alleged
    14
    In Price, McNeal, and Teixeira, the analysis centered upon whether the crime for
    which the defendant was acquitted was a lesser-included offense of the crime for which the
    defendant was convicted. See Price, 
    405 Md. at 37
    ; McNeal, 
    426 Md. at 472-73
    ; Teixeira,
    213 Md. App. at 681-82.
    15
    In determining whether two offenses are the same, we apply the required evidence
    test. Snowden v. State, 
    321 Md. 612
    , 616 (1991). “‘The required evidence test focuses upon
    the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are included in the other
    offense, so that only the latter offense contains a distinct element or distinct elements,’” the
    former is a lesser-included offense of the latter. Graham v. State, 
    117 Md. App. 280
    , 288
    (1997) (quoting Snowden, 
    321 Md. at 617
    ). Applying the required evidence test, courts of
    this State have recognized that
    robbery is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Simple
    assault is a lesser included offense of both robbery and armed
    robbery. Like a little fish being eaten by a bigger fish which in
    turn is eaten by a yet bigger fish, simple assault is swallowed by
    robbery which then is swallowed by armed robbery.
    Gerald v. State, 
    299 Md. 138
    , 140-41 (1984).
    16
    assault was also the force element of the robbery—or two separate and distinct criminal
    transactions, each capable of giving rise to separate, and possibly factually inconsistent,
    verdicts (as the State contends). If one criminal act gave rise to both charges, the jury’s
    verdicts would be legally inconsistent because the jury, by acquitting him of second-degree
    assault, negated a necessary element of robbery. If, on the other hand, the jury was presented
    with two separate criminal acts, the verdicts would be, at most, factually inconsistent.
    The question of whether the charges arose from one or more than one criminal
    transaction asks essentially the same question we ask when we determine whether
    convictions merge.16 See Morris v. State, 
    192 Md. App. 1
    , 39 (2010) (“To evaluate the
    legality of the imposition of separate sentences for the same act, we look first to whether the
    charges ‘arose out of the same act or transaction,’ then to whether ‘the crimes charged are
    the same offense.’” (quoting Jones v. State, 
    357 Md. 141
    , 157 (1999))). The State bears the
    “burden of proving distinct acts or transactions for purposes of separate units of
    16
    The appellant in Dansbury v. State, 
    193 Md. App. 718
     (2010), raised the same-
    transaction issue before this Court in the inconsistent jury verdict context, but the case was
    decided on a separate and dispositive ground, so we declined to reach it there. Id. at 722.
    It is true that at least two of our pre-Price cases have held that merger is not
    appropriate when a jury has acquitted the defendant of a lesser-included charge. See Dorsey
    v. State, 
    9 Md. App. 80
    , 88 (1970) (“We have consistently held that the doctrine of merger,
    which may be applied to avoid multiple convictions at the same trial, does not apply where
    there is an acquittal of the lesser crime and a conviction of the greater crime at the same trial,
    or conversely.”); Tyler v. State, 
    5 Md. App. 158
    , 161 (1968). We wonder, in light of Price
    and its progeny, whether these cases remain good law at this point. But we need not and do
    not decide that question—we simply find the merger analysis a useful analogy for thinking
    through whether the assault at issue here is transactionally distinct from the robbery.
    17
    prosecution,” 
    id.
     (citing Snowden v. State, 
    321 Md. 612
    , 618 (1991)), and argues here that
    the testimony offered at trial supports a finding of separate instances of assault. But this
    determination “is, given the requisite convictions, foreordained before a word of testimony
    is taken.” Thompson v. State, 
    119 Md. App. 606
    , 617 (1998). “The pertinent question is not
    whether more than one assault was conceivably proved. It is whether more than one assault
    was actually charged and, if not, then which of several possible assaults was the only assault
    charged.” Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
    We addressed the same-transaction analysis at length in Morris. The defendant in that
    case was involved in a robbery and was convicted and sentenced for charges of both assault
    and robbery. 192 Md. App. at 7. There, we asked “whether appellant’s first-degree assault
    convictions were distinct acts or whether they arose out of the acts of armed robbery against
    [the victims],” id. at 40, and thus whether they should have been merged by the sentencing
    court. Instead of looking to the evidence, as the State had proposed, id. at 42, we looked to
    the indictment and jury instructions to determine whether it had been made clear to the jury
    that an act of assault separate from the one explicitly charged underlay the robbery charge.
    Id.; see also Snowden, 
    321 Md. at 619
    . We observed that “when the indictment or jury’s
    verdict reflects ambiguity as to whether the jury based its convictions on distinct acts, the
    ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Morris, 192 Md. App. at 39
    (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. State, 
    187 Md. App. 470
    , 477 (2009)). And because
    “neither the [indictment] nor the jury instructions made clear that the charges of assault were
    18
    based upon separate and distinct acts from those upon which the robbery charges were
    based,” we resolved the ambiguity in favor of the defendant, found that the assault and
    robbery arose from the same criminal transaction, and held that the sentencing court erred
    by failing to merge the assault charge into the robbery charge. Id. at 44.
    We also looked back to our earlier decisions in Gerald v. State, 
    137 Md. App. 295
    (2001), and Williams, 
    187 Md. App. 470
    , cases in which the State argued that the evidence
    introduced at trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant’s act of assault was an act
    distinct from the act of robbery at issue. See Morris, 192 Md. App. at 42-43. In Gerald, we
    rejected this argument because, again, it focused on the proof rather than the indictment:
    The court instructed the jury on the elements of each charge, but
    it did not explain how the assault and robbery charges related to
    one another, how they differed, and what the jury needed to find
    to convict under both charges. See Graham v. State, 
    117 Md. App. 280
    , 289 (1997) (no ambiguity where the court clearly
    explained the difference between the two counts at issue). . . .
    With an ambiguity in the indictment, and non-curative
    instructions, the first degree assault conviction must indeed
    merge into the robbery conviction.
    Morris, 192 Md. App. at 42 (emphasis added) (citing Gerald, 137 Md. App. at 312). We
    made the same point again in Williams:
    “[Defendant’s] charging document is ambiguous as to the
    particular act for which he was charged with first degree assault
    of [the victim]. See Gerald, 137 Md. App. at 312 (conviction
    for first degree assault merges into a conviction for robbery with
    a dangerous and deadly weapon when the charging document is
    ambiguous as to the particular act alleged to have constituted
    first degree assault). Moreover, the court did not instruct the
    jury as to ‘how the assault and robbery charges related to one
    19
    another, how they differed, and what the jury needed to find to
    convict under both charges.’ Id. (citations omitted). In light of
    the court’s failure to give curative instructions, and the
    ambiguity of [defendant’s] charging document, we must resolve
    the question of whether the charges of robbery and assault of
    [the victim] were based upon the same conduct in [defendant’s]
    favor. Id.”
    Morris, 192 Md. App. at 43 (emphasis added) (quoting Williams, 187 Md. App. at 477).
    Put another way,
    “If the facts could somehow support a finding that there was [an
    assault] in this case unrelated to the robbery . . . the short answer
    is that such an unrelated [assault] was never charged. If a single
    [assault] count could somehow support either of two separate
    [assaults] but not both, then we would have vagueness problems
    and double jeopardy problems that are mind-boggling.”
    Thompson, 119 Md. App. at 620 (quoting Snowden v. State, 
    76 Md. App. 738
    , 752 (1988),
    (Moylan, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 
    321 Md. 612
     (1991)).
    In this case, the State argues that the jury could have inferred from the evidence
    introduced at trial that the act underlying Mr. Wallace’s second-degree assault charge was
    an act distinct from the robbery of Mr. Womack.17 Simply put, the separate assault was never
    17
    This despite the fact that the State’s own closing argument illustrated the ambiguity:
    The Judge just instructed you on the offenses the
    defendant is charged with. You have here the verdict sheet in
    front of you. Second degree assault is one of the offenses.
    Second degree assault is causing physical harm or offensive
    physical contact to another.
    There is your second degree assault right there. Hitting
    (continued...)
    20
    charged. But the indictment is ambiguous as to the particular act giving rise to the second-
    degree assault charge.18 And we see no curative instruction to the jury explaining “how the
    17
    (...continued)
    him, pushing him down on the grounds, hurting his eye, hurting
    his knee.
    ***
    And then the robbery. Robbery is the taking of property
    by force. We know we have the taking of property covered, and
    the force we know pushing him down to the ground, hitting him,
    and pointing a gun at him, all the things that create force.
    (T2.30-33)
    (Emphasis added.) Even the State doesn’t argue that the charging documents or jury
    instructions identified two separate and distinct acts, however.
    18
    The indictment read as follows:
    THE GRAND JURORS FOR THE BODY OF PRINCE
    GEORGE’S COUNTY, ON THEIR OATH DO PRESENT
    THAT BRANDON BERNARD WALLACE ON OR ABOUT
    THE 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND
    ELEVEN, IN PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
    DID FELONIOUSLY ROB MATTHEW LAWRENCE
    WOMACK OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TO INCLUDE
    CELLULAR PHONE, TD BANK CARD, JACKET AND
    BAG, IN VIOLATION OF § 3-402 OF THE CRIMINAL
    LAW ARTICLE AGAINST THE PEACE, GOVERNMENT
    AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE. (ROBBERY)
    ***
    THE GRAND JURORS FOR THE BODY OF PRINCE
    GEORGE’S COUNTY, ON THEIR OATH DO PRESENT
    THAT BRANDON BERNARD WALLACE ON OR ABOUT
    THE 4TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, TWO THOUSAND AND
    (continued...)
    21
    assault and robbery charges related to one another, how they differed, and what the jury
    needed to find to convict under both charges.”
    19 Morris, 192
     Md. App. at 43 (internal
    18
    (...continued)
    ELEVEN, IN PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND
    ASSAULTED MATTHEW LAWRENCE WOMACK IN THE
    SECOND DEGREE, IN VIOLATION OF § 3-203 OF THE
    CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE AGAINST THE PEACE,
    GOVERNMENT AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE. (2ND
    DEGREE ASSAULT)
    19
    The jury instructions read as follows:
    MPJI-Cr 4:01: SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT
    The defendant is charged with the crime of assault.
    Assault is causing offensive physical contact and/or physical
    harm to another person. In order to convict the defendant of
    assault, the State must prove:
    (1) that the defendant caused offensive physical contact with
    and/or physical harm to Matthew Lawrence Womack; and
    (2) that the contact was the result of an intentional or reckless
    act of the defendant and was not accidental.
    ***
    MPJI-Cr 4:28: ROBBERY
    A
    TAKING AND CARRYING AWAY
    The defendant is charged with the crime of robbery. Robbery is
    the taking and carrying away of property from someone else by
    force or threat of force, with the intent to deprive the victim of
    the property. In order to convict the defendant of robbery, the
    State must prove:
    (1) that the defendant took the property from Matthew Lawrence
    Womack;
    (2) that the defendant took the property by force or threat of
    force; and
    (continued...)
    22
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 187 Md. App. at 477); see also Snowden, 
    321 Md. at 619
     (recognizing that had the case before it been a jury trial, it “could have looked to
    the judge’s instructions in hope of illuminating the rationale behind the verdicts”);
    Thompson, 119 Md. App. at 611 (requiring the separate assault offenses to be “clearly and
    distinctly charged as part of the Grand Jury indictment”).
    In accordance with Morris, Gerald, Williams, and Thompson, and in light of the
    ambiguities apparent in the indictment and jury instructions, we hold that Mr. Wallace’s
    second-degree assault and robbery charges arose from the same criminal transaction. And
    because the elements of second-degree assault are included within the greater offense of
    robbery, the acquittal on the second-degree assault charge was legally inconsistent with the
    guilty robbery verdict, and the circuit court erred in accepting those legally inconsistent
    verdicts. The conviction imposed for robbery must be vacated, and we remand for further
    proceedings.
    19
    (...continued)
    (3) that the defendant intended to deprive Matthew Lawrence
    Womack of the property.
    Property means anything of value. Deprive means to withhold
    property of another permanently, for such a period as to
    appropriate a portion of its value, with the purpose of restoring
    it only upon payment of a reward or other compensation, or to
    dispose of the property and use or deal with the property so as
    to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
    23
    CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY VACATED
    AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL;
    JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
    FO R PRINCE G EO RG E’S CO UNTY
    AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
    CO STS TO BE DIVIDED EVENLY
    BETWEEN APPELLANT AND PRINCE
    GEORGE’S COUNTY.
    24