Wheeling v. Selene Finance, LP ( 2020 )

Whitney Wheeling, et al. v. Selene Finance LP, et al. No. 2128, September Term 2017
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
REAL PROPERTY – SELF HELP – THREATENING TO TAKE POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY
Real Property § 7-113(b)(2)(ii) permits a party to use non-judicial self-help to gain
possession of residential real property if, and only if, the party is (1) a party claiming the
right possession, as that term is defined in the statute; (2) reasonably believes the resident
has abandoned or surrendered possession of the property; (3) has a basis for that reasonable
belief based on a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status of the property; (4) provides
notice to the resident(s) of the property as provided in subsection (c) of the statute; and (5)
receives no responsive communication to that notice within 15 days after the later of
posting or mailing the notice as required by subsection (c) of the statute.
Subsection (d) of Real Prop. § 7-113 provides a cause of action for violations of
subsection (b), and allows a resident to recover (i) possession of the property, if no other
person then resides in the property; (ii) actual damages; and (iii) reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs.
The remedies of subsection (d) are available to a resident only when the party seeking
possession locks a protected person out of the property, intentionally terminates or
diminishes utility, water and sewer and similar services to the property, or takes any other
action which deprives a protected resident of actual possession of the property. “Any other
action” could include posting an abandonment notice without first conducting the
“reasonable inquiry” required by subsections (b) and (c) of § 7-113 if, as a result of
abandonment notice, a protected person vacates the property.
The operative complaint in this case alleged that defendants Selene Finance and Gina
Gargeu did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status of the properties of
the plaintiffs, Eric and Whitney Wheeling, and Joanne Rodriguez, before posting an
abandonment notice. Further, Selene Finance was not a “party claiming the right of
possession” as to the Wheelings because it had not initiated foreclosure proceedings against
the Wheelings’ property. However, neither the Wheelings nor Rodriguez were actually
deprived of their property nor did the complaint allege that Selene Finance and Gargeu
locked them out, terminated or diminished utility, water and sewer and similar services, or
took any other action which deprived them of actual possession. The statutory cause of
action of § 7-113(d) does not extend to them.
MARYLAND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT – PLEADING DAMAGES
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) (codified in Commercial Law §
13-101 et seq.) prohibits unfair, abusive, and deceptive trade practices in the collection of
consumer debts. Com. Law § 13-303. The general rule for pleading damages, pursuant to
Md. Rule 2-203(b) provides that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required. A pleading shall contain only such
statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground
of defense.” However, the MCPA contains a heightened pleading requirement for claims
made under that statute, in that damages for emotional distress must be accompanied by
observable physical manifestations. See Sager v. Housing Commission of Anne Arundel
County, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 548–49 (D. Md. 2012).
In their amended complaint, appellants alleged that they suffered “emotional damages
and losses with physical manifestations such as fear (of losing their home), anxiety (with
the threat of eviction through no fault of their own), [and] anger.” Additionally, appellants
alleged that they “incurred legal fees to know her rights as a former owner of the property
based on Selene’s and Gargeu’s deceptive eviction threats[.]”
While these allegations may have satisfied the general pleading requirement of Md.
Rule 2-203(b), they did sufficiently plead any observable physical manifestations of their
emotional distress. The operative complaint did not allege that appellants manifested any
observable physical manifestations of the emotional distress caused by Selene. Rather, the
allegations regarding emotional distress amount to nothing more than assertions that
Selene’s actions upset them. The MPCA requires more in order for a complaint to survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
2
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-17-000996
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 2128
September Term, 2017
____________________________________
WHITNEY WHEELING, ET AL.
v.
SELENE FINANCE LP, ET AL.
____________________________________
Kehoe,
Berger,
Reed,
JJ.
____________________________________
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
____________________________________
Filed: May 29, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
is authentic.
Suzanne Johnson
2020-10-23 14:36-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
In 2013, the General Assembly enacted Md. Code, § 7-113 of the Real Property Article
to restrict the use of self-help in certain kinds of residential evictions. Eric Wheeling,
Whitney Wheeling, and Joanne Rodriguez filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against Selene Finance LP and Gina Gargeu (doing business as Century 21 Downtown),
alleging that they had violated § 7-113 in their efforts to obtain possession of two
residential properties. The Wheelings and Rodriguez also asserted that Selene’s actions
violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (the “MCPA”), codified at Md. Code,
§ 13-101, et seq., of the Commercial Law Article. Selene and Gargeu filed motions to
dismiss appellants’ amended complaint on the basis that it failed to state a cause of action.
The circuit court granted both motions. Appellants noted this timely appeal and raise three
issues, which we have rephrased:
1. Did the circuit court err in ruling that appellants failed to plead a claim
pursuant to the statutory cause of action established by Real Prop. § 7-113?
2. Did the circuit court err in ruling that appellants failed to plead a claim
under the MCPA?
3. Did the circuit court err in ruling that appellants failed to adequately plead
that they suffered actual injuries as a result of Selene’s and Gargeu’s actions?
Although we see things a bit differently than did the circuit court, we will affirm its
judgment. The amended complaint alleges facts which, if proven, establish that Selene and
Gargeu violated § 7-113. However, the cause of action established by the statute extends
only to cases in which a defendant has locked the plaintiff out of the property, intentionally
terminates or diminishes utility, water and sewer and similar services to the property, or
takes any other action which deprives a resident of actual possession of the property. The
amended complaint does not assert that any of these things happened in this case. Assuming
for purposes of analysis that Selene’s actions violated the MCPA, the amended complaint
fails to allege damages with the specificity required for private causes of action under that
statute.
Background
The Wheeling Claim
Donna Poole owns a residential property in Anne Arundel County. At the time the
events discussed herein took place, Eric and Whitney Wheeling, along with their children,
were tenants on the property. We will refer to this property as the “Wheeling property.”
Prior to the Wheelings’ tenancy, Poole purchased the property through a mortgage loan
with CitiMortgage, Inc. When Poole defaulted on that loan in 2013, the loan was acquired
by Christiana Trust, as trustee for Normandy Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2013-9.
Selene Finance LP is a mortgage lender and servicer licensed to operate in Maryland.
Selene acted as Normandy Mortgage’s servicer for Poole’s mortgage. On May 15, 2015,
Selene posted a notice on the Wheeling property in accordance with Real Prop. § 7-113(c).
The notice stated:
IMPORTANT NOTICE ABOUT EVICTION
A PERSON WHO CLAIMS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS THIS PROPERTY
BELIEVES THAT THIS PROPERTY IS ABANDONED. IF YOU ARE
CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE PROPERTY, YOU MUST
IMMEDIATELY CONTACT:
2
Selene Finance
NAME
9990 Richmond Avenue, Suite 400 S.
Houston, TX 77042
ADDRESS
(877) 768-3759
TELEPHONE
5/15/15
DATE OF THIS NOTICE
IF YOU DO NOT CONTACT THE PERSON LISTED ABOVE WITHIN
15 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, THE PERSON
CLAIMING POSSESSION MAY CONSIDER THE PROPERTY
ABANDONED AND SEEK TO SECURE THE PROEPRTY, INCLUDING
CHANGING THE LOCKS WITHOUT A COURT ORDER.
We will refer to this document as an “abandonment notice.”
The amended complaint alleged that, after Mr. Wheeling read the abandonment notice,
he telephoned Selene on May 19, 2015. A representative of Selene told him that foreclosure
proceedings had been initiated against the property, that Selene understood the property
was abandoned because it was not owner-occupied, and that the Wheelings had to vacate
the property by June 1, 2015, or else Selene would change the locks. However, the
representative refused to provide any details of the alleged foreclosure proceedings to Mr.
Wheeling because he was not the owner of the property. Additionally, the amended
complaint alleged that neither Selene nor Normandy Mortgage had initiated foreclosure
proceedings against Poole when the abandonment notice was posted and, indeed, never did
so. According to the amended complaint, at the time that the abandonment notice was
posted, Poole was negotiating with Selene for a short sale of the property and had been
informed by Selene that her property was not subject to a foreclosure.
3
The amended complaint also alleged that, as a result of both the abandonment notice
and the statements made by Selene’s representative, the Wheelings suffered emotional
distress and incurred attorney’s fees by contacting an attorney to seek legal advice about
their rights as tenants.
The amended complaint did not allege that the Wheelings vacated the home as a result
of Selene’s actions, nor did it allege that Selene took any steps other than posting the
abandonment notice to force or induce them to move.
The Rodriguez Claim
The second property at issue in this appeal is located in Baltimore City and was owned
by Joanne Rodriguez during the relevant period (the “Rodriguez property”). Rodriguez
purchased the property in 2008 through a mortgage backed by a federal housing program.
After she was unable to make timely payments, the loan went into default and was
eventually transferred to Sunset Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2014-1.
Selene, acting on behalf of Sunset Mortgage, filed a foreclosure action against the
Rodriguez property. Sunset Mortgage was the successful bidder at the foreclosure auction
and acquired the property for $42,000. The sale was ratified in September 2016.
In February 2017, Selene contracted with Century 21 Downtown, a real estate
brokerage company operated by Gina Gargeu. Acting as Selene’s agent, Gargeu scheduled
a sheriff’s eviction for the Rodriguez property on March 28, 2017. On February 10, the
sheriff posted a notice on the property informing the occupants that they would be evicted
pursuant to a court order on March 28, 2017.
4
A little less than two weeks later, on February 22, Gargeu posted an abandonment notice
on the Rodriguez property that was identical to the notice posted on the Wheeling property,
but for differences in names, addresses, and other incidental information. The amended
complaint alleged that Rodriguez learned about the abandonment notice through her
neighbor, Dermot Delude-Dix. After seeing the abandonment notice, Delude-Dix called
Gargeu and told her that Rodriguez still occupied the property. Rodriguez also alleged that
she consulted an attorney to learn about her rights. Despite the scheduled eviction date and
the abandonment notice, Rodriguez was never evicted from the property. The amended
complaint did not allege that Rodriguez vacated the home as a result of Selene’s and
Gargeu’s actions, or that Selene or Gargeu took any steps other than posting the
abandonment notice to force or induce them to move. The amended complaint alleged that
Rodriguez, like the Wheelings, suffered emotional distress and incurred legal fees as a
result of the posting of the abandonment notice.
The Current Action
On March 1, 2017, appellants filed a joint complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of persons similarly situated. On May
30, 2017, they filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint asserted two claims
against Selene and Gargeu. First, the complaint alleged that Selene and Gargeu violated
Real Prop. § 7-113(b) by making threats of eviction without first making a reasonable
inquiry as to whether the properties were, in fact, abandoned. Second, the complaint alleged
that Selene and Gargeu violated the MCPA by threatening to take possession of their
properties by way of the abandonment notices. Appellants asked the court to certify their
5
claims as a class action, to grant declaratory and injunctive relief, and to award them
monetary damages and attorneys’ fees.1
Gargeu and Selene filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
On August 8, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss. Selene
and Gargeu argued that: (1) they were not liable under Real Prop. § 7-113 because the
abandonment notices did not constitute a “threat” as defined in that statute; (2) the MCPA
did not apply in this case because (a) the appellants are not “consumers” as defined in the
MCPA, and (b) posting an abandonment notice on a residence is not a collection activity
within the provisions of the MCPA; (3) Selene, as a licensed mortgage lender, was exempt
from the provisions of the MCPA; and (4) appellants did not sufficiently plead damages in
their complaint and could not show any accompanying physical manifestations of that
distress.
Appellants responded that § 7-113 requires a party who posts an abandonment notice
to first make a reasonable inquiry as to the occupancy status of the property, and that Selene
and Gargeu failed to do this before posting the abandonment notices. Appellants pointed
out that the amended complaint alleged that both properties were inhabited at the time the
1
Appellants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, requesting that the court
find that “the threats of eviction on behalf of an unlicensed collection agency is not
permitted under Maryland law.” A hearing on that motion was held on July 19, 2017. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the motions court held the case sub curia to reserve on ruling
until after the hearing on the motions to dismiss. The motions were rendered moot when
the circuit court granted the motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
6
abandonment notices were posted. For example, Rodriguez appeared at the foreclosure
proceedings concerning her property, and so, as a result, Selene was on notice that the
property was, in fact, occupied. The alleged failures by Selene and Gargeu to conduct
reasonable inquiries, appellants argued, caused damages, and the case should go to the trier
of fact to resolve these issues. Moreover, appellants asserted that Selene did not have a
basis for posting the abandonment notice to the Wheeling property under Real Prop. § 7-
113 because it did not qualify as a “party claiming possession” as defined in subsection (a)
of that statute.
Appellants also elaborated on their claim for damages for emotional distress. They
asserted that the MCPA allows for non-economic damages, and their counsel told the court
that:
[W]e’ve pled physical manifestations, what’s required under Maryland law
is reasonable objectifiable information. And we’ve provided multiple
characteristics of the physical manifestation. At this stage, that’s all that’s
sufficient for notice pleading for actual damages. We’ve also pled that each
Plaintiff’s incurred expense to make legal inquiries as to what their rights
were. I mean that’s an economic damage. . . . But in any event, we’ve pled
proper damages.
On December 4, 2017, the circuit court granted both motions to dismiss without leave
to amend. The court concluded that the abandonment notices posted by Selene and Gargeu
conformed with the provisions of Real Prop. § 7-113. As to Selene, the court concluded
that the amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts which state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because appellants were not evicted or otherwise deprived of their
property, and so did not suffer an objectively identifiable actual injury. As to Gargeu, the
7
court concluded the MCPA did not apply to her because Com. Law § 13-104 exempts real
estate brokers from the provisions of the MCPA.2
This timely appeal followed.
Analysis
Under Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2), the court may dismiss a complaint if it fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss is properly granted if the
factual allegations in a complaint, if proven, would not provide a legally sufficient basis
for the cause of action asserted in the complaint. Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2). “Dismissal is
proper only if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would, if proven,
2
The court’s ruling as to the MCPA’s application to Gargeu was superfluous. The
MCPA claim in the amended complaint explicitly stated that it applied only to Selene. In
their brief submitted to this Court, appellants’ MCPA arguments are again directed only at
Selene. For reasons that aren’t clear from the record, the circuit court nonetheless stated in
its order dismissing appellants’ MCPA claims that the MCPA does not apply to Gargeu by
virtue of her profession as a real estate broker. See Com. Law § 13-104(1) (“This title does
not apply to . . . [t]he professional services of a real estate broker, associate real estate
broker, or real estate salesperson . . . .”).
To the extent that appellants do assert an MCPA claim against Gargeu, the court’s
ruling has not been challenged on appeal. With that said, the circuit court’s application of
the categorial exemption to real estate brokers from the MCPA without further analysis
may be problematic under the facts alleged in the amended complaint. See Andrews &
Lawrence Professional Services, LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126, 156 (2020) (In deciding
whether Com. Law § 13-104(1)’s exemption to “lawyers” applied to the activities of the
law firm at issue in the case, the Court distinguished between services that require a
professional license, which are exempt, from those that were performed by the law firm
but may also “be performed by any collection agency,” which are not.) For the purposes of
our analysis, we need not address whether a license as a real estate broker or associate
broker is required to post an abandonment notice.
8
nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.” Allied Investment Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md.
547, 555 (1999) (cleaned up).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as
all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from them.” O’Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc.
v. City of Salisbury, 447 Md. 394, 404 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further,
we view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Davis v. Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC, 457 Md. 275, 284 (2018).
1. The Real Prop. § 7-113 Claims
A. The Statute
Appellants assert that Selene and Gargeu violated the provisions of Real Prop. § 7-113
and that the cause of action established in subsection (d) of the statute provides them with
a remedy. We agree, but only in part. As we will explain, the allegations in the amended
complaint, if proven, show that Selene and Gargeu violated § 7-113. But the scope of the
statutory remedy is not as broad as appellants contend.
Our analysis starts with the statute. Section 7-113 states, in pertinent part (emphasis
added):
(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Party claiming the right to possession” means a person or successor
to any person who:
(i) Does not have actual possession of a residential property; and
(ii) Has or claims to have a legal right to possession of the residential
property:
1. By the terms of a contract or foreclosure sale;
9
* * *
(3)(i) “Protected resident” means an owner or former owner in
actual possession of residential property.
(ii) “Protected resident” includes a grantee, tenant, subtenant, or other
person in actual possession by, through, or under an owner or former
owner of residential property.
* * *
(5) “Threaten to take possession” means using words or actions intended
to convince a reasonable person that a party claiming the right to
possession intends to take imminent possession of residential property in
violation of this section.
* * *
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a party
claiming the right to possession may not take possession or threaten to take
possession of residential property from a protected resident by:
(i) Locking the resident out of the residential property;
(ii) Engaging in willful diminution of services to the protected resident;
or
(iii) Taking any other action that deprives the protected resident of
actual possession.
(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, a party
claiming the right to possession may take possession of residential
property from a protected resident only in accordance with a writ of
possession issued by a court and executed by a sheriff or constable.
(ii) A party claiming the right to possession of residential property may
use nonjudicial self-help to take possession of the property, if the party:
1. Reasonably believes the protected resident has abandoned or
surrendered possession of the property based on a reasonable
inquiry into the occupancy status of the property;
2. Provides notice as provided in subsection (c) of this section; and
3. Receives no responsive communication to that notice within 15
days after the later of posting or mailing the notice as required by
subsection (c) of this section.
(c)(1) If a party claiming the right to possession of residential property
reasonably believes, based on a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status
of the property, that all protected residents have abandoned or surrendered
possession of the residential property, the party claiming the right to
10
possession may post on the front door of the residential property and mail by
first-class mail addressed to “all occupants” at the address of the residential
property a written notice in substantially the following form:
“IMPORTANT NOTICE ABOUT EVICTION
A person who claims the right to possess this property believes that this
property is abandoned. If you are currently residing in the property, you must
immediately contact:
______________________________
Name
______________________________
Address
______________________________
Telephone
______________________________
Date of this notice
If you do not contact the person listed above within 15 days after the date of
this notice, the person claiming possession may consider the property
abandoned and seek to secure the property, including changing the locks
without a court order.”.
* * *
(d)(1) If in any proceeding the court finds that a party claiming the right to
possession violated subsection (b) of this section, the protected resident may
recover:
(i) Possession of the property, if no other person then resides in the
property;
(ii) Actual damages; and
(iii) Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
(2) The remedies set forth in this subsection are not exclusive.
(e) This section does not apply if the parties are governed by Title 8,
Subtitle 2, or Title 8A of this article.[3]
Real Prop. § 7-113 was enacted by 2013 Maryland Laws Ch. 514, § 1 (S.B. 642, eff.
3
Title 8, Subtitle 2 of the Real Property Article pertains to residential leases. Title 8A
is concerned with leases in mobile home parks.
11
June 1, 2013).4
The legislative history indicates that the statute was a direct response to the holding of
the Court of Appeals in Nickens v. Mount Vernon Realty Group, 429 Md. 53 (2012). See
Fiscal and Policy Note for S.B. 642 (2013 Session). The property at issue in Nickens was
sold in a foreclosure sale. 429 Md. at 59. The purchaser hired Mount Vernon to act as the
property manager for the property. Id. In that capacity, Mount Vernon told Nickens, who
was living on the property, that it intended to enter the property and remove his possessions
unless he moved out. Id. Nickens did not vacate, and, while he was away, Mount Vernon
4
The title to Chapter 514 states that the statute was enacted:
for the purpose of prohibiting a party claiming the right to possession from
taking possession or threatening to take possession of residential property
from a certain protected resident in a certain manner[, and] prohibiting a
landlord from taking possession or threatening to take possession of a
dwelling unit from a tenant or tenant holding over in a certain manner . . . .
Although uncodified, “the title of an act is relevant to ascertainment of its intent and
purpose[.]” Yonga v. State, 221 Md. App. 45, 63 (2015), aff’d, 446 Md. 183 (2016),
superseded by statute as noted in State v. Smith, 244 Md. App. 354, 376 n.5 (2020) (quoting
MTA v Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 695–96 (1973).
The Maryland Constitution requires that every law enacted by the General Assembly
include a descriptive title. Maryland Constitution Art. III, § 29. Among the functions of a
title are advising the legislature and the public of the subject matter and the purpose of the
proposed legislation. Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution A Reference Guide
106–10 (2006) (citing, among other cases, Originz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 398 (1987) and
Allied Am. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 614–15
(1959)). See also Commissioners of Carroll County v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384, 395 (1979),
abrogated on other grounds by Maryland Overpak Corp. v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 395 Md. 16 (2006) (The purpose of Article III § 29 “is to inform the members
of the General Assembly and the public of the nature of the proposed legislation.”)
12
entered the property, changed the locks, disposed of Nickens’s possessions, and posted a
“No Trespassing” sign. Id. at 59–60.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Mount Vernon’s use of the common-law remedy of
self-help and held that doing so was reasonable in light of the circumstances. Id. at 62.
Tracing the origins of the self-help remedy and its development in Maryland, the Court
reasoned that “even if no notice was given, we hold that notice is not required in order to
exercise peaceable self-help” because doing so “is entirely compatible with a desire to
avoid a confrontation possibly leading to violence.” Id. at 72–73.
In response to the Court’s holding in Nickens, the General Assembly passed § 7-113
which significantly limited the scope of self-help in situations involving residential
properties. Under § 7-113, the general rule is that “possession may only be taken from a
protected resident in accordance with a writ of possession issued by a court and executed
by a sheriff or constable . . . .” Fiscal and Policy Note for S.B. 642 (2013 Session).
However, the statute contains an exception: a party seeking possession of a property that
appears to be abandoned may do so after reasonable inquiry and posting the prescribed
notice.
B. The Parties’ Contentions
Against this backdrop, appellants present two arguments as to why the circuit court
erred in dismissing their claim under Real Prop. § 7-113. Their arguments begin with the
13
premise that both the Wheelings and Rodriguez are “protected residents” for the purposes
of § 7-113. Selene and Gargeu did not assert to the contrary.5
Appellants claim that Selene does not qualify as a “party claiming possession” as that
term is defined in § 7-113(a)(2) as to the Wheeling property because neither Selene nor
Normandy Mortgage filed a foreclosure action, obtained a court order granting possession,
or had a contractual right to possess the property. For that reason, Selene had no right to
utilize the self-help provisions of § 7-113 to take possession of the Wheeling property.
Moreover, appellants argue that Selene and Gargeu violated Real Prop. § 7-113(b) by
posting the abandonment notices without first conducting reasonable inquiries as to
whether either property was occupied. According to appellants’ reading of the statute,
conducting a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status of a residential property is a
prerequisite to posting an abandonment notice, and the failure of a party claiming the right
of possession to do so gives rise to a cause of action under subsection (d). Appellants point
to factual allegations in their complaint showing that no reasonable inquiry was conducted,
such as the fact that the owners of both properties had been in contact with Selene during
the time the abandonment notices were posted. Further, appellants maintain that the mere
posting the notice itself “cannot substitute for or supplant the requisite inquiry.” Appellants
5
The Wheelings claim protected-resident status because they leased the property from
its owner, Poole, and were occupying it. Rodriguez asserts that she is a protected resident
because she was the owner of her property and was in actual possession of it at the time
that the abandonment notice was posted.
14
acknowledge that the abandonment notices otherwise conformed with the requirements of
Real Prop. § 7-113(c)(1).
Selene and Gargeu present two arguments in response. 6 First, they assert that Real
Prop. § 7-113 provides no avenue of relief for appellants. They characterize appellants’
amended complaint as stating a claim under subsection (c) of Real Prop. § 7-113, and not
subsection (b) of that statute. Selene and Gargeu do not deny that remedies are available in
Real Prop. § 7-113 through subsection (d). However, according to them, the subsection (d)
remedies are available only to persons injured when the party seeking possession actually
locks a protected resident out, actually willfully diminishes services to the resident, or
actually takes “any other action to deprive the protected resident of actual possession.” See
§ 7-113(b)(i)–(iii). Selene and Gargeu contend that, because the amended complaint does
not allege that any of these occurred with regard to appellants, they are not entitled to any
relief under subsection (d).7
C. The Proper Interpretation of Section 7-113
The parties’ contentions require us to engage in a statutory analysis of § 7-113.
Statutory construction involves:
an examination of the statutory text in context, a review of legislative history
to confirm conclusions or resolve questions from that examination, and a
6
Selene and Gargeu filed separate briefs on appeal, but they make similar arguments
as to the issues and have incorporated one another’s arguments in their briefs.
7
Appellees also contend that appellants did not plead facts which showed that they
suffered actual injuries. It isn’t necessary for us to address this contention in the context of
Real Prop. § 7-113.
15
consideration of the consequences of alternative readings. “Text is the plain
language of the relevant provision, typically given its ordinary meaning,
viewed in context, considered in light of the whole statute, and generally
evaluated for ambiguity. Legislative purpose, either apparent from the text
or gathered from external sources, often informs, if not controls, our reading
of the statute. An examination of interpretive consequences, either as a
comparison of the results of each proffered construction, or as a principle of
avoidance of an absurd or unreasonable reading, grounds the court’s
interpretation in reality.”
Blue v. Prince George’s County, 434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) (quoting Town of Oxford v.
Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 585–86 (2012), aff’d, 431 Md. 14 (2013)).
The prime directive to those who engage in statutory construction is “‘to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intention.’” McKay v. Department of Public Safety, 150 Md. App.
182, 193 (2003) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128
(2000)). “The overarching rule is that, in construing statutes, ‘our primary goal is always
‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied
by a particular provision . . . .’” Opert v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 403 Md.
587, 593 (2008) (quoting Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 (2007)).
The Court of Appeals has recently provided us with a concise framework for
conducting a statutory construction analysis:
[W]e begin with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular
understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its
terminology. When the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and
unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read
as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by
searching for legislative intent in other indicia. Moreover, after determining
a statute is ambiguous, we consider the common meaning and effect of
statutory language in light of the objectives and purpose of the statute and
Legislative intent.
16
Even in instances when the language is unambiguous, it is useful to review
legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate
another version of legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.
Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 (2018) (cleaned up).
As we have explained, Selene and Gargeu do not dispute that a cause of action exists
for violations of Real Prop. § 7-113. However, they assert that the cause of action
established in subsection (d) applies only in cases in which the party seeking possession
locks the resident out of the property, terminates utilities or other services to the resident,
or otherwise takes “any other action that deprives the protected resident of actual
possession.” Although we do not fully agree with appellees’ reading of the statute, we
conclude that the cause of action established by subsection (d) does not apply in this case.
Explaining why requires us to look more closely at subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the
statute to discern the ways that the General Assembly intended these provisions to work
together.
In our view, subsection (b) of § 7-113 serves two purposes. First, it sets out the general
rule that a party claiming possession of a residential property may only do so by means of
a writ of possession issued by a court and served by a sheriff or constable. See Real Prop.
§ 7-113(b)(2)(i). In furtherance of that end, subsection (b) prohibits a party claiming a right
to possession from taking possession or threatening to take possession by committing any
one of three enumerated acts: “locking the resident out of the residential property; engaging
in willful diminution of services to the protected resident; or taking any other action that
deprives the protected resident of actual possession.” Real Prop. § 7-113(b)(1). This part
of subsection (b) appears to be directed at the Court of Appeals’ holding in Nickens.
17
Second, subsection (b) carves out a limited exception to the requirement that
possession can only be acquired through a court-issued writ of possession. Subsection
(b)(2)(ii) sets out a means for a party claiming possession of a residential property to
acquire possession through nonjudicial self-help if the property is abandoned. Specifically,
a party claiming possession may use self-help if the party (emphasis added):
1. Reasonably believes the protected resident has abandoned or surrendered
possession of the property based on a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy
status of the property;
2. Provides notice as provided in subsection (c) of this section; and
3. Receives no responsive communication to that notice within 15 days after
the later of posting or mailing the notice as required by subsection (c) of this
section.”
Real Prop. § 7-113(b)(2)(ii).
The legislative intent is made clearer still in subsection (c), which reiterates the
requirement that self-help is available only after reasonable inquiry.8
From this, we conclude what is obvious: it was the intent of the General Assembly that
the first step in the posting process is a reasonable inquiry by the party seeking possession
8
Subsection (c) requires that (emphasis added):
If a party claiming the right to possession of residential property reasonably
believes, based on a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status of the
property, that all protected residents have abandoned or surrendered
possession of the residential property, the party claiming the right to
possession may post on the front door of the residential property and mail by
first-class mail addressed to “all occupants” at the address of the residential
property a written notice in substantially the following form . . . .
Real Prop. § 7-113(c)(1).
18
as to the occupancy status of the property. If, based on that inquiry, the party reasonably
believes the property is abandoned, the party may post the notice. Because this is an
exception to the general rule prohibiting self-help, we assume that the General Assembly
intended that the exception’s requirements be strictly adhered to. See Arthur E. Selnick
Associates, Inc. v. Howard County, 206 Md. App. 667, 694 (2012) (“A court may not as a
general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or
insert exceptions not made by the legislature.” (cleaned up)); see also Lee v. Cline, 384
Md. 245, 256 (2004) (The Court of Appeals “has been most reluctant to recognize
exceptions in a statute when there is no basis for the exceptions in the statutory language.”).
Implicit in Selene’s and Gargeu’s arguments regarding § 7-113 is the notion that
subsections (b) and (c) should be read in isolation from one another. We do not agree.
Subsection (b) provides a limited right of self-help in certain circumstances and subsection
(c) sets out what a party seeking possession must do to exercise that right. Subsection (b)
explicitly refers to subsection (c), and the two subsections dovetail exactly. Were we to
cabin the two sections from one another, we would ignore a fundamental principle of
statutory construction, namely, to read “the statutory text in context.” Blue, 434 Md. at 689.
Moreover, subsection (b)(2)(ii)(1) unquestionably mandates that, before a person
claiming possession may resort to nonjudicial self-help by posting notice under subsection
(c), the person must make “a reasonable inquiry into the occupancy status of the property,”
in addition to the other two requirements listed. That making a reasonable inquiry is a
prerequisite to lawfully engaging in self-help demonstrates that a party who fails to do so
before posting an abandonment notice violates § 7-113(b). To conclude otherwise would
19
turn the reasonable-inquiry requirement into meaningless surplusage. So, while it is true
that, other than posting the abandonment notices, neither Selene nor Gargeu took steps to
dispossess the Wheelings or Rodriguez, they did not need to do so to violate Section 7-
113(b). This comports with the General Assembly’s intent in enacting Section 7-113 as a
response to Nickens to limit a foreclosure purchaser’s ability to engage in self-help.
Therefore, it is clear to us that a party claiming a right of possession violates subsection (b)
by posting an abandonment notice without first making a reasonable inquiry into the status
of the property.9
This brings us to the crux of Selene’s and Gargeu’s § 7-113 argument, namely, that the
cause of action established in subsection (d) does not extend to them in this case because
they did not actually lock any of the appellants out of their residences, actually diminish
services to appellants, or otherwise take “any other action to deprive [appellants] of actual
9
That leaves us with the Wheelings’ alternative contention that it was inappropriate
for Selene to attempt to use the provisions of Real Prop. § 7-113 to obtain possession of
the property that they were renting because Selene was not a “party claiming the right of
possession” as defined in that statute. We agree with the Wheelings.
In relevant part, § 7-113(a)(2) defines a “party claiming the right of possession” as a
party not in actual possession of the property, but who has a legal right to possess the
property because of the terms of foreclosure proceeding. According to the amended
complaint, Selene did not satisfy this requirement for the simple reason that no foreclosure
was ever filed against the Wheeling property.
It is true that § 7-113 does not address whether it applies to an entity (such as Selene
in the present case) that is not a party claiming the right of possession (as that term is
defined in § 7-113(a)(2)) but nevertheless seeks to use subsections (b) and (c) to gain
possession of the property. This question is an academic one in this appeal because Selene
concedes that Real Prop. § 7-113 applies to it.
20
possession.” See § 7-113(b)(i)–(iii). Appellees’ proffered interpretation of subsection (d)
is not quite consistent with the plain language of the statute. Subsection (d) establishes a
remedy for violations of “subsection (b)” and not only for violations of “subsection (b)(1).”
Although subsection (d) applies to violations of subsection (b), the remedies available
pursuant to subsection (d) suggest that the General Assembly intended to restrict the scope
of the statutory cause of action. Subsection (d) provides that a protected resident is limited
to recovering “[p]ossession of the property, if no other person then resides in the property;
[a]ctual damages; and [r]easonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (emphasis added). The use
of the conjunctive “and”—as opposed to “or”—is an indicator that the General Assembly
intended the cause of action for the purpose of regaining possession of the property in
addition to actual damages and attorney’s fees. See SVF Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy,
459 Md. 632, 642 (2018) (Indicating that “‘and’ is a conjunction meaning together with or
along with; in addition to; as well as used to connect words, phrases, or clauses that have
the same grammatical function in a construction” but that “‘or’ is a conjunction used to
indicate an alternative, usually only before the last term of a series.” (cleaned up)).
Moreover, when, as in the present case, a statute confers a right in derogation of the
common law, we must strictly construe its terms. Cosby v. Dept. of Human Resources, 425
Md. 629, 645 (2012). Maryland courts have followed this principle for nearly a century.
See, e.g., Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 287 (2011) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of the
common law are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the [L]egislature . . .
intended to make any alteration in the common law other than what has been specified and
21
plainly pronounced.’” (quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 573–74 (2006)); State,
for the Use of Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23 (1936).
As we discussed above, Real Prop. § 7-113 was enacted in derogation of the common
law. See Fiscal and Policy Note for S.B. 642 (2013 Session) (explaining that § 7-113 was
enacted as a direct response to the Court of Appeals’ holding in Nickens explaining the
common law right of self-help). As a result, we construe the language of subsection (d)
strictly so as not to expand the cause of action provided for by the General Assembly. See
also Walzer, 395 Md. at 572 (“We neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous
statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in
forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.”).
In summary, we believe that the plain language of § 7-113(d) indicates that the cause
of action established by the statute is limited to cases in which the party seeking possession
locks a protected person out of the property, intentionally terminates or diminishes utility,
water and sewer and similar services to the property, or takes “any other action” which
deprives a protected resident of actual possession of the property. “Any other action” could
include posting an abandonment notice without first conducting the “reasonable inquiry”
required by subsections (b) and (c) of § 7-113 if, as a result of abandonment notice, the
protected person vacates the property. The statutory cause of action does not extend to
persons, like appellants, who did not vacate their properties even if the parties seeking
possession violated § 7-113(b) and (c) by not making the required inquiry before posting.
Real Prop. § 7-113(d) provides that the “remedies set forth in this subsection are not
exclusive.” This brings us to appellants’ alternative theory of relief, namely, that the
22
amended complaint sets out a private cause of action pursuant to the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act. We will assume for the purposes of analysis that one or more aspects of
Selene’s alleged behavior constituted a violation of the MCPA. However, as we will
explain, the amended complaint nonetheless fails as a matter of law.
2. Pleading Damages
The amended complaint alleged that the Wheelings “incur[red] legal fees to know their
rights as bona fide tenants based on Selene’s unfair and false statements[, and] emotional
damages and losses with physical manifestations such as fear (of losing their home),
anxiety (with the threat of eviction through no fault of their own), anger, (that Selene could
not answer basi[c] questions to them as bona fide tenants), etc.” As to Rodriguez, the
complaint alleged that she “incurred legal fees to know her rights as a former owner of the
property based on Selene’s and Gargeu’s deceptive eviction threats,” and that she suffered
“emotional damages and losses with physical manifestations such as fear, anxiety, and
anger that she would return from a medical or other appointment to find her possessions
and property taken from her before the date established by the Sheriff’s office[.]”
Appellants assert that these allegations are legally sufficient to support their § 7-113 and
their MCPA claims.
Selene argues that these allegations are inadequate as a matter of law to support a
private cause of action for an alleged violation of the MCPA. For reasons that we will
explain, Selene is correct. (Additionally, in its brief, Selene has adopted the arguments
presented by Gargeu, which we set out below.)
23
For her part, Gargeu presents several contentions as to why the amended complaint
failed to adequately plead damages. Some of her arguments on this score consist of
assertions that, because she didn’t violate § 7-113, it is impossible for appellants to allege
that they were damaged by her actions. Those arguments fail for the reasons that we have
explained in part 1 of this opinion. This leaves us with her argument that:
Finally, with respect to the emotional distress damages asserted by Ms.
Rodriguez in the amended complaint, the same are untenable. Under
Maryland law, recovery for emotional distress may be had if the injury is
objectively ascertainable and is shown to be a provable consequence of the
wrongful conduct. Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 34 (2005), citing Vance
v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 498 (1979). There of course remains the concern that
mental distress may be too easily simulated and there is no practical standard
for measuring such distress. As such, recovery for emotional injury is not
allowed based on the plaintiff simply saying, “This made me feel bad; this
upset me.” There must be at least a consequential physical injury, considered
a “sufficient guarantee of genuineness that would otherwise be absent in a
claim for mental distress alone.” Vance, 286 Md. at 498.
Although our reasoning differs a bit from Gargeu’s, we ultimately reach her desired
result.
Md. Rule 2-203(b) states the general rule (emphasis added):
Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleadings are required. A pleading shall contain only such
statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to
relief or ground of defense. It shall not include argument, unnecessary
recitals of law, evidence, or documents, or any immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
In Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108 (2007), the Court explained:
[I]n determining whether a petitioner has alleged claims upon which relief
can be granted, there is . . . a big difference between that which is necessary
to prove the commission of a tort and that which is necessary merely to allege
its commission, and, when that is the issue, the court’s decision does not pass
24
on the merits of the claims; it merely determines the plaintiff’s right to bring
the action.
Id. at 121–22 (emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc.,
174 Md. App. 681, 725–26 (2007) (“Pulte was not, at the pleading stage, required to make
an evidentiary ‘showing’ that there was an express warranty. Pulte was, however, required
to set forth an ‘averment’ that was ‘simple, concise, and direct,’ and that contained ‘such
statements of fact as may [have been] necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to
relief[.]”), aff’d, 403 Md. 367 (2008) (emphasis in original); B & P Enterprises v. Overland
Equipment Co., 133 Md. App. 583, 621 (2000) (“Under our liberal rules of pleading, a
plaintiff need only state such facts in his or her complaint as are necessary to show an
entitlement to relief.” (cleaned up)).
This is the general rule. Were it applicable to the causes of action at play in the present
appeal, the amended complaint’s sparse allegations as to the nature of appellants’ damages
might suffice. However, as we will now explain, the Court of Appeals has imposed a more
demanding standard for pleading damages in private actions brought under the MCPA. The
requirements of this standard are particularly relevant in cases, like the present one, that
involve claims for emotional distress.
Com. Law § 13–201 “establishes the Division of Consumer Protection in the Office of
the Attorney General, charging the Division with the duty to administer the Consumer
Protection Act.” The Division has the power and the duty to receive and investigate
complaints and to initiate an investigation of any unfair and deceptive trade practice.
Consumer Protection Division v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 149 (2005). In addition to the
25
broad enforcement powers wielded by the Consumer Protection Division, the MCPA also
provides that a person “may bring an action to recover for injury or loss sustained by him
as the result of a practice prohibited by this title.” Com. Law. § 13-408(a). If the party
successfully recovers damages for loss or injury at trial, it may also seek reasonable
attorney’s fees. Com. Law § 13-408(b).
Maryland’s appellate courts have held that, to prevail in a private action pursuant to
§ 13-408, a plaintiff must prove “actual injury or loss.” Lloyd v. GMC, 397 Md. 108, 143
(2007) (quoting CitaraManis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 153 (1992)); McGraw v. Loyola
Ford, 124 Md. App. 560, 581 (1999)). As the Court explained in Lloyd:
We have . . . established that, in order to articulate a cognizable injury under
the Consumer Protection Act, the injury must be objectively identifiable. In
other words, the consumer must have suffered an identifiable loss, measured
by the amount the consumer spent or lost as a result of his or her reliance on
the sellers’ misrepresentation.
397 Md. at 143. A party’s “failure to ‘establish the nature of the actual injury or loss that
[a consumer] has allegedly sustained as a result of the prohibited practice’ is fatal to a
private cause of action under the Act.” McGraw, 124 Md. App. at 581 (1999) (quoting
CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 152).
In Lloyd, the Court made it clear that the requirement to demonstrate “actual injury or
loss” was not only a requirement of proof, but also of pleading (emphasis added):
[In CitaraManis] [w]e further elucidated that, under the Consumer Protection
Act a party may pursue a public remedy, by filing a claim with the Attorney
General, a private remedy, by filing a private cause of action, or both. We
noted, however, that there is a difference between the two options with regard
to the necessity of pleading injury or harm:
26
Notwithstanding the availability of both public and private remedies to
consumers, the Legislature has established a clear distinction between
the elements necessary to maintain a public enforcement proceeding
versus a private enforcement proceeding. In a public enforcement
proceeding any practice prohibited by this title is a violation . . .
whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or
damaged as a result of that practice.” § 13–302. In contrast, a private
enforcement proceeding pursuant to § 13–408(a) expressly only
permits a consumer “to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as
the result of a practice prohibited by this title.” § 13–408(a). Section
13–408(a), therefore, requires an aggrieved consumer to establish the
nature of the actual injury or loss that he or she has allegedly sustained
as a result of the prohibited practice. This statutory construction creates
a bright line distinction between the public enforcement remedies
available under the CPA and the private remedy available under § 13–
408(a).
Id. at 147–48 (quoting CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 147–48).
The Lloyd Court explained the policy basis for its holding (emphasis added):
The requirement that parties plead actual injury or harm in a private cause of
action under the Consumer Protection Act:
“is said to prevent aggressive consumers who were not personally
harmed by the prohibited conduct, or even involved in a transaction
with the offending businessman, from instituting suit ‘as self-
constituted private attorneys general’ over relatively minor statutory
violations. Another fear is that the powerful weapon given to
consumers in the form of the private remedy ‘was capable of being used
improperly for harassment and improper coercive tactics.’”
[CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 153] (quoting 1 H. Alperin & R. Chase, Consumer
Law: Sales Practices And Credit Regulation § 136 at 193).
We acknowledged the differing interests sought to be promoted by the public
and private enforcement proceedings.
“[T]he CPA’s public enforcement mechanisms are set up to prevent
potentially unfair or deceptive trade practices from occurring, even
before any consumer is injured, whereas § 13–408(a) requires that
actual ‘injury or loss’ be sustained by a consumer before recovery of
damages is permitted in a private cause of action. A construction of the
27
CPA that would establish § 13–302 as a benchmark to determine
whether a consumer has sustained ‘injury or loss’ within the meaning
of § 13–408(a) is both strained and illogical.”
[CitaraManis, 328 Md. at 153] quoting Comment, Maryland’s Consumer
Protection Act: A Private Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade
Practices, 38 Md. Law Rev. 733, 739 n. 50 (1979).
397 Md. at 148–49.
Moreover, in private actions brought under the MCPA involving claims of emotional
distress, the Court of Appeals has long required that such claims “must be capable of
objective determination.” As Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander explained (emphasis added):
The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that “noneconomic damages,”
which include damages for pain and suffering, are available under the CPA,
up to the limits established by Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 11–108,
Maryland’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages for personal injury. As
the Maryland court explained in the CPA case of Hoffman v. Stamper, supra,385 Md. [1] at 32–38 [(2005)], Maryland adheres to the so-called “modern
rule” articulated in Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490 (1979), which permits
“recovery of damages for emotional distress if there was at least a
‘consequential’ physical injury,” in the sense that “‘the injury for which
recovery is sought is capable of objective determination.’” Hoffman, 385 Md.
at 34 (quoting Vance). This “physical” injury standard permits recovery for
“such things as depression, inability to work or perform routine household
chores, loss of appetite, insomnia, nightmares, loss of weight, extreme
nervousness and irritability, withdrawal from socialization, fainting, chest
pains, headaches, and upset stomachs,” id. at 34–35, but excludes recovery
“based on the plaintiff simply saying, ‘This made me feel bad; this upset
me.’”
Sager v. Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 548–49 (D.
Md. 2012) (some citations omitted).
Returning to the case before us, the amended complaint does not allege that appellants
manifested any observable physical manifestations of the emotional distress caused by
Selene. Rather, and we mean no disrespect to appellants, the allegations regarding
28
emotional distress amount to nothing more than assertions that Selene’s actions upset them.
The MPCA requires more in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action. This result doesn’t change because appellants also alleged that
they contacted attorneys for advice as to their rights after learning of the notices. If, for the
purposes of a private action under the MCPA, attorney’s fees incurred for such purposes
were enough to satisfy Com. Law § 13-408(a)’s requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate
an “injury or loss sustained” as the result of the violation of the statute, the limitations
imposed by Lloyd, CitaraManis and other decisions would be rendered meaningless.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY IS
AFFIRMED. APPELLANTS TO PAY
COSTS.
29
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/2128s17cn.pdf