Meek v. Linton ( 2020 )

Marybeth Davis Meek v. Thomas Warren Linton, et al., No. 682, September Term, 2019.
Opinion by Woodward, J.
I. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP – GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON – NO LESS
RESTRICTIVE FORM OF INTERVENTION – WELFARE AND SAFETY OF
THE ALLEGED DISABLED PERSON
II. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP – APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN OF THE
PERSON – “GOOD CAUSE” TO PASS OVER PERSON WITH HIGHER
PRIORITY UNDER ESTATES & TRUSTS ARTICLE (“E.T.”) § 13-707 –
DEFINITION OF “GOOD CAUSE” UNDER E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii)
III. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP – APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN OF THE
PROPERTY – “GOOD CAUSE” TO PASS OVER PERSON WITH HIGHER
PRIORITY AND APPOINT PERSON WITH LOWER PRIORITY UNDER E.T.
§ 13-207 – DEFINITION OF “GOOD CAUSE” UNDER E.T. § 13-207(c)(2)
In 2008 Lois Hansen executed a Durable Power of Attorney and an Advance Health Care
Directive, naming her daughter, Marybeth Meek, as attorney-in-fact and Health Care
Agent. At that time both Mrs. Hansen and Meek lived in California. Also, around that
time Mrs. Hansen reconnected with her childhood sweetheart, Adrien Hansen, who lived
in Cambridge, Maryland. Mrs. Hansen moved to Cambridge to be with Mr. Hansen, and
they were married in 2010. Several years later, Mrs. Hansen was diagnosed with dementia
and in 2017 her mental state declined considerably. In March of 2017, Meek and Thomas
Linton, Mrs. Hansen’s eldest son, discovered that the home in which Mr. and Mrs. Hansen
were living was in terrible condition. By the end of 2018, however, the home was in much
better condition, and a team of professional health care providers, along with family
members, had been assembled to provide care for Mrs. Hansen in her home.
Notwithstanding the condition of Mrs. Hansen’s home and the care that she was receiving
there, Meek attempted to exercise her authority as attorney-in-fact and Health Care Agent
to move Mrs. Hansen from her home to a long-term care facility. Linton then filed a
petition for guardianship of the person and property. After a two-day trial, the circuit court
issued a lengthy, thorough, and well-reasoned oral opinion. Among other things, the court
ruled that (1) there was no less restrictive form of intervention available, other than
guardianship, that was consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s welfare and safety; (2) there was
“good cause” to pass over Meek’s higher priority under E.T. § 13-707(a) and appoint
Linton, a person with lower priority under that section, as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s
person; and (3) there was “good cause” to pass over Meek’s higher priority under E.T. §
13-207(a) and appoint Barrett King, Esq., a neutral third party and a person with lower
priority under that section, as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property. Meek noted a timely
appeal.
Held: Affirmed.
I. On appeal, Meek argued that a guardianship was not warranted under E.T. § 13-705(b),
because she was willing and capable of acting as Mrs. Hansen’s attorney-in-fact and
Health Care Agent, and thus a less restrictive form of intervention was available. The
Court of Special Appeals rejected Meek’s argument, pointing to the language of E.T. §
13-705(b)(2) that a less restrictive form of intervention must be available and
“consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.” The Court held that the trial court
did not err when it found that allowing Meek to act as Mrs. Hansen’s Health Care Agent
was not a less restrictive form of intervention that was consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s
welfare and safety. See E.T. § 13-705(b)(2).
II. Meek argued that the trial court erred by finding “good cause” to pass over Meek’s
statutory priority under E.T. § 13-707(a) and appoint Linton, a person with lower
priority, as the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person. The Court of Special Appeals
disagreed. The Court stated that the trial court must find “good cause” under E.T. § 13-
707(c)(1)(ii) in order to pass over a person with higher priority and appoint a person
with lower priority. Because there was no definition of “good cause,” the Court
considered the statutory purpose and relevant case law and concluded that “good cause”
under E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii) means a substantial reason to find that a person with lower
priority under E.T. § 13-707(a) is a better choice than a person with higher priority to
act in the best interest of the ward.
After a review of the record, the Court concluded that the trial court’s reasons and
underlying factual findings were based on competent evidence and that the reasons
supported the conclusion that Linton was the better choice to act in the best interest of
Mrs. Hansen. Because those reasons, when taken as a whole, could be classified as
substantial, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that “good cause” existed to pass over Meek’s statutory priority and appoint Linton as
guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person.
III. Meek argued that the trial court erred by finding “good cause” to pass over Meek’s
statutory priority under E.T. § 13-207(a) and appoint King, a neutral third party and a
person with lower priority, as the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property. The Court of
Special Appeals again disagreed. The Court stated that the trial court must find “good
cause” under E.T. § 13-207(c)(2) in order to pass over a person with higher priority and
appoint a person with lower priority. Because there was no definition of “good cause,”
the Court considered the statutory purpose and relevant case law and concluded that
“good cause” has the same meaning under E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii) and E.T. § 13-
207(c)(2).
After a review of the record, the Court concluded that the trial court’s reasons and
underlying factual findings were based upon competent evidence and that the reasons
supported the conclusion that King was the better choice to act in the best interest of
Mrs. Hansen regarding her property. Because those reasons, when taken as a whole,
could be classified as substantial, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that “good cause” existed to pass over Meek’s statutory
priority and appoint King, a neutral third party, as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property.
Circuit Court for Dorchester County
Case No. C-09-FM-19-000030
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 682
September Term, 2019
______________________________________
MARYBETH DAVIS MEEK
v.
THOMAS WARREN LINTON, ET AL.
______________________________________
Berger,
Friedman,
Woodward, Patrick L.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Woodward, J.
______________________________________
Filed: April 29, 2020
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
is authentic.
Suzanne Johnson
2020-04-29 13:47-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
This appeal involves a petition for guardianship of the person and property of Lois
A. Hansen, appellee, that was filed by her son, Thomas W. Linton, appellee, in the Circuit
Court for Dorchester County on January 23, 2019. In an order dated June 3, 2019, the
circuit court decided, among other things, that (1) Mrs. Hansen was in need of a guardian
of the person and property; (2) no less restrictive form of intervention was available that
was consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s welfare and safety; and (3) notwithstanding the higher
priority of Mrs. Hansen’s daughter, Marybeth Meek, appellant, under Maryland Code,
Estates and Trusts (“E.T.”) §§ 13-707(a) & 13-207(a), there was “good cause” to pass over
Meek and appoint persons with lower priority as guardians of Mrs. Hansen’s person and
property. As a result, in the same order, the court appointed Linton as guardian of Mrs.
Hansen’s person and a neutral third-party attorney, Barrett R. King, Esq., as guardian of
Mrs. Hansen’s property.
On appeal, Meek presents two questions for our review,1 which we have expanded
and rephrased as:
1. Did the trial court err in finding that there was no less restrictive form of
intervention available that was consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s welfare and
safety?
1
Meek posed the questions presented as:
A. Did the trial court err in determining guardianship was necessary and was
the least restrictive form of relief available when Mrs. Hansen had appointed
Meek as her attorney in fact, health care agent, and trustee of her trust?
B. Did the trial court err in passing over Meek for appointment as guardian
of the person and property of Mrs. Hansen where the basis of doing so was
disagreement among family members as to the residency and location of
health care for Mrs. Hansen?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that “good cause”
existed to pass over Meek’s higher priority under E.T. § 13-707 and appoint
Linton as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that “good cause”
existed to pass over Meek’s higher priority under E.T. § 13-207 and appoint
a neutral third party as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
I. Family Background
Lois Hansen is an 82-year-old resident of Cambridge, Maryland. Mrs. Hansen met
Adrien Hansen when they were young and were “high school sweethearts,” but they
“parted ways after their high school days, separated by fate, circumstances[,] and time.” In
her early adulthood, Mrs. Hansen moved from Cambridge, Maryland, to Virginia, and then
to San Diego, California. Mr. Hansen joined the Air Force in his early adulthood, and then
started two seafood businesses, one in Southern Maryland and the other on the Eastern
Shore of Maryland. Both Mr. and Mrs. Hansen had several other marriages, and Mrs.
Hansen is the mother of three adult children from two relationships: Linton, Patrick
Ferguson, and Meek. Meek and Ferguson are siblings; Linton is their half-brother.
In 2008, Mr. and Mrs. Hansen reconnected. On June 12, 2008, while Mrs. Hansen
was still living in California, she executed a Durable Power of Attorney (“Durable POA”)
and an Advance Health Care Directive (“the 2008 documents”). Mrs. Hansen named Meek
as her attorney-in-fact (“AIF”) in the Durable POA and as Health Care Agent in the
Advance Health Care Directive. Additionally, Mrs. Hansen appointed Meek to serve as
trustee of a trust titled in Mrs. Hansen’s name. Mrs. Hansen designated her close friend,
2
Margaret Calder, to serve as the back-up in both the Durable POA and in the Health Care
Directive, in the case that “Meek was not willing, able[,] or reasonably available to serve in
the capacity contemplated.” At some point in 2008, Mrs. Hansen moved back to
Cambridge, Maryland to be with Mr. Hansen.
On June 4, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Hansen were married. Mr. and Mrs. Hansen “lived
together as husband and wife happily and without interruption” in their home on Cassons
Neck Road in Cambridge, Maryland. The couple’s relationship was described as “close,”
and they were seen “cuddling in their home and out and around Dorchester County[.]”
A. Thomas Warren Linton
Linton is Mrs. Hansen’s eldest child. Mrs. Hansen gave birth to Linton when she
was seventeen years old, and Mrs. Hansen and Linton’s father divorced when Linton was
two years old. Linton was raised by his father in Cambridge, Maryland, and lived there
until he left home when he was eighteen years old to serve in the Marines. During Linton’s
adult life, “circumstances allowed for a closer relationship” between Linton and Mrs.
Hansen. Specifically, Linton “came to understand that his mother was young and
overwhelmed at [seventeen] years old when [Linton] was born.” While he was living in
California in his thirties, Linton would have Sunday brunch with Mrs. Hansen, and while
in his forties, Linton visited his mother frequently on the weekends. After Mrs. Hansen
returned to Cambridge in 2008, Linton attended a family reunion at the Cassons Neck
property that same year. Linton would speak to Mrs. Hansen on the phone once every three
to four weeks. In 2010, Linton attended Mr. and Mrs. Hansen’s wedding, where he “stood
3
up or vouched for the legitimacy of [Mr. and Mrs. Hansen’s] relationship during the
marriage ceremony.” Linton currently resides in New Bern, North Carolina.
B. Marybeth Meek
Meek is Mrs. Hansen’s youngest child. Meek and Mrs. Hansen resided together
from Meek’s birth until Meek turned eighteen years old and went to college. Even after
leaving home, Meek “continued to remain close with her mother and father.” Meek stated
that she and Mrs. Hansen shared “many life experiences,” such as caring together for Mrs.
Hansen’s former husband (Meek’s father) and for Ferguson’s daughter. Meek describes
her relationship with Mrs. Hansen as “close and loving.” Meek visited Mrs. Hansen in
Cambridge in 2009 and again in 2017, and Mrs. Hansen visited Meek “at least once each
year from 2008 through 2013.” Meek resides in San Diego, California.
C. Patrick Ferguson
Ferguson is Mrs. Hansen’s middle child. Ferguson resided in a trailer on the
Cassons Neck property with Mr. and Mrs. Hansen from early 2018 until March 15, 2019.
Although Mr. Hansen was not Ferguson’s father, Ferguson referred to Mr. Hansen as
“dad.” Ferguson checked on Mr. and Mrs. Hansen regularly and “would often have dinner
or go out to dinner with them.” Ferguson and Meek have a history of acrimony between
them, including Ferguson threatening to use physical violence against Meek.
4
II. Mrs. Hansen’s Dementia
Mrs. Hansen began seeing Dr. Jeevan Errabulo,2 a local primary care physician, in
2010, and Dr. Errabulo first noted Mrs. Hansen’s dementia in August 2012. Medical
records written by Dr. Errabulo repeatedly refer to Mrs. Hansen’s dementia. Specifically,
on April 3, 2013, Dr. “Errab[u]l[o] noted that his patient’s chief complaint was that she
was disoriented . . . . [H]istory [from patient] has been unreliable due to dementia issues.”
Again in medical records dated December 28, 2017, Dr. Errabulo wrote that Mrs. Hansen
“remained confused due to her dementia.” Dr. Errabulo later opined that “Mrs. Hansen’s
mental state declined considerably during the years 2017 through 2018.”
III. 2017–2018
In March 2017, Linton and Meek visited the Hansens’ home after they were alerted
that their mother was having increased cognitive difficulty. When he arrived, Linton found
the house to be in “terrible condition.” The home smelled of “ammonia from dog urine
along with urine stains on the furniture and carpets.” Mrs. Hansen had apparently scorched
the microwave from cooking aluminum foil inside of it. “[M]old [was] growing on the
ceiling from an improper roof repair.” Papers, bills, syringes, and medicine bottles littered
the dining room table and kitchen counters. A large sum of money was found in the clothes
dryer and at least $1800 “was falling out of” Mrs. Hansen’s purse. Mrs. Hansen began to
cry when asked why she had so much money, because “she could not tell them about this
money.”
2
The record contains two spellings of Dr. Errabulo’s name. We adopt the spelling
used in the Official Transcript of Proceedings of the May 20, 2019 hearing.
5
In October 2017, Phoebe Westsinger, Mrs. Hansen’s niece and goddaughter, visited
Mrs. Hansen. During this visit, Mrs. Hansen “appeared disheveled where once [Mrs.
Hansen] was meticulous about her appearance in public.” Additionally, Mrs. Hansen
repeated herself throughout their conversations. Westsinger returned to Cambridge in
January 2018 and observed that the Cassons Neck home was “appalling” and in “disarray.”
During this visit, “Mrs. Hansen had a hard time following her questions and . . . asked the
same questions of Wes[t]singer repeatedly.”
On or about April 10, 2018, Mr. Hansen called his long-time attorney and friend,
Ray Simmons, and asked him “to draw up a Power of Attorney and Health Care Directive”
for Mrs. Hansen and told him “that he [Mr. Hansen] was to be Mrs. Hansen’s primary AIF
and Patrick Ferguson was to be the back-up.”3 Mr. Hansen explained that Mrs. Hansen
“required a new Power of Attorney and revocations that related to prior documents because
of some sort of financial/family issues she was having with [Meek].” Mr. Hansen did not
“mention that his wife had any sort of cognitive issue, disability, or dementia.” Then on
April 11, 2018, Simmons came to the Hansens’ house in order for Mrs. Hansen to execute
a new Power of Attorney and Health Care Directive and revoke the 2008 documents.
According to Mr. Hansen, Mrs. Hansen “had the capacity to execute the new POA and
revocations.” Again, he failed to mention “that his wife was diagnosed with dementia or
that she had any cognitive impairment at all.” Simmons reviewed the new Power of
Attorney and Health Care Directive with Mrs. Hansen for forty minutes, and Simmons
3
Simmons later stated that Mr. Hansen came into his office, instead of calling.
6
found Mrs. Hansen to be “in contact with reality in [his] opinion.” Mrs. Hansen then
executed the new Power of Attorney and Health Care Directive (“the 2018 documents”)
and revoked the 2008 documents.
Later in July or August 2018, Linton visited the Hansens’ home again. He found
the house to be in better condition “but still not good.” Linton then had a conversation
with Ferguson and told him to fix and clean the house. Linton returned to the Hansens’
home on or around December 13, 2018, and found the home to be in much better condition.
Linton attributed some of this improvement to Marsha Palmer, a caretaker that Mr. Hansen
hired to assist Mrs. Hansen.
IV. The Power of Attorney Case
Sometime after April 11, 2018, Meek learned that Mrs. Hansen had revoked the
2008 documents and executed the 2018 documents, which appointed Mr. Hansen as AIF
and Health Care Agent and Ferguson as the back-up. On September 14, 2018, Meek filed
a Verified Petition for Emergency Relief and Declaratory Judgment in the Circuit Court
for Dorchester County, seeking emergency relief under E.T. § 13-709 and requesting that
the court determine (1) the validity of the 2008 documents and trust agreement, and (2) the
validity of the 2018 Power of Attorney and revocation of the 2008 documents (“the POA
case”). After a hearing on January 7 and 10, 2019, the circuit court entered a written
Declaratory Judgment and Order on January 14, 2019. The order determined and declared
that (1) “Mrs. Hansen [wa]s not a person in need of emergency services pursuant to Section
13-709 of the Estates and Trusts Article”; (2) the 2018 Power of Attorney and the
7
revocation of the 2008 documents were invalid, because Mrs. Hansen was not mentally
competent at that time; and (3) the 2008 documents were valid.
In late January 2019, Meek filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, in which
she “allege[d] that the Court was in error in finding that an ‘emergency’ did not exist as
this term is contemplated in Section 13-709 of the Estates and Trust[s] Article” and that
the circuit court’s declaration “was insufficient as a matter of law and that a more detailed
written opinion concerning the Court’s finding should be prepared.” In an Opinion and
Order dated February 18, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part Meek’s Motion
to Alter or Amend Judgment. Regarding its finding that an “emergency” did not exist
within the meaning of E.T. § 13-709, the trial court stated that “[b]y the time of the hearing,
the conditions that could have constituted an ‘emergency’ . . . abated.” The court credited
the testimonies of Linton, Simmons, Dr. Errabulo, Ferguson, and other witnesses, that “the
conditions of the Hansen home [had] vastly improved” by the time of the January 2019
hearing. Notably, because Dr. Errabulo testified that “nothing [in the home] was unsafe or
dangerous,” the court held that it did not have the “authority to order emergency services
as contemplated in [E.T.] § 13-709(b).” The court then granted the portion of Meek’s
motion requesting a more detailed written opinion. In the Opinion and Order the court
wrote a twenty-four page opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the POA case.
V. The Guardianship Case
On January 23, 2019, while the POA case was still pending, Linton filed a Petition
for the Appointment of Guardian of the Person and Property of Lois Ann Hansen, an
8
Alleged Disabled Person (“the guardianship case”). Linton supported the guardianship
petition with the following relevant allegations:
19. That notwithstanding the presence of a dedicated and loving care
provider who arrives each day at 9:00 a.m. and leaves at 8:00 p.m., at the
[Hansens]’ residence, seven days a week, to assist [Mrs. Hansen] with all of
her needs, the presence of [Mr. Hansen] and [Ferguson], and the comfort of
her surroundings, the said [ ] Meek insists that their mother be removed from
her residence and institutionalized.
20. That [Linton] has at all times since his mother’s relocation to
Maryland remained in close contact with her, calling the house where she
lives two to three times per week, speaking with either his mother, her
husband, Adrien, or his brother [ ] Ferguson; [Linton] visits [his] mother
every other month.
21. That . . . [Meek’s] contact with [Mrs. Hansen] has been
remarkably limited during the last ten years; she has visited her mother on
but two occasions during this period of time, and on those occasions the visits
were incidental to other purposes.
22. That despite [Linton’s] repeated attempts and pleas to convince
his sister to allow their mother to remain at home, . . . Meek persists in
pursuing an objective which [Linton], [Mr. Hansen], and [Ferguson], believe
is contrary to their mother’s wishes and best interest . . . .
23. That [Mrs. Hansen] has always made it clear to her children, her
husband[,] and primary care physician that her principal desire is to remain at
home if at all possible.
On January 28, 2019, the circuit court appointed counsel for Mrs. Hansen.
The circuit court held a hearing on the guardianship case on March 15 and 20, 2019.
On March 20, 2019, the court completed the taking of evidence but did not have time for
the parties to make their respective closing arguments. The court requested, and counsel
agreed, that closing argument be submitted in writing.
9
VI. The Trial Court’s Opinion in the Guardianship Case
On May 20, 2019, the trial court held a hearing during which it rendered an oral
opinion in the guardianship case. The court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions
of law in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion spanning twenty-two pages of the
transcript. Relevant portions of the court’s opinion are as follows:
So here are my findings of facts. Lois [A]. Hansen is 81 years of age.
She resides with her husband, Adrien Hansen, at [ ] Cassons Neck Road,
Cambridge, Maryland.
Mr. and Mrs. Hansen were married on June 4, 2010, and have lived
together as husband and wife happily without interruption since the date of
their ceremony. . . .
***
Thomas Warren Linton, a petitioner in this case, is 65 years of age
and is Mrs. Hansen’s oldest son[;] he resides in New Bern, North Carolina.
He has lived in New Bern for eleven years, he’s married with two sons and
two daughters, has grandchildren and a great grandchild. He has served in
the Marine Corps[;] he joined the armed services when he was 18 and served
for 23 years until he retired as a Master Sergeant and was honorably
discharged. Now he runs a small landscaping business.
***
The Court found [Linton’s] testimony credible that he quote “loves
his mom to death” end quote. Mrs. Hansen spoiled him when he was with
her. They also enjoy a jovial, joking relationship where they would tease
each other about their personality traits.
***
During trial [ ] Linton’s motives were called into question by [ ] Meek,
who was shown to have not read the Court’s opinion in [the POA case], and
his litigation expenses in this case were advanced by Mr. Hansen. While
these facts definitely caused the Court to carefully evaluate [ ] Linton and his
motives, the Court finds that his testimony, taken as a whole, shows that his
motives are relatively altruistic.
10
[Linton] does love his mother and his sister, [ ] Meek. Whether
he is motivated by financial gain could be questioned, this could be a
possible motive for all parties involved in this case. It is not likely, based
upon the totality of the evidence educed [sic] in this matter, assuming
arguendo that financial gain motivates [ ] Linton or any other party to
this matter, any such motive and attendant negative effect upon Mrs.
Hansen can be ameliorated by the Court appointing a [neutral] party to
act as guardian of the property.
[ ] Linton certainly has made mistakes, as this case unfolded . . . . The
Court, however, finds that [ ] Linton is generally of good character and is
motivated by a desire to care for his mom and see to it that her overall dignity
is preserved and her best interest served.
***
Patrick Ferguson is 60 years of age, is single and has resided in the
trailer on the Cassons Neck property with his mother and Mr. Hansen from
early 2018 until March 15, 2019. Based upon the totality of the evidence that
this Court received in [the POA case] and during the instant case, the Court
is very concerned about [Ferguson]. His actions in the case exacerbated the
acrimony among all parties.
***
[ ] Meek is Mrs. Hansen’s daughter, she is 58 years of age and resides
in San Diego, California. [ ] Meek enjoyed a close and loving relationship
with her mother. She resided with her mother from birth until the age of 18,
after which she attended college.
During her life she worked for her family’s floral business and during
her adulthood she remained close with her mother. The closeness between [
] Meek and her mother was certainly confirmed by the testimony of . . .
Phoebe Westsinger. She shared many experiences with her mother through
which they forged a very close bond.
I will note that I took a lot, I got a lot out of . . . Wes[t]singer’s
testimony and found her to be very credible.
Among these experiences was caring for Mrs. Hansen’s former
husband and [ ] Meek’s father after he was diagnosed with cancer. She also
11
aided in petitioning for guardianship of the daughter of [ ] Ferguson and
helped raise [ ] Ferguson’s daughter.
***
Just prior to moving to Maryland to live with Mr. Hansen, Mrs.
Hansen executed a Power of Attorney, the Health Care Directive, and the
Lois A. Davis Intervivos Revo[c]able Trust on June 12, 2008. In the Health
Care Directive [ ] Meek was designated as Mrs. Hansen’s health care agent.
The alternate agent was not one of Mrs. Hansen’s other children, either
[Ferguson] or [Linton], but was her close friend Margaret N. Calder, who has
since departed this life. . . .
***
Mrs. Hansen also appointed [ ] Meek as her primary attorney[-]in[-]
fact, with the power to perform all things that she herself could do in the
transaction of any business on such terms and in such manner as said
attorney[-]in[-]fact may deem appropriate.
***
[ ] Meek honestly believes that her mother is better, that it’s better
for her mother if she’s transported from the home on Cassons Neck
Road where she has lived since 2008 with her husband Mr. Hansen and
is placed in a nursing home. She argues that it is not in the best interest of
Mrs. Hansen to remain in the Cassons Neck home because she’s not
receiving care from a skilled provider or care that is tailored for a person
suffering from dementia. She mentioned that in the evaluation for a Court,
Dr. Errabulo reaffirmed that Mrs. Hansen requires 24 hour care and that she
is not receiving such care.
The Court notes, however, that Dr. Errabulo verified those statements
during a hearing in this instant case, explaining that the care he recommended
in his report and affidavit “could be beneficial” but that she was currently
getting “quite appropriate care”.
He further testified that 24/7 care would not be needed in the middle
of the night. The Court took the totality of his testimony to mean that he
was satisfied that Mrs. [Hansen] was being adequately cared for in her
home, that she was comfortable and happy. Indeed, the Court gleaned
from his testimony that it would be in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to
remain in the home and that she would likely receive little to no benefit
12
from physical therapy and may be harmed by a sudden change in her
surroundings and her caregivers. His exact words, that under such
circumstances “the majority of the time it is not good,” meaning the
change.
The Court notes that [ ] Meek is motivated by pure love and devotion
to her mom. She is truly operating under this mode, based upon the Court’s
evaluation of the totality of evidence in this case. . . .
The Court also notes the following facts[,] which are relevant to the
Court’s determination in this matter. [ ] Meek did not visit with her mother
at the Cassons Neck home from 2008 through 2017 with the exception of
a family reunion hosted by [Mr.] Hansen just prior to her mother’s
marriage to Mr. Hansen. According to the testimony it was [ ] Linton
who actually alerted [ ] Meek to the exacerbation of Mrs. Hansen’s
health conditions in 2017 when the dementia was becoming the most
salient feature of Mrs. Hansen’s health. [ ] Linton contacted both of his
siblings for the purpose of getting together to discuss what they could do to
assist Mr. Hansen in taking care of their mother. [ ] Linton testified that he
contacted [ ] Meek so that she could come to understand and appreciate her
mother’s condition as it was dramatically worsening, in his opinion.
Each of the siblings arrived at their mother’s and Mr. Hansen’s home.
[ ] Linton never heard back from [ ] Meek. [ ] Meek just started acting
independently of her siblings without communicating with them, presumably
she was operating under the authority she believed was granted to her by
virtue of the above-referenced Power of Attorney and Health Care
Directives. [ ] Linton agreed during his testimony that they had a meeting at
the house.
[ ] Linton has proven, in my opinion, by clear and convincing evidence
that Mrs. Hansen suffers from dementia, which she has suffered from for the
past several years. Indeed the Court notes that by the two physicians’
certificates[,] which I take note of and incorporate herein, filed in this case,
attest to the fact that Mrs. Hansen has advanced dementia and does not have
the mental capacity to understand or consent to the appointment of a
guardian. Notably both physicians further attested that Mrs. Hansen does not
require institutionalized care at this time.
The Court takes notice of the testimony of Dr. Errabulo[,] which
the Court detailed on pages nine through eleven of [its] opinion in [the
POA case]. Dr. Errabulo clarified that Mrs. Hansen has been his patient
since 2010. She suffers from advanced dementia that is lifelong and
13
irreversible. It came across from the substance of his testimony and his
manner of testifying that he truly cared for his patient and wants what
is in her best interest. He made several home visits to check on her status
during the pendency of this case. He has caused home hospice care to assist
in Mrs. Hansen’s care. He also testified that he speaks to home health
providers regularly. He testified that his patient wanted at all times to
stay home. That she never wanted to be placed in a box – that she never
wanted to be placed in a box, which in context of all the evidence that
the Court received in this case meant that she did not want to be placed
in a nursing home.
As Dr. Errabulo described, at home Mrs. Hansen is pleasantly
demented. He also stated that in his great experience with Cambridge,
Maryland’s greying population, such patients do not deal well with
change. He explained that under such circumstances when there is great
change in the demented person’s environs, the majority of the time the
outcome will not be good. He made it clear that if she is kept comfortable
and all can visit in her home, that would be what is in her best interest.
***
[Dr.] Errabulo noted that the home health and hospice provides
adequate stimulation for a person in Mrs. Hansen’s condition. He also noted
that physical therapy at this point in Mrs. Hansen’s treatment would result in
very minimal benefit. He emphasized that Mrs. Hansen was getting quite
appropriate care, although he did admit that skilled nursing care could be
beneficial, it would not be needed around the clock. For instance, he stated
that a skilled nurse would not be needed in the middle of the night.
The Court also heard from [ ] Marsha Palmer. [ ] Palmer was paid by
Mr. Hansen to provide care for Mrs. Hansen in their home. She testified in
detail as to her routine. She arrives at the Hansen home at 8 a.m. each day,
seven days a week, and stays until Mrs. Hansen falls asleep, usually about 9
p.m. The Court was very impressed with the attention and physical contact
that [ ] Palmer has with her client. A typical day consists of the following:
she lays in bed with Mrs. Hansen until Mrs. Hansen wants to get up. She
attends to her hair and hygiene. She takes Mrs. Hansen into the living room,
decoy room, and sometimes into the kitchen in her wheelchair while she
makes breakfast, which often consists of scrambled eggs topped with
strawberry preserves. At lunch she prepares Mrs. Hansen’s lunch. At dinner
she sits with Mr. and Mrs. Hansen at the dinner table.
14
[ ] Palmer noted the beautiful waterfront view that Mrs. Hansen gets
to enjoy while she resides in her home. Notably the Court also received
testimony from Mr. Hansen, . . . and others that Mr. and Mrs. Hansen love
each other and enjoy each other[’]s company, touch and affection dearly.
***
The weight of all of this evidence goes not towards an argument that
[ ] Palmer should not be caring for Mrs. Hansen[;] indeed it is quite the
contrary. She has convinced me that she is caring and honest, one of the
most caring human beings that Mrs. Hansen has involved in her life.
***
The Court also received testimony from Wendy Shertenlieb[;] she was
a registered nurse who had been providing care for Mrs. Hansen for six
months. She testified that she sees Mrs. Hansen two weeks at a time,
anywhere between forty-five minutes and two hours is what she told me. She
assesses Mrs. Hansen’s surroundings, makes mental and skin assessments to
ensure that Mrs. Hansen is well cared for. Notably she testified that Mrs.
Hansen has no sores, those are the bedsore types, and exhibits no observable
conditions that caused Coastal [H]ospice any concern.
She further testified that a music therapist comes in once every other
week and plays piano for Mrs. Hansen. [ ] Shertenlieb also testified as other
witnesses in [the POA case] on the importance of Boo Boo, the chocolate
lab. [ ] Shertenlieb testified that Boo Boo comes and sits with her[;] she
exclaimed “she loves that dog”. And I will say this, that Boo Boo has come
– Boo Boo’s presence has come with a cost, too, and that’s always very
difficult. The Court, as others in this courtroom are probably dog owners,
when old labs get old and they tend to urinate on the carpet, the smell has a
very heavy ammonia smell to it. It can be very frustrating. But in this
circumstance, it seems like parties have taken care of that issue with
maximum extent that they can, they probably can’t alleviate all instances of
the dog urinating, however, whatever detriment is derived from Boo Boo’s
presence there’s a greater effect upon Mrs. Hansen’s best interest that she
have the companionship of Boo Boo; it’s so important to individuals in her
capacity. . . .
Supporting [ ] Shertenlieb’s testimony was Kylie Bender, she is a
Social Worker assigned to Mrs. Hansen through Coastal [H]ospice. She
testified that she meets with Mrs. Hansen every other week to determine if
15
she needs to make any referrals to outside resources. She testified that Mrs.
Hansen is extremely well taken care of.
The Court notes that after all the testimony was educed [sic] from
Dr. Errabulo, [ ] Palmer, [ ] Shertenlieb and [ ] Bender about Mrs.
Hansen’s state of mind, her wishes that she not be placed in a box, her
wishes that she not be separated from her husband, [Mr.] Hansen, and
the great care she is receiving at home, [ ] Meek still makes clear that
her intention was to place her mother in HeartFields Nursing Facility.
Kelly Johnson, Executive Director at HeartFields, testified
concerning the care that Mrs. Hansen would receive at HeartFields. She
testified that Mrs. Hansen would reside in their neighborhood unit, which the
Court did not believe to be as pleasant as the Cassons Neck home, based upon
my assessment of all of the testimony. At the Cassons Neck Home she has
a waterfront view, she has the care of [ ] Palmer. It was clear to the Court
that the nurse at HeartFields would provide nursing services to Mrs. Hansen
every day, but that she likely had other patients to look after.
[ ] Meek is convinced that her mother would be more stimulated at
HeartFields because of their specialized experience and the programs they
provide. Viewing this testimony in light of Dr. Errab[u]l[o]’s testimony, the
Court is not convinced that this would be the case. Indeed, [Dr.] Errabulo, a
medical professional who has had a long-standing doctor patient relationship
with this particular patient, seemed to disagree and warned that normally
such a change for a patient such as Mrs. Hansen is detrimental.
The Court notes that right now with the care that Mrs. Hansen is
receiving at home and all the support from caregivers, family and
medical professionals it is in her best interest to remain at home and not
be placed in a facility. Such has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence during this hearing. This may change at some point where the
potential downsides of leaving what is beautiful, comfortable[,] and familiar
are outweighed by the benefits provided by a place like HeartFields, but the
overwhelming weight and impact of the evidence right now proved to the
Court that such is not the case today.
The applicable priorities in this case for determining the guardian of
a person and property are in the following order: a health care agent
appointed by the disabled person, spouse, parents, then children, and finally
any other person considered appropriate by the Court. For good cause shown
the Court may pass over a person with priority and appoint a person with less
or no priority. The Court found in [the POA case] that Mrs. Hansen
16
appointed [ ] Meek to be her attorney[-]in[-]fact and health care agent in the
June 12, 2008, Power of Attorney and Health Care Directive that she signed
before she left California, before she married Adrien Hansen and spent years
loving him and building a life and home with him.
Under the Estates and Trusts Article ordinarily the enforcement
or permitted operation of documents that Mrs. Hansen executed on June
12, 2008, would represent the least restrict[ive] means available as Mrs.
Hansen appointed [ ] Meek to be her attorney[-]in[-]fact and her health
care agent when she was of sound mind. The Court finds, however, that
[ ] Linton has proven by clear and convincing evidence that there exists
good cause to avoid the priority status granted to her pursuant to the
Power of Attorney and Health Care Directive. The Court is convinced
that [ ] Meek loves her mother[,] but she is simply not contemplating the
life her mother chose to build with Mr. Hansen, the love she has for her
husband, her dog, her home, her water view, and the team of
professionals and caregivers who have been assembled to care for her.
Also, the Court cannot discount the testimony of Dr. Errabulo,
her long-time personal physician, who by the way seems to be more
dedicated, knowledgeable[,] and concerned about his patient than most.
She did not want to be taken from her home, from [Mr.] Hansen,
regardless of how [ ] Meek feels about him. Her dog, her view and not
being placed in a nursing home, those are values above all others that
should be considered to the maximum extent practicable as long as it
does not significantly risk Mrs. Hansen’s health and well-being.
The weight of the evidence is that she is well cared for and that
her health and well-being may actually be negatively impacted if she is
ripped out of what is familiar and placed in HeartFields. If the Court
does not grant this guardianship to another, Mrs. Hansen’s placement
in HeartFields will be certain, swift[,] and sudden.
By clear and convincing evidence it would not be in Mrs. Hansen’s
best interest to have a guardian who is not factoring in her wishes as the
[2008 Advance Health Care Directive] require[s], and what is at this
point subjectively not in her best interest.
Certainly the Court has concerns about the prior condition of the
Cassons Neck property detailed in [the POA case], but so much has changed.
So many caregivers are coming into the home to monitor conditions and care.
Should conditions change the Court, upon petition, could change its orders.
17
. . . . Thus the Court appoints [ ] Linton as guardian of [Mrs. Hansen]’s
person. In making decisions for Mrs. Hansen, the Court is explicitly making
it a condition that he consults with [ ] Meek about their mother’s care. He,
however, makes the final decision and if [ ] Meek refuses to speak or
cooperate with [ ] Linton to discuss Mrs. Hansen’s care, [ ] Linton, of course,
has full authority to make decisions on behalf of his mother.
***
[ ] Linton has also shown by clear and convincing evidence good
cause for the Court to appoint a neutral guardian of the property of
[Mrs.] Hansen. [ ] Meek’s appointment as guardian of the property,
considering all the evidence, is just unworkable and not in the best
interest of [Mrs.] Hansen.
All the parties’ motives in this case have been clouded with the
potential for financial gain and interest that they may have in Mrs.
Hansen’s assets. The Court orders could be obstructed by the person
who holds the pursestrings in this case. Suspicions over the motivation
of Mr. Hansen and [ ] Meek has actually exacerbated the acrimony[,]
which has affected the family and Mrs. Hansen. Mrs. Hansen deserves
to have a [neutral] third party who is unemotional, detached[,] and who
will truly act in her best interest. Also a [neutral] guardian is needed to
unravel the financial transactions executed by her daughter and by
[Mr.] Hansen. A [neutral] guardian will determine what assets Mrs.
Hansen should have in her name and how much is needed to truly
provide for her care and well-being.
The Court appoints Barrett King, Esquire, if you should accept
this appointment, as guardian of the property of Mrs. [ ] Hansen.
(Emphasis added).
On June 3, 2019, the circuit court issued an Order in accordance with the above
opinion. On June 17, 2019, Meek filed a Notice of Appeal. We will supply additional
facts as necessary to the resolution of this appeal.
18
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We recently determined the appropriate standard of review in adult guardianship
cases. See In the Matter of Meddings, 244 Md. App. 204, 220 (2019). After a thorough
review of the case law, Judge E. Gregory Wells, writing for this Court, stated:
We conclude that in reviewing whether a circuit court properly decided to
appoint a guardian for an adult, we adopt a tri-partite and interrelated
standard of review. Factual findings will be reviewed for clear error,
while purely legal determinations will be reviewed without deference, unless
the error be harmless. As to the ultimate conclusion of whether an adult
guardianship is appropriate, the circuit court's decision will not be
disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. No Less Restrictive Form of Intervention
Under E.T. § 13-705(b):
(b) A guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines
from clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) A person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible personal decisions, including provisions for
health care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental
disability, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs; and
(2) No less restrictive form of intervention is available that is
consistent with the person's welfare and safety.
(Emphasis added).
Meek concedes that “[i]t is undisputed [that] Mrs. Hansen lacked sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning her
person.” Meek contends, however, that “[t]he appointment of a guardian of the person and
19
property of Mrs. Hansen was not the least restrictive means available.” Meek argues that
by executing the 2008 documents, “Mrs. Hansen expressly selected Meek to make
decisions on [Mrs. Hansen’s] behalf once [Mrs. Hansen] was no longer capable of doing
so.” According to Meek, “[t]here is no reason to appoint a guardian when Meek is fully
willing and capable of acting as Mrs. Hansen’s health care agent and attorney-in-fact.”
Meek concludes that “[t]he least restrictive form of relief available mandated that Meek be
authorized to continue to act under the [2008 documents].”
Counsel for Mrs. Hansen responds that “Meek ha[s] proven [that] she is unwilling
or incapable of acting in Mrs. Hansen’s best interests in both her capacity as Health Care
Agent and Attorney-In-Fact.” Therefore, according to Mrs. Hansen’s counsel, “the trial
court had no choice but to appoint a Guardian of the Person and Guardian of [the] Property
to protect Mrs. Hansen.”
Likewise, Linton argues:
On its face, Meek’s appointment as Health Care Agent represented a less
restrictive form of intervention contemplated by the statute, . . . In reality, it
did nothing of the kind. In action, the exercise of her authority has proved
disastrous for the family and [ ] properly gave the trial court pause.
Linton also pointed to (1) the trial court’s finding, based upon clear and convincing
evidence, that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to remain at home and not be placed in
a facility, and (2) the court’s observation that, notwithstanding the testimony of four
witnesses to the contrary, “Meek still makes clear her intention to place her mother [in the]
Heart[F]ields Nursing Facility.”
20
In Meddings, we addressed the issue of whether under E.T. § 13-705(b)(2) a no less
restrictive form of intervention was available that was consistent with the alleged disabled
person’s welfare and safety. 244 Md. App. at 220–21. Applying the aforementioned
standard of review, we determined that such issue was one of fact, and thus we reviewed
the trial court’s rulings for clear error. Id. at 226–29, 233.
In Meddings, Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”) petitioned the circuit
court to appoint a guardian for one of its patients, Robert Meddings, who was diagnosed
with schizophrenia and atrial fibrillation. Id. at 207. Perkins sought the appointment of a
guardian because (1) Meddings refused to take his medication and the hospital was forced
to convene a Clinical Review Panel (“CRP”) every 90 days to review and forcibly
administer Meddings’s psychotropic medications; (2) medication to treat Meddings’s atrial
fibrillation was not subject to the CRP; thus the doctors could not forcibly administer
medications to treat that condition; and (3) Meddings did not have an advance medical
directive. Id. at 209. After a bench trial on Perkins’s petition, the court found that
Meddings was a disabled person and appointed Meddings’s brother as guardian of his
person. Id. at 213.
Meddings appealed to this Court and argued that the trial court erred in finding that
a less restrictive form of intervention was not available, because Perkins had three
alternatives available to it: “(1) the CRP, (2) a surrogate decision maker, and (3) an advance
directive.” Id. at 220. Conversely, Perkins contended that “the issue is[ not] whether a less
restrictive form of intervention exists, rather, the issue is ‘whether a less restrictive
alternative was available and consistent with Mr. Meddings’ own welfare and safety
21
needs.’” Id. at 223 (emphasis added). Perkins claimed “that the CRP, a surrogate decision-
maker, and use of an advance directive are not ‘practically available’ alternatives in
Meddings’ case because they are inconsistent with his health and welfare.” Id. at 224–25.
We agreed with Perkins and held that the trial court did not commit clear error in its finding
that the CRP, a surrogate decisionmaker, and the use of an advance directive were not
available as less restrictive forms of intervention consistent with Meddings’s welfare and
safety. Id. at 227–29, 233. Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its “decision to appoint a guardian for Meddings, finding that it was the least
restrictive alternative for him.” Id. at 233.
Here, like Meddings, Meek seeks to limit our inquiry to simply finding that a less
restrictive form of intervention to a guardianship is available. Meek claims that, because
she is willing and capable to act as Mrs. Hansen’s Health Care Agent and attorney-in-fact
under the 2008 documents, there “is no reason to appoint a guardian.” Meek, however,
overlooks the language of E.T. § 13-705(b)(2) that a less restrictive form of intervention
must be “consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.” In other words, the availability
of a form of intervention less restrictive than a guardianship is insufficient alone to defeat
a petition for guardianship. The form of intervention also must be “consistent with the
person’s welfare and safety.” Id. at 224.
The trial court specifically found, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in
Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to remain at home and not be placed in a facility. In making
the finding that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to remain at home, the court relied on
Dr. Errabulo’s professional opinion that Mrs. Hansen was receiving “quite appropriate
22
care” at home. The court also pointed to the testimony of Palmer, who was Mrs. Hansen’s
in-home caretaker. The court emphasized Palmer’s role in Mrs. Hansen’s care by
highlighting Palmer’s routine, which included arriving at the Cassons Neck home “at 8
a.m. each day, seven days a week, and stay[ing] until M[r]s. Hansen falls asleep, usually
about 9 p.m.” Each day, Palmer would lie in bed with Mrs. Hansen until Mrs. Hansen was
ready to get up, attended to Mrs. Hansen’s hair and hygiene, made Mrs. Hansen’s breakfast
and lunch, and sat with Mr. and Mrs. Hansen at the dinner table. The court concluded that
Palmer “convinced me that she is caring and honest, one of the most caring human beings
that Mrs. Hansen has involved in her life.”
In addition, the trial court noted that Mrs. Hansen benefited from regular visits by
Shertenlieb, a registered nurse, who testified that “Mrs. Hansen has no sores, those are
bedsore types, and exhibits no observable conditions that caused Coastal [H]ospice any
concern.” Shertenlieb also testified to the every other week visits by the music therapist,
who played the piano for Mrs. Hansen, and to the importance to Mrs. Hansen of the
companionship of her chocolate lab, Boo Boo.
The trial court next cited to the testimony of Bender, a social worker assigned to
Mrs. Hansen by Coastal Hospice. Bender testified that she met with Mrs. Hansen every
other week and that Mrs. Hansen was “extremely well taken care of.” In light of the
testimony of Dr. Errabulo, Palmer, Shertenlieb, and Bender about “the great care [Mrs.
Hansen] [wa]s receiving at home,” the court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to remain at home.
23
As stated above, the trial court also found that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest
“not [to] be placed in a facility.” The court again relied heavily on the testimony of Dr.
Errabulo. In its opinion, the court noted Dr. Errabulo’s testimony about the placement of
Mrs. Hansen in a nursing home: (1) Mrs. Hansen “may be harmed by a sudden change in
her surroundings and her caregivers”; (2) “in his great experience with Cambridge,
Maryland’s greying population, such patients do not deal well with change. He explained
that under such circumstances when there is a great change in the demented person’s
environs, the majority of the time the outcome will not be good”; and (3) “normally such
change for a patient such as Mrs. Hansen is detrimental.” The court concluded that “[t]he
weight of the evidence is that [Mrs. Hansen] is well cared for and that her health and well-
being may actually be negatively impacted if she is ripped out of what is familiar and placed
in HeartFields.”
The trial court also found that, despite the evidence that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s
welfare and safety to remain at home and not be placed in a facility, Meek remained
adamant that Mrs. Hansen should be placed in a facility for long-term care. At the end of
Linton’s case-in-chief, Meek was called as a witness and the following questioning
occurred:
Q. For the record were you present at the proceedings on Friday, March
15, before this Court in this matter?
A. I was.
***
Q. And you heard the testimony of Dr. Errab[u]l[o]?
24
A. I did.
Q. Testimony of [ ] Shertenlieb?
A. I did.
Q. [ ] Bender?
A. I did.
Q. [ ] Linton?
A. I heard them all, yes.
Q. After having heard that testimony is it still your position that your
mother should be moved to a facility for long term care?
***
Q. So [t]he answer to the question is, yes, you do believe that—
A. I believe that my mother can get better care.
Q. And in your capacity if you are – if after this proceeding you are the
Power of Attorney, you would move her to HeartFields?
A. I am currently the Power of Attorney, and, yes, I would like to have
her –
Q. No, after this proceeding if you’re still the Power of Attorney you
would move her to Heart[F]ields?
A. That would be my choice.
In sum, it is clear to this Court that the trial court had ample evidence before it to
find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mrs. Hansen was “well cared for” at home by
a team of professional health care providers and family members and that “her health and
well-being may actually be negatively impacted” if she was moved from her home to a
long-term care facility. The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that Meek
25
intended to place Mrs. Hansen in a long-term care facility if a guardianship was not granted
and Meek was permitted to act as Mrs. Hansen’s Health Care Agent under the 2008
Advance Health Care Directive. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it
found that allowing Meek to act as Mrs. Hansen’s Health Care Agent under the 2008
Advance Health Care Directive was not a less restrictive form of intervention that was
consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s welfare and safety. See E.T. § 13-705(b)(2).
II. Passing Over Meek’s Statutory Priority and Appointing Linton as Guardian
of Mrs. Hansen’s Person
Priorities for the appointment of the guardian of the person are laid out in E.T. §
13-707, which states:
(a) Persons are entitled to appointment as guardian of the person
according to the following priorities:
(1) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by the disabled
person if the disabled person was 16 years old or older when the
disabled person signed the designation and, in the opinion of the
court, the disabled person had sufficient mental capacity to make
an intelligent choice at the time the disabled person executed the
designation;
(2) A health care agent appointed by the disabled person in
accordance with Title 5, Subtitle 6 of the Health--General Article;
(3) The disabled person's spouse;
(4) The disabled person's parents;
(5) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by the will of a
deceased parent;
(6) The disabled person's children;
(7) Adult persons who would be the disabled person's heirs if the
disabled person were dead;
26
(8) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by a person caring for
the disabled person;
(9) Any other person, agency, or corporation considered appropriate
by the court; . . .
***
(c)(1)(i) Among persons with equal priority the court shall select the one best
qualified of those willing to serve.
(ii) For good cause, the court may pass over a person with priority
and appoint a person with a lower priority.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Meek enjoyed a higher priority than Linton
in the selection of the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person under E.T. § 13-707(a). Mrs.
Hansen nominated Meek as the “conservator of my person” and appointed Meek as her
Health Care Agent under the 2008 Advance Health Care Directive, and thus Meek had
priority under E.T. § 13-707(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively. Linton had priority under E.T.
§ 13-707(a)(6) as Mrs. Hansen’s child. Nevertheless, the trial court determined that under
E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii), there was “good cause” to pass over Meek’s statutory priority and
appoint Linton as the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person.
Meek contends that “[g]ood cause was not established to disregard Meek’s priority
status for appointment as guardian.” Meek argues that “[t]he only basis for seeking to have
the trial court pass over Meek and appoint [Linton] as guardian of the person and property
is the disagreement as to Mrs. Hansen’s health care and where she should receive such
care.” Meek claims that “[n]o evidence was introduced to establish that Meek was
27
unqualified to act as guardian, that she was unwilling to act as guardian of the person and
property of Mrs. Hansen[,] or that she had otherwise acted inappropriately with respect to
her mother.” According to Meek, she wanted Mrs. Hansen to live in an assisted living
facility, because Mrs. Hansen was not receiving proper care at home; Meek was worried
about Mr. Hansen’s motives; and Mr. Hansen was interfering with the communications
between Mrs. Hansen and Meek. Meek also contends that “[t]he trial court erred in
appointing Linton as guardian of the person due to his inequitable conduct.” In particular,
Meek asserts that “Linton initiated the guardianship at the request of Mr. Hansen’s
attorney, Linton’s attorney’s fees were being paid by Mr. Hansen, Linton failed to review
the trial court’s decision in the POA [c]ase, and Linton participated in the attempted tape-
recording of Meek’s visits with her mother.”
Counsel for Mrs. Hansen responds that “[t]he trial court made the correct
determination by refusing to grant Meek priority status” and appointing Linton as guardian
of the person. Counsel for Mrs. Hansen contends that “Meek systematically alienated Mrs.
Hansen’s family members,” and Meek’s “acrimonious relationship with her siblings
interfered with [Mrs. Hansen’s] interests.”
Linton responds that, contrary to Meek’s argument, “[t]he lower court had multiple
reasons for overriding the statutory priority accorded [to] Meek” under the statute. Linton
cites as support: (1) “Meek’s intractability in seeking to remove her mother from her home
. . . was shown to be inconsistent with her mother’s wishes, which were well known to
Meek”; (2) the trial court found that Dr. Errabulo was more credible than Meek when Dr.
Errabulo opined “that transferring Mrs. Hansen from her home was not in her best interest
28
and would more likely than not accelerate her demise”; (3) the separation of Mrs. Hansen
from Mr. Hansen proposed by Meek “was entirely inconsistent with . . . the loving
relationship between Mrs. Hansen and [Mr. Hansen]”; and (4) Linton was a suitable
alternative to Meek. Finally, Linton claims that the actions previously taken and those
proposed to be taken by Meek “engendered bitterness, acrimony, suspicion, and a profound
lack of trust among the family, including, especially, Mrs. Hansen’s husband.”
In her reply brief, Meek argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law because
it did not recognize that “it retained jurisdiction to decide Mrs. Hansen’s place of
residence.” Thus, according to Meek, “even if the trial court appointed Meek as guardian
of the person of Mrs. Hansen, Meek had no ability to transfer Mrs. Hansen’s residence
unilaterally without court authorization.”
A. Good Cause
In order for a trial court to pass over a person with higher priority under E.T. § 13-
707(a) and appoint a person with lower priority under that section as guardian of the person,
the trial court must find “good cause.” E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii). E.T. § 13-707, however,
does not define “good cause.” Nor have the Maryland appellate courts explicitly explained
what constitutes “good cause” to pass over a person with higher priority under E.T. § 13-
707. See Angela B. Grau, Overview of Adult Guardianships, Md. Trial Rep. 12, 21 (Fall
2018).
The Court of Appeals, however, has defined good cause in other contexts. See In
re Robert G., 296 Md. 175 (1983). In In re Robert G., the Court examined whether
confidential juvenile court records should be released to prosecutors, who wanted to
29
consider such records in determining whether to seek the death penalty against a juvenile
charged with first-degree murder. Id. at 177. In order to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion by releasing the records, the Court had to define good cause, because
the pertinent statute stated: “A juvenile court record pertaining to a child is confidential
and its contents may not be divulged, by subpoena or otherwise, except by order of the
court upon good cause shown.” Id. (quoting Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol., 1982 Cum.
Supp.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-828(b) (emphasis added)). Stating that the Court had never
defined good cause in the context of releasing juvenile records, the Court noted that
Maryland follows the definition of good cause as set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary:
“Substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally
sufficient ground or reason. Phrase ‘good cause’ depends upon
circumstances of individual case, and finding of its existence lies largely in
discretion of officer or court to which decision is committed. . . . ‘Good
cause’ is a relative and highly abstract term, and its meaning must be
determined not only by verbal context of statute in which term is
employed but also by context of action and procedures involved in type
of case presented.”
Id. at 179 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added)). The
Court further explained that “‘[w]hat will measure up to a showing of good cause in a
particular case will depend upon the circumstances of that case.’” Id. at 183 (quoting Kay
Const. Co. v. Cty. Council for Montgomery Cty., 227 Md. 479, 484–85 (1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Quoting from the Pennsylvania case of Trexler v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Cmwlth. 180, 184 (1976), the Court
elaborated: “‘We must also remember that good cause, being undefined in the Act, is a
flexible term and therefore not amenable to general rules or rigid formulas. Instead, its
30
meaning must be deduced from the facts of each case in a manner that is consistent with
the Act's fundamental purpose, . . .’” Id. at 187 (emphasis added); see also Sanchez v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1977) (stating that “the term
‘good cause’ as used in the statute means an adequate cause, a cause that comports with
the purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Code and with other laws”) (cleaned up).
Based on its in-depth examination of good cause, the Court held that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion by allowing prosecutors to review the juvenile court records to
determine whether the State should seek the death penalty. In re Robert G., 296 Md. at
188.
In Maryland, Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188 (1993), is the only case that has addressed
the issue of good cause in the appointment of a person with lower priority over a person
with higher priority as guardian of the person under E.T. § 13-707. Mack involved an
alleged disabled person (“ADP”), who for eight years had been in a persistent vegetative
state as a result of brain injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Id. at 191–92, 194.
The ADP’s father and wife cross-petitioned for appointment as guardian of the ADP’s
person. Id. at 194. Notwithstanding the wife’s higher priority under E.T. § 13-707(a), the
trial court appointed the father as guardian of the person “because it is the father of the
[ADP] who will carry into effect the applicable law of Maryland[,] which requires the
disabled’s life to be continued through the administration of food and water.” Id. at 196
(internal quotations omitted). The trial court viewed the wife’s “intention not to continue
artificial nutrition and hydration” as “not consistent with the objectives and directives of
Maryland law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
31
On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the appointment of the father as guardian
of the person. Id. at 206. The Court held:
Here, there was no finding whether [the wife] could or would fulfill
the duties of guardian. There was no finding on [the father’s] contention that
his geographical proximity to [the ADP] weighted the best interest scale in
favor of appointing the father as guardian. Rather, the circuit court merged
the issue of whether sustenance could be withdrawn into the issue of who
should be guardian. Because the court concluded that Maryland law
required sustenance to be continued, the court concluded that [the
wife]'s desire to have sustenance withdrawn constituted good cause to
pass over [the wife]'s statutory priority and to appoint [the father]. That
assigned reason does not constitute good cause.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court explained further that the lower
court treated the wife as “disqualified” to serve as guardian because of her views regarding
the withholding of nutrition and hydration. Id. at 206. The Court concluded that, contrary
to the trial court’s opinion, the wife’s views were consistent with the statutory requirement,
and thus she was “not per se disqualif[ied] from appointment as guardian, although the
court may consider [the wife’s views] as a factor in an overall determination.” Id. Finally,
the Court made clear in its analysis that “[a] statutory preference in the appointment of a
guardian, although seemingly mandatory and absolute, is always subject to the overriding
concern of the best interest of the ward.” Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
From our consideration of the purpose of E.T. § 13-707 and relevant case law, we
conclude that “good cause” under E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii) means a substantial reason to find
that a person with lower priority under E.T. § 13-707(a) is a better choice than a person
with higher priority to act in the best interest of the ward. See Black’s Law Dictionary at
623; Mack, 329 Md. at 203. This definition is a flexible one, and its application will vary
32
with the facts and circumstances of the individual case.4 See In re Robert G., 296 Md. at
183.
In reviewing the application of the above definition of “good cause” to the facts and
circumstances of the instant case, we begin our analysis by looking at the reasons
articulated by the trial court to select Linton over Meek as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s
person. We determine whether the reasons and any factual findings underlying those
reasons are supported by competent evidence and then determine whether the reasons
support the conclusion that Linton is the better choice to act in the best interest of Mrs.
Hansen. If our answer is in the affirmative, we next review whether the trial court’s
reasons, either individually or as a whole, can be classified as substantial, and thus
constitute “good cause.” Such review is made under the abuse of discretion standard. See
In re Robert G., 296 Md. at 179–80 (stating that “[w]ithout exception we have applied an
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing action by a trial judge” regarding “good cause”).
In its opinion, the trial court set forth three reasons why “good cause” existed: (1)
Meek failed to consider what Mrs. Hansen valued in her life at that time; (2) Meek’s plans
for Mrs. Hansen were not consistent with Mrs. Hansen’s health and well-being and may
have a negative impact on her; and (3) Meek would not “factor in” Mrs. Hansen’s wishes
while serving as her guardian.
4
Factors that may be considered by the trial court in its determination of “good
cause” under E.T. § 13-707 have been identified in two secondary sources. See Angela B.
Grau, Overview of Adult Guardianships, Md. Trial Rep. 12, 21 (Fall 2018); Joan L.
O’Sullivan & Andrea I. Saah, The Guardianship Benchbook: The Practitioner’s Guide to
Adult Guardianship and Guardianship Alternatives in Maryland, Apx. A § 12 (2001). We
commend these factors to the bench, bar, and litigants.
33
First, the trial court found:
The Court is convinced that [ ] Meek loves her mother[,] but she is simply not
contemplating the life her mother chose to build with Mr. Hansen, the love
she has for her husband, her dog, her home, her water view, and the team of
professionals and caregivers who have assembled to care for her.
. . . [T]hose are values above all others that should be considered to
the maximum extent practicable as long as it does not significantly risk Mrs.
Hansen’s health and well-being.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings regarding Mrs.
Hansen’s love for her husband, her dog, her home, her water view, and all who were caring
for her. In our view, nothing could be more central to acting in the best interest of the ward
than the recognition and preservation of what the ward values most at that time in his or
her life. As the court said, these values “should be considered to the maximum extent
practicable.”
Second, the trial court found:
The weight of the evidence is that [Mrs. Hansen] is well cared for and
that her health and well-being may actually be negatively impacted if she is
ripped out of what is familiar and placed in HeartFields. If the Court does
not grant this guardianship to another, Mrs. Hansen’s placement in
HeartFields will be certain, swift[,] and sudden.
As stated in Section I, supra, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that it was in
Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to remain at home and not be placed in a long-term care facility.
Mrs. Hansen was receiving “appropriate care” at home and “may be harmed by a sudden
change in her surroundings and her caregivers.” Clearly, the best interest of Mrs. Hansen
would not involve actions that would place her health and well-being at risk of harm.
Third, the court found:
34
[Mrs. Hansen] did not want to be taken from her home, from [Mr.] Hansen,
regardless of how [ ] Meek feels about him. . . .
***
By clear and convincing evidence it would not be in Mrs. Hansen’s
best interest to have a guardian who is not factoring in her wishes as the [2008
Advance Health Care Directive] requires, . . .
The 2008 Advance Health Care Directive, in which Mrs. Hansen designated Meek
as her Health Care Agent, states in relevant part: “My agent shall make health care
decisions for me in accordance with this power of attorney for health care, any instructions
I give in Part 2 of this form, and my other wishes to the extent known to my agent.” Meek
became aware of Mrs. Hansen’s wishes regarding placement in a long-term care facility
when she heard Dr. Errabulo’s testimony at trial. Dr. Errabulo testified:
But the one thing is very clear in my mind that she did not want to be put in
a box, [were] her words. I clearly remember. I think she meant put in a
room, in a geriatric care or dementia care where she’d just lay down there in
bed. That’s what she meant.
***
That’s her way of saying in a nursing home.
Notwithstanding such knowledge, Meek testified that it was still her intention to move Mrs.
Hansen into a long-term care facility. Therefore, the evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that, without the appointment of another person as guardian, Meek would have
acted in direct contravention of Mrs. Hansen’s wishes and of the terms of her appointment
as Health Care Agent under the 2008 Advance Health Care Directive.
In light of the above discussion, we conclude that the trial court’s reasons and
underlying factual findings are based on competent evidence and that the reasons support
35
the conclusion that Linton was the better choice to act in the best interest of Mrs. Hansen.
Because those reasons, when taken as a whole, can be classified as substantial, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that “good cause” existed
under E.T. § 13-707 to pass over Meek’s statutory priority and appoint Linton as guardian
of Mrs. Hansen’s person.
B. Improper Conduct
Meek argues that the trial court was required to find that Meek acted improperly to
find “good cause” to give Linton priority over her. In support of her argument, Meek cites
several out-of-state cases that provide examples of either extreme impropriety or trial court
findings not based on competent evidence. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Burrell, 367
P.3d 318 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016); In re Penning, 930 A.2d 144 (D.C. 2007); In re Mueller,
872 N.W.2d 906 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015); In re Conservatorship of T.K., 775 N.W.2d 496(N.D. 2009); In re Thomas, 723 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 2006). We are not persuaded. As we
said, supra, the determination of “good cause” depends on the facts and circumstances of
an individual case. See In re Robert G., 296 Md. at 183. In Mack, the Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the trial court’s treatment of the wife’s views on withholding artificial
nutrition and hydration as “disqualifying” her from appointment as guardian of the person.
329 Md. at 206. The Court said that the trial court could consider the wife’s views “in an
overall determination” of “good cause.” Id. Thus we conclude that a determination of
“good cause” does not require the trial court to find that the person with higher priority has
engaged in improper conduct. Accord In re Benson, 124 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that there is no requirement that a trial court find that a family member
36
seeking to be appointed as guardian was somehow deficient in order for the court to find
good cause to pass over that family member).
Likewise, we reject Meek’s argument that Linton could not be appointed guardian
of Mrs. Hansen’s person solely because of his alleged “inequitable conduct.” In support
of her argument, Meek cites to evidence of several instances of Linton’s alleged
“inequitable conduct,” including the payment of Linton’s litigation expenses by Mr.
Hansen, the failure of Linton to read the trial court’s opinion in the POA case, and Linton’s
attempt to tape-record Meek’s visits with Mrs. Hansen. The trial court considered all of
the evidence and “carefully evaluate[d] [ ] Linton and his motives.” Although the court
acknowledged that Linton “ha[d] made mistakes,” it found that “Linton is generally of
good character and is motivated by a desire to care for his mom and see to it that her overall
dignity is preserved and her best interest served.” We see no error in that finding.
C. The Mack Case
Meek relies heavily on Mack, arguing that “[t]he rationale of the Court of Appeals
in Mack applies to this case.” Specifically, Meek contends that “[t]he Court of Appeals in
Mack, made clear that a mere disagreement regarding the disabled’s care does not establish
good cause to pass over the statutorily imposed priority.” In addition, according to Meek,
the trial court erred as a matter of law by “conclud[ing] that Mrs. Hansen could be moved
unilaterally by the guardian of the person.” We disagree.
In our view, Mack is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In Mack, the
Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erroneously “merged the issue of whether
sustenance could be withdrawn into the issue of who should be guardian.” 329 Md. at 204.
37
Specifically, the trial court erred by treating the wife’s views on withholding artificial
nutrition and hydration as “disqualifying” her from appointment as guardian of the person.
Id. at 206. Here, by contrast, the trial court did not merge the issue of where Mrs. Hansen
should reside into the issue of who should be guardian of the person by disqualifying Meek
from appointment because of her plans for Mrs. Hansen’s residence. The court considered
all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including Mrs. Hansen’s values, her health and
well-being, and her wishes as to where she should live. The court then set forth three
reasons why there was “good cause” to pass over Meek’s priority and appoint Linton as
guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person. Thus the court properly placed Meek’s plans to move
Mrs. Hansen into a long-term care facility in the context of its overall “good cause”
determination.
Furthermore, unlike in Mack, the trial court here did not err as a matter of law by
determining that the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person had the authority to unilaterally
move her from her private home into a long-term care facility. E.T. § 13-708 provides in
relevant part:
(a)(1) The court may grant to a guardian of a person only those powers
necessary to provide for the demonstrated need of the disabled person.
***
(b) Subject to subsection (a) of this section, the rights, duties, and powers
that the court may order include, but are not limited to:
***
(2) The right to custody of the disabled person and to establish
the disabled person's place of abode within and without the State,
38
provided there is court authorization for any change in the
classification of abode, . . .
(Emphasis added). E.T. § 13-101(c) defines “classification of abode”:
(c) “Classification of abode” means one of the following types of abode
licensed or certified by a State agency:
(1) Related institutions under § 19-114 of the Health – General
Article;
(2) Private or public group homes under § 7-601 of the Health –
General Article;
(3) CARE homes under Title 6, Subtitle 5, Part II of the Human
Services Article;
(4) Adult foster care homes regulated by the Department of Human
Resources; or
(5) Senior assisted housing facilities under Title 10 of the Human
Services Article.
(Emphasis added).
Notably, E.T. § 13-101(c) only includes entities that are “licensed or certified,”
which do not include private homes. The Guardianship Benchbook: The Practitioner’s
Guide to Adult Guardianship and Guardianship Alternatives in Maryland explains:
A move from one classification to another, such as from a group home into
a nursing home, or from the community into a nursing home, must be
approved by the court. Although the statute does not include private
homes as a separate classification, guardians would be well-advised to
obtain the court's authorization before moving a disabled person from
the community into a more protective setting.
Joan L. O’Sullivan & Andrea I. Saah, The Guardianship Benchbook: The Practitioner’s
Guide to Adult Guardianship and Guardianship Alternatives in Maryland, Ch. 3, XIII
(2001). Therefore, contrary to Meek’s argument, the trial court was correct when it stated
39
that without appointing someone other than Meek as guardian of the person, Mrs. Hansen’s
placement in a long-term care facility would be “certain, swift[,] and sudden.” We
emphasize, however, that we are not suggesting that guardians move wards from their
private homes into more restrictive facilities without court authorization simply because
E.T. § 13-101(c) does not include a private home as a “classification of abode.” We stress
that “[i]n reality the court is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is merely an
agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its sacred responsibility.” Kicherer v. Kicherer,
285 Md. 114, 118 (1979). A guardian who moves a ward from the familiar and comfortable
environment of a private home to a more restrictive facility without court authorization
may not be acting in furtherance of that sacred responsibility.5
In sum, the trial court determined, based on a thorough consideration of all of the
facts and circumstances of the instant case, 6 that “good cause” existed to pass over Meek’s
5
Even assuming that Meek was required to obtain court authorization before
moving Mrs. Hansen into a long-term care facility, the appointment of Meek as Mrs.
Hansen’s guardian would not have resolved the underlying issue of this case. Meek
testified that, notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary, she still wanted to move Mrs.
Hansen from her private home to a long-term care facility. Therefore, it would be
counterproductive for the circuit court to appoint Meek as guardian, because Meek would
inevitably petition the court to allow her to move Mrs. Hansen into a long-term care facility,
which the court would inevitably deny based on its findings that it was in Mrs. Hansen’s
best interest to remain in her home.
6
In her brief, Meek also points to facts that the circuit court did not address in its
ruling. We decline to address such arguments. Trial judges “are not obliged to spell out
in words every thought and step of logic[.]” Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273 (1993).
Accordingly, a trial court “‘need not articulate each item or piece of evidence she or he has
considered in reaching a decision. . . . The fact that the court did not catalog each factor
and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require reversal.’” Smith–Myers
Corp. v. Sherill, 209 Md. App. 494, 504 (2013) (quoting Davidson v. Seneca Crossing
Section II Homeowner's Ass'n, 187 Md. App. 601, 628 (2009)).
40
statutory priority under E.T. § 13-707(a) and appoint Linton as the guardian of Mrs.
Hansen’s person. The court articulated three reasons that are based on competent evidence,
support its conclusion, and when taken as a whole, can be classified as substantial. We
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its “good cause” determination.
III. Passing Over Meek’s Statutory Priority and Appointing a Neutral Third
Party as Guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s Property
E.T. § 13-207 governs the appointment of a guardian of the property and provides
in relevant part:
(a) Persons are entitled to appointment as guardian for a minor or
disabled person according to the following priorities:
(1) A conservator, committee, guardian of property, or other like
fiduciary appointed by any appropriate court of any foreign
jurisdiction in which the minor or disabled person resides;
(2) A person or corporation nominated by the minor or disabled
person if :
(i) The designation was signed by the minor or disabled person
when the minor or disabled person was at least 16 years old;
and
(ii) In the opinion of the court, the minor or disabled person
had sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice at
the time the designation was executed;
(3) The minor or disabled person's spouse;
(4) The minor or disabled person's parents;
(5) A person or corporation nominated by the will of a deceased
parent;
(6) The minor or disabled person's children;
41
(7) The persons who would be the minor or disabled person's heirs if
the minor or disabled person were dead;
(8) A person or corporation nominated by a person, institution,
organization, or public agency that is caring for the minor or disabled
person;
(9) A person or corporation nominated by a governmental agency that
is paying benefits to the minor or disabled person; and
(10) Any other person considered appropriate by the court.
***
(c)(1) Among persons with equal priority, the court shall select the one best
qualified of those willing to serve.
(2) For good cause the court may pass over a person with priority
and appoint a person with less priority or no priority.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Meek enjoyed a higher priority than Barrett
King, Esq., in the selection of the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property under E.T. § 13-
207(a). Meek had priority under E.T. § 13-207(a)(6) as Mrs. Hansen’s child7 while King
had no priority as a neutral third party, but he was eligible to be appointed as a “person
considered appropriate by the court” under E.T. § 13-207(a)(10). The court determined
that under E.T. § 13-207(c)(2), there was “good cause” to pass over Meek’s statutory
priority and appoint King as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property.
7
Mrs. Hansen did appoint Meek as her attorney-in-fact in the 2008 Power of
Attorney. Unlike the Advance Healthcare Directive, however, Mrs. Hansen did not
nominate Meek as the guardian of her property in the Power of Attorney. Consequently,
Meek’s priority is based on her status as Mrs. Hansen’s child under E.T. § 13-207(a)(6).
42
Meek’s opening and reply briefs focus on her contention that the trial court erred by
appointing Linton as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person. Meek simply states that “[g]ood
cause was not established to disregard Meek’s priority status for appointment as guardian
in accordance with the Power of Attorney, Health Care Directive[,] and Sections 13-707
and 13-207 of the Estates & Trusts Article.” Meek seems to support her argument by citing
to a comment in the Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship and Other Protective
Arrangements Act, which has not been adopted in Maryland. Meek quotes the comment
to Section 309, which states in pertinent part:
Consistent with respecting the wishes of the individual and appointing
a person who understands the adult's values and preferences, courts should
resist the temptation to appoint a professional guardian simply because it is
difficult to choose among family members and friends. While a professional
guardian avoids the need to select between family members who are feuding
or who are otherwise in disagreement, appointment of a professional is likely
not to be consistent with the adult's wishes. The extensive literature on
surrogate decision-making shows that people typically prefer to have
decisions made by close family members.
Who May be Guardian for Adult; Order of Priority, Unif. Guardianship, Conservatorship
& Other Protective Arr. Act § 309 Comment (citation omitted). Without further argument,
Meek concludes: “[T]he trial court’s decision appointing . . . King as guardian of the
property [should] be reversed, and that [Meek should] be appointed guardian of the . . .
property of Mrs. Hansen.”
Counsel for Mrs. Hansen contends that King “is best suited to unravel what financial
decisions were made by Meek, when they were made, and for what purpose the decisions
were made.” Counsel for Mrs. Hansen points out that “Mrs. Hansen has substantial assets,”
including certificates of deposits, the Lois Hansen Intervivos Trust, $5000 of income per
43
month, real property, personal property, and a potential statutory share in Mr. Hansen’s
estate. Mrs. Hansen’s counsel concludes: “King or any attorney acting as a fiduciary for a
disabled person makes decisions strictly in the best interest of the disabled person
unburdened by the old jealousies and long held resentments that are evident in this family.”
Like Meek, Linton focuses his arguments primarily on who should be appointed as
the guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s person. Linton simply states that “[g]ood cause was shown
for passing over Meek and appointing . . . Barrett R. King, Esq., a party unrelated to these
proceedings, guardian of the property[.]”
In order for a trial court to pass over a person with higher priority under E.T. § 13-
207(a) and appoint a person with lower priority under that section as guardian of the
property, the court must find “good cause.” E.T. § 13-207(c)(2). E.T. § 13-207, however,
does not define “good cause.” From a consideration of the purpose of E.T. §§ 13-207 &
13-707 and the relevant case law discussed in Section II, supra, we conclude that “good
cause” has the same meaning under E.T. § 13-707(c)(1)(ii) and E.T. § 13-207(c)(2). To
reiterate, “good cause” means a substantial reason to find that a person with lower priority
under E.T. § 13-207(a) is a better choice than a person with higher priority to act in the
best interest of the ward. This definition is a flexible one, and its application will vary with
the facts and circumstances of the individual case.8
8
Factors that may be considered by the trial court in its determination of “good
cause” under E.T. § 13-207 have been identified in two secondary sources. See O’Sullivan,
supra note 4, at Apx. A § 13; Grau, supra note 4, at 21. We commend these factors to the
bench, bar, and litigants.
44
In its opinion the trial court set forth two reasons why “good cause” existed to pass
over Meek’s statutory priority and appoint King, a neutral third party, as guardian of Mrs.
Hansen’s property: Mrs. Hansen deserved and needed a neutral third party who (1) would
be detached from any family members with motives for financial gain, and (2) would
unravel prior financial transactions involving Mrs. Hansen’s assets.9
First, the court found:
All the parties’ motives in this case have been clouded with the
potential for financial gain and interest that they may have in Mrs. Hansen’s
assets. The Court orders could be obstructed by the person who holds the
pursestrings in this case. Suspicions over the motivation of Mr. Hansen and
[ ] Meek has actually exacerbated the acrimony[,] which has affected the
family and Mrs. Hansen. Mrs. Hansen deserves to have a [neutral] third party
who is unemotional, detached[,] and who will truly act in her best interest.
There is extensive evidence in the record to support the above findings. In 2017, Mr.
Hansen had his name added as a joint owner to the certificates of deposit that had been
titled in Mrs. Hansen’s name alone. Then in 2018, Mr. Hansen retitled those certificates
of deposit in his name alone. Moreover, both Meek and Linton have an interest in Mrs.
Hansen’s assets as heirs of her estate. Given the possible motives of family members for
financial gain, it is in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to appoint a neutral third party “who is
unemotional, detached[,] and who will truly act in her best interest.”
9
Although E.T. § 13-207(a) authorizes a trial court to appoint a corporation as
guardian of the property if properly nominated, see E.T. § 13-207(a)(2), (5), (8), & (9),
there is no provision in the statute for the appointment of a person who is a “professional
guardian.” See Who May be Guardian for Adult; Order of Priority, Unif. Guardianship,
Conservatorship & Other Protective Arr. Act § 309 Comment. In the instant case, the trial
court considered King “appropriate” as a neutral third party, and thus could appoint him as
guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property under E.T. § 13-207(a)(10).
45
Second, the trial court found:
Also a [neutral] guardian is needed to unravel the financial transactions
executed by [Meek] and by [Mr.] Hansen. A [neutral] guardian will
determine what assets Mrs. Hansen should have in her name and how much
is needed to truly provide for her care and well-being.
The evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that, because of the financial
transactions by Meek and Mr. Hansen regarding Mrs. Hansen’s assets, there is a need to
unravel those transactions. As a result, it is in Mrs. Hansen’s best interest to appoint a
neutral third party, who will be in the best position to “determine what assets Mrs. Hansen
should have in her name.”
In light of the above discussion, we conclude that the trial court’s reasons and
underlying factual findings are based upon competent evidence and that the reasons support
the conclusion that King was the better choice to act in the best interest of Mrs. Hansen
regarding her property. Because those reasons, when taken as a whole, can be classified
as substantial, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
“good cause” existed under E.T. § 13-207 to pass over Meek’s statutory priority and
appoint Barrett King, Esq., a neutral third party, as guardian of Mrs. Hansen’s property.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR DORCHESTER COUNTY
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
46